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Abstract 
 
This thesis uses cognitive theory to examine gesture in William Shakespeare’s plays. 
Cognition involves both thoughts and emotions, and cognitive theory examines 
thought which is rooted both in the body and its gestures and in the gesturer’s 
environment. Based on recent neuroscientific findings and laboratory studies into 
gesture and speech, cognitive theory is a developing discipline that tends to focus on 
the relationship between gesture, speech, and thought. This was also a preoccupation 
of early modern writers: theologians, philosophers, and both opponents and defenders 
of the theatre attempted to understand how gestures could shape as well as be shaped 
by thought. This thesis examines the similarities and differences between the ways in 
which Shakespeare and cognitive theory approached these issues. It establishes the 
ways in which Shakespeare’s plays suggest new ideas for cognitive theorists to study, 
as well as the ways in which cognitive theory can generate new readings of 
Shakespeare’s plays.  
The research for this thesis is based on a database that I made of all the gestures 
mentioned in Shakespeare’s plays, from the earliest quartos to the fourth folio. From 
this database, I selected the five most common types of gesture and devoted a chapter 
to each. The chapters examine handclasps, kneeling, kissing, refusals to gesture (or 
stillness) and striking. 
Examining these four gestures and the refusal to gesture shows that being performed 
on stage gives gesture a particularly complex and rich cognitive quality. Gestures 
acted out on stage are deliberately performed by an actor, but are often designed to be 
seen as involuntary or unconscious acts on the character’s part. Gestures performed 
on the Shakespearean stage are thus sites where the thoughts and feelings of the actor 
and those of the character are intriguingly blurred, making Shakespearean gestures a 
rich topic for cognitive analysis. 
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7 
Introduction 
 
What does it mean to enact gesture on stage? When Hamlet acknowledges that his 
mournful behaviours are ‘actions that a man might play’ (Hamlet 1.2.84), he draws on 
an early modern anxiety about, and interest in, the fraught and often blurred boundary 
between representation and reality.1 Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
antitheatricalist writers, theologians, and defenders of the theatre all gravitated 
towards the question: what does acting out a gesture, representing it, do to a person’s 
thoughts and emotions? The bishop of Winchester Lancelot Andrewes (1555-1626) 
argued that, of itself, ‘our outward gesture may stir up our souls to their duty’, 
claiming that gestures like kneeling and bowing are enough to shape a person’s 
thoughts to devotion and humility.2 Meanwhile, the clergyman Stephen Gosson 
(1554-1624), a hotter Protestant than Andrewes, took up the debate from a different 
perspective. In Gosson’s view of performing gestures, actors ‘reape no profit’ from 
repeatedly performing the gestures of noble or honest people; actors’ minds remain 
particularly impervious to chaste, honest thoughts, he emphasises.3 Cognitive theorists 
are currently working on the same questions, typically using neuroscience to examine 
how gesture shapes, as well as being shaped by, thought in everyday life.  
When gestures are performed on stage, a further dimension is added to the 
cognitive picture. On stage, gestures are consciously represented by actors as part of a 
scripted story rather than arising spontaneously during conversation as they often do 
in ‘real life’.  Gestures performed on stage can challenge the boundary between 
representation and reality. On the one hand, stage weddings, for instance, dislocate the 
entrenched, normative meanings of handclasps and kisses as performative gestures 
that bring about as well as represent a loving union. A couple who ‘marry’, kiss and 
take hands, on stage are not ‘really’ married; the context of the theatre prevents the 
performative language of marriage from having effect in the real world. At the same 
time, however, the inherently powerful and significant gestures of kissing and taking 
                                                
1 The Riverside edition is cited from throughout the thesis unless another edition is specified. William 
Shakespeare, The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. Herschel Baker, Harry Levin, and Ann Barton, 2nd edn 
(New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997). 
2 Lancelot Andrewes, The Pattern of Catechistical Doctrine at Large (London: Roger Norton, 1650), 
Ee1r. 
3 Stephen Gosson, Playes Confuted in Five Actions (London: for Thomas Gosson, 1582), C7v. 
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hands, even on stage, can be assumed to change the thoughts and emotions of the 
person performing them. Shakespeare often thematises the inherent power of certain 
gestures by depicting characters who attempt to perform a meaningful and culturally-
significant gesture ironically or jokingly, and who end up profoundly altered by the 
gestures they have performed. For example, in Julius Caesar, the conspirators kneel 
in a gesture of submission to Caesar before they murder him. Some of the 
conspirators (like Cassius, whose acerbic remarks about having to ‘bend his body’ 
(1.2.116-8) to Caesar are discussed in chapter 2) may perform this gesture ironically, 
mocking the tyrant they plan to kill and submissive gestures he demanded of them. 
Others (such as Brutus, who states as he kneels, ‘I kiss thy hand, but not in flattery 
Caesar’ (3.1.52)) may kneel in what is to some extent genuine deference. However, 
by the end of the play the conspirators are all utterly vanquished by Caesar’s ghost. It 
is as if their kneeling gesture, no matter how hypocritically performed, has had a real 
effect on their minds, their characters, and their positions within society. Kneeling of 
course is not the sole reason for the conspirators’ downfall, but it connects with a 
pattern of language in the play that relates a person’s social position to the vertical 
position of their body.  
Deploying neuroscientific research in conjunction with close readings of 
Shakespeare’s texts and the analysis of the material conditions of performance 
provides a new scientifically-led understanding of the mechanisms behind performed 
gestures. As well as supplying a rigorous body of evidence about the relationship 
between gesture and thought, neuroscience provides new metaphors and frameworks 
for describing cognition. These help to generate illuminating readings of 
Shakespeare’s plays, such as one which places the conspirators’ kneeling gesture at 
the heart of Julius Caesar and understands this gesture as a significant force that 
shapes the later action of the play.  
Based on recent—and ongoing—neuroscientific findings about the workings 
of the embodied brain, cognitive theory has a wide remit. The notion of ‘cognition’ 
employed in cognitive literary studies covers conscious thought, sensation, 
perception, affect, emotion, and unconscious and involuntary thought processes. 
These concerns are present at the roots of cognitive studies, in works like George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s Philosophy in the Flesh (1999) or their Metaphors We 
Live By (1980). The key existing studies of Shakespeare and cognition tend to focus 
on rhetoric and language, or the plays’ effect on the audience. Raphael Lyne’s 
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Shakespeare, Rhetoric and Cognition (2011) relates particularly dense, convoluted 
grammar to dense, convoluted thought, arguing that ‘Shakespeare’s characters’ 
mental strains and stretches...must be conveyed in the strains and stretches of 
language: in the tropes of rhetoric’.4 Mary Crane’s Shakespeare’s Brain (2000) 
examines the structure of language in Shakespeare’s plays for clues about authorial 
thought; Crane claims that linguistic features of his plays (like patterns of similarly-
themed words) map Shakespeare’s thought processes. Focusing on the materials and 
mechanisms of performance (from prompt books to rehearsal schedules) Evelyn 
Tribble’s Cognition in the Globe (2011) uses modern cognitive theories to sharpen 
previous historical accounts of rehearsal and performance practices in the Globe. Amy 
Cook’s Shakespearean Neuroplay (2010) again centres on a cognitive analysis of the 
language of Shakespeare’s plays, thinking particularly about ‘conceptual blends’ (the 
cognitive theoretical term for the process whereby two distinct categories of things are 
mentally combined).  In The Oxford Handbook of Situated Cognition (2009) Philip 
Robbins and Murat Aydede state that ‘the embodiment thesis’, i.e. that ‘cognition 
depends not just on the brain but also on the body’, is the first principle of cognitive 
theory,5 Teenie Matlock’s “Abstract Motion is No Longer Abstract,” (2010), provides 
experimental evidence for the idea that humans conceptualise abstract ideas of motion 
as physical, visible motion.6 
As well as playing an essential role in developing the field of cognitive literary 
studies, critical works like these have cast new light on long-standing questions in 
Shakespeare studies about the relationship between how characters’ thoughts are 
represented and the representation of their words and actions. By drawing on 
scientific evidence for the idea that language tracks a person’s thoughts—the 
neurolinguists Susan Goldin-Meadow’s Hearing Gesture (2003) and David McNeill’s 
Gesture and Thought (2005) are particular influences for Cook’s work for instance— 
                                                
4 Raphael Lyne, Shakespeare, Rhetoric and Cognition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), 3. 
5 Philip Robbins and Murat Aydede, “A Short Primer on Situated Cognition,” in Philip Robbins and 
Murat Aydede, eds., The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 3.  
6 Teenie Matlock’s “Abstract Motion is No Longer Abstract,” Language and Cognition 2(2) (2010), 
243-60, provides experimental evidence for the idea that humans conceptualise abstract ideas of motion 
as physical, visible motion. 
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these studies encourage us to analyse Shakespeare’s language closely, to seek traces 
of his own thought, or representations of his characters’ thoughts, in the shifts and 
twists of his texts. These literary cognitive studies also provide rich new theses about 
the role of the audience’s and actors’ thoughts and emotions in bearing and 
developing meaning in the theatre. Cook uses the theory of mirror neurons: the 
neuroscientific finding that when we are watching someone perform an action, the 
neurons that we would use to perform that action fire in our own brains. She proposes 
a tight link between actors’ words and gestures and audience affect. 
There has not yet been a cognitive study focussing solely on gesture in 
Shakespeare’s works as a whole, though studies of movement in single plays are 
beginning to crop up. In 2014, for instance, Hannah Chapelle Wojciehowski 
published an exciting reading of The Winter’s Tale, arguing that movement is 
essential to aesthetic enjoyment. She argues that this effect is created in particular by 
the ‘vitality’ we feel when actors move from stillness to action. She concludes that 
‘Shakespeare was a visual and sensory-motor artist, as much as a verbal one’.7 
Despite a relative (but thankfully ever-dimimishing) scarcity of cognitive studies on 
the theme of Shakespearean gesture, bodily movement was an integral part both of 
early modern performances and of Renaissance notions of language and meaning. The 
physician John Bulwer’s mid-seventeenth-century works Chironomia and Chirologia, 
for instance, are founded on the idea that gestures are essential methods of 
communication. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, monarchs, 
church leaders and lay people debated about which gestures should be permitted in 
church. These theological debates are one of the key sources for showing that in the 
early modern era gestures were seen as dangerously replete with meanings, with the 
power to change both social rituals and the individual gesturer’s thoughts and 
feelings. A cognitive focus on gesture thus illuminates an important area of 
Shakespearean drama and early modern thought that complements the existing body 
of critical texts devoted to rhetoric and language. 
Thinking beyond the cognitive focus, gesture has historically received less 
attention than language in Shakespeare studies as a whole. Editions of Shakespeare’s 
plays will provide glossaries of difficult words, but rarely provide explanations of 
                                                
7 Hannah Chapelle Wojciehowski, “Statues that Move: Vitality Effects in The Winter’s Tale,” 
Literature and Theology 28(3) (2014), 300. 
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what the various gestures in his plays might signify. This may be due to editors 
focusing on the play-text as something to be studied for, and understood through, its 
written language alone rather than a combination of language and gesture in 
performance. However, at certain points in Shakespeare’s plays, gesture can be as, if 
not more, crucial to conveying meaning than language. As I suggested above, for 
example, the conspirators’ kneeling gesture before Caesar in Julius Caesar, rarely if 
ever remarked on in discussions of the play, helps to make sense of their subsequent 
defeat. The Riverside edition used here does not provide a discussion of this crucial 
kneeling gesture, nor of the other gestures discussed in this thesis unless they also 
coincide with a textual crux, and the same is true of Arden and Cambridge editions of 
Shakespeare. The privileging of discussions and glosses of language over gesture in 
editions of Shakespeare’s plays overlooks the fact that gestural meanings, like 
linguistic meanings, may have changed over time. Several gestures in Shakespeare’s 
plays draw on a complex and wide-ranging network of normative significances that 
have been lost or altered over the centuries. A handclasp, for example was thought in 
early modern England to be able not only to make visible but also to create feelings 
and relationships of friendship, love, and feudal allegiance, as well as potentially 
having the power to heal physical and spiritual ailments. Though many of these 
significances persist into the present day, several do not; the use of the handclasp as a 
gesture of feudal allegiance is not part of modern culture, whilst Bulwer speaks of 
hands literally containing potions (‘philtres’) that affect the minds of the gesturers in a 
handclasp and this too is not something that is commonly thought today.8  
This thesis shows that some of the most important ways in which 
Shakespeare’s plays bear signs and meanings are through the gestures of actors and 
their characters. Meanings are created and transmitted in the theatre not just by the 
words that audiences hear, but also by the gestures that they see performed on stage. 
Gestures can be recovered from actors’ manuals, eyewitness accounts, early modern 
discussions of gesture like Bulwer’s, and historical studies of gesture. Examining 
gesture as the site where questions of what belongs to a character, what belongs to an 
actor, and how plays affect their audiences come to the fore brings a new perspective 
to long-standing critical discussions of the relationship between the Shakespearean 
actor, audience, and character. 
                                                
8 John Bulwer, “Chirologia,” in Chirologia…Chironomia (London: Thomas Harper, 1644), I3r. 
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Why cognitive theory? 
A currently-developing field, cognitive theory provides exciting new ways of reading 
literary texts. In particular, cognitive theorists have shown how thought and emotion 
in the theatre are both embodied and ‘distributed’.  According to cognitive studies, 
thought and emotion, as well as language, are embodied in several ways. Cognitive 
practitioners such as the actor and cognitive scholar Rhonda Blair, and cognitive 
theorists such as Tribble, have traced how gesture provides an anchor for thought, 
helping with the process of memorising lines: the movements of the body become 
sites where thoughts and words are stored to be later released. Moving becomes 
integral to speaking, as particular gestures prompt actors to say particular words. 
Gesture is also vital for conveying thoughts and feelings; theorists such as Amy Cook 
show that when actors perform certain gestures (kneeling, for example), they prompt 
affective reactions in the bodies as well as the minds of audiences. In sum, cognitive 
studies of gesture are establishing that, in many different ways, gesture is not simply 
an external representation of thought. Rather, gesture can shape, express, transmit, 
and record thought, as well as impede thought and send it off track. Tribble deploys 
the idea that cognition in the theatre is ‘distributed’. This means that an actor or 
audience member’s thoughts and emotions are not contained solely by their mind, or 
even by their body. Rather, thought can be recorded in, extended to, and transmitted 
and affected by, their whole environment: prompt books, props, the architecture of the 
theatre and the bodies of (other) actors or (other) audience members.9  John Lutterbie 
describes theatre as a ‘dynamic system’ made up of bodies, texts, spaces, and objects; 
each of the elements in this system has the ability to affect and be affected by the 
others.10 By paying attention to the embodiment and distribution of thought, cognitive 
                                                
9 Tribble explains that because it does not just involve the brain and body but is extended into the 
environment, this is ‘a genuinely extended (rather than a merely embodied) practice’, Evelyn Tribble, 
Cognition in the Globe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011), 2, 101, 20.  
10 ‘Dynamic systems theory’ originated in mathematics and extends to physics and neuroscience; 
according to ‘DST’, ‘a “system” is generally defined as elements that function together to create a 
complete whole; and a “dynamic system” is one that exists in a constant state of disequilibrium, 
responding to perturbations (disturbances) that further destabilise the whole’, John Lutterbie, Toward a 
General Theory of Acting: Cognitive Science and Performance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011), 2, 25. 
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theory enables Shakespeare scholars to re-evaluate the relationship between the play-
text and its performance. One way in which this relationship is manifested is in the 
way that an actor’s gestures shape as well as are shaped by the play-text: their body 
does not just passively represent the meaning of the words, but brings its own 
meaning to the play.    
Margaret Kidnie argues that, because play-texts have the potential to be 
interpreted in radically different ways in performance, the examination of 
performance is integral to understanding Shakespearean drama. She contends that 
because the text of any given Shakespearean play will have gone through several 
states (from manuscripts rewritten and edited several times to various differing 
printed texts), the text cannot be appealed to as a stable, authoritative entity that is 
superior and prior to performance. Rather, the Shakespearean play is an ongoing 
‘process’ comprised of slightly different but intrinsically-related texts and numerous 
performances. Moreover, she argues that productions will influence our understanding 
of the play, and thus influence the way that subsequent editions are produced and 
discussed. Kidnie encourages scholars ‘to resist the dominant inclination to regard 
past histories as foundational to editorial labour’ and ‘to insist on the realization that 
textual no less than theatrical efforts to recover what happened can only be pursued 
alongside efforts to shape what is happening’ in the present day.11 The Shakespearean 
play-text is in a continual state of flux, and so it is important to look at both the play-
text and a range of performances. In recent times, some productions have aimed to 
follow early modern rehearsal and performance practices and thereby aim to 
approximate the ways Shakespearean productions would have originally appeared on 
stage. Looking at the prompt books, props lists and other written material associated 
with such performances can be useful for seeing how historical research into early 
modern rehearsal and staging practices can inform the staging of modern day 
Shakespeare. Prior to 2006, some productions at the Globe Theatre, for instance, used 
original practices, deploying historical research into the play’s original staging to 
inform several aspects of the performance including costume, setting, and props.12  
                                                
11 Margaret Kidnie, Shakespeare and the Problem of Adaptation (London: Routledge, 2008), 7-8. 
12 The production team for the Globe’s 2003 The Taming of the Shrew, for instance, created a section of 
the production notes entitled ‘Authentic Brief’ for the wedding scene; this historical briefing lists 
authentic materials that could be used for drinking-vessels and details early modern bridal customs 
(e.g. ‘sprigs of rosemary…were tied to the arm at a wedding’). Production Meeting Notes, The Taming 
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Examining gestures in Shakespeare’s plays involves an awareness of this 
complex stage-history, where the meanings of gestures are partly recaptured and 
partly masked as stage practices change over the ages. In the case of the conspirators 
kneeling in Julius Caesar, modern audiences are not as sensitive as early modern 
audiences will have been to kneeling’s sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
connotations as a gesture of feudal allegiance and as a site where both Catholic and 
Protestant ways of worship could uneasily coexist. Whilst these connotations of the 
gesture have been somewhat lost over time, and it is up to the scholar to recover them, 
one modern production brought audiences close to the ways that the conspirators play 
with perspective in the original text. As chapter 2 discusses, in 2012, Phyllida Lloyd 
used cameras to recreate the ambiguous perspectives involved in the conspirators’ 
kneeling gesture, enabling audiences to empathise with Caesar and with the 
conspirators simultaneously, by allowing audience members physically to experience 
both Caesar’s and the conspirators’ viewpoints at the same time. 
Cognitive theory enables literary critics to recapture ways of understanding 
and interpreting Shakespeare’s plays that bring us closer to early modern thought. 
Gestures were given key significance in the early modern era, not least on the English 
Renaissance stage, as a means of communicating thoughts and feelings. Take, for 
example, the gesture of kissing, which is central to so many Shakespearean love 
stories (from Beatrice and Benedick to Romeo and Juliet) and which also occurs in 
                                                                                                                                       
of the Shrew, by William Shakespeare, directed by Phyllida Lloyd, June 20 2003, 1 leaf, Globe Theatre 
Archive. Often, a search for an ultimately elusive authenticity is shaped by present-day concepts and 
practices; in the same production, ‘the Pedant (Ms. Kettle) requires …something on his luggage to 
signify that he is from Mantua (i.e. the authentic equivilant [sic] of an “I love Mantua” sticker!)’, whilst 
Christopher Sly attends what is recognisably an early-modern version of a present-day ‘stag party’ with 
an ‘authentic stripper’, Rehearsal Note 21, The Taming of the Shrew, by William Shakespeare, directed 
by Phyllida Lloyd, Globe Theatre, London, 2003, 1 leaf, Globe Theatre Archive. Since the late 
nineteenth century, ‘Elizabethanist’ productions have allowed contemporary culture to intersect 
creatively with their desire for historical accuracy, see Joe Falocco, Reimagining Shakespeare’s 
Playhouses: Early Modern Staging Conventions in the 20th Century (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2010). 
As Alan Dessen writes, the successful combination of period costume and music with updated features 
such as mixed gender casting or the use of the yard (in the Globe) as a storytelling and acting space in 
such productions demonstrates that a ‘major reflex that conflicts with “historical” findings at the Globe 
and comparable sites can be summed up as: “If you have it, use it.”’,  ‘“Original Practices”: A Theatre 
Historian’s View”, in Shakespeare’s Globe: A Theatrical Experiment, ed. Farah Karim-Cooper and 
Christie Carson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 46-8. 
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several notable death scenes: Othello, Romeo and Juliet and Cleopatra all die on a 
kiss. Kissing brings not only the movements of the body to bear on thought and 
emotion, but also the touch, the feeling of the skin. Moreover, the relatively new field 
of cognitive studies of olfaction suggests that the olfactory element of kissing, the 
chemical dimension to touch and cognition, helps to unlock the significance of this 
gesture. Paying attention to the olfactory element of kissing uncovers a rich set of 
early modern discourses (particularly in religious and courtly or romantic texts) that 
tend to connect kissing and olfaction, and the olfactory disgust or delight involved in 
the kiss with moral disgust or delight. Chapter 3 demonstrates how early modern ideas 
about the power of olfaction to change people’s minds are recaptured in cognitive 
discussions of olfaction and taste. In so doing, this chapter casts new light on 
olfactory vocabulary in Othello, a thematic pattern that is usually sidelined by literary 
critics in favour of discussions of eyes and seeing.  
Cognitive theory’s ability to uncover and shed light on important themes in 
early modern thought is not limited to olfaction. Chapter 5, for instance, explores how 
cognitive analyses of the effects of violent media on viewers’ minds are part of a 
tradition stretching back to the early modern antitheatricalists. By reading 
Shakespeare’s plays alongside cognitive theory, each chapter of the thesis brings early 
modern texts into a sharper historicised focus whilst also providing new readings of 
these plays based on recent findings about the embodied brain. Though cognitive 
literary theory is a new discipline, one that is developing now, its interests in 
olfaction, touch, the effect of spectacle on audiences, and the relationship between 
gesture and thought lead us to seek, and find, the same interests in early modern texts 
and in Shakespeare’s plays.  
Cognitive theory is itself embedded in its own historical moment. This thesis 
contextualises theories of cognition in terms of the philosophical movements that 
helped to shape them, especially the phenomenological works of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (1908-61), a philosopher who was influenced by the neuroscientific work of 
Kurt Goldstein. The thesis also traces the history of key metaphors that have emerged 
from cognitive-theoretical texts. Cognitive theorists often use theatrical metaphors 
and methodologies; metaphors of scripts and performances, and techniques of 
rehearsal and impersonation are integral to many cognitive studies. As chapter 5 
explains, cognitive studies of thought, emotion and gesture often favour studying 
subjects in a circumscribed environment, where fictional scenarios are carefully 
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created and controlled and specific emotions are deliberately provoked and observed. 
The theatre provides the tools for creating such an environment and for provoking and 
isolating emotions. Thus it is no wonder that, when they come to experiment with 
cognition, cognitive theorists (like Leonard Berkowitz, discussed in chapter 5) often 
use the ready-made tools that theatre provides. 
Cognitive theorists also frequently double back on themselves in a self-
reflective fashion, examining and pondering the metaphors that they use for cognition. 
This is something that Shakespeare’s characters are also prone to do. For instance, 
touch and olfaction have long been metaphors for cognition: we speak (like Sir Toby 
Belch in Twelfth Night 2.3.159) of ‘smelling out’ an answer to a problem, or 
‘grasping’ the meaning of a word. When they study touch and olfaction, then, 
cognitive theorists examine not only material cognitive processes in humans, but also 
age-old metaphors for the process of cognition itself. 
In summary, the thesis comprises a two-way dialogue between Shakespeare 
and cognitive theory. It looks at what cognitive theory tells us about Shakespeare, but 
it also looks at what Shakespeare can tell us about cognitive theory. Examining how 
gestures are performed on stage, analysing early modern discourses about 
performance and tracing the roots of theories of olfactory cognition and gestural 
cognition back to the Renaissance helps to cast light on the new and emerging critical 
methodology that is cognitive theory. Chapter 1, for example, demonstrates how an 
early modern belief that touching another’s skin produce feelings of affection adds a 
rich set of new ideas to cognitive theory’s tendency, up until recently, to ignore the 
tactile and to concentrate instead on the visual aspect of hand gestures. All of the 
chapters address the similarities and differences between gestures that are performed 
on stage and those that are studied cognitively in the laboratory. I propose ways that 
cognitive theory, much of which has been developed in laboratory studies of gesture 
and language, might be adapted to better suit the specific context of Shakespearean 
drama, as well as highlighting ways that it is already well adapted for this purpose.  
 
The database: defining Shakespearean gestures 
The research for this thesis is grounded in a database I made, comprising all the 
gestures in all editions of Shakespeare’s plays from the first quartos to the Fourth 
Folio of 1685. Only the plays now attributed wholly or mostly to Shakespeare in 
modern scholarly editions have been included in the database. So The Yorkshire 
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Tragedy and The Two Noble Kinsmen, which appear apocryphally in the Third Folio, 
are not included in the database, though the former is discussed in chapter 4 as an 
analogue to The Taming of the Shrew.  
This set of texts was chosen for several reasons. Firstly, the early quartos often 
constitute interesting variations on the folios when it comes to the gestures discussed 
in this thesis, so it was important to include them in the database. For example, it was 
useful in chapter 2, which deals with kneeling, to know that only Q1 of Hamlet 
provides the stage direction ‘he kneeles’ when Claudius attempts to pray. Moreover, 
Pericles, now generally attributed (at least for the most part) to Shakespeare, did not 
appear in folio editions of his complete works until the Third Folio (1663). The 
Fourth Folio, though it does not include any substantial differences from the earlier 
folios regarding the gestures discussed in this thesis, was included in the research for 
database because it was the basis for editions of Shakespeare’s works in the 
eighteenth century, and eighteenth-century interpretations of Shakespeare are 
important for the historical discussion in chapters 1, 3 and 4 of the thesis. Later 
editions of Shakespeare’s plays are based on some combination of the quartos and the 
first four folios, so it would have been superfluous to include any more editions of 
Shakespeare’s works in the database. 
The database is included here in the attached CD. To my knowledge no 
database of this kind has been made publicly available before. Alan Dessen and Leslie 
Thomson created a Dictionary of Stage Directions in English Drama 1580-1642 
which discusses Shakespeare alongside other playwrights.  However, while this 
dictionary provides entries for every category of stage direction, it does not record 
every single extant stage direction, and does not include implied stage directions. My 
database catalogues every time a gesture is mentioned or implied, whether in 
something a character says or in a stage direction. For the purposes of creating a 
comprehensive database, I defined a gesture as any movement of the body; later, 
when it came to writing up the findings, I used this raw material to create a much 
more fine-tuned definition of Shakespearean gesture. When in Julius Caesar Antony 
says, ‘Let each man render me his bloody hand’ (3.1.184), this is listed in the 
database, as Antony is clearly referring to the gesture of taking hands. When, as in the 
example above, the stage direction states ‘he kneels’, this is listed, as the actor is 
being prompted to perform a kneeling gesture. The database takes the 1623 First Folio 
(F1) as its basis, and if at any point a quarto or another folio gives a variant reading to 
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F1, this is noted in the database beside the entry for F1. When quartos or other folios 
mention gestures that are not in F1, these are listed as separate entries in the database. 
Stage directions are marked ‘SD’;13 all other entries in the database come from 
characters’ lines within the text. Though actors might interpret the gestures in the 
database in different ways (moments of refusal to gesture in particular are, 
historically, moments that have been interpreted in very different ways), the raw 
material in the database helps to highlight which gestures are particularly significant 
in performance.  
The database provides a comprehensive picture of the types of gestures in 
which Shakespeare was interested in his plays.  This is useful in two main ways. 
Firstly, it reveals which gestures are most common in Shakespeare’s dramatic works. 
Felicitously, five clear, most common groups of gesture emerged in the database. The 
database is colour-coded to mark out these five types of gesture (the remaining entries 
are left uncoloured). These are: taking hands (lilac), kneeling (blue), kissing (orange), 
striking (yellow), and stillness or the refusal to gesture (pink). The last is not a gesture 
as such, but the fact that Shakespeare’s plays are permeated with marked moments of 
stillness or refusals to gesture reflects a preoccupation that Shakespeare seems to have 
had with pushing the boundaries of gesture and in exploring its limits, inverting its 
significance. In addition to chapter 4, which is devoted to stillness in Shakespeare’s 
works, the chapters on taking hands and striking in this thesis show just how 
important refusals to gesture, or the restraining of gesture, are to Shakespearean 
drama. Moments of stillness or restraint in plays like The Taming of the Shrew and 
Hamlet are fraught with multiplying meaning. They are also moments when the 
boundary between the actor’s intentions and the character’s intentions becomes both 
most visible and most ambiguous. 
 Secondly, analysing the way in which gestures crop up throughout the whole 
of Shakespeare’s dramatic corpus provides the basis for the development of an idea of 
how Shakespeare used gesture. The gestures called for by the Shakespearean play-text 
often involve the touch (kissing and taking hands are two of the most common 
gestures in Shakespeare’s plays), for example, and they can be moments where the 
                                                
13 Alan Dessen and Leslie Thomson argue that stage directions, which are probably ‘authorial in origin’ 
were a ‘language shared’  by ‘theatrical professionals’ and are a useful source of information given the 
paucity and lack of helpful content in eyewitness accounts and other documents,  A Dictionary of Stage 
Directions in English Drama 1580-1642 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), viii-x. 
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thoughts of an actor and their character can overlap, or radically differ. Because it 
focuses only on Shakespeare and not on other playwrights, the database cannot be 
used to explain how unique to Shakespeare various uses of gesture are, but it can 
show (whether or not he was the only person to do so), the types of gesture 
Shakespeare was interested in and how he used these gestures to create meaningful, 
shocking, or intriguing moments in his plays. 
Understanding the way in which Shakespeare uses gesture is invaluable for 
developing a concept of gesture that is designed to apply specifically to Shakespeare’s 
plays. There are several existing (cognitive) definitions of gesture, though these do 
not always match up completely with the way that Shakespeare, and other early 
modern writers, used the body’s movements to convey, prompt, or disguise thoughts 
and feelings on stage. In his influential work Gesture (2004), Adam Kendon stresses 
that gestures should be deliberate and conscious.14 Following Kendon’s wider 
discussion, Goldin-Meadow defines gesture as an act which is not functional and 
(ideally) does not involve skin contact; on this definition, whilst miming opening a jar 
is a gesture, actually opening a jar is not.15 However, I decided to define gesture in a 
more symbiotic way, looking first at how particular types of bodily movements 
appear and bear meaning in Shakespeare’s plays rather than imposing a rigid 
definition on them from outside. Many of the most interesting gestures in 
Shakespeare’s plays are not intended to be read as deliberate acts on the character’s 
part; precisely because they are involuntary, they reveal important things about that 
character. Rosalind fainting whilst disguised as a man and thus potentially 
involuntarily revealing to the other characters that she is a woman in As You Like It is 
one example. In instances like these, there is an interesting gap between the gesture as 
it belongs to the character and the same gesture as it belongs to the actor; an actor is 
deliberately performing a character’s involuntary gesture. Kendon’s definition of 
gesture here applies to the actor but not to the character, one way in which the 
specifics of gesture in Shakespearean performance differs from key existing cognitive 
notions of what a gesture is. Moreover, some of the most powerful kinaesthetic 
                                                
14 Adam Kendon argues that only movements that are manifestly ‘deliberate, conscious, governed by 
an intention to say something or to communicate’ can be classed as gestures, Gesture: Visible Action as 
Utterance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 8-11. 
15 Susan Goldin-Meadow, Hearing Gesture: How Our Hands Help Us Think (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2003), 6-8. 
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moments in Shakespeare’s plays, from the kisses in Othello to the gestures of 
grabbing severed hands in Titus Andronicus, involve significant, provocative levels of 
skin contact. And as the chapter on striking gestures shows, it is important to note that 
Shakespearean gestures can be functional in a specifically theatrical way, in that they 
can be carefully calibrated to serve the purpose of creating a believable performance.  
Part of this calibration involves absorbing the gestures of actors into a fictional 
plot, ensuring that the actors’ movements do not puncture the fictional world but 
rather help to consolidate it. When it comes to stage violence (as the chapter on 
striking discusses), there is a gap between the actors’ need to stop short of actually 
harming each other, and the characters’ desire to harm each other as much as possible. 
Here, there is the potential for a noticeable gap between the actors’ restrained gestures 
and the characters’ bloody, all-out violent gestures. In Hamlet, Shakespeare gets 
around this problem by having Laertes emphasise how lightly he needs to touch 
Hamlet with his poisoned sword in order to kill him. This means that both actors and 
characters engage in only light, restrained touches as Hamlet and Laertes fight; thus, 
the disparity between the characters’ gestures and those of the actors is minimal. It is 
not just in violent scenes that the gap between actors’ gestures and characters 
intention is minimalised in Shakespeare’s plays. In As You Like It 5.4.68-9, for 
instance, Touchstone says to his wife, ‘bear your body more seeming Audrey’; Juliet 
Dusinberre suggests that this line may be intended to enable the older actor playing 
Touchstone to remind the young apprentice playing Audrey to keep paying attention 
and stop slouching during this long scene in which he has little to do or say.16 
Touchstone’s admonition to the character of Audrey to perform her femininity 
‘seeming[ly]’ segues seamlessly into the actor’s admonition to his colleague to 
perform Audrey’s femininity well. The word ‘seeming’ here both masks and draws 
attention to the fact that Audrey’s femininity is something that ‘seems’ rather than 
‘is’, as it is acted on stage. 
 
Why Shakespeare? 
Shakespeare’s play-texts are often concerned with the limits of gestures, and several 
plays seek to represent what happens when gestures are pushed to those limits. In 
                                                
16 Juliet Dusinberre, “Introduction,” in Juliet Dusinberre, ed., As You Like It, by William Shakespeare 
(London: Arden, 2006), 35. 
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Titus Andronicus, the handshake, the classic gesture of sociable, amiable skin contact, 
involves the uncanny touch of a severed hand. In Othello, the traditionally amicable 
kiss becomes a gesture of betrayal. Several other Renaissance playwrights explored 
the limits and reverse sides of gesture; Katherine’s stillness and silence in The Taming 
of the Shrew is echoed in the silence of the character Honoria in another shrew-taming 
play, Grim the Collier of Croydon (first published 1662; written up to 63 years 
earlier), for example. However, Shakespeare’s popularity on stage from the early 
modern era to the present day means that it is especially possible with Shakespeare to 
track the way in which particular gestures have been performed on stage in a given 
play throughout the ages, by looking at evidence like archival film and video, prompt 
books, eyewitness accounts, and photographs. The importance of gesture for bearing, 
altering, and transmitting meaning in a play means that performance evidence—which 
enables the researcher to study bodily movements as well as the words on the page—
is particularly vital for a cognitive study of gesture. Concentrating on Shakespeare 
enables the cognitive theorist to examine the different ways in which gestures on 
stage have been shaped by the various material cultures in which they were embedded 
across their performance history. 
The ability to track the performance history of Shakespeare’s plays is also 
important because, as well as exploring gestures’ boundaries in terms of subverting 
their meanings, Shakespeare thematises the fact that gestures can be performed and 
pretended. He repeatedly explores how gestures can be staged, and tests the ways in 
which performing a gesture on stage can provide opportunities for giving that gesture 
new meanings. Chapter 5 establishes how, in the final duel in Hamlet, the characters’ 
fatal striking gestures become almost gentle, protective ones between the actors as 
Shakespeare closes the gap between the light touches of the actors and the light 
touches of the characters. This thesis shows that in some ways, Shakespeare shared 
these interests with other early modern playwrights, especially Kyd and Webster. 
Indeed, his interest in gesture often stems from a seeming desire to play around with 
and subvert existing early modern ideas about handshakes, kneeling, kisses, moments 
of stillness, and violent gestures. Further cognitive research into early modern gesture 
might look at how a particular theatrical company, or playwrights other than 
Shakespeare, used gestures in their work. Shakespeare seemed very interested in 
making a single gesture the focal point of a play, exploring the different possibilities 
of that gesture again and again, and enmeshing it in a web of related linguistic 
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patterns. Titus Andronicus is a key example of this: handshakes are given in 
friendship, then subverted with the grasping of severed hands, whilst a wave of hand-
related vocabulary builds up and up as the play progresses and Titus jokes about 
‘handl[ing]’ a ‘theme’ and ‘lay[ing] hands on’ his enemies (Titus Andronicus 3.2.29, 
5.2.158). 
 Shakespeare’s interest in gesture makes his plays ripe for analysis using 
cognitive theory. At the same time, it is important to avoid de-historicising 
Shakespeare, and to avoid assuming that Shakespeare’s plays can unproblematically 
be read alongside modern cognitive-theoretical texts as though there were no 
important differences between the two. The book The Bard on the Brain: 
Understanding the Mind Through the Art of Shakespeare and the Science of Brain 
Imaging (2003) by Paul Matthews and Jeffrey McQuain falls at this hurdle. This book 
juxtaposes quotations from Shakespeare about (for instance) smell with quotations 
from scientific studies on the same topic. The assumption is that Shakespeare’s works 
contain timeless truths that can be equated with the timeless truths of neuroscience.  
This thesis espouses the more reliable historicised approach taken by scholars 
like Tribble and Steven Connor, which understands that both Shakespeare’s works 
and cognitive theory have been shaped by, as well as helped to shape, the historicised 
material cultures in which they were embedded. This means that Shakespeare and 
theories of cognition enter into a much more nuanced relationship than that envisaged 
by Matthews and McQuain. Though there are suggestive similarities between (for 
instance) cognitive theories of how olfaction influences our moral judgements about a 
person and early modern theological texts linking sin to bad smells, the differences 
between these historical approaches to olfaction are just as suggestive. Understanding 
the difference between a cognitive and an early modern account of olfaction’s 
influence over the mind means that the places where the norms and values of 
Shakespeare’s sixteenth- and seventeenth-century cultural context differ from those of 
modern cognitive theory are brought into sharper focus.   
Scrutinising the historical context of Shakespeare’s plays also enables me to 
suggest moments where early modern thought can supplement cognitive theory, by 
providing imaginative ways of conceptualising gesture that seem to have been 
somewhat lost to us in the centuries following Shakespeare’s death. Shakespeare’s 
interest in touch in Titus Andronicus, for instance, highlights the fact that cognitive 
theories of hand gestures have tended to exclude ideas about skin contact, prompting 
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me to turn cognitive theory in the direction of haptics (the word ‘haptic’ comes from 
the Greek word haptikos (‘able to touch’), and haptics is the study of touch, tactile 
sensation and proprioception).17  Situating Shakespeare criticism historically as well, 
moreover, enables a discussion of how the modern advances of neuroscience can 
supplement and alter previous critical responses to the plays which were developed 
when theories of cognitive underload, offline cognition, kinaesthetic memory, and 
cognitive ecology had not yet been developed.  
 At the same time, the thesis is alert to the fact that in some ways 
Shakespeare’s plays and cognitive theory are both part of the same continuous 
tradition. Shakespeare’s plays are imbued with influences from early modern English 
culture from Elizabethan debates on kneeling (chapter 2) to sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century playhouse practices of staging highly realistic fights (chapter 5). 
His plays provide particularly rich portals through which to examine and understand 
this cultural moment. Shakespearean drama also helped to shape early modern 
language, thought, and stage practice. Hamlet, for instance, as chapter 5 shows, was 
responsible for bringing into being two new uses of the term ‘contagion’; an 
important word both for ideas of touch and of olfaction. Cognitive theory often has 
roots and resonances in early modern culture; in particular, gesture’s power to shape 
thought, whether in religious ceremonies or playhouse rehearsals, is emphasised both 
in cognitive theory and in early modern texts. In Gesture, Kendon traces a continuous 
intertextual history of gesture from the classical period, through early modern times, 
up to the present day work of cognitive theorists. To study Shakespeare and his 
culture, then, is to study a cultural moment that is important for understanding the 
historicity of cognitive theory. To study cognitive theory and Shakespeare together is 
to study two offshoots of a particular early modern cultural moment. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
Each chapter of the thesis concentrates on one of the five most common 
Shakespearean gestures identified in the database: taking hands, kneeling, kissing, 
                                                
17 When the severed hand’s status as a pervasive visual emblem in early modern culture is taken into 
account, an analysis of the gesture of taking hands that focuses on touch can be combined with a visual 
one. Farah Karim-Cooper explains for instance that ‘faithfulness was often emblematized as two right 
hands touching, usually in a clasp as the many images of faithful unions in contemporary emblem 
books show’, The Hand on the Shakespearean Stage (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 56. 
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stillness, and striking. Chapter 1 examines taking hands in Titus Andronicus, looking 
particularly at the ways in which this gesture is subverted and restrained. This chapter 
shows that, when gestures fail to signify in the way that they are expected to, ideas 
about the difference between gestures that are ‘real’ and gestures that are ironically or 
theatrically performed come to the fore. The second chapter builds on this discussion 
of subverting gestures and examines kneeling in Julius Caesar. This chapter focuses 
on the conspirators coupling their attempts to subvert Caesar’s authority with a 
traditional gesture of submission. Adding nuance to the findings about theatrical 
representation in the first chapter, this chapter argues that Julius Caesar dramatises 
the profound effect that gestures (particularly habitual gestures) have on the mind, 
making it difficult to perform gestures purely ironically. The gesture of kissing in 
Othello is the focus of chapter 3. This chapter expands on the ideas of touching and 
skin contact in chapter 1 and adds an olfactory dimension to this discussion. Chapter 4 
builds on chapter 1’s ideas of restraint and failed gestures more fully; by examining 
stillness and the refusal to gesture in The Taming of the Shrew, this chapter shows that 
the idea of ‘character’ necessarily involves that of ‘actor’, and that moments of 
stillness are moments that highlight the complex relationship between actor and 
character.  Chapter 5, which examines the gesture of striking in Hamlet draws 
together all the strands of the thesis. By thinking about stage violence as violence that 
is cut short and stopped, it reflects on ideas of stillness and restraint, and in particular 
in how they shape the relationship between actor and character. This final chapter also 
returns to the idea of the touch on the Shakespearean stage, and explores how on stage 
touches have the potential to blur the boundary between appearance and reality. 
The plays chosen for discussion in each chapter were selected because they are 
plays in which Shakespeare particularly explores, and tests, the significances of one of 
the five gestures: taking hands, kneeling, kissing, stillness and striking. In Titus 
Andronicus, for example, focusing on severed hands provides a way for Shakespeare 
to examine the limits of contemporary ideas that handclasps produced friendship, and 
helps him to dramatise the drastic effects that occur when this simple social gesture is 
subverted or abrogated. Throughout his works, Shakespeare dramatises the very real 
effects of performed or dramatic gestures on the gesturer’s thoughts and emotions, as 
well as the destabilising effect that performance can have on gestural norms; 
Shakespeare’s plays thus suggest that the theatre continues to be a fascinating place 
for the cognitive theorist to go. 
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Chapter 1 
‘Lend me thy hand’: taking hands in Titus Andronicus 
 
Introduction 
In one of the most arresting moments in Titus Andronicus (first performed 1594), 
Titus asks Aaron to help him cut off his hand so that he can exchange it for his sons’ 
lives. Titus’ words at this point, ‘Lend me thy hand, and I will give thee mine’ 
(3.1.187), play on the more usual idea of ‘lending’ or ‘giving’ someone one’s hand as 
a figurative term for a handshake whilst also emphasising that Titus’ hand will 
literally be given as an object of exchange. Lavinia’s entrance, with ‘her hands cut off 
and her tongue cut out’ (SD before 4.1.1), is another moment in Titus Andronicus 
where the severed hand is made the focus of the action. Directors have taken great 
care to draw the audience’s attention to the ways in which the severed hands in this 
play are performed, using a variety of visual effects to this purpose that range from 
the heavily stylised to the gruesomely realistic.  
Vivien Leigh’s Lavinia in Peter Brook’s production at the Shakespeare 
Memorial Theatre in 1955 elicited gasps from the audience as she appeared in an 
exquisite gown with red ribbons streaming from her wrists. According to the actress 
Janet Suzman, these audiences were shocked not because the scene was so gory but 
‘because [Leigh] was so beautiful’.18 Her glamorous appearance created such an 
iconic image that other productions deploying this ribbon-device tend to be seen as 
referencing or echoing Brook’s definitive use of it.19 In 2006 at the Globe, director 
Lucy Bailey concentrated on making the scenes of severed hands as horrifying as 
possible by using realistic dummy hands filled with false blood and tubes hidden in 
actors’ sleeves which spurted constant and copious supplies of even more false 
blood.20 Fainting or walking out of Bailey’s production (both in 2006 and in its 2014 
                                                
18 Gregory Doran and Anthony Sher, Woza Shakespeare: Titus Andronicus in South Africa (London: 
Methuen, 1996), 218. 
19 One such later production was Yukio Ninagawa’s (Royal Shakespeare Theatre, 2006). 
20 For instance, when Titus’ hand was severed, he laid his hand on a chopping block then hid it in his 
sleeve, and a false hand filled with blood popped up from inside the block which Aaron then hacked at. 
“Fight Notes 2,” Titus Andronicus, by William Shakespeare, directed by Lucy Bailey, Globe Theatre, 
2006, Globe Theatre Archive. Prompt Book, Titus Andronicus, by William Shakespeare, directed by 
Lucy Bailey, Globe Theatre, 2006, Globe Theatre Archive. 
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revival) became almost de rigueur for audiences (a fact showcased by reviewers) and 
extra first aiders were called in to help. Dominic Dromgoole’s Artistic Director’s 
speech at the end of the 2006 run mentioned this spate of faintings as a highlight of 
the season, the successful creation of a lasting image of the hand offered and 
severed.21  
 These dismemberments are shocking in performance not only because of the 
extreme violence they represent, emphasised as directors compete with each other to 
terrify audiences with their bold stage effects in a phenomenon Pascale Aebischer 
refers to as ‘Shakesploitation’.22 Over and above this visual shock factor, the severed 
hands in Titus Andronicus are powerful because they bring to the fore, only to 
subvert, a rich web of metaphors that are sustained by the living hand. In a seminal 
body of work for cognitive theory, first published in the 1980s and 1990s, George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson show how mental processes are rooted in bodily gestures, 
and hand gestures in particular: we ‘grasp’ an idea, for instance.23 Lakoff and Johnson 
establish that this embodied metaphor is at the heart of our thought: the way in which 
we grasp ideas, and the way in which we think about ourselves grasping ideas, is 
shaped by the grasping movement of the hand. The idea that metaphor is embodied 
entails that the gestures of the body are essential to creating and shaping thoughts. 
Titus Andronicus demonstrates the importance of cognitive processes to the 
metaphors embodied by the gesture of taking hands. A handclasp allows the 
participants to affect each other cognitively by transmitting knowledge and shaping 
each others’ thought and emotions. This dynamic cognitive interaction keeps 
numerous metaphors in play; the touch, grasp, and exchange of hands enables 
metaphors of touching, grasping, and exchanging thoughts and emotions. Titus 
Andronicus shows that when hands are severed, this interaction is halted, and the 
potential for a versatile metaphorical play is reduced to a single metaphor: that of the 
                                                
21 E.g. Rashid Razaq, “Theatregoers Passing Out Over Gory Scenes at the Globe,” Evening Standard, 
May 5 2006; Richard Stott spoke of ‘first aiders and wheelchairs’ being brought in to help people who 
fainted, “It’s No Holds Bard,” Sunday Mirror, 11 June 2006. Dominic Dromgoole, “Artistic Director’s 
Speech,” 2006, Globe Theatre Archive, London. 
22 Pascale Aebischer, Shakespeare’s Violated Bodies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
24. 
23 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to 
Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 3ff.  
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exchange of objects. As such, the severed hand shows how important cognitive 
processes, over and above the physical structure of the hand, are to creating and 
sustaining metaphors. 
In the early modernn era, the hand, alongside the face, was thought to be the 
main body part for bearing signs and meanings. This idea persists in present day 
cognitive theory; colleagues Goldin-Meadow and McNeill describe hand gestures as 
the repositories, communicators, and creators of various abstract and concrete ideas, 
from ‘I love you’ to ‘he’s running away’. Unlike Lakoff, Johnson, Goldin-Meadow 
and McNeill, early modern writers focused not only on the hand’s shapes and 
movements but also on its capacity to touch, thereby linking handshakes with an even 
richer set of metaphors. Early modern texts relate handclasps to exchange, and to 
ideas of love, reconciliation, and bargaining, emphasising that it is the touch of the 
skin that conveys and creates these ideas.  
My database shows that the gesture of taking hands occurs at pivotal moments 
in Shakespeare’s plays, helping to alter, create, or consolidate friendship, kinship, 
allegiance, and identity.  By enabling the two participants to share and shape thoughts 
and feelings, the handclasp constitutes them as human subjects with a social 
relationship to each other. Hands are most often given and taken in the plays at times 
of pledges to marry (as with Ferdinand and Miranda, or Claudio and Hero),24 and of 
reconciliation (like Capulet and Montague at the end of Romeo and Juliet).25 These 
are moments when characters’ identities change, or are affirmed in relation to, the 
other: as friend, spouse, subject, or participant in a promise. A living, moving, feeling 
hand is needed to engage both participants, in order to ensure that promises are kept, 
                                                
24 Giving of hands is explicitly referred to in pledges of marriage between Ferdinand and Miranda (The 
Tempest 3.1.89-90), Julia and Proteus (The Two Gentlemen of Verona 5.4.116), Claudio and Hero 
(Much Ado About Nothing 5.4.56-8), Bertram and Helen (All’s Well that Ends Well 2.3.173-6), Orsino 
and Viola (Twelfth Night 5.1.272), Viola and Sebastian (Twelfth Night 5.1.157) and Perdita and Florizel 
(The Winter’s Tale 4.4.154). Additionally, Romeo and Juliet's ‘hands do touch…palm to palm’ (Romeo 
and Juliet 1.5.99-100), and Paulina promises Leontes in The Winter’s Tale 5.3.88-9, as he is confronted 
with his long-lost wife, ‘I’ll make the statue…descend and take you by the hand… present your hand’. 
A comprehensive list of examples for all gestures discussed can be found in the database. 
25 The newly-reconciled Capulet and Montague take hands at the end of Romeo and Juliet (5.3.296). 
Stephano’s words to Trinculo are another example of this, ‘Give me thy hand, I am sorry I beat thee’ 
(The Tempest 3.2.111), as are those of the Host to Evans and Caius after they argue, ‘Give me thy 
hand’ (The Merry Wives of Windsor 3.1.105-6).  
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marriages are valid, and friends stay friends. With a severed and unfeeling hand, the 
handshake’s essential ability to keep multiple different meanings in play is lost. In 
many productions of Titus Andronicus, the handshake is performed using a dummy 
hand: such hands are ‘dead’ in the sense of being incapable of movement or haptic 
perception. Titus Andronicus depicts how, when the handshake is turned into an 
unfeeling clasp with a dead hand, the living hand that had kept these metaphors in 
complex, nuanced, changing play turns into an overly literal metaphor: an object 
rather than an agent of exchange.  
As we will see, Katherine Rowe’s notion of the ‘dead hand’ in literature 
reattributes an uncanny agency to severed and unfeeling hands. Reflecting on the dead 
hands Rowe describes, which move with a mischevious and sinister purpose, helps to 
add complexity to our understanding of handshakes in Titus Andronicus. Using 
Rowe’s analysis of the severed hand in literature, we can see that the severed hands in 
Titus Andronicus, though broadly reduced to the status of mere objects of exchange, 
nevertheless exert agency over the play’s central characters. 
 Because they are central to marrying, creating friendships, and 
communicating, handclasps are integral to society, (literally) holding societies 
together by embodying relationships of trust, dependency, and exchange. Titus 
Andronicus reflects this, as, in this play, handshakes broken by dismemberment signal 
and produce the breakup of social bonds. Examining Titus’ literalisation of this 
metaphor as a purely economic exchange of objects helps us to understand justice and 
Roman civilisation in Titus Andronicus as sustained and subverted by embodied 
metaphor. Ralph Berry has argued that (the metaphor of) dismemberment is essential 
to justice in this play; a cognitive and phenomenological approach pinpoints how, 
specifically, justice is sustained and challenged through the social bonds created by 
the touch of the living, feeling hand or destroyed by the unresponsive severed hand.  
At the start of Titus Andronicus, Titus and his family believe that according to law 
Alarbus must be dismembered to appease the ghosts of Titus’ dead sons (1.1.96-100); 
Titus’ remaining sons emphasise the specifically Roman nature of this rite, ‘we have 
perform’d| Our Roman rites. Alarbus’ limbs are lopp’d’ (1.1.142-3). The Roman state 
itself is a giant body, the dismemberment of which is the cause of civil unrest; Marcus 
asks Titus to run for Emperor so that he can ‘help to set a head on headless Rome’ 
(1.1.186). 
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Berry argues persuasively that by exploring this kind of ritualized violence, 
Titus Andronicus evokes the human sacrifices from which the tragic genre itself 
sprung, ‘the ceremonies of Titus Andronicus lead toward a giant myth of cleansing, 
the eradication of evil from Roman society’. 26 This enables Berry to situate Titus 
Andronicus within Shakespeare’s body of work as definitively setting the tone for 
later explorations of corporeality and the Roman state. He describes it as, ‘the first of 
the Roman plays’, as it depicts a move towards a more civilized Rome, culminating in 
Marcus’ final promise to re-member the state, ‘to knit again...These broken limbs into 
one body’ (5.3.70-2), foreshadowing later evocations of the body politic in 
Coriolanus.27 In his later adaptation of the play, Titus Andronicus, or, The Rape of 
Lavinia, Edward Ravenscroft (1687) prefigures Berry’s idea of Shakespeare’s Rome 
as a state which is dismembered and then rebuilt, extending it outwards to a criticism 
of the Shakespearean text itself. Ravenscroft describes Shakespeare’s original play as 
a structure that had broken and needed to be put back together, ‘’tis the most incorrect 
and indigested piece in all his Works; It seems rather a heap of Rubbish then a 
Structure’, he writes, adding, ‘However as if some great Building had been design’d, 
in the removal we found many Large and Square Stones both usefull and Ornamental 
to the Fabrick, as new Modell’d’.28 
Rather than using actual Roman legal texts such as the Theodosian Code, 
Gaius’ Institutes, or Justinian’s Digest and Institutes (many of which would have been 
nearly impossible to source in the early modern era) to inform his depiction of Roman 
justice in Titus Andronicus, Shakespeare turned to literary sources for his depiction of 
Rome, and particularly Ovid’s Metamorphosis which emphasises animal 
transformation and dismemberment in narratives of crime and punishment. Titus 
Andronicus sets itself up in direct competition to Ovid in terms of dismembered 
bodies: Titus says to Chiron and Demetrius, ‘worse than Philomel you us’d my 
daughter| And worse than Progne I will be reveng’d’ (5.2.194-5). Ovid’s Philomel 
had her hands cut off, but Lavina also has her tongue cut out; Ovid’s Tereus was 
punished by eating his son, and Tamora is punished in similar fashion but here two 
sons are dismembered and eaten and several other people are killed at the dinner 
                                                
26 Ralph Berry, Tragic Instance: The Sequence of Shakespeare’s Tragedies (New Jersey: Associated 
University Presses, 1999), 29-30. 
27 Berry, Tragic Instance, 41. 
28 Edward Ravenscroft, Titus Andronicus, or, The Rape of Lavinia (London: J.B., 1687), A2r. 
 
30 
table. Shakespeare’s choice of this particular literary source for a play about Roman 
justice underscores how integral ideas of the dismembered and re-membered body are 
to his notion of the breakup and renewal of the Roman state. A cognitive reading of 
the handclasp also takes this reading of the dismembered bodies in the play further 
and insists that Lavinia represents not just an allegory but a human individual. The 
early modern hand’s status as a symbol of wider human agency enables Shakespeare 
to reinforce the agency of Titus and Lavinia after their hands have been severed. As 
this chapter goes on to discuss, Titus pointedly uses variations on the word ‘hand’ to 
emphasise that, though he and Lavinia have lost their physical hands, they can still 
‘handle’ ideas and projects and ‘lay hands on’ their enemies through revenge.  
 Berry’s work helps to place Titus’ dead handshake as a destructive 
literalisation of usual metaphors of ‘exchanging hands’—‘lend me thy hand, and I 
will give thee mine’—within a wider framework of ideas about justice and society. 
Conversely, paying attention to metaphor in Titus Andronicus enables us to re-think 
just how useful the metaphor of society as a giant body is to the characters in this 
play. Rather than a moment when two people cognitively affect each other through 
the touch, the ‘exchange’ of hands in Titus Andronicus becomes a literal exchange of 
dead flesh. And it is partly because of this that the broken body politic is, at the end of 
the play, literally made up of dead and broken bodies. The centrality of embodied 
cognition to Roman society in Titus Andronicus ultimately limits the state’s ability to 
be transformed through purely rhetorical ideas of the body politic. This is because at 
the end of the play, once the bodies that made up that society are dead, they are no 
longer able to embody dynamic, interactive cognitive processes. Marcus’ decorous 
image of Rome as a body being ‘knit’ together like ‘scattered corn into one mutual 
sheaf’ (5.3.71), delivered when he is surrounded by literal broken limbs, is 
undermined by the impossibility of literally putting the Andronici’s very dead bodies 
back together and having them interact again as socialised humans. Marcus’ words 
emphasise the centrality of dynamically-embodied metaphor to Titus Andronicus. 
When hands become mere objects, rather than the living creators of multiple 
metaphors that facilitate cognitive exchange (exchanging friendship, ‘touching’ the 
soul, ‘grasping’ a thought or another person’s heart), they pose an obtrusively literal 
obstruction to metaphorical and literal transformation. 
 To touch the other’s hand with one’s own is to know and be known, to 
recognise oneself as, and to become, part of society and to help others become so too. 
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The severed hand, which cannot participate in a communicative touch, is the 
embodiment, the result, and the cause, of a Roman society where human relationships 
break up and become destructive and hateful rather than cohesive, sharing, and 
empathetic. Thus as much as Titus Andronicus is about shocking performances of 
dismemberment, it is also about metaphor, and how metaphor is created by cognitive 
processes that are enabled by the body. Analyses of Shakespearean performances, 
particularly Bailey’s, Gregory Doran’s stage version and Julie Taymor’s film version, 
are crucial to my argument as they help to illustrate ways in which metaphors are 
embodied physically in this play. Analysing these historic performances demonstrates 
how actors’ living bodies build brief, suggestive stage directions (‘Enter Lavinia, her 
hands cut off and her tongue cut out’, for instance) into richly metaphorical moments 
that are crucial to the play’s concern with justice and society. Though within the 
world of the play Marcus’ suggestion that he can revivify Rome by ‘knitting’ its 
dismembered limbs back to life does not seem entirely plausible,  paying attention to 
the actors’ bodies makes his claim ring, in some sense, true. The actors will arise at 
the end of the play and the next performance will bring the characters back to life to 
be dismembered and scattered anew, creating a cyclic ritual of cleansing and renewal 
not too far from what Berry describes as being central to the tragic genre. 
Titus Andronicus and cognitive theorists share a concern with embodied 
metaphors: exchanging thoughts with hands and ‘handling’ an idea. Thus, cognitive 
theory can recover an emphasis on touching and grasping as sites of knowledge in 
Titus Andronicus, which had slipped out of view in the centuries intervening between 
the early modern era and the present day. Cognitive theory also throws back into the 
spotlight an early modern assumption that handclasps are a fundamental cause of 
states of mind like promising, bargaining, and allegiance because experiencing the 
touch of each other’s skin has a practical cognitive effect on each of the participants, 
shaping their thoughts to make them feel more amicable, loyal, or obliged to each 
other. Early modern texts also provide a rich set of ideas about feeling, persuading, 
healing, and worshipping through the touch which can augment cognitive theory’s 
current tendency to focus on the hand gesture as a purely visual sign.29 Titus 
Andronicus brings these issues to the fore by exploring the alterations in Titus’ and 
                                                
29 A notable exception is Raphael Lyne, “The Shakespearean Grasp”, Cambridge Quarterly 2013 
42(1), 38-61, a cognitive study that like this chapter discusses John Bulwer’s work. 
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Lavinia’s ways of being in the world when their hands are cut off. When they lose 
their hands, Titus and Lavinia relinquish those parts of their body that are most crucial 
for pledging allegiance to authority, a lover, or friend, and persuading, 
communicating, knowing, and being known. With the offhand phrases ‘lend me thy 
hand and I will give thee mine’, and ‘give his majesty my hand’ (3.1.187, 194), Titus 
alludes to this normative backdrop of the handclasp even as he explores its limits and 
its potential to be disrupted and subverted. 
 
Cognising with hands 
As we have seen, the idea of Roman justice in Titus Andronicus is not just expressed 
through metaphors of the body, but also literally created and sustained, as well as 
destroyed, by bodily gestures, especially the handclasp. Both cognitive theory and 
early modern thought recognise the ability of the handclasp not only to represent 
particular states of mind such as amity, allegiance, and love, but also to produce these 
states of mind, shaping and altering cognition. The hand becomes a particularly 
salient case of the wider power of gesture to both represent and shape thought, 
because both early modern discourses and cognitive studies present the hand as the 
main instrument of thought and the main gesturing part of the body30. In Titus 
Andronicus, hands are related in particular to ideas of exchange and of political 
agency by committing crimes, bearing the brunt of crimes, and meting out justice and 
revenge. In her book Dead Hands: Fictions of Agency, Katherine Rowe establishes a 
tradition of hands as symbols of consent and agency, particularly within the context of 
labour and ‘political rights and authority’, running from the early modern era (Titus 
Andronicus is one of her first examples) to nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
                                                
30 As discussed below, John Bulwer describes gesture as ‘the only speech and generall language of 
Humane Nature’, and by gesture (as the focus of his book shows), he means, specifically, hand gesture, 
Chirologia…Chironomia, A7v. Early modern authors often quoted Aristotle’s idea of the hand as the 
‘instrument of instruments’, i.e. the part of the body best suited for expressing the mind and carrying 
out a person’s plans. In his discussion of ‘Invention’, knowledge and rationality in The Advancement of 
Learning, for example, Francis Bacon writes, ‘the hand is the Instrument of Instruments’, The Twoo 
Bookes of Francis Bacon (London: for Henrie Tomes, 1605), Mm4r. This chapter goes on to discuss 
the way that Aristotle and Quintilian privileged the hand as the best body part for representing and 
carrying out thought in their writing on gesture and rhetoric, and the influence that their ideas had on 
early modern writers such as John Bulwer and Abraham Fraunce. 
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Anglo-American literature.31 Kendon’s Gesture situates cognitive, linguistic, and 
neuroscientific depictions of the hand within a tradition, beginning in the classical 
period, of depicting the hand as the paradigmatic gesturing body part.32 Later 
twentieth- and early twenty-first-century Anglo-American cognitive and 
neuroscientific studies continue this tradition, presenting the hand as almost the sole 
focus of gesture. Part of Goldin-Meadow’s definition of gesture is that ‘gestures come 
out of the hand’. 33 McNeill writes that, ‘[g]esticulation…is made chiefly with the 
arms and hands but is not restricted to those body parts–the head can take over as a 
kind of third hand if the anatomical hands are immobilised or otherwise engaged’.34 
McNeill’s description of the gesturing head as ‘a kind of third hand’ shows how 
central the hand is to theories of gesture: any body part that gestures is a kind of hand. 
Neuroscientific studies tend to focus on hand movements when they are looking for 
paradigmatic gestures of intent.35 Though, as subsequent chapters show, gestures such 
as kneeling, and deliberate refusals to gesture, have their own sets of political 
significances in Shakespeare’s plays, Titus Andronicus is firmly situated within this 
tradition of seeing the hand gesture as a paradigmatic expression of political and 
social agency. 
In the Renaissance, the idea of the hand as the main instrument of thought 
derived largely from Aristotle’s description in the fourth century B.C.E. of the hand as 
‘the tool of tools’, and his statement that, ‘the possession of these hands is the cause 
of man being of all animals the most intelligent’.36 This idea pervaded early modern 
discourses on gesture and rhetorical treatises (the latter were heavily influenced by 
Aristotle’s Poetics and Rhetoric), and it is likely that the many speeches of rhetorical 
persuasion in Titus Andronicus (such as Lavinia pleading with Tamora not to harm 
                                                
31 Katherine Rowe, Dead Hands: Fictions of Agency Renaissance to Modern (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), 11, passim.  
32 Kendon, Gesture, 17-83. 
33 Goldin-Meadow, Hearing Gesture, 201. 
34 David McNeill, Gesture and Thought (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), 5. 
35 For instance work on the mirror neuron system governing empathic understanding of the other’s 
intent overwhelmingly relies on experiments involving hand gestures, Roy Mukamel et al, “Single-
Neuron Responses in Humans during Execution and Observation of Actions,” Current Biology 20 
(2010), 750–756. 
36 Aristotle, “On the Soul” III 8.432a, “On the Parts of Animals” IV.10.687a, in Complete Works of 
Aristotle, 2 vols, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
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her, or the opening speeches of the two candidates for emperor) will have followed 
the Renaissance tradition of using plenty of hand gestures to emphasise the words 
spoken. Aristotle embedded his discussion of the human hand’s superior ability to 
make signs, use tools, and bear meaning, within a wider conceptualisation of the 
human being as more rational than other animals. This link between the anatomical 
capacity of the hand and humans’ rational superiority over other animals remained 
strong into the nineteenth century. For instance, the anatomist Charles Bell argues in 
his treatise The Hand: Its Mechanism and Vital Endowments – As Evincing Design 
(1833) that the human hand is a God-given sign of humankind’s ‘superior mental 
capacities’, and status as ‘ruler over animate and inanimate nature’.37 
Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria (first century C.E.), which focuses throughout 
(though not exclusively) on hands underpins much early modern and Enlightenment 
thinking on rhetoric, either explicitly (as in the works of the actor and drama theorist 
Thomas Betterton)38 or implicitly (as in the works of the rhetorician Abraham 
Fraunce).39 In Book 11 chapter 3 of Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian notes that hands 
are able to perform a plethora of movements, ‘it is scarcely possible to tell how many 
motions the hand, without which oration would be lacking and weak, can perform’. 
He argues that hands are so superior to all other parts of the body when it comes to 
                                                
37 Charles Bell, The Hand: Its Mechanism and Vital Endowments – As Evincing Design (Philadelphia: 
Carey, Lea, & Blanchard, 1833), 157, 26. This book is one of “The Bridgewater Treatises”, a collection 
of scientific works designed to glorify God by showing how the patterns found in anatomy, chemistry, 
and other sciences provide evidence that the world was designed by a divine intelligence. Thus, Bell is 
careful to state that possessing and using hands does not itself make humans superior to other animals; 
rather, humans were given hands because God had already created their minds more rational and 
ingenious than other animals’; Bell’s assumption that hands do little to alter our already-superior state 
of mind makes him different from most of the other cognitive and early modern texts discussed in this 
chapter, which present the hand as vital for shaping humans’ superiority over animals. For histories of 
the hand’s association with human intelligence and superiority see Richard Sennett, The Craftsman 
(London: Penguin, 2008), 149ff. and Raymond Tallis, The Hand: A Philosophical Inquiry into Human 
Being (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003). 
38 Thomas Betterton, William Oldys, and Edmund Curll, History of the English Stage (London: for E. 
Curll, 1741), base their description of ‘speaking with the hands’ on stage (F2v-F3v) on Quintilian’s 
Institutes. 
39 The section on gesture in Abraham Fraunce’s The Arcadian Rhetorike (London: Thomas Orwin, 
1588), is mostly devoted to the hand, because, Fraunce attests, ‘Without the hand the gesture is 
nothing’ (K2r). This book has absorbed Quintilian’s general ideas, but does not discuss them explicitly. 
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making signs that they even approximate the power of speech itself, ‘whilst other 
body parts help speech, the hands may be said to speak themselves’. His list of the 
main things that hand gestures can do includes expressing the speaker’s emotions 
such as ‘joy, sadness, and doubt’, creating certain effects in others such as 
‘summoning, dismissing, threatening, or asking for something’, and logically 
organising the world by ‘signifying measure, quantity, number, and time’. Hands can 
also, he notes, perform a function at once deictic and grammatical, ‘by pointing out 
places and people the hands act like adverbs and pronouns’.40  
One of the key messages that writers on rhetoric in later centuries took from 
the Renaissance material was the hand’s superiority to all other body parts when it 
comes to conveying meaning. The private school teacher Gilbert Austin’s Chironomia 
(1806), a book which Adam Kendon calls ‘a summation of the post-Renaissance 
rhetorical tradition of gesture study’,41 is heavily influenced by Quintilian. Austin 
states that he uses the term ‘chironomia’ (which literally means ‘rules of the hand’) 
‘in the extended sense… of the whole art of gesture and delivery’, yet he focuses 
almost exclusively on the hand; for him hand gestures are ‘the whole art of gesture 
and delivery’.42  
So, there is a long tradition of describing the hand as the body part which is 
best able to express thought. This tradition manifested itself in the Renaissance, not 
only through the continued popularity of Quintilian but also in the writings of authors 
like John Bulwer and Giovanni Bonifacio who saw the hand as a body part 
particularly adapted for communicating and shaping thought. Bulwer writes that 
gesture is ‘the only speech and generall language of Humane Nature’, explaining that 
the head and the hand are privileged above all other body parts thanks to their unique 
and superior relationships with cognition, ‘these two comprise the best part of the 
expressions of Humane Nature’.43 As such a privileged agent of thought, the hand has 
a certain metaphoricity: to possess a hand in both cognitive and early modern texts is 
to possess a wider ability to understand, plan, and use and affect the world. Rowe 
shows that the severed hand problematises this idea of the hand as a straightforward 
                                                
40 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, ed. Donald Russell (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1920), 
11.3.85 [Latin, my translation]. 
41 Kendon, Gesture, 86. 
42 Gilbert Austin, Chironomia (London: W. Bulmer and Co., 1806), xii. 
43 Bulwer, Chirologia…Chironomia, A7v. 
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symbol of political and economic agency. Dead hands appear in literature, she notes, 
as entities which can both be employed by others like objects (the burglar’s 
magically-illuminating and stiffly-moving hand of glory is a central example), but 
they also gain the status of an uncanny subject like the crawling severed hands of 
Gothic fiction. Rowe shows that this fearful, uncanny quality arises from the dead 
hand’s residue of agency, displayed through its movements or its use as an instrument 
in sinister plots. This is a subversive shadow of the Aristotelian paradigm of the hand 
as the ultimate instrument, and embodiment, of rational agency.  
Though they do not crawl around as they might in a Gothic novel, Titus and 
Lavinia’s severed hands do have a residual agency. This agency, however, is not that 
of the hands’ original owners, Titus and Lavinia, but of their enemies. The violators 
(Tamora, Chiron, Demetrius and Aaron) variously use Titus and Lavinia’s severed 
hands as tools for their own purposes. As early as Act 1 Scene 1, soon after Titus has 
ignored her entreaties and killed her son, Tamora states her mind in an aside to 
Saturninus: 
 
I'll find a day to massacre them all 
And raze their faction and their family, 
The cruel father and his traitorous sons, 
To whom I sued for my dear son's life, 
And make them know what 'tis to let a queen 
Kneel in the streets and beg for grace in vain (1.1.500-5). 
 
Berry sees Saturninus as ‘the animating spirit of the play’,44 and this is true when we 
consider that almost every character in the play seems to share Saturninus’ violent, 
vengeful personality. However, it is surely the violators who control most of the plots 
and schemes in the play, and it is Tamora who controls Saturninus himself. Focusing 
on severed hands in particular, it is because of the violators’ desire for revenge  that 
they are severed in the first place. And it is Aaron, Tamora, and her sons who 
subsequently ‘animate’ these severed hands, controlling what they mean and how they 
are circulated in society. Tamora makes clear that she wants revenge for Alarbus, ‘her 
dear son’s life’ (1.1.453), and Titus, Lavinia’s, Quintus’ and Martius’ severed hands, 
                                                
44 Berry, Tragic Instance, 35-6.  
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tongue, and heads become her revenge in kind for Alarbus’ dismembered limbs. 
When she has captured Lavinia, Tamora makes this clear, 
 
Remember, boys, I pour’d forth tears in vain 
To save your brother from the sacrifice. 
But fierce Andronicus would not relent. 
Therefore away with her, and use her as you will; 
The worse for her, the better lov’d of me (2.3.163-7). 
 
Chiron and Demetrius interpret Tamora’s broad command to ‘use her as you will’ and 
decide to cut off Lavinia’s hands and tongue. Later, though Titus may think he is the 
one deciding to cut off his hand, willingly sacrificing it and displaying his agency by 
tricking Lucius and Marcus into leaving him alone to get it done (3.1.184-5), in fact it 
is the plot to revenge Tamora’s son—carried out this time by Aaron—that is 
controlling Titus’ situation and the decision placed before him (either to let his sons 
die or cut off his hand and get his sons back). The violators also control the outcome 
of Titus’ decision to sever his hand; when Titus’ sons are returned to him as 
dismembered corpses this reflects not what Titus wants, but what Tamora wants. 
Titus’ severed hand is like a puppet, ultimately uncannily controlled by Tamora’s 
agency.  
 Berry’s metaphor of an ‘animating spirit’ is very suggestive, conjuring up an 
image of a dead body brought to, or sustained in, life by a quasi-autonomous agent 
rather like Rowe’s Gothic severed hands. Berry explains that he describes Saturninus 
in this way because for him Saturninus ‘is Roman justice and retribution’,45 reflecting 
his description of Roman justice at the end of the play as the reassembling of a 
‘scattered’, ‘broken’ set of limbs with Rome becoming a kind of re-animated corpse. 
This useful framework can be shifted, and used to understand how Tamora turns 
Rome into a collection of scattered, broken (limbs of) citizens controlled by her, and 
how her method of justice or retribution is powered by severed limbs that live on 
uncannily in her mind. Narrowly, Alarbus’ limbs exert agency as the source of 
Tamora’s revenge. In a more general way, hands in Titus Andronicus are embedded 
within a wider backdrop of metaphorical associations; to ‘handle’ is to know and 
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affect the world, to ‘grasp’ is to possess an idea, to ‘touch’ is to affect the emotions of 
another person. Hands to essential metaphorical work which holds society together; 
without this work, society becomes at most a dead corpse, artificially animated rather 
than a flourishing body politic. However, even when the hand is severed it lives on in 
the mind as an embodied metaphor for agency and knowledge.!
In the early modern era, as today, the union of two hands not only represented 
but also helped to shape more abstract types of union: unity of thoughts, of lives, of 
goals, of fortunes. Goldin-Meadow and McNeill call these types of gesture, which 
physically embody abstract concepts, ‘metaphoric’. A specific instance of the more 
broader ability of the hand to bear embodied metaphors, ‘Metaphoric 
gestures…display an image, either of a shape or of movement…that represents or 
stands for some abstract concept’.46 Metaphoric gestures do not just represent this 
abstract concept, but also often help to bring it into being. This technical vocabulary 
of metaphoric gestures helps to describe in cognitive terms the ways in which early 
modern people used handclasps to marry, swear allegiance, and make promises. Here, 
the abstract union of two loves, two minds, and two souls, is embodied in the physical 
union of hands. Again, then, over and above the pure shock factor of the dismembered 
body, Titus’ subversion of the handclasp as a friendly gesture (as he parodies an 
amicable exchange of minds and hearts, making it an exchange of dead flesh) turns a 
whole raft of early modern social interactions on their heads. 
Early modern texts pervasively acknowledge the handclasp’s ability to 
embody abstract emotions, relationships, and states of mind (such as reconciliation). 
The most sustained early modern treatment of the hand and the handclasp is a volume 
by the physician John Bulwer, which contains two linked treatises analysing all the 
gestures of the hand, Chirologia and Chironomia (1644). Bulwer states that the 
gesture of taking hands was used to persuade, recommend, lead, assist, thank, 
welcome, reconcile, love, wish well, and bid farewell. He testifies that the gesture of 
taking hands expresses unity of fortunes, love, and minds. It is,  
 
An expression usuall between those who desire to incorporate 
completely or grow into one, and make a perfect joynt….since they who 
                                                
46 Kendon, Gesture, 100. C.f. Goldin-Meadow, Hearing Gesture, 7. This categorisation of gesture 
ultimately derives from McNeill, Gesture and Thought, 39. 
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thus professe communion of good while they willingly embrace each 
others hand signifie that they are both content that their works shall be 
common.47  
 
In the marriage ceremony in the Book of Common Prayer (the richest source of 
information about the early modern marriage ceremony, which remained unchanged 
in the editions between 1549-1662 and has altered very little since then) the handclasp 
between spouses as they make their vows is described as the way in which ‘either 
geve their trouth to other’.48 Early modern marriage treatises emphasised that this 
union of hands was part of a metaphysical union of minds. For instance, in Fiftie 
Godlie and Learned Sermons (1577) Heinrich Bullinger states, ‘First let the good 
liking of their consenting mindes be ioyned in one, whom the open profession of 
mutuall consent & outwarde handfasting must afterward couple together.’49  
However, stressing the variety and multivalence of early modern marriages, 
Frances Dolan cautions that the rhetorical tropes associated with marriage in the 
seventeenth century did not always reflect the reality of early modern married life. For 
instance, pervasive references to consummation as a kind of exchange, ‘the conjugal 
debt’, masked the reality that many couples waited to consummate a marriage, or 
never consummated it at all.50 The ‘reality’ Dolan describes is one where human 
interaction is capable of enabling many different metaphors at once, without being 
completely defined by them. For instance, though the idea of a ‘conjugal debt’ might 
arise from the exchange of hands, the metaphorical meaning of the handclasp does not 
end there. The married couple are, in reality, agents able to embody a variety of 
metaphors, and to interact in a variety of ways, through their handclasps. Dead hands, 
however, create the very situation that Dolan deplores, where human social 
interaction becomes trapped by economic metaphors of exchange that fail to 
encapsulate the full ethical potential of human relationships. Shakespeare is certainly 
not trying to uphold a perfect, uncomplicated ideal of marriage in Titus Andronicus; 
                                                
47 Bulwer, Chirologia, H7r-v. 
48 Thomas Cranmer et al, The Book of the Common Prayer and Administration of the Sacraments 
(London: Edward Whitchurch, 1549), [unsigned] fols 29r-33v.  
49 Heinrich Bullinger, Fiftie Godlie and Learned Sermons (London: Henry Middleton, 1577), Piir. 
50 Frances Dolan, “Shakespeare and Marriage: An Open Question”, Literature Compass 8/9 (2011), 
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Titus gives Lavinia away to the emperor for political ends, for instance, and as soon 
as Saturninus feels he has secured Lavinia’s hand, he instantly starts wishing he could 
marry Tamora instead. Dolan argues that metaphors for marriage (such as exchange 
and payment) cannot encapsulate the meaning of this social relationship between two 
people. This illustrates how cognitive interactions, shaped and sustained through the 
mutual touch, are crucial for ensuring that metaphors remain dynamic, multiply 
meaningful, and powerful social bonds rooted beneficially in the body. As Titus 
Andronicus shows, once the touch is stopped and subverted, the gap between 
metaphor and flesh widens. 
The idea that handclasps can shape and create, as well as represent, abstract 
concepts and states of mind is common to both early modern and cognitive texts. As 
Carla Mazzio explains, ‘to touch’ in the Renaissance was at once to physically sense 
the world with one’s skin and to have thoughts and emotions that were shaped by the 
material cultures of this world.51 Bulwer wrote of the handclasp’s ability to change a 
person’s state of mind (for instance, by persuading one or both participants to change 
their minds, or creating relations of amity between two subjects) by suggesting that 
there were certain powerful physical properties present in the touch. He describes the 
hand as possessing a ‘virtue’ or power akin to, or consisting in, a magic potion; he 
uses the word ‘philtre’, which can be read both as a metaphorical assertion that the 
handclasp’s effect on the mind is like a drug and as a literal assumption that there is a 
chemical substance contained in the hand that affects anyone it touches. Bulwer 
explains, ‘Hence Physitians the subtile and diligent observers of nature, thinke that 
there is in the Hand a certaine secret and hidden vertue, and a convenient force or 
philtre to procure affection’.52  
Bulwer describes the handclasp as a fundamentally interactive gesture, 
involving the bodies and minds of two people. Cognitive theorists often turn to 
phenomenological theory, and particularly the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, to 
help them describe the interactive nature of gesture, the ways in which the touch both 
affects and is affected by the world, and shapes as well as being shaped by a person’s 
                                                
51 ‘To feel was, in the Renaissance, a verb used interchangeably with “to touch”, and both verbs 
implied physical as well as emotional sensation’, ‘To have “tact” is to have just the right touch, a 
manifest sensitivity to one’s linguistic and social surrounds’, Carla Mazzio, The Inarticulate 
Renaissance (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2009), 180, 214. 
52 Bulwer, Chirologia, I2v-I3r. 
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thoughts. For McNeill, Merleau-Ponty demonstrates that gesture can not only be a 
representation of a thought that has happened, but can also constitute the act of 
cognition itself, ‘a way of cognitively being’. From this McNeill deduces that, by 
observing a person’s gestures we can make deductions about their cognitive state at 
that very moment, ‘when we see a gesture we see part of the speaker’s current 
cognitive being, her very mental existence, at the moment it occurs’; by gesturing, a 
person is both manifesting and ‘updating’ their cognitive state.53 McNeill’s analysis 
fits in well with what we understand of early modern marriage, helping us to 
articulate how taking hands in marriage shapes each spouse’s being as an embodied 
cognitive subject; the handclasp tracks, and produces, a trajectory of changes in the 
participants’ thoughts and feelings, as well as in their legal status. Early modern 
writers stressed that this gesture fundamentally altered the couple’s identities, 
creating, as Bishop Edmund Bonner wrote in 1555 in the tract A Profitable and 
Necessarye Doctrine, ‘an indiuiduall or vnseperable bonde or knotte of lyuynge, 
whereby eyther to other muste do as that vocation requyreth’.54  Fulfilling their 
marriage vows meant embodying new roles which involved theoretically at least love, 
loyalty, and sharing their lives with each other, and, for the wife, obeying the 
husband. Where there is no touch, vital social and legal institutions, like marriage, and 
the promises that go with them, come unstuck. 
Throughout this history of the handclasp, the hand’s power to ‘update’ or 
change a person’s cognitive state has been seen to reside in the touch of bare skin on 
skin. The idea of the ‘naked’ hand has historically been linked closely to the notion 
that a person’s mind is also bared to the other during a handclasp. Bare hands are 
often explicitly called for in making oaths as a guarantee of the sincerity and 
effectiveness of the oath. In Walter Raleigh’s History of the World (1614), the naked 
hand is the precondition for the ‘naked’ (sincere) bargain,  
 
When the Earle of Caesarea saw that the Caliph gaue his hand, neither 
willingly nor bare, hee told him roundly thus much in effect. 
SIR, Truth needs no holes to hide it selfe; Princes, that will hold 
                                                
53 McNeill, Gesture and Thought, 91-2. 
54 Edmund Bonner, A Profitable and Necessarye Doctrine (London: John Cawood, 1555), Bbiv. This 
work is based on the 1543 King’s Book of Christian doctrine prepared for Henry VIII. 
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couenant, must deale openly, nakedly, and sincerely; Giue vs therefore 
your bare hand, if you meane that we shall trust you, for we will make 
no bargaines with your Gloue.55  
 
Raleigh plays upon the connotations of the word ‘naked’, which meant not only 
unclothed, but also unconcealed, exposed, sincere, and undisguised.56 The idea that 
only a person’s ‘naked’ skin could enable genuine contact with their mind has 
persisted through to the present day. In a work on gesture first published in 1807, 
Practical Illustrations of Rhetorical Gesture and Action, the actor Henry Siddons 
wrote that it had long been thought rude to shake hands with one’s gloves on, as the 
covered hand is entangled with discourses of (dis)honesty, ‘Persons to this day 
apologise when they shake hands with their gloves on, and sometimes conclude with 
this elegant witticism: “Excuse my glove, perhaps it is the more honest skin of the 
two”’. 57 Etiquette guides continue to state today that, unless absolutely necessary, 
gloves must always be removed before shaking hands with someone.58  In the early 
modern era bare skin is also deemed to be curative whereas the covered hand is not. 
In his 1680 report of the Duke of Monmouth’s ability to cure the ‘King’s Evil’ 
(scrofula) with his touch, Henry Clerk testifies that Elizabeth Parcet was not cured 
when she touched the Duke’s gloved hand with her own, but was cured when she 
removed his glove and managed to touch his bare wrist, ‘her mind was, she must 
touch some part of his bare skin’.59 Traces of a similar idea are detectable today in the 
practice of using bare hands for faith healing or curative practices such as Reiki. The 
mutual touch is thus fundamental to cognitively affecting the other in the contexts of 
meeting, persuading, healing, bargaining, promising, marrying, and making friends. 
Titus’ subverted ‘handclasp’ with Aaron can thus perhaps also be read as a sign of 
mistrust. Titus might understandably be reticent about touching the evil Aaron’s bare 
                                                
55 Walter Raleigh, The History of the World, 2nd edn (London: William Stansby, 1617), Fff2r. 
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57 Henry Siddons, Practical Illustrations of Rhetorical Gesture and Action Adapted to the English 
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58 Sue Fox, Etiquette for Dummies (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2011), 150. 
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(London: for Benjamin Harris, 1680), single leaf, r-v. 
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skin with his own, thereby instituting, whether he wants to or not, a bond between 
them. But, instead of just keeping his gloves on, Titus (in keeping with the 
extravagantly violent spirit of the whole play) goes one further and cuts off all his 
nerves.  
Merleau-Ponty’s writings suggest the mutuality of the touch –the fact that both 
participants in the handclasp are at once touching and being touched by the other–  is 
crucial to the ways in which a handclasp forges relationships between two people. In 
both Phenomenology of Perception (1945) and The Visible and the Invisible (1964), 
Merleau-Ponty presents the touch of the hand as a core case of understanding the 
world through the body. For Merleau-Ponty, we do not touch things and subsequently 
think about them consciously; rather, touching is in itself a way of cognising the 
world and other people.60 He attests that a mutual touch does not just involve forming 
thoughts about the other, it also means shaping their thoughts, and allowing them to 
shape ours. Merleau-Ponty states in Phenomenology of Perception that when my hand 
touches another hand there exists ‘an ambiguous set up in which both hands can 
alternate the roles of “touching” and being “touched”’. This is because in one sense, 
when I take hands with another person, my hand is the object of another’s touch: it is 
perceived by the other to be a passive and thing-like ‘bundle of bones and muscles’. 
In another sense, however, my hand is a perceiving subject ‘alive and mobile, which I 
thrust towards things in order to explore them’: one of these ‘things’ is the other’s 
hand.61 Merleau-Ponty’s main example here is of one person pressing both their hands 
together and experiencing themselves to be alternately a subject and object of their 
own touch. However it is not crucial to his argument that both hands belong to the 
same person, and thus his ideas can be applied without substantive loss to a gesture of 
taking hands between two different people. Following Merleau-Ponty, a handclasp 
between two people can be described as having the following chiastic structure. In its 
capacity as a subject, the other’s ‘alive and mobile’ hand perceives my hand to have 
the role of an object comprising ‘bundle of bones and muscles’. However, in its 
capacity as a subject, my ‘alive and mobile’ hand experiences the other’s hand as an 
object comprising a ‘bundle of bones and muscles’. As Merleau-Ponty wrote when he 
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revisited this topic in The Visible and the Invisible, this ability ambiguously to 
embrace the roles of both subject and object means that the human body, both 
perceived by and perceiving (other people in) the world, is the site where the world 
both shapes and is shaped by our thought. In making this assertion, he deploys a 
description of the body ‘overlapping’ with the world, becoming porous to it, ‘between 
my body looked at and my body looking, my body touched and my body touching, 
there is overlapping or encroachment, so that we must say that the things pass into us 
as well as we into the things’.62  
But, this emphasis on the immediacy of the touch and the genuineness of the 
effect it has on others is problematised when these phenomenological theories are 
applied to touches that are deliberately performed on stage; here, characters’ reactions 
to touches are scripted rather than truly spontaneous. By tracing the results of a ‘dead’ 
handclasp, and weaving together the various dismemberments in the play into a wider 
early modern framework of ideas about touches as social ‘glue’, Titus Andronicus is a 
study in the move from subject to object. Reading Goldin-Meadow and McNeill 
alongside Merleau-Ponty suggests that the hand’s ability to perform a ‘metaphoric 
gesture’ relies on its ability to be both subject and object of the touch. In Titus 
Andronicus, a severed hand does have a certain agency that can enable it to shock 
people and influence their lives. But, this agency informing the severed hand is eerie, 
uncanny, and zombie-like rather than beneficial to society. Severed hands can 
certainly be alive with meaning; later on in this chapter I will discuss how they can be 
ambiguous symbols of both law and lawlessness, for instance. But, despite its agency 
and ability to make and bear meaning, the severed hand is, significantly, not the 
subject of a touch. Though severed hands in early modern drama and (as Rowe 
discusses) emblem books may move and gesture, there is no person attached to them 
that is able to feel these gestures. Despite exhibiting lively movements and quick 
influences over people’s lives, severed hands are, crucially, deadened to the touch.  
It was arguably the touch that meant that early modern handclasps did not just 
function in the abstract sense of ‘uniting two minds’. Taking a cue from Bulwer, 
whose image of ‘philtres’ seems to be meant as a literal descriptifon of how hands 
physically create bonds between people and bodies, it is important explicitly to 
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recognise the physical, literal effects that were thought to result from the touch of the 
hand. Here, Goldin-Meadow and McNeill’s idea of ‘iconic’ gestures can help to 
define how early modern handclasps were thought very physically to entwine two 
people’s hearts. ‘Iconic’ gestures are not like metaphoric gestures, which embody an 
abstract concept or state of mind. Rather, iconic gestures are physical representations 
of some other physical entity or action.63 For instance, if I am describing someone 
running, I can wiggle my fingers to represent the movement of their legs: this is an 
iconic gesture, as the physical movement of my fingers is representing not something 
abstract but the physical movement of another body. The same wiggling motion 
would become a metaphoric gesture, though, if I used it to represent a more abstract 
concept like ‘taking an idea and running wild with it’.  
The gesture of taking hands was often described as representing, and 
physically bringing about, the contiguity of two hearts. As well as an instrument of 
thought, hands were believed to be a physical conduit of the heart. The widely-used 
Sarum marriage rite, on which the Book of Common Prayer is closely based, states 
that the husband should put the wedding ring on the wife’s fourth finger because there 
was a vein running from there right to the heart and touching the sonorous silver ring 
would thus (via this nerve, with a kind of vibration-effect) remind her at the core of 
her being of her duty to love the husband (‘Ibique dimittat annulum. Quia in medico 
est quaedam vena procedens vsque ad cor et in sonoritate argenti designator interna 
dilecto, quae semper inter eos debet esse recens’).64 The Book of Common Prayer 
therefore states that the ring should be placed on ‘the fowerth finger of the womans 
left hande’.65 Thus, when Henry VI asks Warwick and Clarence to ‘join your hands, 
and with your hands your hearts’ (3 Henry VI 4.6.39) or Miranda offers Ferdinand her 
hand in betrothal ‘with my heart in it’ (The Tempest 3.1.89-90) they are not speaking 
purely metaphorically. This early modern idea of literally joining both hands and 
hearts at once is almost unheard of in the present day, when handclasps tend to be 
thought of as a purely metaphorical union of hearts. With their emphasis on the 
physical union of hearts, early modern texts thus provide us with a new way of 
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understanding handclasps, which can readily be absorbed into cognitive notions of the 
‘iconic’ gesture. 
Titus Andronicus both explicitly draws on, and disrupts, the idea of the 
handclasp as an iconic exchange of hearts. Titus states that he gives Aaron his severed 
hand ‘with all my heart’ (Titus Andronicus 3.1.160). In one sense, this is simply an 
expression of his willingness to cut off his hand; the phrase ‘with all my heart’ just 
meaning ‘I really want to do this’. In a second sense, in terms of an early modern 
understanding of the phrase, Titus is literally giving away an important conduit to his 
heart. This alludes subversively to the usual way in which hands and hearts are said to 
be ‘given’. Titus Andronicus is an early play, so with it Shakespeare presents a 
subverted version of the handclasp before he followed this up with a series of more 
normative, loving handclasps in plays like The Tempest and Much Ado About 
Nothing. Rather than (as Warwick and Clarence in 3 Henry VI or Miranda in The 
Tempest), ‘giving’ his heart with a handclasp that enables Aaron to come into contact 
with the living vein that runs from the hand to the heart, Titus gives Aaron a severed, 
deadened part of this link to the heart. This is part of the wider way in which Titus 
Andronicus performs a destructive literalisation of the abstract and metaphoric 
elements of the gesture of taking hands. This, again, makes explicit the way in which 
the dead handclasp Titus offers Aaron is a refusal to participate in a loving social 
bond, and turns what ought to be a dynamic cognitive exchange into an exchange of 
objects. 
The iconicity of the handclasp and the ability for the hand to represent the 
tactile and physical properties of other body parts (not only hearts but many others, 
such as the legs in the example at the beginning of this section), demonstrate that the 
handclasp can be a symbol of the tactile properties of the human body as a whole. 
Tamora, obsessed with revenging herself by removing Titus’ ability to clasp hands, 
makes it clear that she is interested in ‘touching’ him in the wider sense of harming 
the core of his being in a more total way than just his hand. Titus’ hand, severed as a 
result of Tamora’s plots, both literally and symbolically cuts him off from society. 
‘Titus, I have touch’d thee to the quick’ (4.4.35), Tamora gloats as she arrives to revel 
in his ultimate grief-stricken madness; here the word ‘touch’ suggests a general harm 
that extends far beyond the wound at Titus’ wrist to encompass (as she thinks at least) 
damage done to his sanity, his family, and his standing within society. Tamora’s use 
of the word ‘touch’ here, combined with her earlier plot to sever Titus’ hand 
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illustrates how, as a particularly culturally-significant and common form of touch, the 
handclasp is a test-case for the ways in which the body senses and engages with the 
world and other people in general. Deploying the word ‘touch’ to mean ‘harm’, and 
using it to destroy society rather than build bonds, Tamora perverts the empathetic, 
mutual cognitive exchanges that the touch can usually achieve.   
The hand’s ability to stand in for other body parts qua tactile is central to 
Merleau-Ponty’s description of the handclasp. He stresses that the entire body, both 
its outer surface and its interior, has the ability to touch and to be touched. Thus, 
though localised in the hand, the touch is not in principle confined to the hand, but 
expresses the tactile abilities of the whole body.66 As Merleau-Ponty writes, ‘The 
body is borne towards tactile experience by all its surfaces and all its organs 
simultaneously, and carries with it a certain typical structure of the tactile “world”’. 67  
As two people take hands, they cognise themselves and each other as beings that can 
be touched in general. Merleau-Ponty’s work shows both that the handclasp is 
synonymous with ‘the touch’, and that all bodily touches are phenomenologically 
significant. For Shakespeare the kiss or embrace is another significant form of human 
touching, and chapter 3 will extrapolate the arguments in this chapter to examine what 
happens when we add an olfactory dimension to the touch. 
 
The destruction of the handclasp and the non-human 
As we have seen, hand gestures are integral to Aristotle’s definition of the human as a 
rational animal who, as a maker and interpreter of signs, is superior to other animals. 
This idea permeated Renaissance discourses on the hand, and in the present day we 
have seen that hand gestures remain closely tied to ideas of abstract thought, iconic 
representation, and the ability to make metaphors. On a practical level, handclasps 
enabled, and still enable, people to participate in key rituals of human society, such as 
marriage, bargaining, and making friends or business contacts. These rituals help to 
form human subjects, as both agents shaping others and objects constituted by the 
other’s touch. In early modern culture, the gesture of taking hands was intimately 
allied with the notion of the human as intelligent, deliberating, socialised, and 
superior to animals. In Titus Andronicus, the metaphor of a broken body politic is 
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often mapped literally onto the dismembered or amputated bodies of its citizens. As a 
result of these two factors, when the characters in Titus Andronicus are unable to 
perform handclasps, their status as human citizens becomes ambiguous and 
questionable. Partly because of this destruction of the handclasp, Rome degenerates 
from being (if it ever was this at all) a society of humans to a collection of beasts 
preying on each other, to a heap of plant matter with Marcus’ final image of the city 
as a ‘sheaf’ of ‘corn’. Here, again, Shakespeare goes one further than Ovid: whilst 
Philomel, Procne and Tereus transform from humans to birds, Shakespeare takes the 
transformation a step further and turns everyone ultimately into plant life. This 
transition seems inevitable in a society where human bonds are so badly, and so 
increasingly, disrupted. 
For Merleau-Ponty, the status of the clasped hand as ambiguously subject and 
object of the touch illustrates the difference between human beings and objects. 
Unlike objects, humans can not only be perceived through the touch, they can also 
touch back and perceive the world around them. This dual subject-object status is, he 
states, constitutive of what makes us human; he illustrates this as we have seen with 
the image of a person pressing their hands together, becoming alternately subject and 
object of their own touch. Titus, however, imagines his hands interacting only to 
destroy this relationship. Instead of Merleau-Ponty’s image of two hands caressing 
each other, Titus evokes an aggressive, attacking gesture when he states of his hands, 
‘all the service I require of them| Is that the one will help to cut the other’ (3.1.77-8). 
By destroying his power to touch with his hand, Titus destroys an important part of 
his humanity. No longer potentially both subject and object, Titus’ severed hand can 
only ever be a mere object. This is underscored by the fact that in performance, Titus’ 
‘hand’ is not made of flesh, but is a prop made of (depending on the era) materials 
like silicone, paint, wax, and leather which were never part of a human body in the 
first place. 
Directing Merleau-Ponty’s theories back onto this intellectual tradition of 
thinking about hands as paradigmatically human tools provides one explanation why, 
following the loss of their hands, Lavinia and Titus are described using imagery of 
bestial and vegetable, rather than human, life. Symbolically relinquishing their power 
to touch and be touched by the world which constituted them as human subjects 
causes them to lose their human qualities and take on a more object-like status. When 
he first sees Lavinia after the attack, Marcus uses horticultural language of ‘lopping’, 
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foreshadowing his description in the next line of Lavinia as a tree with ‘branches’,68 
‘What stern ungentle hands| Hath lopp’d and hew’d, and made thy body bare| Of her 
two branches…?’ (2.4.16-18). Chiron, again evoking tree imagery, refers to Lavinia’s 
amputated arms as ‘stumps’ (2.4.4) as does Titus (5.2.182) and a stage direction (SD 
after 4.1.76). Later, Titus remarks to Marcus, ‘we are but shrubs, no cedars we’ 
(4.3.46) and ends up being a mere ‘trunk’ (5.3.152). Moreover, at the very point of 
letting Aaron chop off his hand, Titus describes it as a plant, ‘such with’red herbs as 
these| Are meet for plucking up’ (3.1.177-8). Lavinia is also described as an animal, a 
‘dainty doe’ (2.2.26) to be hunted by Tamora, Chiron and Demetrius, who are 
themselves described as predatory tigers (2.3.142). Themselves inhuman, Tamora and 
her sons destroy the humanity of others; Titus takes revenge in kind by dehumanising 
them even more in return. When Chiron and Demetrius are eaten in a pie, the human 
body is turned into the ultimate object, to be consumed and used rather than respected 
as a subject in its own right. Directors often present Chiron and Demetrius as 
butchered animals at this point; it is a common directorial decision to hang them 
upside down on meathooks in a slaughterhouse (Julie Taymor, Jane Howell, and Lucy 
Bailey did so, for example). In Howell’s production, young Lucius stands alone on 
stage, pointedly contemplating some butchered animal carcasses hanging beside him 
before turning his attention to the dead Chiron and Demetrius, suggesting that he 
perceives a similarity between the animal and human corpses. 
Directors often draw out the text’s suggestions that Titus and Lavinia become 
progressively less human and increasingly more like objects, animals, or plants. 
Remembering McNeill’s description of the gesturing head as ‘a kind of third hand’ 
suggests that Lavinia carrying Titus’ hand in her mouth is a subversion of the gesture 
of taking hands because instead of mutual skin contact, Titus’ deadened hand is 
clasped in Lavinia’s teeth. Some critics, for instance Alan Dessen, have noted that this 
gesture makes Lavinia resemble a hunting dog carrying quarry in her mouth.69 
Lavinia is indeed compared to Hecuba, whom Ovid depicts in Metamorphoses 13 as 
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turning into a barking dog with grief, two scenes later; she reminds Lucius of how 
‘Hecuba of Troy| Ran mad for sorrow’ (4.1.20-1). In Howell’s version (1985, BBC), 
the camera focuses on  Aaron orchestrating the plot to rape Lavinia, and straight after 
this the screen is filled with a barking dog haloed in flames; this serves to announce 
the start of the hunt and perhaps prefigures Lavinia’s Hecuba-like role.70 These canine 
connotations once again suggest that, when the mutual touch is subverted, the result is 
something less than human. In the National Theatre company’s 1995 performance at 
the Market Theatre in Johannesburg, Doran went so far as to replace Jennifer 
Woodburne who played Lavinia with an object at the moment that she loses her 
hands: a blank, featureless mannequin which Chiron and Demetrius attacked.71 It is 
tempting to read this as a visual statement that the attackers reduce Lavinia to an 
object by denying any mutuality to the touches they exchange with her.  
Julie Taymor deploys particularly poignant use of tree imagery in her film 
Titus (1999), an adaptation of her stage version performed by Theatre for a New 
Audience off-Broadway in 1994. In this film, Marcus discovers Lavinia (Laura 
Fraser) after the attack standing in a landscape of amputated trees (Taymor in her 
Directors’ Commentary to the film says that this landscape represents Lavinia herself, 
‘the essence of the raped woman’).72 Standing on a tree stump, Lavinia takes the place 
of its absent trunk. Twigs are stuck into what Chiron calls her ‘stumps’. By replacing 
her hands with twigs, Chiron and Demetrius mockingly literalise Marcus’ subsequent 
metaphor of Lavinia as a tree that has lost its branches. However whilst an amputated 
tree branch can usually grow back (and indeed, such an amputation can make the tree 
grow back even stronger than before), an amputated hand is lost forever. The French 
surgeon Ambroise Paré (1510-90) invokes and stresses this difference between human 
and plant life, stating that human bodies are not like plants which ‘grow again when 
they are set and grafted’.73 By mockingly suggesting that, like plants’ tendrils, 
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Lavinia’s severed limbs can regrow, the twigs stuck into her stumps in this production 
cruelly emphasise the fact that in actuality as a human her hands are lost forever. They 
thereby uncannily evoke the human body that is descending into a vegetable life form. 
The presence of plant life underscores the loss of the human. This is a powerful 
example of how, from a single stage direction, actors can embody the richly 
metaphorical movement of Lavinia, and Rome, from a human to an animal to a plant. 
Throughout Taymor’s film, the human body hovers on the brink of object-like 
status: it is dispensable, visibly dismemberable, re-constructible, bestial, plant-like, 
and edible. The broken hands and feet of stone statues (perhaps of the last emperor) 
litter the set, for instance, creating a lasting image of the body, and by extension the 
state, as composed of parts that can be assembled and disassembled. In a scene 
inserted between 3.1 and 3.2, young Lucius brings Lavinia a pair of wooden 
prosthetic hands he has obtained from a shop full of prosthetic body parts and 
articulated dolls. When he enters the shop, the camera rests on the hands in the 
process of being made, emphasising the idea that the human body can be constructed 
from separate parts.74 Early on, moreover, as Tamora (Jessica Lange) stares at Titus 
(Antony Hopkins), Alarbus’ torso and limbs whirl between them, engulfed in flame, 
making it clear that Tamora is obsessed with the dismemberment of her son and that 
this is what fuels her desire to harm Titus. The limbs multiply, with five hands 
whirling past (arguably these represent Alarbus’ two hands, plus Lavinia’s two hands 
and Titus’ one), suggesting the vindictive dismemberments that are generated by 
Alarbus’ death. With this hallucinatory image, Taymor taps into what I suggested 
above to be the uncannily-continued agency of Alarbus’ severed limbs as they live on 
in Tamora’s mind. During the attack scene, special effects metamorphose Lavinia into 
a deer and Chiron and Demetrius into tigers (in the stage-version, this was achieved 
with cut-out tiger-puppets and a deer mask).75 As well as the final scene in which 
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Chiron and Demetrius are eaten in a pie, there are several additional evocations of the 
human body as food, subverting another key social bonding ritual: the communal 
meal. Tamora and Saturninus (Alan Cumming) throw a party featuring giant edible 
people; Tamora can be seen plucking out the eye of one (made of what looks like a 
kiwi fruit) and feeding it to Saturninus. The morning after, Demetrius picks up a pair 
of leftover chicken feet and waggles them at Chiron whilst they are talking before 
throwing them away; here, the dismembered, edible body is worthless, used as an 
accessory and simply discarded. Later, Aaron cuts off Titus’ hand in a kitchen using a 
meat cleaver that had just been used to chop vegetables, as though the hand were just 
another foodstuff. Taymor’s Titus is perhaps the most thoughtful recent production of 
the play in terms of integrating characters’ descent from human to animal to plant life 
with what Berry describes as a very ‘Shakespearean’ idea of Roman justice as bodily 
dismemberment and re-memberment. 
 
Cognition and exchange 
When his hand is severed, Titus’ change of status from a dual subject-object to a mere 
object draws on ideas of exchange; ‘lend me thy hand and I will give thee mine’ 
sounds like an usurious bargain, ‘help me out for a moment and I will give you 
something to keep’.  Early modern texts establish handclasps as ideally a cognitive 
exchange, participants exchange thoughts and emotions through the physical touch of 
the hand and this helps to embed them within society. However, in Titus Andronicus, 
only the ‘physical’ side of the metaphor is left behind. Presented to Aaron in return 
for his sons’ lives, Titus’ hand becomes an object rather than an agent of exchange; an 
inert, senseless thing used to bargain with. We know that handclasps were involved in 
the exchange of valuable objects, tactile information, and abstract entities, as well as 
enabling an exchange of hearts both literal and metaphorical. Thereby, early modern 
handclasps enmeshed the gesturer in a variety of cultural norms and expectations, 
emotions, and deliberations. Looking more closely at early modern metaphors of 
exchange via the handclasp shows how important it was for these exchanges to be 
made by a living hand, which keeps multiple different metaphors of exchange (of 
hands, hearts, love, minds, bodies, objects) in play. In early modern texts, the hand’s 
agency as it clasps another hand can be closely tied to the material objects which it 
exchanges, something which Titus exploits to the full. The Book of Common Prayer 
states in one breath that bride and groom are married ‘by gevyng and recyvyng golde 
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and sylver and by joining of handes’.76 Often, early modern handclasps enabled two 
people to exchange information about themselves, the hand’s temperature, humidity, 
and roughness was thought to transmit information about their state of mind.77 Here, 
the hand both actively exchanges and passively contains information. As illustrated by 
Giovanni Bonifacio in his compendium of gestures L’Arte Dei Cenni (1612), the 
gesture of taking (or rather ‘giving’) hands, ‘dar la mano’, was often a metaphorical 
act of gift-giving. When one takes hands with someone, Bonifacio argues, one is 
‘giving’ them something abstract: one’s friendship, service, fidelity, love, or 
allegiance, whilst hands themselves are a valuable ‘gift’ from God.78 As an object of 
exchange, the dead hand goes too far with the metaphor and as a result destroys the 
very communal and interactive systems of economic exchange that Titus jokes about.  
Bulwer’s preface to Chirologia…Chironomia involves a detailed discussion of 
handclasps which draws on early modern ideas of exchange, showing how closely 
they are related. Bulwer’s preface demonstrates the rich symbolic potential of the 
handclasp for cognitive theory. Dedicating the work to his friend Edward Goldsmith 
of Gray’s Inn (there are two Edward Goldsmiths in the register of admissions to 
Gray’s Inn in the seventeenth century: one in 1621 and one in 1624),79 Bulwer states, 
‘having put forth my Right Hand in signe of amity to you, and for performance of 
promise: there remaines nothing (most noble Chirophilus) but that you take it in 
between Yours in token of warranty’.80 This dedication creates a very allusive and 
polyvalent idea of the hand as figuring in an exchange. In dedicating 
Chirologia...Chironomia to Goldsmith, Bulwer is giving him his ‘Hand’ in the sense 
of giving him a book called ‘The Hand’ (the preface often roughly and reductively 
translates Chironomia, or ‘rules of the hand’, as ‘The Hand’). Bulwer is also alluding 
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to the practice of presenting Goldsmith with his flesh and blood hand as an act of 
friendship. Moreover, he is presenting both book and anatomical hand for Goldsmith 
to read in both a figurative and a literal act of chiromancy (the subject matter of the 
book will also help Goldsmith to be an even better chiromancer). When Bulwer 
writes, ‘you turn’d Chiromancer, divining by the lines of life and property, which 
appeared fairlie unto you in the first draught, that the Hand would be embraced and 
kissed by the more intelligent part of the world’, 81 it is unclear whether the ‘Hand’ 
being kissed here is the book or Bulwer’s flesh and blood hand, and whether the 
‘lines’ being read are creases in Bulwer’s palm or lines of print, ambiguities that 
perfectly capture the ambiguous playing on the word ‘Hand’ in this preface. Bulwer’s 
evocation of the hand as an object as well as an agent of exchange involves much 
richer and more playful ideas of the hand’s ability to convey information than can be 
found in the cognitive works of Goldin-Meadow and McNeill. For Goldin-Meadow 
and McNeill, the hand communicates information to others with visible gestures 
alone. For Bulwer, however, the hand conveys information not only by being watched 
as it gestures, but also by being touched, by being given as a gift, by being read as if it 
were a book by a chiromancer, and by being read as a literal book by the reader. The 
cognitive texts reflect the early modern notion of the hand as the main body part for 
making signs and for communicating information about a speaker’s state of mind. 
This shared concern, coupled with the fact that early modern conceptions of the hand 
involve a variety of ideas about the hand’s ability to convey meaning that are 
untapped by cognitive theory, make texts like Bulwer’s a useful resource for cognitive 
studies of hand gesture. 
The hand’s ability to be both giver and gift relies on its attachment to a human 
agent. Titus’ severed hand can no longer give, and as a gift it is worthless because it 
no longer contains information about his state of mind, or enables him to affect and be 
affected by the other people it touches. Titus’ severed hand is, accordingly, described 
only as a low-value monetary object of exchange. Aaron calls it a ‘ransom’ (money 
exchanged for the lifting of some penalty) (3.1.156) and Titus describes both his hand 
and his sons in economic terms: the hand is something to be ‘given’ as a barter whilst 
his sons are ‘jewels purchas’d at an easy price’ (3.1.198). However, Titus is tricked, 
and his gift is returned; a messenger enters, bringing Titus back his hand and with it 
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his sons’ heads. It is tragically fitting that, having tried to bargain for human life using 
dead flesh and by renouncing the touch which is constitutive of his humanity, he gets 
dead, rather than living, flesh in return. Titus’ failure to buy his sons’ lives with his 
severed hand also marks his hand out as valueless in that it cannot be exchanged for 
anything of value. It is treated only with derision, the messenger who returns it 
describes it as ‘in scorn to thee sent back’ (3.1.237), and Titus later remembers ‘my 
hand cut off and made a merry jest’ (5.2.174).  At the end of the play, Aaron draws on 
another, by then well-established, meaning of ‘hand’ as the ‘hand of cards’ dealt to a 
player in a game. Aaron taunts Lucius with what could be read as an image of himself 
cheating at a card game, gambling with Titus’ ‘hand’ in the sense both of his ‘hand of 
cards’ and his flesh and blood hand, ‘I play’d the cheater for thy father’s hand’ 
(5.1.111). Titus Andronicus pre-dates by 6 years the earliest known use of ‘hand’ to 
signify ‘fortune’ or ‘chance’, a meaning enabled by the metaphor of Fortune dealing 
out a person’s fate like a hand of cards.82 However, it is possible that the word was 
used in this sense before it was written down in 1600. Aaron is perhaps presenting 
himself as a trickster-Fortune, deliberately dealing Titus a losing hand with his plots. 
Here, the unfairness of the exchange is further underscored; rather than with an 
equitable purchase of the kind that keeps a society’s economy running well, Titus’ 
hand is won dishonestly by cheating and gambling. 
When the handless characters in Titus Andronicus absent themselves from the 
ability to make productive exchanges, they also evoke a varied set of metaphors to do 
with the hand of justice and of God. Bonifacio asserts that handlessness is a symbol of 
legal impartiality because it represents exclusion from systems of exchange. He refers 
to a statue of justice in Thebes whose lack of hands signifies that justice takes no 
bribes and is thus incorruptible.83 This idea does not seem to be widely discussed in 
early modern English literature, though it is entirely possible that Shakespeare saw, or 
read or heard about, them. The description of Theban handless judges (rather than 
Justice) stems from the Moralia of Plutarch, an author popular in the Renaissance, 
and depictions of handless Justice and handless judges were common in European 
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courts of the time.84 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott describes such depictions of ‘maimed 
justice’ as encompassing an ‘ambiguity’; they both suggest that justice is completely 
incorruptible and that she is always-already corrupted. As Douglas-Scott implies, 
perhaps Justice had to have her hands chopped off because she just could not help 
snatching up those bribes? As such, Douglas-Scott argues, these depictions also 
‘reveal a lack of faith and absence of confidence in the virtue of justice’.85  
Using Douglas-Scott’s analysis alongside Berry’s argument that the 
dismembered body is integral to the imperfect Roman justice in Titus Andronicus 
suggests that Lavinia (and perhaps Titus) could be read partly as a problematic 
symbol of the impartial justice Bonifacio describes. The character of Lavinia is not 
merely a symbol. But, her resonance with contemporary iconography of Justice 
illustrates the way that the severing of her hands leads to her focus her cognitive 
agency on securing revenge. All of Lavinia’s gestures and actions after Chiron and 
Demetrius’ attack on her relate back to the attack (from searching through an edition 
of Ovid to catching the brothers’ blood in a basin), and help her to avenge the wrongs 
against her and Titus. In keeping with the ambiguous, problematic nature of the 
maimed justice, Lavinia and Titus only break society further apart as they work to get 
revenge. Revenge is, as Francis Bacon wrote, at best ‘a kind of wild justice’, 
undesirable because it ‘putteth the law out of office’.86 Richard Posner explains that 
this idea applied to private acts of revenge where individuals sought, without recourse 
to the law, to punish other individuals who had wronged them. Posner writes that 
Elizabethan and Jacobean legal authors saw the criminal justice system as the 
accessory of God’s revenge, but that justice was emphatically an official, communal 
activity involving the entire state; any private act of revenge was seen as radically 
excessive and lawless, usurping God’s prerogative to revenge.87 The law was thus a 
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kind of divinely-sanctioned revenge (as Titus says of his sons, ‘the law hath tae’en 
revenge on them’ (3.1.117)), but all private acts of revenge that occurred without 
recourse to the law were sinful. And yet, with the highest authorities in Rome working 
against them, private acts of revenge are one of the only means available to Titus and 
Lavinia; ‘the most tolerable sort of revenge’, Bacon concedes, ‘is for those wrongs 
which there is no law to remedy’.88 The handless Lavinia could thus perhaps be read 
as a symbol of the wild and rough justice to which she and Titus are driven, a poor 
replacement for the divine justice which, Titus states, has left the earth: ‘terras Astrea 
reliquit’ (4.3.4). She is also a reminder of how, in this play where broken handclasps 
both represent and cause the breakup of society, Justice ought ideally to have hands, 
so that she can participate in the mutual touches that are constitutive of a properly 
working human society. Lavinia and Titus’ handlessness thus evokes both the lack of 
justice, and the ability to do justice.  
This suggests that we can refine Berry’s idea that justice in Titus Andronicus 
is all about dismemberment. The ability of the severed hand to symbolise two 
completely opposite things, action and inaction, is an overarching theme of Titus 
Andronicus. Whilst severed hands do break society apart in one sense in that they 
embody an imperfect form of justice and broken social ties, they also embody the 
entirely just principle of powerful impartiality. Moreover, hand gestures have a very 
wide metaphorical remit; as we have seen, so many ways of conceptualising 
knowledge, experience, and acting within society revolve around embodied 
metaphors of grasping and touching. Thus, even when the physical hand is severed, 
this web of metaphors remains in force. Throughout the play, handlessness 
paradoxically represents both an inability to engage cognitively with the world and an 
ability to affect the world in profound, metaphorical, and abstract ways.  
 
The severed hand as a phantom of cognition 
The idea of the ‘phantom limb’ (where patients with severed limbs continue, whether 
deliberately or involuntarily to behave and feel as though their limbs are still there) 
provides a way of articulating how limbs can remain in existence and exert an 
uncanny agency even when they have been physically severed. Phenomenological and 
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neuroscientific studies of phantom limbs suggest that limbs are not merely anatomical 
features, but are also constructed within discourse. These theories provide a cognitive 
understanding of how Titus and Lavinia’s hands are constructed in relation to internal 
representations. Though the theory of phantom limbs has its roots in the early modern 
era in the works of Paré, it is unlikely that Shakespeare was explicitly referring to 
ideas of phantom limbs in Titus Andronicus. Nevertheless, these theories are very 
useful for understanding the play, as what is at stake in phantom limb theory is similar 
to what is at stake in Titus Andronicus. Shakespeare, cognitive theorists, and 
neuroscientists all aim to understand how limbs, as part of an embodied self, are 
created through representation and can be recreated through language and, 
specifically, how hand gestures and mental processes are intrinsically linked. These 
shared concerns mean that phantom limb theory is a rich repository of ideas that can 
be used to understand Titus Andronicus, and vice versa. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that phantom limbs are amputees’ ways of retaining the 
image of their body they had before they lost a limb. Though his explanation of the 
phantom limb effect is by no means definitive or supported by all of the neurological 
evidence, it is a powerful illustration of how limbs are part flesh, and part 
imagination. For Merleau-Ponty, a phantom limb enables an amputee to believe that 
they can continue to manipulate and be affected by the environment as if the limb was 
still there. Their conceptions both of themselves as subjects and of their environments 
thus remain the same: 
 
What it is in us which refuses mutilation and disablement is an I 
committed to a certain physical and inter-human world, who continues 
to tend towards his world despite handicaps and amputations…To have 
a phantom arm is to remain open to all the actions of which the arm 
alone is capable; it is to retain the practical field which one enjoyed 
before the mutilation.89  
 
Neurologist V.S. Ramachandran describes patients with phantom limbs continuing to 
respond to the demands of the world as though their limbs still existed. One patient 
tried to pick up a tray loaded with glasses of water using her one good hand and her 
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phantom hand, inevitably dropped it and spilled water all over herself, yet maintained 
that she had successfully lifted the tray and not spilt a drop. Others claimed to have 
tied their shoelaces with their phantom hands whilst the laces clearly hung loose, 
completely untied. As well as a neurological disorder of proprioception, 
Ramachandran interprets this as the patient using language and rhetoric to persuade 
“him”self, a refusal to accept the fact of the amputation that is often so deeply rooted 
that ‘the patient believes his own denials and confabulations’.90  
Merleau-Ponty and Ramachandran draw on a long tradition of the 
phenomenon of phantom limbs that stretches back until Shakespeare’s time. The term 
‘phantom limb’ was not coined until it was included in a short story by the doctor and 
fiction writer Silas Weir Mitchell in 1866 (thus the ‘phantom limb’ was from the 
outset a mix of neurological evidence and literary creativity).91 But, the idea of pain in 
limbs that had been amputated was available in the sixteenth century. Paré first 
described the phenomenon of phantom pain in 1551; the 1649 English translation of 
his works runs, ‘the Patient who have many moneths after the cutting away of the 
legge, grievously complained that they yet felt exceeding great paine of that Leg so 
cut off’.92 Though he could have read Paré’s original French text or heard the 
phenomenon of phantom pain recounted, Shakespeare does not explicitly evoke the 
idea of either a literal phantom limb or phantom pain in Titus Andronicus. What he 
does do is show how hands exert influence in society not only physically but through 
language and, in particular, metaphor. 
Other characters drive home the fact that Lavinia has lost her hands; in doing 
so, they conjure up phantom hands in their imaginations, urging Lavinia to wash or tie 
ropes and recalling how she sewed and played music. Chiron and Demetrius mock her 
by commanding her to perform actions of which she is no longer capable. They ask 
her to write their names, joke ‘wash thy hands…she hath no hands to wash’, and 
suggest in parting that she should hang herself despite having ‘no hands to help thee 
knit the cord’ (2.4.3-10). Marcus’ first reaction to the attack is to dwell lamentingly 
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on hand gestures and actions no longer available to Lavinia: embracing a husband, 
sewing, and playing the lute (2.4.19-46). When Titus sees her he states, ‘Thou hast no 
hands to wipe away thy tears’ (3.1.106), and later he says that he and Lavinia ‘cannot 
passionate our tenfold grief’ (3.2.6) because they have no hands to make the proper 
expressive gestures. In Howell’s production, Lavinia (Anna Calder-Marshall), frozen 
in horror and seemingly oblivious to much that has gone on since the attack began, 
indeed first seems to become aware of the attack by acknowledging for the first time 
her inability to use her hands. She notices a spot of blood on her dress, motions as if 
to wipe it away with her hands then stops, staring at her arms in horror, suddenly 
realising that she cannot do so.93 Thus the characters, and many actors and directors, 
emphasise the cognitive crisis that occurs when, due to the loss of a body part, a 
person can suddenly no longer act in their environment in the way in which they were 
accustomed. 
Though it does not employ the idea of literal phantom limbs, Titus Andronicus 
can be described as deploying the idea of limbs that, despite being severed, continue 
to figure in a person’s cognitive world, and which return from the dead to exert an 
uncanny agency. As we have seen, the hands have an important metaphorical 
function: as well as actually carrying out our intentions, hands symbolise our more 
general ability to intend, plan, and create. As Bonifacio writes, they are ‘symbols and 
figures of human operations in both the arts and sciences’..94 Titus and Lavinia use 
language, and in particular the rich metaphorical language associated with the hand, to 
compensate for their lost hands and their suddenly disabling environments. Their 
physical hands lost, Lavinia and Titus fall back (as Bulwer did when he played on the 
idea of giving Goldsmith his hand) on the wider connotations of the hand as an 
instrument of the thought and as a symbol of human ability to plan and carry out those 
plans. Their severed hands thus return as phantoms in language, spectral symbols of 
wider cognitive abilities to engage with the world. Titus plays on ideas of ‘laying 
hands on’ (manipulating) one’s body and the world and intellectually ‘handling’ 
themes as ways of cognitively engaging with the world, ‘What violent hands can she 
lay on her life?...O handle not the theme, to talk of hands’ (3.2.25-9). Titus also uses 
the hands of others as instruments of his thought, ‘Lay hands on them’, he instructs 
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Caius and Valentine when he has Chiron and Demetrius in front of him and cannot 
grab them himself (5.2.158). In Howell’s version, Trevor Peacock placed extra stress 
on the word ‘hands’ as he pronounced this sentence, amplifying his voice and 
lengthening the vowel; the aptness of laying metaphorical revengeful hands on the 
men who had helped to take away his and Lavinia’s physical hands thereby seemed to 
be at the forefront of his mind.95 Rather than being in denial, lost in what 
Ramachandran suggests is a world of false ‘confabulations’, Titus is drawing on the 
wider idea of ‘the hand’ as any force that has a social impact. Titus is not the only 
early modern figure to fall back on the wider metaphoricity of the hand in order to 
cope with the loss of his anatomical hand. Eyewitnesses report that, on the brink of 
losing his hand as a public punishment for writing a seditious pamphlet in 1579, John 
Stubbs ‘said often to the people “Pray for me, now my calamity is at hand”’.96 
 
Performance and cognition 
Cognitive theorists, Merleau-Ponty, and early modern texts such as the Book of 
Common Prayer, L’Arte Dei Cenni, and the works of Bonner and Bulwer, focus on 
the hand(clasp)’s ability actually, and in an embodied way, to affect a person’s state 
of mind and to provide accurate information about their thoughts. Shakespearean 
drama, however, often focuses on the potential for a handclasp to be used deceitfully 
and to conceal rather than reveal a person’s thoughts. It is precisely the fact that the 
handclasp is usually seen to be an honest expression of friendship, love and allegiance 
that enables many Shakespearean characters (not least Titus and Aaron) to use it for 
entirely different purposes. Thinking about how the meanings of handclasps are 
deployed calculatingly by characters in Titus Andronicus helps us to understand how 
actors also deploy hand gestures to affect audiences cognitively.  
For example, in Julius Caesar, Antony counts on the conspirators assuming 
that his insistence on shaking their hands is a genuine gesture of friendship. However, 
far from wishing to unite his love and goals with the conspirators’, Antony hates them 
and only wants them to believe he is their ally so that they will let him speak at 
Caesar’s funeral (where he denounces them). The conspirators’ hands are covered 
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with Caesar’s blood and Antony makes clear that by taking their hands, his hands will 
be contaminated with the blood too, ‘Let each man render me his bloody hand’ 
(3.1.184). The blood becomes a symbol of the contaminating power of the other, but 
one which is fittingly only superficial and impermanent; the blood adheres only to the 
surface of Antony’s skin, and only for a short time, whilst his mind remains 
unaffected by the touch of the conspirators’ hands. When the conspirators leave, 
Antony states unequivocally in his soliloquy that he feels only animosity towards 
them and, significantly, towards their hands; he wishes, ‘Woe to the hands that shed 
this costly blood!’ (3.1.258).  
Shakespeare empowers Caesar’s blood with an ambiguous symbolism before 
Antony’s entrance, meaning that this handclasp is a site of proliferating meanings. 
The conspirators deliberately intend that their act of covering their hands in Caesar’s 
blood should turn their bloody hands into meaningful signs; Brutus instructs the other 
conspirators to ‘bathe our hands in Caesar’s blood| Up to the elbows and besmear our 
swords’ so that their hands and swords will appear to Rome’s citizens as signs of 
‘peace, freedom, and liberty!’ (3.1.106-10). However, the blood also makes the 
conspirators look like terrifying, violent murderers, and in performance the Roman 
citizens often act very fearfully when they see the conspirators’ bloody hands and 
swords. The ambiguous significance of Caesar’s blood–does it represent violence or 
peace? Amity or animosity? Freedom or a new tyranny? A permanent new political 
order and set of alliances or a momentary disruption in the Roman state?–explored in 
the remainder of the play is already present in the ambiguous nature of the handclasp 
between Antony and the conspirators. David Farr’s 2005/6 RSC production brought 
the symbolic nature of the contaminating blood to the fore. Farr’s conspirators did not 
get their hands bloody during the course of Caesar’s murder, but, once he was dead, 
they calmly dipped their hands into plain metal buckets of stage blood.97 Rather than a 
mere by-product of stabbing Caesar, the blood was a symbol, allowed to stand alone 
as if it was more important than Caesar’s body, of all of the elements present in 
Antony’s handclasp: violence, freedom, hatred, allegiance, hypocrisy, peace, 
contamination. 
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Antony is playing with fire here because, as we have seen, the early modern 
handclasp was thought to invoke divine, religious, and physiological forces to bring 
about lasting changes in identity (marriage, for example) that affected the 
participants’ souls. This may be what led Shakespeare to emphasise its potential for 
misinterpretation. By disrupting the normative significances of the gesture of taking 
hands, Shakespeare often safely distances his plays from the consequences that occur 
from real life handclasps and underscores the fictionality of their context. The real life 
religious significance of taking hands in marriage makes it a potentially taboo subject 
on the early modern stage, for instance, especially after the 1606 Act To Restrain The 
Abuses of Players tightened restrictions on depicting or mentioning anything to do 
with God. This may be the reason that, even when they are central to the plot, 
marriage ceremonies are never completely performed in Shakespeare’s later plays but 
rather occur offstage (Othello and Desdemona, and Romeo and Juliet are two 
examples) or are interrupted (in Much Ado About Nothing, for example, Hero’s first 
attempt at marriage is abrogated when Claudio jilts her, and her second attempt to 
marry him is put off until after the play ends when Benedick insists that everyone 
dances first). But, in the earlier play Titus Andronicus, the fictional context enables 
Shakespeare to push the boundaries of the handclasp, taking the ideas of exchange 
central to the marriage ceremony and playing on them in the extreme form of the 
severed hand, the deadened link to the heart, gambled with like an object worthless in 
itself. 
Shakespeare’s interest in deliberately performed handclasps is partly a 
metatheatrical one; it can be linked to the ways in which actors perform this gesture 
and also to their relationship with the audience. Handclasps have long been the 
subject of, and shaped by, debates on how to perform gestures on stage. From the mid 
eighteenth century, as the earliest acting manuals in English began to be written, 
descriptions of the handclasp were incorporated into instructions for actors about how 
to express loyalty, subservience, and amity on stage. Siddons’ Practical Illustrations, 
the text instructing actors how to represent different emotions cited earlier, shows 
how very thoroughly sixteenth- and seventeenth-century discourses of the prime 
importance of the hand and the meaning of the handclasp were absorbed into acting 
manuals. Siddons is here adapting a German text by Johann Engel, the Director of the 
Berlin National Theatre, entitled Ideen zu Einer Mimik (1785), to include examples 
from Shakespearean plays and references to British actors. Siddons writes that, ‘the 
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hand is the general instrument of the mind’ and that love or friendship ‘gives 
testimony of its internal contentment, its desire of a reciprocal communications of 
souls, its wishes for a union, by the clasping of hands’, because the handclasp is ‘a 
gesture of hearty good will’.98 Later acting manuals echoed Siddons’ instructions, 
often to the letter, such as Joshua Belcher’s The Thespian Preceptor (1810), which 
was widely read but which was also something of a byword for promoting overly 
programmatic acting. As Dene Barnett shows in his comprehensive study, 
seventeenth- to eighteenth-century acting manuals throughout England, France, 
Germany, and the Netherlands, Siddons’ included, heavily influenced and copied each 
others’ texts and illustrations as well as sticking rigorously to rules laid by earlier 
theorists such as Quintillian, creating a high degree of uniformity in the way in which 
they described gesture.99 It is difficult to tell precisely how far these books influenced 
actors themselves. However, the fact that Siddons’ original precepts did not obviously 
appear on stage in an undigested or unmodified form suggests that his descriptions of 
hand gestures had a certain adaptability and openness to interpretation. This perhaps 
fits Siddons’ purposes more than anything else, because he often implies that a 
gesture needs to be inhabited by the individual actor’s body rather than simply copied 
from his book. Siddons speaks vehemently against the ‘pedantry’ of actors who 
simply follow to the letter guides about which outward gestures to perform; this 
leaves us with the ability to ‘complete a set of puppets’, he writes, but not to act.100  
 The set of meanings associated with the handclasp also extends to the 
relationship between actors and audiences; at certain points, Shakespearean characters 
proffer their hands to audience members to create a social bond. Several of his plays 
end with actors asking for applause with variations of what we have seen to be a 
multiply significant phrase: ‘give me your hands’ (A Midsummer Night’s Dream 
5.1.437).  This gesture is often implicated in discourses of exchange: characters 
bargain with the audience for applause, or promise them future entertainments in 
return for their ‘hands’. As he offers his hand to the audience Puck says he will 
‘restore amends’ (5.1.438) to dissatisfied audience members, for instance, and the 
                                                
98 Siddons, Practical Illustrations, 163-4. 
99 Dene Barnett, The Art of Gesture: The Practices and Principles of Eighteenth Century Acting (Carl 
Winter: Heidelberg, 1987). Earlier primary sources are collected in Lisa Zunshine, ed., Acting Theory 
and the English Stage, 5 vols. (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2009). 
100 Siddons, Practical Illustrations, 30. 
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King in All’s Well That Ends Well asks the audience ‘your gentle hands lend us’ as he 
promises to ‘pay’ them with future plays (Epilogue, 3-6). By proffering (like Bulwer) 
friendship, a text, and a bargain through the image of the handclasp, Shakespearean 
epilogues extend the rich set of metaphors associated with the gesture of taking hands 
to the relationship between actors and audience. Here, as often, Shakespeare uses a 
fictional situation to affect audiences cognitively in very real ways. Though Puck is a 
fictional character, the relation that the audience feels with him, or experiences with 
the actor playing him, can be emotionally real. 
Moreover, whatever the era, Puck’s offer of a handclasp with the audience 
prompts them to experience the propriceptive situation described by Merleau-Ponty 
where they are both subject and object of the touch when they clap their hands 
together to applaud. Bulwer defines the gesture of applause as ‘clapping [the] hands’; 
this type of applause was a prominent part of early modern drama, and signified 
approval and encouragement, as well as often accompanying laughter.101 This is also a 
kind of exchange, as audiences ‘give’ Puck their hands, they echo the more economic 
ways in which they financially support the acting companies and the theatre by 
handing over money to watch a play. Though the two plays are generically very 
different, there is a certain echo of Titus’ words when Puck asks the audience to feel 
their own human-ness and remember economic exchanges by ‘giving’ him their 
hands. Steven Connor describes applause in terms redolent of Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy, stating, ‘Clapping one hand on another dramatises the fact that you are a 
subject and an object simultaneously, a doer and a done to’.102 As they respond by 
clapping, audience members are implicated in the subversive potential of the 
handclasp. Handclasps involve two people touching each other’s hands, whilst by 
contrast applause in the theatre consists of a crowd of people touching their own 
hands together. However, what these two gestures—clapping and clasping the 
hands—have in common is the fact they involve people experiencing what it is like to 
be both subject and object of a touch; whether a touch that is entirely their own or one 
that is shared with someone else. Theatre audiences feel themselves both subject and 
                                                
101 Bulwer, Chirologia, A5r. See Jeremy Lopez, Theatrical Convention and Audience Response in Early 
Modern Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 33. 
102 Steven Connor, “The Help of Your Good Hands: Reports on Clapping,” last accessed June 23 2015, 
http://www.stevenconnor.com/clapping/. 
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object of their own touch in a way which is also performed, or at least demanded of 
them.  
Titus Andronicus underscores the (meta)theatricality of the handclasp by 
asking audiences to focus on an act which can only be artificial and performed; 
audiences know that the moment when Titus and Lavinia lose their hands necessarily 
involves some deliberate contrivance, some clever use of props or costume. The play 
generates much interest in how severed hands are created on stage, whether audiences 
are enchanted by Vivien Leigh’s spectacular costume and makeup or busy peering at 
the copious blood and realistic dummy hands in Lucy Bailey’s production to see how 
she created the severed hand effect. Many directors opt for a stylised approach to the 
play, inviting audiences to acknowledge the artifice involved in creating the severed 
hands. Doran, for instance, used giant plasters which scarcely concealed Woodburne’s 
balled up fists to evoke Lavinia’s stumps; to make the artifice more transparent, these 
were applied on stage in full view of the audience.103 Sher notes, ‘Greg wants the 
audience to see whatever device we use’.104  
The real and the fictional are not ontologically separable in Titus Andronicus. 
An obviously fake severed hand can still produce a powerfully real (and sometimes 
very physical) yet still calculated and conscious cognitive response in audience 
members. Audience responses to the severed hands in Titus Andronicus, from the 
faints and ostentatious walkouts at Bailey’s production to the gasps and swoons at 
Brook’s, may, in some cases, even have been deliberate performances. Such audience 
responses to the failed handclasps in Titus Andronicus interrupt the immediacy of the 
relationship between actor and audience, echoing the interrupted handshake between 
Aaron and Titus on stage.  
 
Conclusions 
As he hands over his own hand, Titus asks Aaron to tell the emperor, ‘it was a hand 
that warded him| From thousand dangers. Bid him bury it’ (3.1.194-5). Here, Titus 
indicates the importance of the living hand to metaphor and social action. Alive, 
                                                
103 Michael Church, Review of Titus Andronicus, Independent on Sunday, July 16 1995. Cue Sheets, 
Titus Andronicus, by William Shakespeare, directed by Gregory Doran, National Theatre, 1995, 
National Theatre Archive. Production Photographs, Titus Andronicus, by William Shakespeare, 
directed by Gregory Doran, National Theatre, 1995, National Theatre Archive. 
104 Doran and Sher, Woza Shakespeare, 143. 
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Titus’ hand has a history; it records memories of its previous actions. It has the ability 
to help hold society together with its touch; forming bonds and allegiances as well as 
wielding weapons. The intimate link between the living handclasp and cognition is 
such that Titus sees his severed hand as no longer able to participate meaningfully in 
society. Once it has been exchanged as a mere object, he implies, it is good for only 
one thing: burial. These lines show in microcosm, how, in Titus Andronicus, a 
concern with the loss of the capacity to touch enables a study in the move from human 
subject to object, and from gestures that create a multiplicity of meanings and 
metaphors to a narrowed metaphorical scope.  
 It is true that social interaction is embodied in Titus Andronicus, and thus that 
according to the ‘Roman’ logic of this play the dismemberment of the body can only 
spell the breakup of the state. However, it is significant that, instead of being buried, 
Titus’ hand returns to him and continues to have meaning and a metaphorical agency 
right up to the very end of the play. This chapter has shown that, like Lakoff and 
Johnson, Goldin-Meadow and McNeill, the Shakespearean touch roots metaphors for 
thought in the body, as characters ‘handle’ themes, grasp ideas, ‘touch’ each other’s 
minds and ‘lay hands on’ a solution. Putting these ideas into the spotlight in Titus 
Andronicus has uncovered a rich set of meanings that enables Titus’ failed handshake 
to resonate throughout the play. Everything from the vegetable imagery associated 
with Lavinia to his own order to ‘lay hands on’ his enemies works within a 
framework of ideas about embodied social cohesion.  
Severed hands, then, are never completely ‘buried’ in Titus Andronicus. 
Cognitive processes and social ceremonies are so pervasively embodied in gesture in 
this play that even when hands are severed they remain as a symbolic and cognitive 
force in Rome. The next chapter develops these arguments about embodied political 
action, examining how a relatively brief kneeling gesture in Julius Caesar lingers on 
with an uncanny agency.  
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Chapter 2 
‘Doth not Brutus bootless kneel?’ Kneeling in Julius Caesar 
 
Introduction 
In Julius Caesar (1599), the conspirators kneel to Caesar before killing him.105 Their 
ostensible purpose is ‘to beg enfranchisement for Publius Cimber’ (3.1.57), but, given 
that immediately afterwards they turn against Caesar and perform the utmost act of 
disobedience by murdering him, their kneeling gesture is much more than a simple act 
of submission. This kneeling gesture is striking because Shakespeare deliberately 
added it to the drama and carefully emphasises its presence. In Thomas North’s 
translation of Plutarch’s Life of Julius Caesar, the key source for Shakespeare’s play, 
the conspirators do not kneel before killing Caesar, they simply ‘press’ close to 
him.106 Shakespeare’s characters, contrastingly, highlight this kneeling gesture, 
making what North figures as a horizontal movement into a very definitely vertical 
one. Cassius, for instance, says to Caesar, ‘as low as to thy foot doth Cassius fall’, and 
Caesar remarks, ‘doth not Brutus bootless kneel?’ (3.1.56, 75). At first glance, it 
seems odd that, precisely at the moment that they aim to destroy his authority, the 
conspirators perform a gesture of obedience to Caesar. This chapter establishes that 
both early modern texts and cognitive theory suggest that the kneeling gesture can 
produce deferent thoughts in the kneeler’s mind towards the person they are kneeling 
to. This makes the conspirators’ kneeling gesture seem downright hazardous as well 
as counterintuitive: why would they risk making their thoughts become submissive 
towards Caesar when their goal is to submit to him no longer? This chapter uses 
Catherine Malabou’s theory of neural plasticity to provide an answer to this problem. 
Reading neuroscientifically-inspired texts by Malabou, Amy Cook, and Guillemette 
Bolens alongside Julius Caesar shows that, precisely because kneeling is so crucial to 
creating and cementing social hierarchies in this play, it is also a gesture with the 
potential to trouble and disrupt those hierarchies. 
 Amy Cook in Shakespearean Neuroplay (2010) and Guillemette Bolens in The 
Style of Gestures (2012) have developed theories of kinesis in literature and drama 
                                                
105  The play was first published in the First Folio (1623); tourist Thomas Platter's diary records visiting 
the newly-opened Globe around 2pm on September 21 1599 to see Julius Caesar. 
106 Thomas North, Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans (London: Richard Field, 1595), Xxxiv.  
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that are useful for understanding this kneeling gesture in Julius Caear. Shakespearean 
Neuroplay focuses on conceptual blending theory: a cognitive linguistic theory that, 
as Cook describes, explains how Shakespeare blends together different concepts in 
Hamlet to create ‘a complicated and often ambiguous text’ filled with ‘novel ideas, 
creative leaps, and powerful associations’.107 Within this overall linguistic framework, 
Cook constantly draws attention to the actors’ bodies as a place where not only the 
author’s words but the audience’s own thoughts are ‘incarnated’: ‘the words of the 
author become the language of the character through the bodies of the actor and we 
are incarnated’.108 Shakespearean Neuroplay’s concern with bodily movement as a 
site where thought is not just represented but also produced is also taken up in The 
Style of Gestures. Bolens argues that we use our ability to read other people’s 
thoughts and emotions through their gestures to help us to understand the thoughts 
and emotions of literary characters. She contends that, taking advantage of our ‘ability 
to read others’ kinesis’, authors embody characters’ cognition in descriptions of those 
characters’ bodily movements, as well as of other bodily phenomena such as 
blushing.109 This chapter will extend Bolens’ examination of kinesis in books that are 
intended to be read (she focuses here, for instance on the novels of James Joyce and 
Jane Austen, and worked in 2013-4 on the experience of reading Dante’s Divine 
Comedy aloud) to gestures performed on the Shakespearean stage. 
As explored in the previous chapter, Lakoff and Johnson argue that our 
abstract concepts are inherently based on embodied metaphors, and that the physical 
structures of the brain and body fundamentally shape thought. We saw that the notion 
of ‘grasping’ an idea is embodied in the grasping motion of the hand; the same 
principle can be applied to genuflection and other gestures of submission.  For 
instance, when I say that I ‘refuse to bow to your arguments’, Lakoff and Johnson’s 
work suggests that the notion of ‘bowing’ is not just a secondary representation of the 
more abstract concept of my acquiescing to your point of view. Rather, our 
understanding of what it is to ‘acquiesce’ is entirely shaped by our embodied 
experience of the bowing motion of the knees and back.110  The idea that thought is 
                                                
107 Amy Cook, Shakespearean Neuroplay (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 91-2. 
108 Cook, Shakespearean Neuroplay, 150. 
109 Guillemette Bolens, The Style of Gestures: Embodiment and Cognition in Literary Narrative, trans 
Guillemette Bolens, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2012, first published in French, 2008), 40. 
110 C.f. Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 3, 9-12, 77.  
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shaped by the body has always been, and continued to be, central to cognitive theory, 
as the work of Matlock, and Murat and Aydede (cited in the introduction), 
demonstrates. Cook uses submissive gestures, kneeling in particular, to illustrate this. 
Submissive gestures, she argues, generate feelings of submissiveness on the part of 
the gesturer, and reflect and generate hierarchical power-relationships. She writes, 
‘who we are—what we feel, what we do, where we are, and what we remember—is 
then best seen as an embodied, embedded, and transactional performance’. By 
‘performance’, Cook means that gestures do not just represent thought but can also 
produce it, ‘the performance of the action does not signify; it creates’.111 The fact 
that the actors are deliberately acting the kneeling gesture perhaps insulates them from 
the potential performativity of this gesture: they do not kneel like a devout subject or 
worshipper, hoping that the gesture will effect a mental transformation. The actors are 
not in the court pledging allegiance or in the church attempting to connect with the 
divine, but in the theatre, following a script. As far as the characters of the 
conspirators in Julius Caesar are concerned, though, it can be argued that the kneeling 
gesture does have a significant impact on their minds. As this chapter will 
demonstrate, early modern discussions of kneeling suggest that the physical gesture of 
kneeling was all that was needed to produce submissive thoughts. I will contend in 
this chapter that is possible to read Julius Caesar as depicting something like this 
happening to the conspirators’ thoughts when they kneel.  
Intriguingly, Shakespeare leaves it somewhat ambiguous as to whether or not 
the conspirators kneel ironically, or, like the theare actor, with a deliberate and 
conscious sense of creating a particular visual effect rather than a genuine mental 
transformation. This is particularly true of Cassius, who (as we have seen) expresses 
scorn earlier in the play at having to ‘bend his body’ (1.2.116-8) at Caesar’s 
command. In this way, Shakespeare also problematises the neat distinction between 
the actor and the character that I have just proposed. 
As one of the most important and widely-used early modern gestures of 
secular and religious obedience, kneeling was a powerful tool for rulers to shape their 
subjects’ thoughts into a submissive bent. This suggests that Shakespeare and his 
audiences, along with modern cognitive theorists, are likely to see the conspirators’ 
kneeling gesture as potentially producing submissive thoughts in the conspirators’ 
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minds. Notably, unlike other gestures such as kissing saints’ images, kneeling in 
church survived the reformation and related political changes (though it still provoked 
controversy).  Invoking Aristotelian theories of habit discussed at more length in 
chapter 4, the historian Ramie Targoff writes that Elizabeth I’s insistence on 
attendance at the Church of England, no matter what each individual worshipper’s 
private thoughts were on the matter, enabled the monarch to produce conforming, 
pious, obedient subjects, due to the church’s ‘affirmative belief in what Aristotle 
describes as the efficacy of “habit”…what appeared to be a simple request for an 
untaxing and potentially unmeaningful participation in a weekly service turns out to 
be a strategy to transform the worshipper’s soul’. Targoff cites Hamlet’s advice to 
Gertrude, ‘assume a virtue if you have it not’, and suggests that, according to 
Elizabethan Anglicanism, ‘assuming’ a virtue for long enough enables one to ‘have’ it 
eventually.112  Elizabeth I did not rely solely on kneeling to procure conformity; she 
required all members of the House of Commons to swear an Oath of Allegiance to her 
in 1563 for instance. However, the potential for kneeling to sculpt thought was clearly 
an important part of Renaissance discourse and theological and political practice.113  
Cook’s assertion that subjectivity is ‘transactional’ centres around the 
experimental finding that subjects learn through mimicking others’ gestures, 
‘According to embodied cognition, perception/cognition does not exist as thought; it 
is an internal action. We imitate in order to feel, and we feel in order to know’.114 
Guillemette Bolens argues that people learn by understanding and replicating others’ 
bodily movements in their own bodies and anchoring them in our bodies through 
‘kinaesthetic memory’; she calls this process ‘kinaesthetic learning’.115  Paul Murphy 
has applied these kinaesthetic theories to medieval prayer, arguing that bowing and 
                                                
112 Ramie Targoff, Common Prayer: The Language of Public Devotion in Early Modern England 
(Chicago: Chicago University press, 2001), 4.  
113 James I remained preoccupied with kneeling; prescribing and controlling the ways in which his 
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123-33. 
115 Bolens, The Style of Gestures, 1-3. 
 
72 
kneeling were widely accepted in the medieval era as the best way for lay people, 
though illiterate and untrained in theology, to achieve the penitent mindset adequate 
for salvation simply by copying the priest’s kneeling gestures.116 Post-reformation 
theological texts tend to display a similar trust in the power of gesture to teach and 
induce conformity.117 The Anglican (though Puritan-leaning) bishop of Winchester 
Lancelot Andrewes’ (1555-1626) discussion ‘Of Outward Reverence in Gods 
worship’ in The Pattern of Catechistical Doctrine at Large (published posthumously 
in 1650) provides one of the most thorough accounts, and one that is particularly 
suggestive for kinaesthetic ideas of habit. Andrewes proposes three reasons that 
worshippers ought to kneel in prayer, 
 
1. That God may be glorified, as well by the body, which is the external 
worship, as by the soul and spirit, which is for the internal. 2. That our 
outward gesture may stir up our souls to their duty, as clothes increase the 
heat of the body, though they receive their heat at first from the body. 
Lastly, as to stir up our selves, so to stir up others by our example, that 
they seeing our reverend  behaviour, may fall down with us, and be 
moved to do that which they see us do, and to glorifie God on our 
behalf.118  
                                                
116 Paul Murphy, “John Mirk, Reginald Pecock and the Gestures of Late Medieval Prayer,” paper 
presented at Sensing the Sacred conference, University of York, 21-22 June 2013. 
117 Gervase Babington, who was to become bishop of Worcester writes, ‘The Lord weigheth not 
outward gesture, but inward hart, yet in respect of our selues outward gesture dooth helpe our inward 
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hands lift vp, and such like, therefore to be vsed’, Certaine Plaine, Briefe and Comfortable Notes Upon 
Everie Chapter of Genesis (London: for Tomas Charde, 1592) X7r. Bulwer argues that prayer gestures 
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discussions of external signs of worship. Margery Kempe (c. 1373-c.1439), for example, deduces a 
priest’s holy mindset from his ‘gestur and vestur’, The Book of Margery Kempe, ed. Barry Windeatt 
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Andrewes establishes gesture’s power to bear meaning in church ritual by asserting 
that it can ‘glorif[y] God’. With a felicitous implicit pun on habit (custom), habit 
(clothing), and inhabiting a role until it inhabits us, Andrewes highlights the 
reciprocal, duplicative role of kinesis emphasised by Bolens in her discussion of how 
we learn by physically copying others, arguing optimistically that gesture can cause 
others to ‘be moved to do that which they see us do’.  Andrewes is writing after the 
reformation, when kneeling had become a much more controverisial gesture in terms 
of different Christian sects than it was in the medieval era. However, one key 
continuity between Andrewes’ thoughts on kneeling and medieval ideas of 
genuflection is his suggestion that kneeling has the power to affect the gesturer’s 
mind, and the minds of others.   
 The first prayer manual to deal with kneeling, De Penitentia, was written 
before the early modern period, by the twelfth-century French theologian Peter 
Cantor. Cantor’s work is significant here as he concentrates on the cognitive effects 
that kneeling has on the penitent, establishing ideas about kneeling’s power to sculpt 
thought that laid the foundations for early modern discussions of kneeling.  Cantor 
shows how the physical gesture of kneeling constructs a distinct relationship between 
the person kneeling, their environment, and anyone they are kneeling to. Despite its 
focus on twelfth-century Christianity, Cantor’s work remains applicable today 
because his observations about kneeling are rooted in the downward bodily 
movements involved in the kneeling gesture, and these have not changed over time. It 
has been the case from the twelfth century to the present day that the kneeler becomes 
physically lower than the people standing or sitting around them. Concomitantly, 
kneeling creates a significant difference in perspective between the person kneeling 
and the person they are kneeling to, or other people standing around them. Kneeling 
restricts the view to the feet or legs of the person being knelt to, or (if the kneeler’s 
head is bowed) simply to the ground and the kneeler’s own hands. The person being 
knelt to, however, has a complete view of the kneeler’s body and of the world around 
them. The kneeler can often feel the painful or uncomfortable presence of the ground 
                                                                                                                                       
(London: Longman, 1999), 142. Bishop of Exeter John Gauden writes, ‘a Master of a family may 
appoint the time, place, manner, and measure, gesture and vesture, wherein he will have all his family 
to serve God with him’, having also coupled ‘vesture, gesture’ one page earlier, Considerations 
Touching the Liturgy of the Church of England (London: J.G., 1661), F3r-v. 
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with their knees, touching the earth with more of their body than they do when 
standing, making the earth more of an insistent presence in their experience of the 
world at that point. As such, before the early modern era began, kneeling had acquired 
associations of vulnerability, disempowerment, earthliness, and inferiority.119  
Cantor attests that kneeling is the most significant part of outward penitence, 
because it reminds the gesturer of their fallen condition, that their thoughts are 
sinfully turned to the earth rather than heaven, and their beast-like nature. 120 Bending 
                                                
119 In his twelfth-century commentary on the Ephesians, St. Thomas Aquinas writes that kneeling 
signifies humility and subjection, moreover, ‘the strength of the body is located in the knees; thus, 
when someone bends their knees they testify to the loss of their strength’, ‘flecto genua mea ad patrem, 
etc… est signum humilitatis propter duo. Primo quia qui genua flectit, quodam modo parvificat se, et 
subiicit se ei, cui genua flectit: unde per huiusmodi ostenditur recognitio propriae fragilitatis et 
parvitatis. secundo quia in genu est fortitudo corporis. Quando ergo quis genua flectit, protestatur 
debilitatem suae virtutis’, Epistolam ad Ephesios, 3.4, Corpus Thomisticum, last accessed June 2 2015, 
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/, my translation. The other connotations of kneeling are discussed 
in more detail below. 
120 ‘[S]ane quoniam potissima et principalis pars est penitentiae exterioris genuflexio’ (Cantor reiterates 
this in his section “De Genuflexionibus,” ‘kneeling is the most powerful element of external penitence, 
and its strongest instrument’: ‘genuflexiones sunt potentissima pars exterioris penitentiae et 
fortissimum ferramentum eius’,); ‘whoever prostrates themselves on the earth resembles a beast’, ‘thus 
kneeling is a sign of penitence and misery’ (‘Qui in terra iacet, bestiis quasi similes in factis cernimus’, 
‘Item signum est penitentis et dolentis genuflexio’). Kneeling is fitting at all times, he says, because 
‘this prostrating the person, signifies of him humility, remorse, penitence, devotion, and a mind focused 
on God’, ‘est autem gestus sic prostrati et iacentis hominis significatio, et cum iactura humilitate, 
compuncte, contrite, devote, atque intente ad deum mentis’, “De Oratione,” in The Christian At Prayer: 
An Illustrated Prayer Manual Attributed to Peter the Chanter, ed. Richard Trexler (New York: 
Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1987), 233-4, 189. All translations from Cantor are m 
own. Cantor identifies seven key gestures for use in prayer, all of which he argues can be practiced in 
order to produce various specific types of devotional mindset; two involve kneeling, one is total 
prostration, the rest are various standing postures. Cantor ‘never defines a motion as a mode of 
prayer…not even “genuflection”…as used by Peter, this word–like all other words describing prayer 
behaviour–refers to the already-shaped body and not to the process of shaping it’; for him, 
‘“gesture”…means posture: an immobile sign of a stable moral or immoral condition’, Richard Trexler, 
“Introduction,” in The Christian at Prayer, 36-7. De Penitentia exists in 9 different manuscripts of 
varying length, each with different illustrations. Trexler calls his edition, based on all 9 manuscripts, 
“De Oratione”. Cantor wrote at a time when kneeling upright with the hands clasped (as opposed to the 
previous form of total prostration) was just emerging as a significant way of kneeling, Przemysław 
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the face to the earth whilst kneeling also, Cantor notes, has the practical effect of 
preventing the gesturer from seeing anything that might distract them from prayer (‘a 
woman, or anything else that might draw the heart from God’).121 Cantor’s work 
initiated a long tradition, stretching into the early modern era and beyond, of viewing 
kneeling as the best gesture for producing a penitent mindset.122 In the Renaissance, 
these associations were deeply politicised: high and low postures of the body 
correlated to high and low social status. These culturally-agreed meanings of the 
kneeling gesture were instrumental in forming and consolidating Renaissance political 
hierarchies. 
Before, during, and after the Reformation early modern subjects knelt in 
almost every imaginable context where deference to authority was being confirmed or 
appealed to. Subjects would kneel when asking a favour, pardon, or blessing from, or 
declaring allegiance and obedience to, a parent, courtly lover, political authority (such 
as the monarch or a noble person), or God. They would kneel to be knighted and arise 
with new honours attached to their name. As in Othello 3.1 when Iago and Othello 
vow, kneeling, to kill Desdemona, it may have been common to kneel before making 
a pact, treasonous or otherwise, to register before God one’s determination to perform 
certain actions. The German tourist Leopold von Wedel describes courtiers wishing 
merely to gossip with Elizabeth I in a casual after-dinner setting nevertheless having 
to kneel before her for the duration of the conversation as she sat or reclined on a 
cushion.123 It was also customary for actors to kneel or bow at the end of a play, to say 
a prayer or express allegiance to the monarch and (often) the players’ patron.124 
The kneeling gesture’s deep entanglement with social hierarchy, and its power 
to disrupt these hierarchies, is present in the earliest discussions of religious kneeling 
                                                                                                                                       
Mrozowski, “Genuflection in Medieval Western Culture: The Gesture of Expiation–The Praying 
Posture,” trans. Janina Dorosz, Acta Poloniae Historica 68 (1993), 21.  
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in the West. As Targoff shows, Cantor marks an early emphasis on kneeling’s power 
to shape thought that continued into the Renaissance. Despite this broad continuity, 
though, it is important to remember the discontinuity between medieval and post-
reformation discussions of genuflections. Whilst Cantor talks more generally about 
kneeling producing penitent thoughts, post-Reformation writers often took great care 
to distinguish between Catholic and Protestant notions of penitence and devotion. As 
the discussion of Thomas Morton’s writing later in this chapter shows, whilst post-
reformation Church of England officials tended to agree that kneeling had power over 
a gesturer’s mind, they were careful to separate out this kneeling gesture from the 
‘idolotrous’ ideas associated with genuflection in Catholic worship.    
De Penitentia is permeated with an attention to social hierarchy; Cantor 
divides worshippers into three categories. The clerical classes’ ability to read scripture 
and pray verbally places them in a masterful, pedagogic role, shaping the gestures and 
thus the minds of the lower people whose only hope of salvation is copying the 
priests’ prayer gestures. In the middle are the soldiers, who defend Christianity 
against enemies, protecting the passive laypeople.125 When a higher-ranking person 
kneels, the gesture has the potential to disturb their social position by associating them 
with inferiority and subjection. Cantor repeatedly wrestles with the problem that 
soldiers, rich people, and nobility felt ‘ashamed’ to kneel and disdained this gesture 
because it was associated with social inferiority. Cantor describes the twelfth-century 
upper classes as, ‘those wretched people too proud to bow their knees before God’.126  
Strikingly, many of the various manuscript editions of De Penitentia make this issue 
visible, and perhaps attempt to correct it, by depicting high-status people kneeling and 
prostrating themselves: rakish men-about-town, bejewelled women, and soldiers; 
                                                
125 ‘[P]ersone ecclesie, et omnes dea devote’; ‘bellatorum…hoc est, militum qui debent expugnare 
inimicos ecclesie’; ‘agricolum et pauperum atque operarium labore et sudore…Quos tam oratores 
quem pugnatores tenentur protegere ac defensare, atque pro eis intercedere et orare’, Cantor “De 
Oratione,” 224-6. Trexler argues that this  ‘pedagogical formalization’ of praying gestures ‘casts doubt 
on their assertedly “natural” character’, marking them out as something socially constructed, 
“Legitimating Prayer Gestures in the Twelfth Century. The De Penitentia of Peter the Chanter,” 
History and Anthropology 1(1) (1984), 97. C.f. Trexler, “Introduction,” The Christian At Prayer, 9, 25-
6. 
126 ‘[I]sti sane miseri dedignantur flectere genua sua coram deo’, Cantor, “De Oratione,” 187. 
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people who would be kneeled to in a secular context.127 Richard Trexler argues that 
this attempt to encourage twelfth-century nobility to kneel was a key cause of the 
‘failure’ of Cantor’s book to gain popularity among the upper classes.128 With its 
complaints about the ‘wretched’ elite and its depictions of them in gestures of 
submission, Cantor’s text shows that from its inception as a Western religious gesture, 
kneeling could be used to challenge and unsettle social hierarchies.129 At the same 
time, kneeling in prayer was one way that early modern monarchs asserted their 
claims to religious authority; one famous example is Elizabeth I’s 1559 prayer book 
(currently held in Lambeth Palace Library), which depicts Elizabeth kneeling in 
prayer. The prayers inside evoke both Elizabeth’s humility and her power: she is cast 
as a ‘weake woman’ and yet one who (with God’s help) will ‘rule these thy kingdoms 
of England and Ireland, an innumerable and warlike nation’. 130 A traditional gesture 
of religious and social humility since at least Cantor’s time, kneeling was nevertheless 
the site of power over other human beings in the Renaissance. Again, despite the 
similarities between these medieval and Renaissance depictions and discussions of 
                                                
127 Cantor did not illustrate the manuscripts himself. Trexler provies discussion and sample images 
from all extant manuscripts, “Introduction,” The Christian at Prayer, 62-5. Trexler suggests (121) that 
illustrators included these figures in the manuscripts to try and dispel the shame socially-elite figures 
felt when kneeling, providing them with their own images to copy.  
128 Trexler argues that Cantor ‘failed’ because high-status people continued to disdain to kneel. He adds 
that the illustrations also often contributed to the text’s failure by misrepresenting the substance of the 
text, “The De Penitentia of Peter the Chanter,” 115. The very fact that Cantor’s manuals on kneeling 
are marketed to the upper classes reflects and helps to consolidate this class’s position as arbiters of 
taste and key role models when it comes to the kneeling gesture.  
129 Before the twelfth century, ‘genuflection occurs only sporadically in the iconography of early 
Christianity’ (it is mentioned, for example, by Tertullian), for a similar reason: previously to this 
kneeling was eschewed in practice, and in religious iconography, because it was ‘semantically 
connected with sin and the sense of guilt’; thus kneeling was prohibited on Sundays and Easter in the 
first centuries of Christianity (at first officially, and then officially in 325 at the Council of Nicea) 
because it did not befit a celebration of freedom from sin. The Virgin Mary was not depicted kneeling 
until around the twelfth century; previously to this, portrayals of her kneeling would have contradicted 
the assumption that she was sin-free. Mrozowski argues that when depictions of a kneeling Virgin did 
begin to appear in iconography this ‘shows that this gesture had completely changed its meaning, that 
in Latin Europe it had become first and foremost an expression of full dedication, trust, love and 
adoration’, “Genuflection in Medieval Western Culture,” 6-8, 18, 22. 
130 Lambeth Palace Library, ‘Queen Elizabeth I Prayer Book’, 
http://www.lambethpalacelibrary.org/content/elizabethprayerbook (accessed March 1st 2016). 
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kneeling, Renaissance texts are markedly shaped by their specific context. Here, for 
instance, Elizabeth uses her kneeling gesture to assert her dominance over Ireland and 
her martial power.  
Kneeling was also an important site of intersection between political 
allegiance and religious devotion; to kneel to God was simultaneously to submit 
oneself to the divinely-instituted monarch and vice versa. This secular significance is 
woven into the very roots of the kneeling gesture; Przemysław Mrozowski shows that 
kneeling was first used in the West as a signifier of feudal allegiance and was adopted 
into church ceremonies in the eleventh century as a metaphor which allowed 
worshippers to see God as a kind of feudal lord.131 In his much-published 1547 
homily ‘An Exhortation to Obedience’, Thomas Cranmer, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury who helped to shape the new Church of England under Henry VIII, 
nakedly links the divine and ecclesiastical order to the imperative to obey the earthly 
monarch, urging subjects to ‘obey from the bottom of our hearts’ and ‘fear the most 
detestable vice of rebellion’ because ‘he that resisteth common authority resisteth God 
and his audience’.132  
Isabel Davis shows that kneeling was intimately linked to the creation of 
social class. Davis uses Althusser’s theory of ‘interpellation’ to explain how kneeling 
produced late-medieval subjects. Interpellation is the process of ‘hailing’ or ‘calling’ 
to someone and thus forcing them (when they respond to the call) to acknowledge 
themselves as the recipient of the call and thus to take on the role of the particular 
                                                
131 Mrozowski describes a ‘genetic link’ between kneeling in ceremonies of feudal homage and the 
earliest use of kneeling as a prayer gesture in the 11th century church: kneeling was ‘adopted in the 
sacral sphere to represent the attitude to God in prayer…Not only was the earthly ruler a temporal 
image of God; God, too, was perceived in earthly categories in the general consciousness’; ‘the 
adoption of secular symbolism in the sacral sphere’ rendered orthodox the idea of Christians paying 
‘feudal homage’ to God, Mary, or Christ, “Genuflection in Medieval Western Culture,” 8-9, 22-4. 
132 Thomas Cranmer argues that failure to uphold this hierarchy will result in ‘calamity’: everything 
from wayside robbery to goods held in common, Certayne Sermons, or Homilies, Appoynted by the 
Kynges Majestie (London; Richard Grafton, 1547), R1r-v. This text went through several editions 
throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and was appointed to be read in churches as a more 
detailed exposition of the orthodox doctrine in the 39 articles. Cranmer had ‘a breathtaking scepticism 
about any independent character for the church’, believing it should answer to ‘the authority of the 
Christian prince’, Diarmaid MacCullough, Thomas Cranmer: A Life (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1999), 278-80. 
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type of subject that was being hailed. Althusser gives the example of a policeman 
hailing a criminal, ‘hey you’; by turning round and acknowledging the call, the person 
called becomes a criminal subject.133 Davis argues that kneeling in response to a 
command from authority, such as a monarch commanding subjects to kneel in 
conformity, produces subjects in precisely this way. She contends that, as we have 
seen with early modern kneeling gestures, kneeling in the medieval era produced 
subjects of both God and the current monarch, ‘God temporarily suffers imperfect 
human “callings” at the same time as he issues his own call. Thus, although human 
and divine “callings” are not identical, they are also not necessarily distinguishable 
and in fact often coincide’. 134  As in the present day, in the medieval and early 
modern eras, being ‘called’ in the sense of having a ‘calling’ or ‘vocation’ is 
equivalent to having a designated role in society. In the Renaissance, kneeling to, or at 
the command of, those in authority, produced and consolidated hierarchical social 
relations.135 Deploying the idea of interpellation in the context of cognitive theory 
enables us to reassess Althusser’s idea that the kneeling gesture is not necessary for 
producing ideological subjects. Althusser states that even if subjects did not kneel, or 
otherwise respond to commands from their superiors, they would still be subject to 
their authority because all subjects are already subjects of the dominant ideology, 
‘ideology has always-already interpellated individuals as subjects…an individual is 
                                                
133 Louis Althusser describes hailing as states’ main tool for reproducing social inequalities, ‘Ideology 
“acts” or “functions” in such a way that it “recruits” subjects among the individuals (it recruits them 
all) or “transforms” the individuals (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have 
called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace 
everyday police (or other) hailing: “Hey, you there”’, “Ideology and State Apparatus” (1970), in Lenin 
and Philosophy, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 118-9.  
134 Davis focuses on Philippians 2, a key text for medieval and early modern discussions of kneeling, 
‘at the name of Jesus, every knee shall bow’, explaining, ‘A Pauline turn in recent Continental 
philosophy has acknowledged and endorsed a significant theological residue within Marxist thinking; 
in particular, it has rewritten Paul’s doctrine of calling to describe the relationship between individual 
and Law as intersubjective’, “Calling: Langland, Gower, and Chaucer on Saint Paul,” Studies in the 
Age of Chaucer 34 (2012), 55, 53. 
135 ‘Kneeling and acknowledgement of name, of what someone is called, are thus intricately bound 
together’, Davis explains, citing the poet William Shoreham who uses ‘knowing’ and ‘kneeling’ as 
‘commensurate homonyms’, Davis, “Calling,” 82.
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always-already a subject, even before he is born’.136 Judith Butler rearticulates this 
idea in her book-length treatment of interpellation, contending that because we are 
born into a network of normative relationships, from which we cannot separate 
ourselves, we are born always-already interpellated, ‘there is no “I” that can finally 
stand apart from the social conditions of its emergence’.137 Cognitive theory, 
however, suggests that the kneeling gesture is not just (as Butler and Althusser 
maintain) a symbolic recognition of a person’s social status. Rather, this social status 
or ‘vocation’ would not exist or stay in existence without gestures like kneeling that 
respond to commands and ‘calls’ from authority. For example, in keeping with 
Butler’s ideas of performative gesture, kneeling to become a knight is not an empty 
signifier of a pre-existing relationship between knight and feudal lord; it creates that 
relationship. As such, kneeling is also the site where that relationship can be troubled 
and disrupted; the individual gesturer’s identity is in a state of flux as (s)he performs 
the gesture. 
Malabou’s theory of ‘plasticity’ can explain both why kneeling was a 
powerful tool for rulers to influence their subject’s minds and how the conspirators in 
Julius Caesar might be reclaiming this gesture for their own, republican ends. 
Plasticity is both a neural phenomenon and a cultural one; linking plasticity 
intrinsically to habit, Malabou sees it as fundamental to human existence.138 
Habitually using certain synapses (the structures which allow electrical signals to pass 
between nerve cells) when we perform certain actions and have certain thoughts 
strengthens those synapses and increases their responsiveness. Rarely-used synapses 
become increasingly less responsive. Thus, our neural pathways reflect our habitual 
thoughts and actions, making us increasingly adept at performing those thoughts and 
actions that we most habitually perform.139 Malabou argues that this ‘plasticity’, this 
                                                
136 Althusser, “Ideology and State Apparatus,” 118. 
137 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 7. 
138 Plasticity is intrinsic to being, ‘there is perhaps no reason to talk of the plasticity of Being – as if 
plasticity were some kind of quality – but of saying that Being is nothing but its plasticity’, Catherine 
Malabou, Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing, trans. Caroline Shread (Columbia: Columbia University 
Press, 2010), 36. 
139 Malabou cites cognitive neuroscientist Marc Jeannerod, ‘If a synapse belongs to a circuit in frequent 
use, it tends to grow in volume, its permeability increases, and its efficacy increases. Inversely, a little-
used synapse tends to become less efficacious. The theory of synaptic efficacy thus allows us to explain 
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ability for the brain to develop and adapt, often is an unconscious process whereby we 
allow ourselves to be shaped by the dominant cultural norms of our time. An 
Elizabethan subject who habitually submits unthinkingly to Elizabeth’s ideological 
regime as they kneel, imbibing its ideas about what kneeling means in terms of 
obedience to the monarch and denial of transubstantiation, will form habitual patterns 
in their brain that make this the dominant pattern of their thought.  
Michel Foucault describes ‘docile bodies’, malleable bodies obedient to the 
commands of authority. Malleable, that is, until they achieve the form desired by the 
authorities, at which point they are fixed and solidified into obedient patterns of 
thought and action. Bodies become truly ‘docile’, Foucault argues, when a person’s 
habitual expressions of obedience are internalised and become ‘natural and 
“organic”’.140 Though, for Foucault, this ultimate fixity is never completely attained, 
it is the key goal towards which authorities work. Malabou articulates a similar idea, 
explaining that habitual actions dissolve the boundary between the mind and body, 
turning the body’s external gestures into a holistic second nature until eventually we 
(first ‘passively’, then deliberately) fulfil the commands of authority almost, she says, 
as if we were ‘slumbering’, 
 
If an external change is repeated, it turns into a tendency internal to the 
subject. The change itself is transformed into a disposition, and 
receptivity, formerly passive, becomes activity. Thus habit is revealed as a 
process through which man ends by willing or choosing what came to him 
from outside. Henceforth the will of the individual does not need to 
oppose the pressure of the external world; the will learns gradually to 
want what is.141 
                                                                                                                                       
the gradual molding of a brain under the influence of individual experience, to the point of making it 
possible for us, in principle, to account for the individual characteristics and particularities of each 
brain’, Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, trans. Sebastian Rand (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2008), 7. 
140 ‘A body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved’, Michel Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1975), 136, 
156. 
141 Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, and Dialectic, trans. Lisabeth 
During (London: Routledge, 2005), 70-1. She describes (8-9) how plasticity creates an intractable 
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Thus, ‘habit is the process whereby the contingent becomes essential’.142 As Targoff 
suggests, Renaissance notions of habitual conformity entailed that eventually subjects 
internalised conforming thoughts without even consciously having to think them, 
‘man ends by willing or choosing what came to him from outside’.  
Early moderns underscored the importance of physical action to creating 
thought-patterns, by using physical metaphors to express the idea of religious 
conformity. The word ‘conform’ derives from Latin ‘conformare’, which means to 
shape or modify things so that they become alike. The ideal early modern subject is 
physically and mentally malleable; conformity of mind is produced through a con-
formed body. Non-conformists (generally, Puritans who disliked using too many 
gestures of worship) tended to be described as contrastingly ‘stiff-’ or ‘hard-’ necked 
because they refused to bow their necks in church (and, thus, it was assumed, refused 
to submit to the monarch’s authority), and therefore did not allow themselves to be 
shaped into conforming subjects. Archbishop of Canterbury and staunch anti-Puritan 
Richard Bancroft (1544-1610) laments the ‘hardened neckes’ of non-conformists in 
several of his printed works.143 Like Lakoff and Johnson’s theories, early modern 
notions of habitually-subservient thoughts are inextricable from the bending motions 
of the body bowing to authority. Kneeling in Julius Caesar evokes an early modern 
belief that the mind bends with the body, making the conspirators’ gesture in one 
sense highly risky, and hard to understand if they want to steel their thoughts to kill 
Caesar.  
 Malabou’s work suggests a solution to this conundrum; whilst Foucauldian 
‘docile bodies’ are disempowered by their malleability, Malabou emphasises that we 
can also control our own plasticity to resist the attempts of authorities to transform 
                                                                                                                                       
second nature, ‘the adjective “plastic”, whilst certainly in opposition to “rigid”, “fixed”, and “ossified”, 
is not to be confused with “polymorphous”. Things that are plastic preserve their shape, as does the 
marble in a statue: once given a configuration, it is unable to recover its initial form. “Plastic”, thus, 
designates those things that lend themselves to being formed while resisting deformation’. 
142 Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 74. 
143 E.g. Richard Bancroft et al, Certaine Demandes with their Grounds, Drawne out of Holy Writ 
(Middelburg: R Schilders, 1605), D2r. The phrase ‘stiff-necked’ is first recorded in Tyndale’s 1526 
English Bible, O.E.D., ‘stiff-necked’, adj. 
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us.144 By being conscious of how our brain responds plastically to our thoughts and 
actions, we can choose to cultivate certain ideas and practices that enable us to shape 
our own brains in ways that resist the dominant culture. Thus, plasticity can be both 
active and passive,  
 
According to its etymology – from the Greek plassein, to mold – the word 
plasticity has two basic senses: it means at once the capacity to receive 
form (clay is called “plastic”, for example) and the capacity to give form 
(as in the plastic arts or in plastic surgery). Talking about the plasticity of 
the brain thus amounts to thinking of the brain as something modifiable, 
“formable”, and formative at the same time.145 
 
Malabou stresses plasticity’s anarchic properties further with her idea of ‘destructive 
plasticity’, whereby, ‘plasticity is also the capacity to annihilate the very form it is 
able to receive or create…to talk about the plasticity of the brain means to see in it not 
only the creator and receiver of form but also an agency of disobedience to every 
constituted form, a refusal to submit to a model’.146 Instead of allowing others to 
exploit our malleability, and the close relationship between gesture and thought, we 
can take control of our own plasticity, habitually manipulating our body to change our 
mindset to our own liking. These specifically neural ideas are embedded in Malabou’s 
broader theories of habit, where she emphasises that we can allow others to use our 
habits to shape us, or we can use them to shape ourselves. In The Future of Hegel, she 
links Greek hexis (habit) with exein (to have/possess) and talks of creating a new 
                                                
144 Foucault describes the ideal subject’s body as relinquishing all of its power to the state, and being so 
completely shaped by the hands of the state that it has no remaining energy to act autonomously, 
‘discipline…disassociates power from the body’, leaving it only with enough energy to carry out the 
tasks that the state has shaped it to do, Discipline and Punish, 138. 
145 Malabou, What Should We Do With Our Brain?, 5. Clayton Crockett explains, for Malabou, ‘The 
plasticity of the brain is so radical that we create our brains...We think that our brains make us, 
forgetting that we also make our brains’, “Foreword,” in Malabou, Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing, 
xxii. 
146 Malabou, What Should We Do With Our Brain?, 5. Elsewhere, she puns ‘“Plastic” on its own is an 
explosive material with a nitroglycerine and nitrocellulose base that can set off violent 
detonations....the annihilation of all form (the bomb)’, The Future of Hegel, 9. 
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nature deliberately ‘imposed by the soul’, enabling a kind of self-possession.147 
Prompted by these ideas, this chapter explores the hypothesis that, when they kneel in 
Julius Caesar, the conspirators are in fact attempting to reclaim this gesture: by 
consciously deploying it as part of a republican coup, they attempt to destroy 
kneeling’s significance as a gesture of submission. 
 When Julius Caesar was first performed in 1599, kneeling was embedded 
within a complex network of different, and often conflicting, meanings, which it had 
absorbed throughout Reformation debates.148 Like the conspirators, early modern 
people were thus able to exploit the fact that kneeling had the potential to embody 
many different meanings, allowing onlookers to assume that their kneeling gesture 
meant one thing, when in fact it meant quite another. Before the Protestant Church of 
England was created in 1534, when people knelt before the Eucharist they were 
(officially, at least) kneeling before the Real Presence of Christ. After 1534, church 
leaders created explicit injunctions to try and fix the meaning of the kneeling gesture, 
so that it was not an acknowledgement of the Real Presence but simply a mark of 
gratitude to Christ. Most notably in 1552, a section of text called the ‘Black Rubric’ 
was added to the Book of Common Prayer, stipulating that worshippers should 
receive communion kneeling, but stressing that kneeling did not signify idolatrous 
‘adoration’ of the sacrament or belief in the Real Presence, and was merely a sign of 
the worshipper’s thankfulness and devotion.149 For many worshippers throughout the 
sixteenth century, this transition from Catholicism to Protestantism was not smooth or 
welcomed, rendering their kneeling gestures ambiguous.  
                                                
147 Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 56. She writes (37-8), ‘The characteristic of habit is to substitute for 
an immediacy which is natural a second immediacy, an immediacy “posited” by soul. This repeated 
immediacy rightly deserves the name of “second nature”’. 
148 Ferrell explains, though outward conformity in worship was rarely enforced in practice, vehement 
debates about conformity were longer-lasting, “Kneeling and the Body Politic,” 75-9. 
149 Removed under Elizabeth in 1559, the Black Rubric returned in condensed version in 1662 prayer 
books. This condensed Rubric represents a considerable change from the originally more fluid meaning 
of kneeling evoked at the end of the 1549 prayer book, ‘As touching kneeling, crossing…and other 
gestures: they may be used or left as every mans devocion serveth without blame’, The Book of 
Common Prayer (London: Edward Whytchurche, 1549). The injunction to kneel at communion 
reached Scotland in 1617-18, when the first article of James VI’s Five Articles of Perth stated that 
communion should be received kneeling. Reluctantly approved by Scottish Parliament in 1621, the 
articles remained controversial and were later repealed. 
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 Early modern audiences would have been alert to the way that the kneeling 
gesture could be used both to induce conformity and to carefully calibrate precisely 
what type of conformity is being produced. These audiences would surely have been 
attuned to the way that the consiprators’ act of kneeling can be read, variously and 
simultaneously, as creating a tyrant, acknowledging a lawful ruler, or, even, defying a 
ruler’s authority altogether under the cloak of outward conformity. Early modern 
writers were often very explicit about the ways that they manipulated the meaning of 
kneeling to control subjects, making them conform. The officially-sanctioned treatise 
A Defence of the Innocencie of the Three Ceremonies of the Church of England 
(1618) by Bishop of Durham Thomas Morton is perhaps the most thorough 
illustration of how rulers and church leaders used theological arguments to justify this 
political aim. Morton states that kneeling is not a sacrament whose meaning is fixed 
by God, but a ‘ceremony indifferent’ whose meaning can be decided by humans.150 
Morton deploys a slippery idea of ‘liberty’ to situate the monarch as the sole arbiter of 
this meaning. He argues that allowing human beings to decide whether to kneel in 
church and what this gesture means preserves the ‘liberty’ of both worshippers and 
clergy, ‘to deny the Church power, to choose her gesture of Reverence, is contrary to 
the libertie allowed her by Christ’. He adds that worshippers should be freed from the 
meaningless ceremonies to which Catholicism had bound them, enjoying ‘a libertie 
from the necessary observation of such things, which are in their owne nature 
                                                
150 Thomas Morton, A Defence of the Innocencie of Three Ceremonies of the Church of England 
(London: for William Barret, 1618), ¶4v. Ferrell shows that rulers used this argument that kneeling was 
‘adiaphoric’ (or morally ‘indifferent’) throughout the reformation, explaining of the 1549 prayer book, 
‘to describe communion kneeling as expressive solely of humility and good order made possible, 
therefore, not only its description as mere ceremonial, but also its analogy to secular obedience’; she 
adds that the 5 articles of Perth ‘pitted the interpretation of the Eucharist against the meaning of 
obedience to the monarch’, “Kneeling and the Body Politic,” 80, 75, 77-8. Alain Badiou argues that 
Christian truth needs to contain an adiaphoric element, in order to allow individuals to create their own 
meanings, and that it is not a stringent emphasis on conformity that enables Christian truth to be 
universal, but the presence of multiplicitous meanings, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, 
trans. Ray Brassier (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 2003; first published in French, 1997), 
111. Malabou also argues that in uniting essence and accident, habit allows us to acquire universal 
attributes, ‘“Plastic individuality” makes it possible to imagine the “conformity” of singularity with the 
universal by means of a perspective totally different from that of pure and simple subordination’; ‘The 
adjective “plastic” indicates the nature of what is at once universal and individual’, The Future of 
Hegel, 26, 71. 
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indifferent’. However, Morton quickly makes clear that the monarch’s liberty to 
stipulate what gestures worshippers use in church, and what those gestures mean, 
overrides the individual worshipper’s liberty to decide what gestures they use in 
worship. Kneeling is thus not a site of liberty for individual worshippers at all; quite 
the opposite. Once the monarch has decided on the form of ‘gestures of Reverence’, 
Morton writes, it is seditious for worshippers to oppose this decision.151 Morton 
carefully balances the need to make kneeling a powerful symbol that demonstrates 
and produces the monarch’s power over their subjects, with the need to ensure that it 
is not thought of as a sacrament as this would mean that God rather than the monarch 
controls its meaning. He defines kneeling as an ‘operative symbol’ or ‘morall signe’: 
not a sacrament, but a gesture especially rich in moral meaning, ‘profitable for 
admonition and for testification of our duties’.152 Morton’s pamphlet demonstrates the 
strong early modern concern with making kneeling in both secular and religious 
contexts a way of testifying the gesturer’s ‘duty’ to their monarch. Simultaneously, 
the idea that a worshipper might kneel to recognise the Real Presence threatens 
Morton’s desire to co-opt the kneeling gesture into a wider politicised idea of ‘duty’. 
As Morton’s opponents argued, Morton’s desire to afford the kneeling gesture as 
much signifying power as possible creates the possibility that worshippers could use 
the gesture to give undue reverence to the Real Presence.153 Morton’s pamphlet 
demonstrates how early modern attempts to give kneeling a single (Protestant) 
meaning tended to fail to contain this gesture’s multiple potential meanings. 
                                                
151 Morton, A Defence, z4r. 
152 Sacraments are ‘a necessary means to salvation’, ‘unalterable by any authoritie of man’. Morton 
illustrates this by contrasting kneeling with the sacramental use of aspersion. The form and meaning of 
aspersion are fixed by God and cannot be altered by humans, ‘the Aspersion of the water in Baptisme is 
a signe of the Remission of sinne conferred upon the person Baptized, and therefore is it proper to God, 
who onely giveth the thing, to ordaine such a signe’. He does acknowledge that kneeling’s meaning is 
not completely arbitrary but is partly derived from scriptural precedents and customs of kneeling in 
‘Adoration’, A Defence, ¶4r-v, z4r, Oo4r-Nn1v. 
153 E.g. William Ames’ A reply to Dr. Mortons General Defence of Three Nocent Ceremonies 
(Amsterdam: Giles Thorp, 1622). The Puritan William Prynne argued that kneeling should be 
abolished altogether; he wrote many times against the use of genuflexion as described by Morton. 
Prynne argued that kneeling was something purely superstitious and idolatrous because it was not 
commanded by God. E.g. Lame Giles his Haltings (London: for Matthew Sparke, 1630), A4r-v.  
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Indeed, much of the anxiety occasioned by the kneeling gesture in the early 
modern era arose from the fact that it could potentially embody several very different 
meanings without the kneeler’s intention being clear. The Anglican clergyman 
Thomas Fuller worried in 1652 that the religious connotations of kneeling could 
uneasily be present when kneeling occurred in a secular context, making parents like 
gods when they were knelt to by their children. He asks of parents who ‘expect their 
Children should crave their blessing on their knees, Whether do they not assume to 
themselves too much Reverence, and therein intrench upon Divine Honour?’, but 
comforts himself by reasserting the distinction between kneeling to divine and secular 
authorities, ‘No: Such Genuflection being onely a Civil posture to express their 
Humility; and is performed to Princes and Parliaments, by their Petitioners: and 
therefore may be required by Parents, Monarchs over their own Children’.154 By 
emphasising this distinction, Fuller reasserts the polyvalence of kneeling; it can be 
either secular or religious, and thus still has the potential to be both at once. Indeed, 
many Puritans wanted to eliminate kneeling from church ceremonies completely, to 
remove the very possibility that people might kneel in ‘idolatrous’ worship of the 
Real Presence.  
Like Malabou, and drawing like her on the Greek root plassein, early modern 
writers compared ‘plastic’ physiological processes –  the ‘plastic power’ whereby the 
soul controls the body’s actions and the body heals itself and develops into a distinct 
shape – to humans shaping clay in the ‘plastic’ art of sculpture.155 Deriving from 
Latin plasticus and Italian plastica, the word ‘plastic’ was first used in English in the 
late sixteenth century, in translations of G.P. Lomazzo’s 1584 Italian treatise on 
painting and sculpture.  Richard Haydock’s 1598 translation of Lomazzo, A Tracte 
Containing the Arts of Curious Painting, Carving and Building, uses the word 
‘plasticke’ plentifully. For example, Haydock states in the Preface that ‘God was the 
first Plasticke worker’ because ‘with his owne hande hee framed the moulde of the 
first man and afterwards most miraculously inspired it with a living soule’.156 As this 
                                                
154 Thomas Fuller, A Comment on the Eleven First Verses of the Fourth Chapter of Matthew’s Gospel 
(London: James Cottrell, 1652), L7v.  
155  ‘Plasticity’s native land is the field of art. Plasticity characterizes the art of “modelling”’, but also 
‘signifies the general aptitude for development, the power to be moulded by one’s culture, by 
education’, and finally ‘the “plasticity” of the brain’, Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 8. 
156 O.E.D. ‘plastic’, n.1a. Richard Haydock, A Tracte Containing the Arts of Curious Painting, Carving 
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quotation from Haydock shows, the word ‘plastic’ encompassed the body and its 
relation to the mind. The popular Masterpiece, a work on human reproduction 
apocryphally attributed to Aristotle, states that the body’s ‘natural or vegetable soul’ 
has a ‘plastic power’ which enables it to move and adopt various postures, whilst a 
‘plastic or formative principle’ turns a lump of formless matter into a human shape in 
the womb.157 Though they tend to associate plasticity with humans’ lower, material 
nature, as opposed to the superior spiritual aspect of their being, early modern writers 
often describe the power of the plastic body to affect a person’s temperament. Writing 
to his fellow natural philosopher Margaret Cavendish, Joseph Glanvill (1636-80) 
equates the ‘Plastick Faculties’ with a ‘Lower Nature’, yet attests that their 
‘violent Impetus is the cause of many of our irregularities and vices’. In a later letter, 
Glanvill admits that he cannot tell whether these plastic faculties are a part of the 
body or the soul, ‘whether, as your Grace inquires, they are Faculties inherent, in the 
Soul, or are only Mechanical Motions of the Body I cannot determine certainly’.158 
Glanvill attests that natural philosophers find plasticity somewhat mysterious, ‘what it 
is, how it works, and whose it is, we cannot learn…For though the Soul be supposed 
to be the Bodies Maker, and the builder of its own house; yet by what kind of 
Knowledge, Method, or Means, is as unknown’.159 Malabou references the early 
modern roots of the term plasticity,160 and her theory of plasticity helps us to provide 
new answers to this particularly Renaissance question of how the actions of the body 
affect a person’s temperament and vice versa. Her ideas are thus directly relevant to, 
and rooted in, the early modern culture that Julius Caesar evokes. 
                                                                                                                                       
and Building (Oxford: for R.H., 1598), Aiiijr. 
157 Anon, Aristotle’s Master-Piece, trans. Anon (London: B. Harris, 1697), A4v, B4r. 
158 Joseph Glanvill, in various authors, Letters and Poems in Honour of the Incomparable Princess, 
Margaret, Dutchess of Newcastle (London: Thomas Newcombe, 1676), Dd2v, Ii2r-v.  
159 Joseph Glanvill, The Vanity of Dogmatizing (London: E.C., 1661), E6r-v. Many early modern 
authors are sceptical about the idea of plasticity, believing it to be a placeholder for ignorance; in his 
medical dictionary, Stephen Blankaart shows how the idea of plasticity was itself plastic and adaptable, 
‘Plastica Virtus is that which can form or fashion any thing; it’s an old saying and a sure Refuge of 
Ignorance, for what the Ancients could not explain they called a plastick Virtue’, A Physical Dictionary 
(London: J.D., 1684), Q5v. 
160 ‘[P]lasticity…also means the ability to evolve and adapt. It is this sense we invoke when we speak 
of a “plastic virtue” possessed by animals, plants, and, in general, all living things’, Malabou, The 
Future of Hegel, 8. 
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Malabou’s theory of plasticity helps to nuance descriptions like Andrewes’, 
cited above, and to place a useful emphasis on the fact that early modern subjects 
could use ‘outward gesture’ to ‘stir up their souls’ to many different forms of ‘duty’. 
Indeed, Andrewes highlights the symbiotic relationship between thought and gesture 
that is crucial to ideas of plasticity. His assertion that, though the soul gives the body 
an initial impetus, it is only when the body is involved that a person can experience a 
meaningful relationship with God through prayer, can be understood using Malabou’s 
idea of a habitual ‘mutual fashioning of soul and body’ which enables gesture to 
shape as well as be shaped by the mind, and dissolves the barriers between them, 
 
Through its power of self-repetition, habit creates in man the condition for 
the reversibility of psychic and physical attributes. The features of the 
soul, as they acquire a physical means of expression, cease to function as 
a separate world, or a “mysterious inner space”. Similarly, the body, as it 
is made into an instrument, will no longer act as a natural “immediate 
externality” and a “barrier”.161  
  
Malabou depicts the human subject teetering between plasticity’s manifestations as an 
increasingly intractable second nature, and as form that can be seized and shaped with 
liberating consequences,  
 
A lifetime always proceeds within the boundaries of a double excess: an 
excess of reification and an excess of fluidification. When identity tends 
towards reification, the congealing of form, one can become the victim 
of highly rigid frameworks whose temporal solidification produces the 
appearance of unmalleable substance. Plasticity situates itself in the 
middle of these two excesses.162 
 
                                                
161 Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 73, 69. She continues, ‘in so far as the influence of habit causes a 
translation of soul into body and body into soul, these two will form a unity-in-separation, an absolute 
unity without fusion…Between container and contained, a reversible relation abolishes the partition 
between exterior and interior, allowing soul – henceforth constituted as “Self” – to relate to the world, 
the real externality’, relating to the world in a way that reflects the world back into self-consciousness. 
162 Malabou, Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing, 81. 
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The conspirators in Julius Caesar exhibit a similar tension between their 
entrenched habits of obedience to Caesar, bending to him in mind and body, and 
the more autonomous, liberating use of the kneeling gesture they deploy before 
killing him. Brutus describes Caesar’s murder with a curious mixture of respect 
for his elevated status and a desire to destroy him because of that status. 
Strikingly, though he hates the idea of Caesar becoming a petulant, scornful 
‘tyrant’, Brutus states, ‘let’s carve him as a dish fit for the gods| Not hew him as 
a carcass fit for hounds’ (2.1.173-4). This image of killing Caesar with a 
mannered, almost respectful ‘carving’, acknowledging that he is ‘fit for the 
gods’, the highest beings, suggests an esteem for, and deference to, his 
authority. The rhetorical device of antithetic parallelism creates a similarity in 
these two lines’ structure, emphasising the contrast between Caesar’s high status 
and the low status of a dog-gnawed corpse by spatially aligning and contrasting  
the phrases ‘let’s carve him’ and ‘not hew him’, and ‘fit for the gods’ and ‘fit 
for hounds’. Mark Antony makes this ambiguity between respect and disrespect 
of Caesar even sharper, ‘Witness the hole you made in Caesar’s heart| Crying, 
“Long live! Hail, Caesar!”’ (5.1.31-2). In this chapter’s cognitive reading, the 
most complexly significant moment of Julius Caesar is not Caesar’s actual 
death, but what happens just before he dies, when the conspirators kneel to him. 
At this moment, the network of embodied up-down metaphors and the 
ambiguous presentation of Caesar come to a crux. 
 
Kneeling in Shakespeare’s works 
Drawing into question how sincere the conspirators’ kneeling gesture is shows, again, 
the importance of the relationship between performance and reality in Shakespeare’s 
works. It seems that the conspirators are attempting to separate the two, to make what 
is usually a sincere gesture of obedience into an ironic performance. Shakespearean 
texts often explore the potential for kneeling to be parodied or deliberately performed. 
One of the very few Shakespearean characters depicted kneeling in prayer, Claudius 
in Hamlet, makes visible the process of both mentally and physically becoming 
malleable that is associated with kneeling.163 Though Claudius’ prayer is abandoned, 
                                                
163 Most kneeling in Shakespearean drama is, probably because of contemporary censorship, performed 
before secular rather than divine authorities. The 1606 parliamentary Act to Restrain the Abuses of 
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by dwelling on his mindset as he attempts to kneel, Shakespeare shows a tight link 
between the body and mind during this gesture: Claudius’ mind cannot ‘bend’ unless 
his knees do first. And, the mind must be habituated to this gesture: its stiffness must 
be made pliable. Where Claudius seems to fail outright to achieve this pliability, the 
conspirators in Julius Caesar, accustomed to ‘bend [their] bod[ies]’ (1.2.116-8)before 
Caesar have minds that have laid down habits of submission that threaten to thwart 
their rebellious plans.  
Claudius has trouble kneeling to pray, prompting him to meditate on physical 
and mental (in)flexibility, rendering explicit the themes that are implicit in the 
conspirators’ kneeling gesture. Echoing contemporary descriptions of the unyielding 
bodies of impenitent or non-conforming people, Claudius emphasises his body’s 
reluctance to bend into a contrite gesture, ‘Bow stubborn knees| And heart…be soft’ 
(3.3.70-1) (Q1 alone has the additional stage direction ‘he kneeles’). Claudius extends 
this idea of stiffness to include his ‘liméd soul’ (3.3.68); unable to alter their sinful 
patterns, his thoughts are stuck in wickedness like birds trapped in birdlime, a strong 
adhesive. Claudius abandons the prayer by stressing that the gesture has had no effect 
on his thoughts, ‘My words fly up, my thoughts remain below.| Words without 
thoughts never to heaven go’ (3.3.97-8).  Targoff argues that Claudius’ prayer 
critiques the Church of England’s reliance on the idea that the kneeling gesture 
produced conforming and devoted thoughts in a person’s mind, no matter what their 
                                                                                                                                       
Players forbade any ‘jesting’ mention or representation of God on stage, consolidating a long tradition 
of censoring representation of religion on stage. Playwrights often escaped these strictures by using 
stories from myths or (as with Julius Caesar) the distant past. Characters in plays written before the 
Act sometimes make explicit reference to God when kneeling, for instance in 3 Henry VI, promising to 
fight harder for the Yorkist cause, Warwick states, ‘Here on my knee, I vow to God above’ (2.3.29). 
Shakespeare’s characters kneel most commonly to acknowledge social superiors (in The Tempest 
3.2.40-1, Stephano orders his new servant Caliban, ‘Kneel…I will stand and so shall Trinculo’), to ask 
favours (in Measure for Measure 5.1.19, Peter tells Isabel, suitor to the Duke, to ‘kneel before him’), 
and to ask pardon (Aumerle, having killed Richard II in Richard II 5.3.30, states, ‘For ever may my 
knees grow to the earth’). Not kneeling is significant in some plays; for instance in Henry VIII 4.2.99-
103, when Katherine is supplanted by Ann Boleyn, a messenger pointedly fails to kneel when he brings 
a message to Katherine, signalling Katherine’s descent through the social hierarchy. The only example 
of a Shakespearean character kneeling before a divine being on stage is Cymbeline when ‘The Ghosts 
fall on their knees’ (SD after 5.4.92), before Jupiter (pagan deities tended to escape censorship). The 
database provides a comprehensive list of kneeling gestures in Shakespeare’s plays. 
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initial intention before they started to kneel.164 In finding his body stiff and 
‘stubborn[ly]’ unaccustomed to kneeling, Claudius enacts the fact that the body must 
be carefully moulded into certain habits and the mind thereby ‘soft[ened]’ and made 
malleable so that it can acquire new thought patterns. Sticking and faltering, Claudius 
demonstrates the difficult process of forcing a soul to habituate itself, through gesture, 
to obedience. As Malabou writes of habitual action, ‘In the initial stages, the body 
shows itself intractable, its movements are uncertain and are either too strong or too 
weak for the task at hand’.165  
Julius Caesar’s interest in the idea that kneeling might disrupt rather than 
preserve social hierarchies can be traced back to Shakespeare’s earlier works. In 2 
Henry VI, Suffolk kneels to be knighted, but the play questions the common early 
modern notion that kneeling to be knighted has a performative power that ennobles 
the kneeler and confirms their loyalty to the monarch.166 The king intends thereby to 
                                                
164 Like Cook, Targoff suggests that the kneeling gesture can produce and ‘transform’ thought. She 
argues that historical evidence suggests that even when gesturers seem sceptical of kneeling’s ability to 
transform thought, the inherent power of this gesture will nevertheless transform their minds to some 
extent. Targoff’s discussion of the ambiguities surrounding kneeling’s effect on the mind in Hamlet can 
be extended to similar ambiguities in Julius Caesar. ‘[W]hat is strikingly, and mistakenly, absent from 
our accounts of the Elizabethan sentiment is precisely what the play interrogates in staging Claudius’s 
prayer: the belief that external practices might not only reflect but also potentially transform the 
internal self…Within the context of Hamlet, the potential for a causal relation between outward 
performance and inward change is neither confirmed nor entirely denied. The play does not pursue any 
further the state of Claudius’ mind, nor does it burden Hamlet with discovering the folly of his 
misreading. And yet, however ambivalent Hamlet may ultimately be about the transformative capacity 
of external behaviour, the Church of England was firmly aligned behind it. There were no absolute 
divisions between sincerity and theatricality, inwardness and outwardness, within the early modern 
English church’, Targoff, Common Prayer, 3-4. 
165 Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 73. 
166 The performativity of the knighting ceremony is well documented; Jesús D. Rodríguez Velasco 
writes that from its inception knighting was ‘a performative moment in which a particular speech act 
gives rise to the transformation of a political subject; someone who was not previously considered a 
knight becomes one and acquires a set of privileges, social distinction, and fiscal exemptions’, Order 
and Chivalry: Knighthood and Citizenship in Late Medieval Castile (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania University Press, 2010), 19. Knighting is often used as a key example of a performative 
utterance or gesture, e.g. Greig Henderson, “Performative,” in Encyclopedia of Contemporary Literary 
Theory, ed. Irena Makaryk (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1993), 237. Mrozowski argues that 
kneeling and rising quickly (as in the knighting ceremony) were merely symbolic acts, whereas the 
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reward Suffolk for his good service, but Suffolk ultimately emerges to be a political 
traitor who connives against the king and commits adultery with the queen. Another 
aspect of Julius Caesar echoed in other Shakespearean plays is the idea that when a 
person kneels to someone they ought to have authority over, they overturn a natural, 
cosmic hierarchy. The conspirators force Caesar to prostrate himself before them in 
death, prompting a disruption of natural order, ‘a lioness hath whelpéd in the streets, 
and graves have yawned and yielded up their dead’ (2.2.15-16); earlier, Brutus 
enjoins his wife, ‘Kneel not gentle Portia’ (2.1.278), suggesting that he is 
uncomfortable with a ‘gentle’ (noble, high born, distinguished) person kneeling to 
him.167 Volumnia emphasises that kneeling to Coriolanus inverts her natural maternal 
authority over him (in Ralph Fiennes’ 2011 film this is exacerbated because Vanessa 
Redgrave’s Volumnia is a high-ranking officer, unaccustomed to submission):168 ‘I 
kneel before thee, and unproperly| Show duty, as mistaken all this while| Between the 
child and parent’ (Coriolanus 5.3.54-6). Coriolanus extrapolates her idea that it is 
‘unproper’ for a mother to kneel to her child, conjuring an image of a cosmic 
hierarchy completely overturned, 
 
What is this? 
Your knees to me? to your corrected son? 
Then let the pebbles on the hungry beach 
Fillip the stars; then let the mutinous winds 
Strike the proud cedars ‘gainst the fiery sun; 
                                                                                                                                       
prolonged and painful kneeling of prayer had greater power to affect a person’s thoughts, as a ‘posture 
of sustained meditation, which is helpful to inner transformation and the absolution of sin’, 
“Genuflection in Medieval Western Culture,” 8, 10-11.  
167 O.E.D., ‘gentle’, n. 
168Coriolanus, by William Shakespeare, directed by Ralph Fiennes (California: Icon Entertainment 
International, 2011), DVD. It is difficult to tell whether Redgrave’s Volumnia ranks higher than 
Fiennes’ Coriolanus (which would make her kneeling to him especially striking), because their 
uniforms are only loosely based on real twenty-first-century military ones. As a Roman, Fiennes 
variously wears Serbian combat uniform and a uniform redolent of the Serbian gendarmerie, whilst 
Redgrave’s uniform suggests Bundeswehr parade dress with ribbons taken from US army citations. 
Miloš Brckalo and Bill Emerson identified the Serbian uniforms and Redgrave’s insignia respectively 
for me via email. Emerson remarked that it was unusual for twenty-first-century officers to wear so few 
awards, another way in which the uniforms were removed from reality. 
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Murdering impossibility, to make 
What cannot be, slight work. (5.3.56-62) 
 
Coriolanus shows how important the notion that, as Cranmer urged, human authority 
is part of a wider cosmic hierarchy, was to Shakespeare. Though unlike Cranmer, 
Julius Caesar does not explicitly evoke the divine right of kings, in this play the 
destructive effects of inverting the significance of the kneeling gesture have dramatic 
consequences in the natural world, suggesting that human authority is part of a much 
more all-encompassing order of things. 
Cassius acknowledges that Caesar’s murder has the potential to be performed, 
‘How many ages hence| Shall this our lofty scene be acted over| In states unborn and 
accents yet unknown!’ (3.1.111-3). Here, Cassius hints that future tyrants will be dealt 
with in a similar fashion, but also explicitly alludes to a wider preoccupation in 
Shakespeare’s works with the potential for the kneeling gesture to be theatrically 
performed. In 1 Henry IV, Falstaff dresses as the king, and Hal pretends to genuflect 
devotedly to him, ‘here is my leg’ (2.4.388). In 2 Henry VI, Bullingbrooke organises a 
fake ceremony of allegiance to the devil, he asks the ‘witch’, ‘be you prostrate, and 
grovel on the earth’ (1.4.10-11). These examples test the performative power of 
kneeling, suggesting that this gesture of allegiance to authority can be used to mock or 
undermine authority. Bullingbrooke is only encouraging the witch to kneel to the 
devil because he aims to entrap the Duchess of Gloucester in the act of witchcraft, 
thus putting an end to devil-worship. Hal and Falstaff’s purpose is ostensibly to 
parody Hal’s ceremoniously deferent relationship with his father; Falstaff wears a 
cushion on his head for a crown and calls the bottle of wine he is drinking from his 
‘sceptre’. However, both these examples also suggest that despite this parodic context, 
kneeling does have the power to induce or consolidate deferent and loyal thoughts. 
Throughout most of the Henry IV duology, Hal remains loyal to Falstaff as an 
alternative father-figure (before spectacularly disowning him when he becomes king). 
In 2 Henry VI, once the Duchess has been caught, the witch is also led off under guard 
(1.4.52, and SD after 1.4.54), presumably to be punished as if her devil-worship was 
in earnest. This reflects that fact that, whether or not they are hypocritically 
performed, most acts of kneeling in Shakespeare's plays have a persuasive power and 
symbolic significance. These earlier examples which depict very real consequences to 
faked or parodied kneeling gestures suggest that in Julius Caesar there is a residual 
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power in the kneeling gesture that continues to make the conspirators deferent to 
Caesar even after they have killed him. 
 
Kneeling in Julius Caesar 
Rather than solely constituting a sign of Caesar’s power over his subjects, kneeling in 
Julius Caesar is the site of these subjects’ power over Caesar in two significant ways. 
Kneeling to Caesar gives the conspirators a pretext for getting close enough to their 
ruler to destroy him, a clear inversion of the normative significance of the kneeling 
gesture, which was usually used to produce and consolidate feelings of deference 
towards authority. Whilst in early modern culture kneeling was a ruler’s way of 
constructing obedient subjects, in Julius Caesar the conspirators turn this on its head. 
The conspirators use the traditional implications of kneeling as a gesture of 
subservience to a tyrant to construct Caesar proleptically as a tyrannical ruler in an 
attempt to justify his murder. The conspirators acknowledge that Caesar is not yet a 
tyrant; they kill him purely because he might later become one, just as a serpent’s egg 
should be destroyed before it hatches into a snake,  
 
So Caesar may 
Then, lest he may, prevent… 
think him as a serpent’s egg, 
Which, hatched, would as his kind grow mischievous  
And kill him in the shell (2.1.27-34).  
 
In Julius Caesar, kneeling creates a mutual relationship, where relatively ‘higher’ and 
‘lower’ bodies translate into ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ social statuses. In one of the play's 
most crucial speeches, where Cassius persuades Brutus to join the conspiracy, Cassius 
demonstrates how a mutually-constructed relationship can be a way of controlling 
others. Cassius argues that, just as an eye needs a reflective surface to see itself, a 
person can only know themselves through others. Brutus acknowledges, ‘the eye sees 
not itself but by reflection| By some other thing’ (1.2.52-3), and Cassius counters, 
 
Since you know you cannot see yourself 
So well as by reflection; I your glass 
Will modestly discover to yourself 
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That of yourself you know not of (1.2.67-70) 
 
Cassius concludes by urging Brutus to pursue ‘Honour’ (1.2.91ff), which he defines 
as snatching power from Caesar. Cassius is like a warping mirror, actively 
constructing rather than passively reflecting Brutus’ identity. This echoes the way in 
which being a noble person in the early modern era was, as the historian Ian Archer 
explains, primarily about the way other people responded to you, ‘being a gentleman 
was essentially about being accepted as one by other gentlemen’.169 Cassius applies 
the same logic to Caesar, arguing that Caesar’s and his subjects’ relative social roles 
are created through mutual interaction; Caesar is only a tyrant because the Romans 
treat him as one, constructing themselves as passive followers, ‘Why should Caesar 
be a tyrant then?|...he would not be a wolf| But that he sees the Romans are but sheep’ 
(1.3.103-5). This opens up the possibility that not only Caesar but his subjects can 
change the meaning of these roles. This is precisely what the conspirators do when 
they use the kneeling gesture to construct Caesar as a tyrant so that they can feel 
justified in killing him. 
Cassius uses the fact that Brutus’ identity is created ‘by reflection’ in Cassius’ 
words to sculpt Brutus into a particular role: that of head conspirator. One of the most 
significant ways that identity is mutually created in Julius Caesar is through 
comparing postures. Throughout the play, Caesar and the conspirators are always 
intensely aware of their relative postures. Cognitive theory and earlier texts like 
Cantor’s suggest that higher and lower bodies are not mere metaphors for higher and 
lower social ranks; rather, social hierarchy is produced and given meaning by means 
of these movements and arrangements of the (‘docile’) body. The philosopher 
Alphonso Lingis uses Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the body schema to explore ideas of 
posture, uprightness, and ‘standing tall’. Lingis argues that our gestures are given 
meaning by their relationship to other people, ‘Our “body image” is not an image 
formed in the privacy of our own imagination: its visible, tangible, and audible shape 
is held in the gaze and touch of others’. Like Merleau-Ponty, Lingis argues that 
understanding, responding to, and mimicking other people occurs ‘not with a concept-
generating faculty of our mind’, but with the motions of the body. He cites as an 
                                                
169 Ian Archer, Up and Down the Social Ladder in Elizabethan England, Lecture, National Portrait 
Gallery, London, November 28 2013. 
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example our ability to understand the uprightness of a sequoia trunk only by sensing 
and replicating this uprightness in our own posture,  
 
When we look at the sequoias, we do not focus on them by circumscribing 
their outlines; the width of their towering trunks and the shapes of their 
sparse leaves appear as the surfacing into visibility of an inner channel of 
upward thrust. We sense its force and measure its rise with the movement 
of our eyes and the upright axis of our body. We comprehend this 
uprightness of their life not with a concept-generating faculty of our mind 
but with the uprighting aspiration of our vertebrate organism they 
awaken.170  
 
This quotation shows that we can both understand and alter our relations to others 
simply by adjusting the vertical axis of our body. It helps us to see that, though there 
is an undeniable element of conscious planning to Caesar’s murder, an attention to, 
and manipulation of, the ‘upright axis’ of the body is crucial to Caesar’s downfall. 
The play establishes a strong pattern of embodied up-down metaphors to express and 
create power, and it is as if the conspirators pick up on this and use those metaphors to 
their own advantage. 
Caesar’s death, which the conspirators describe as ridding the world of a 
‘tyrant’ who has achieved a social position too high over other people, is seen as a 
‘fall’ (3.1.77) from a standing posture, to a posture of prostration. Brutus imagines 
Caesar climbing other people like a ‘ladder’, then looking down on them from his 
vantage point, ‘scorning the base degrees| By which he did ascend’ (2.1.23-7). 
Cassius describes the conspirators as exaggeratedly smaller beings, no higher than 
Caesar’s legs, playing upon the contemporary dual sense of ‘petty’ as ‘physically 
small’ and of low social importance or rank, or (as Cassius goes on to say), 
‘dishonourable’.171  
 
he doth bestride the narrow world  
                                                
170 Alphonso Lingis, “The Body Postured and Dissolute,” in Veronique Foti, ed., Merleau Ponty: 
Difference, Materiality, Painting (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996), 64-5.   
171 O.E.D., ‘petty’, adj. and n. 
 
98 
Like a Colossus, and we petty men 
Walk under his huge legs, and peep about 
To find ourselves dishonourable graves (1.2.135-8)   
 
Cassius emphasises the difference in perspectives between kneeling people and 
Caesar standing. The conspirators do not see but simply ‘peep’ (‘peep’ is further 
linked to ‘petty’ by alliteration), and their views are restricted by Caesar’s ‘huge legs’; 
unlike Caesar who surveys the world and makes it ‘narrow’ by comparison, all the 
conspirators can see from their much lower perspective is their own ‘graves’. 
 Kneeling to Caesar in Julius Caesar seems to be a habit for the conspirators. 
Cassius’ emphasis on Caesar’s hugeness is part and parcel of the same cognitive 
framework which demands that Cassius (like every inferior of Caesar) ‘must bend his 
body’ (1.2.116-8) at Caesar’s whim. That this is a society whose inhabitants have 
been trained to use kneeling as social currency is seen not only in the conspirators’ 
pointed kneeling gesture before Caesar’s murder but also in Antony’s servant 
kneeling before the newly-victorious conspirators: ‘Thus, Brutus, did my master bid 
me kneel…’ (3.1.123). Couple this with the fact that (as the early modern sources 
discussed in this chapter show) kneeling was a prevalent way of expressing and 
creating hierarchical social and religious relations in the early modern era, and we can 
productively examine Julius Caesar as a play that dramatises the effect of habitual 
kneeling on the mind and body.  
As the conspirators kneel to Caesar, both parties draw attention to the social 
implications of the gesture. Cassius addresses Caesar, ‘As low as to thy foot doth 
Cassius fall’ (3.1.56). The word ‘falling’ throughout the play signifies low social 
status; at Brutus' suggestion that Caesar has epilepsy, ‘the Falling sickness’, Cassius 
responds with a pun on being content with a dishonourable life, ‘No, Caesar hath it 
not: but you and I…we have the falling sickness’ (1.2.255-6). Caesar compares his 
high ‘rank’, ‘true-fix’d…quality’, and superior social ‘place’ to ‘the northern star’, 
high up in the ‘firmament’ (3.1.60-9). When he dies, Caesar registers the end of his 
authority as his body’s physical descent, ‘fall, Caesar’ (3.1.77). Antony also registers 
the idea that Caesar’s physical fall is precisely the moment of his ‘fall’ from authority; 
Antony’s first words contrast Caesar's prostrate form with his previous political 
might, ‘O mighty Caesar! Dost thou lie so low?’ (3.1.148). At the Globe’s 400th 
anniversary production, Mark Rylance created a striking contrast as Caesar’s prone 
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corpse lay at the feet of his towering statue, the latter as ‘fix’d’ and ‘unshak’d’ as 
Caesar had mistakenly believed himself to be.172 In North’s Plutarch, the wound that 
Brutus gives Caesar is ‘low’ both because it is low down on Caesar’s body and 
because it is ignoble (‘below the belt’ in both senses of the word), ‘Brutus him selfe 
gaue him one blow about his privities’.173 Brutus’ new status as high up in the social 
hierarchy is underscored when he is knelt to straight after killing Caesar; Antony’s 
servant enters and says, ‘Thus, Brutus, did my master bid me kneel…’ (3.1.123). 
Julius Caesar is an apposite play for examining how seemingly-stable social 
roles can be resisted and changed, as it repeatedly problematises the idea that 
vocations and social hierarchy are fixed. At the beginning, the tribunes grow anxious 
because they are unable to discern the vocations of holidaying tradespeople. Flavius 
berates the traders for not having ‘the sign| Of your profession’ (1.1.4-5). The cobbler 
responds that his business is with ‘awl’ and ‘all’ – suggesting he is both of a fixed 
trade (he works only with the ‘awl’) and of fluid identity (he works with ‘all’); the 
homophony of ‘awl’ and ‘all’ further frustrates Flavius’ attempts to discern the 
cobbler’s trade.174 Caesar by contrast associates superior social ‘rank’ and ‘quality’ 
with fixity, implying that a key indicator of high social status is retaining that status 
constantly, 
 
I am constant as the northern star, 
Of whose true-fix’d and resting quality 
There is no fellow in the firmament… 
So in the world: ‘tis furnish’d well with men, 
And men are flesh and blood, and apprehensive; 
Yet in the number I do know but one 
                                                
172 Archival Recording, Julius Caesar, by William Shakespeare, directed by Mark Rylance, September 
21 1999, Globe Theatre Archive. In the prompt book for this production, scene 3.1 is labelled ‘THEN 
FALL, CAESAR’ in pencil, suggesting that this image of falling was central to this company’s 
interpretation of the play, Prompt Book, Julius Caesar, by William Shakespeare, directed by Mark 
Rylance, Globe Theatre, 1999, Globe Theatre Archive, 31. 
173 Plutarch, Lives, Xxxiv. 
174 Athanasios Boulukos argues that the cobbler’s quibbling over his identity prefigures Brutus’ 
preoccupation with stoic wisdom and social hierarchies, citing Horace’s remark in Satires that a wise 
person has the capacity to be both a cobbler and a monarch without actually practicing either vocation, 
“The Cobbler and the Tribunes in Julius Caesar,” Modern Language Notes 119(5) (2004), 1084. 
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That unassailable holds on his rank, 
Unshak’d of motion; and that I am he (3.1.60-70) 
 
In Rylance’s production, at the words ‘unshak’d of motion’, Caesar slapped the 
kneeling Brutus half-playfully on the cheek; Brutus remained kneeling ‘unshak’d’. 
This gesture suggested that Caesar was attempting to ‘shake’ Brutus from his kneeling 
posture and thus to test how fixed the social hierarchy was; he thereby drew attention 
to the way that this hierarchy is embodied in, and threatened by, gesturing subjects 
and their rulers.  
Caesar’s speech reflects prominent early modern descriptions of the ideal 
social hierarchy as static, immutable, and divinely-ordained. Cranmer states, 
‘Almightie God hath created and appointed all things in heaven, earth, and waters in a 
most excellent and perfect order’. In the human realm, ‘He hath assigned kings and 
princes with other governers under them all in good and necessary order…Every 
degree of people in their vocation, calling, and office hath appointed to them their 
duty and order. Some are in high degree, some in low’.175 In Julius Caesar, natural 
portents–corpses rising from the grave, comets, lions giving birth in the streets–
strengthen the sense that Caesar’s murder is a disruption of this hierarchy 
encompassing heaven and earth. However, Cassius’ critique of kingship, and the 
play’s continual engagement with debates about the fixity of vocations and 
hierarchies, suggest that, rather than being always-already in existence, this hierarchy 
requires the habitual performance of acts of obedience by ‘docile bodies’ to stay in 
being. Specifically, the fact that the early modern body needed to be moulded and 
shaped to fit its social role indicates that the ‘natural’ hierarchical order is partially 
constructed by humans. The social mobility for which the conspirators stand was just 
as prominent as appeals to God-given hierarchy in the late sixteenth century. 176 
                                                
175 Cranmer, Certayne Sermons, R1r-v. 
176 ‘Population growth, the commercialised economy, and the growth of London’ generated a growing 
class of upwardly mobile merchants who threatened the established hierarchy; this nouveau riche’s 
status was not static like the old hierarchy but endlessly fragile, able to move both ‘up and down the 
social ladder’, Archer, Up and Down the Social Ladder. Kieran Dolin speaks of Shakespeare’s concern 
in plays of this period, like The Merchant of Venice (1596-8), with the ‘radically new conditions of 
existence’ generated by ‘the gradual collapse of feudal society’ and new social mobility, A Critical 
Introduction to Law and Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 85. 
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Implying that the social inequality between Caesar and themselves is wrongful, 
Cassius denies that fixed ‘stars’ determine a person’s life, rather, ‘Men…are masters 
of their fates’ (1.2.139). He focuses on kneeling as a symptom of this wrongful 
inequality, whereby Caesar presents himself as having a fixed place in society and 
also wants to fix others in a lower place, by moulding their bodies, ‘Cassius is| A 
wretched creature, and must bend his body| If Caesar carelessly but nod on him’ 
(1.2.116-8). But the conspirators try to use the very adaptability that had made their 
bodies docile and obedient to Caesar to change their social status and resist his rule.  
 Shakespeare leaves it ambiguous whether the conspirators are successful in 
reclaiming the kneeling gesture. Caesar’s response to the conspirators’ kneeling 
gesture both consciously renounces the tyrant-subject relationship the conspirators 
attempt to construct, and discloses certain tyrannical features,  
 
These couchings and these lowly courtesies 
Might fire the blood of ordinary men…Be not fond 
To think that Caesar bears such rebel blood  
That will be thaw’d from the true quality 
With that which melteth fools—I mean sweet words, 
Low-crooked curtesies and base spaniel fawning. 
Thy brother by decree is banished 
If thou dost bend, and pray, and fawn for him, 
I spurn thee like a cur out of my way (3.1.36-46) 
 
Initially, by rejecting kneeling and the ‘lowl-crooked curtesies’ it implies, Caesar 
refuses to accept that other men should kneel to him like a tyrant’s subjects. And yet, 
this refusal stems from Caesar’s belief that he is superior to ‘ordinary men’. 
Insultingly calling Cimber a ‘cur’, Caesar reveals that he does have the potential to 
become a tyrant, lording it over other people. Caesar’s ambiguous depiction of 
himself as both a lordly superior and a person battling with a dog or ‘cur’ uncannily 
echoes the conspirators’ own ambivalent depiction of Caesar as potentially both a 
noble being who is sacrificed by humans in an almost Christ-like way and a dead 
animal gnawed by dogs after a hunt, ‘Let’s carve him as a dish fit for the gods| Not 
hew him as a carcass fit for hounds’. Surveying Caesar’s corpse, Antony evokes 
precisely the hunting image the conspirators aimed to avoid, ‘here wast thou bayed, 
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brave hart…here thy hunters stand’ (3.1.204-5). Just as Caesar walks a fine line 
between being a legitimate ruler and a tyrant, the conspirators walk a fine line 
between being liberators and lawless animals.  
 Rylance’s production made this tension visible. Initially, the conspirators 
‘carved’ rather than ‘hewed’ Caesar, circling Caesar calculatingly and cuttting him 
carefully with their swords. Then they descended into an animalistic ‘hewing’ of his 
‘carcass’, ultimately engaging in what the fight notes call a lengthy, frenzied ‘mass 
stabbing’ of Caesar’s prostrate body, as one cast member let out a long animal wail of 
pain, evoking a bestial hunt.177 Brutus did not partake in this mass stabbing, and his 
actions emphasised the contrast between ‘carving’ and ‘hewing’, and between acting 
like men and like ‘hounds’. Having stabbed Caesar once, Brutus returned to the spot 
on stage where he had knelt to Caesar before the attack and resumed his kneeling 
posture.178 Brutus’ courteous kneeling gesture downstage emphasised the animalistic 
behaviour of the other conspirators upstage. Whilst Brutus respectfully ‘carve[d 
Caesar] as a dish fit for the gods’, the other conspirators ‘hew[ed] him as a carcass fit 
for hounds’. Taken together, the action upstage and downstage encapsulated the 
curious mix of respect and disrespect for Caesar in the way that the conspirators 
envision his murder. This production drew out the way that, in the play-text, the 
conspirators fail neatly to construct Caesar as a pure tyrant with their kneeling 
gesture. They can never completely fix his malleable image in the form that they 
desire. 
And yet, the conspirators are unable to shake off this constructed image of 
Caesar as tyrant. When Caesar's ghost appears, Brutus’ first reaction is to believe that 
he has created this domineering image of Caesar, ‘I think it is the weakness of mine 
eyes| That shapes this monstrous apparition’ (4.3.276-7). North’s Plutarch does not 
identify the ghost as Caesar, emphasising rather its superiority and authority: it seems 
a man of ‘wonderful greatness’.179 Shakespeare’s stage directions in 4.3 stipulate that 
it is ‘the ghost of Caesar’, but also preserve North’s association of the ghost with 
                                                
177 ‘Assassination of Caesar: FIGHT SEQUENCE’, Julius Caesar, by William Shakespeare, directed 
by Mark Rylance, Globe Theatre,  London, 1999, 1 leaf, Globe Theatre Archive. For instance the 5th 
move is, ‘Caesar grabs Metellus right arm. Caesar circles with Metellus, holding Metellus’ sword arm, 
and points sword’. 
178 Julius Caesar, Rylance. 
179 Plutarch, Lives, Xxxiiiv. 
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authority and domination. On the battlefield at Philippi, the conspirators’ military 
defeat is described as Caesar’s revenge. Brutus chooses to kill himself when he sees 
the ghost ‘here in Philippi fields’ (5.5.19), whilst dying on his own sword, Cassius 
states, ‘Caesar, thou art reveng’d| Even with the sword that kill'd thee’ (5.3.44-5). 
This is fitting given that they knelt to Caesar before killing him, as kneeling was 
originally a pagan gesture of submission to a military victor;180 the kneeling gesture 
thus prefigures and even generates Caesar’s ultimate victory. As the conspirators 
kneel, the plasticity of a group of people attempting to overturn others’ authority over 
them competes with the fixity of traditional social hierarchies. Habits of submission 
are partly destroyed, but also partly linger in powerful, residual ways.   
 
Performance, plasticity, and hypocrisy 
In the earliest performances of Julius Caesar, the kinaesthetic class differences within 
the play, whereby characters’ high and low social statuses are embodied by higher and 
lower bodily postures, will have been replicated and confirmed by the ways in which 
the audience was vertically arranged. The most expensive seats were situated higher 
up in the Renaissance playhouse and enabled the richer (and usually more noble) 
patrons of the theatre to enjoy a higher position than the poorer, lower-class, 
groundlings standing in the yard below. However, this effect will have been, 
potentially, multiply nuanced. For example, though the higher-class audience 
members in the higher-up seats will have enjoyed the ability to look down on the 
onstage action like Caesar atop his metaphorical ladder, they will at times have had to 
bow their heads and bodies to see the players below them. In so doing, they may have 
felt their backs and necks bend in a way that resonated with Cassius ‘bend[ing] his 
body’ in submission. This remains the case to an extent in the modern Globe, where it 
is still much cheaper to be a groundling than to sit up in the gallery. However, the 
Globe is an exception nowadays; in the modern West End in London, the situation is 
reversed: the most expensive seats for the richest people are also the lowest, in the 
stalls. And of course we do not kneel or bow to each other nearly so much in present 
day England. The fact that audience members are not, in the present day, always 
arranged in a vertical hierarchy that neatly mirrors the hierarchies in the play is 
perhaps one reason why modern directors often seek other ways than the vertical axis 
                                                
180 Mrozowski, “Genuflection in Medieval Western Culture,” 6-8.  
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of the body to portray the onstage kneeling gesture. For example, in Jan Klata’s 2013-
14 Hamlet with Schauspielhaus Bochum, Claudius’ struggle to kneel and pray did not 
focus on him struggling to move from a standing to a kneeling posture at all. Instead, 
Klata darkened the entire stage except for a tiny spotlit space stage right. As he 
attempted to pray, Claudius laboriously attempted to move from the dark space to the 
light space; this dark-light contrast will have been experienced in the same way by all 
members of the audience, wherever they were sitting.181 In Rylance’s version, several 
critics noticed not the relative heights of Caesar and the conspirators but rather the 
time Caesar took to die (which again will have been experienced in the same way, 
wherever a person sat). Caesar’s death was noticeably drawn out, lasting roughly 67 
seconds (from Cassius’ line ‘speak hands, for me’ to the final stab) and involving a 
16-phase fight sequence whereby Caesar tried to fend off each conspirator in turn. 
Ignoring the height-issue completely, Michael Billington wrote in the Guardian that it 
was the sheer difficulty of killing Caesar quickly and cleanly that showed his power 
over the conspirators and the durability of his authority; he was ‘a robust autocrat who 
was going down fighting’.182 
Tackling these difficulties head-on, Phyllida Lloyd’s 2012/13 production of 
Julius Caesar at the Donmar Warehouse, London, is a good illustration of how the 
differences in perspective between Caesar and the kneeling conspirators can still work 
powerfully in modern performance. The production was set within a women’s prison; 
the cast played a group of prisoners staging a production of Julius Caesar. Lloyd 
argued that the prison setting (‘a world of oppression and violence’) resonated with 
the play's themes of hierarchy, ‘By setting it in a prison, we are creating a world in 
which violence is ever possible, freedom is restricted, power and hierarchy are the 
meat and drink of every person who is incarcerated; where status is important, and 
                                                
181 Hamlet, by William Shakespeare, directed by Jan Klata, Teatr Szekspirowski, Gdańsk, October 3 
2014. This theatre, opened in September 2014, is a reconstruction of what is believed to be the first 
professional purpose-built theatre that housed productions of Shakespeare’s works in continental 
Europe during Shakespeare’s lifetime. The original site was used by travelling English players 
performing popular classics, including Hamlet. 
182 Michael Billington, “Saturday Review,” Guardian, May 29 1999, 4. Many critics noted, often 
negatively, how much this moment was dwelt upon. For instance, Robert King writes, the ‘violence 
was studiously artificial’, The North American Review, 284(6) (1999), 42. Madeleine North describes 
the drawn-out killing sequence as, ‘a cartoon-like farce’, Time Out, June 2 1999, 130. 
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where superstition is rife’.183 This production focused innovatively on the kneeling 
gesture when the conspirators knelt to and then murdered Caesar (Frances Barber). 
Lloyd deliberately gave her theatre a levelling effect, with all audience members 
seated on the same level in rows of prison-style plastic seating, so that she could play 
with perspective and audience experience. 
At Caesar’s murder, the company carefully drew the audience’s attention to 
the differences in perspective between the kneeling conspirators and Caesar who sat 
elevated above them on a chair. Barber swapped seats with an audience member in 
the front row, meaning that as Caesar died he was facing the same way as the 
audience. As a result, as the conspirators knelt to Barber, the audience shared Barber’s 
perspective relative to them. Occasionally turning round to address her lines to 
audience-members in a manner that suggested she expected sympathy and support 
from them, Barber consolidated this relationship, and this identification, between 
Caesar and the audience. Simultaneously, via a camera trained on Barber’s face, an 
image of Caesar’s threatening countenance was shown on television screens 
positioned high up on either side of the stage. Thus, as well as experiencing Caesar’s 
viewpoint of the conspirators as they knelt and looked up at him, the audience could 
see Caesar’s face looking down on them, as if they were in the conspirators’ 
position.184  
                                                
183 The Donmar Warehouse, “A Conversation with Phyllida Lloyd, Director,”  Julius Caesar: Behind 
the Scenes, Accessed July 15 2014, 
http://www.donmarwarehouse.com/~/media/Files/Julius%20Caesar%20Behind%20the%20Scenes%20
Guide.ashx, 21. Lloyd analogises, ‘Caesar represented an erosion of fundamental civil rights so huge, 
so towering, terrifying and confining that the conspirators believed they were in a prison’, 18. Harriet 
Walter (Brutus) draws the same comparison in an “Interview” (27), ‘The metaphor of an incarcerated 
group of people who are dependent on favours and handouts and punishments and everything else from 
a superior power is also neat. That is everyday life in a prison’. Lloyd’s “Production Diary” 
demonstrates how seriously the prison setting was taken: during rehearsals, ‘staying true to our locked 
prison setting, no-one leaves the space. This means that in the first run, props go astray, wires end up in 
a tangle and costumes are left all over the place’, Week Six, 20. The actors used only those props and 
costumes that would have been available to prisoners. For instance, the phrase ‘beware the Ides of 
March’ is found in a magazine horoscope.  
184 The audience also experienced the death physically; the conspirators jostled the audience as they 
crowded to force Caesar to drink bleach, Archival Recording, Julius Caesar, by William Shakespeare,  
directed by Phyllida Lloyd, Donmar Warehouse, London, January 22, 2013, V&A Archive, Blythe 
House, London.  
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Lloyd’s production illustrates how crucial perspective and relative vertical 
height are to significant moments in the play. As Caesar was murdered, Lloyd enabled 
the audience to experience the radically different viewpoints of the kneeling 
conspirators and the upright Caesar and invited the audience to ponder the different 
allegiances with different characters that these two perspectives might provoke. 
Fittingly, in this production, after Caesar's death, Barber returned to the stage to play a 
tyrannical prison warden who threatens to stop the amateur production in its tracks: a 
bold suggestion that after his murder Caesar retains some authority over the 
conspirators. 
Returning, in conclusion, to the material cultures of 1599, the original 
performance conditions of Julius Caesar meant that this play will very likely have 
been framed by another significant moment of kneeling; the players will probably 
have knelt to the audience, and to the monarch if the play was a court performance, at 
the end of the play. Tiffany Stern questions the previously-common idea that prayer to 
and on behalf of monarchs and players’ patrons were only a feature of court 
performances. She shows ‘that in some–and perhaps all–companies, terminal prayers 
for some public performances were usual’ throughout the reigns of Elizabeth I and 
James I. Stern describes these moments as ones where the boundary between the 
fictional world of the play and the ‘real’ world outside it is uncertain, as they are often 
‘moments in which the Epilogue becomes cognizant of the audience and “notices” the 
monarch’ in court performances.185 She suggests that prayers or bows to monarchs in 
court performances at the end of plays that critique the authority of rulers might be 
contaminated by some of the anarchic elements in the play, even as the final kneeling 
or bowing gesture attempts to contain those elements by reasserting the players’ 
deferent relationship towards their rulers and patrons. This was especially the case 
once Shakespeare’s company officially became ‘The King’s Men’ with the accession 
of James I in 1603, ‘That means that though, potentially, whatever king or queen may 
have been questioned or slaughtered within the fiction, the reigning monarch of the 
                                                
185 Stern, “Epilogues, Prayers after Plays,” 27, 25. Stern states (27), ‘Though prayer endings from the 
time of King James onwards tend not to be found in print, they are still referred to’ in other texts and 
therefore probably continued to happen, especially as these mentions of prayer-endings ‘assume a 
reader who is familiar with the event they are describing. They seem, that is to say, simply to be 
reflecting normal theatrical practice’. 
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time ruled the end of some versions of Shakespearean drama’. For instance, she 
writes, in words that could equally be applied to Julius Caesar, 
 
the prayer moment in Shakespeare’s 2 Henry VI suggests that on some 
occasions at least Shakespeare’s play ended its exploration of troubled 
kingship, its questioning of everything the monarch stood for, with a 
rousing, monarchical prayer. Ironies encoded in this text can perhaps be 
traced to that prayer…its words are already potentially heralded as 
meaning their opposite…Bringing complicated issues of loyalty to God 
and to the monarch to bear on whatever play had preceded them, the will 
(depending on the audience’s point of view) have bolstered or ironized the 
play that they accompanied.186 
 
Stern’s evidence suggests that players knelt or bowed at the end of Julius Caesar for 
some (if not all) of their earliest performances, especially as the Lord Chamberlain’s 
Men (Shakespeare’s company before they became The King’s Men) often performed 
at court. This action will have resonated with the conspirators kneeling to Caesar 
within the play. The preceding action of the play will question the sincerity of the 
players’ act of kneeling deferentially to the monarch at the end of the play. At the 
same time, this act of deference will retrospectively comment on the conspirators’ 
hypocritical and seditious kneeling gesture, framing it as something aberrant and 
wrong. The next chapters explain how this uneasy relationship between performance 
and reality in the theatre was at the heart of antitheatricalist discourse, and has 
continued into the present day; antitheatricalists and modern cognitive theorists both 
express fear that performance can create real seditious, immoral, or dangerous 
behaviour.  
 Kneeling at the end of the play, a player retains residual traces of their 
character. Half in and half out of the play, part player finishing the day’s work and 
still part fictional character, they occupy a space where performance and reality are 
not ontologically separable but shape and reflect each other. This is the very space 
where habit does its work, where performed gestures seep into the core of our being 
and become ‘real’ second nature. The cognitive themes that this chapter has explored 
                                                
186 Stern, “Epilogues, Prayers after Plays,” 28-9. 
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in Julius Caesar can also be brought to bear on the process of creating the play itself. 
For instance, we saw that Cassius and Brutus espouse a model of kinaesthetic learning 
whereby one person’s identity is created and sustained by their relation to the people 
around them, ‘The eye sees not itself| But by reflection, by some other thing’. In her 
analysis of how early modern actors learnt their parts and created roles, Tribble 
describes a ‘dynamic system’ whereby embodied learning is fundamentally achieved 
through mimicking, observing, and interacting with other gesturers.187 By relying on 
embodied interactions to shape each other's identities, Cassius and Brutus, and the 
conspirators kneeling to Caesar, reflect both early modern rehearsal practices in the 
playhouse and early modern methods for producing political subjects.  In Julius 
Caesar, the boundary between real-life kinaesthetic relationships and staged 
representations of those relationships is blurred.  
This reflects a wider Shakespearean and early modern concern with the 
potential for kneeling to be either pure performance or a genuine devoted gesture. 
Most worryingly for early modern religious writers, these two were not strictly 
separable; seemingly devout gestures could conceal seditious or impious thoughts. 
Speaking of fictional prayers performed by characters within the world of the play 
(rather than those addressed outwards to the audience or monarch) Joseph Sterrett 
argues that Shakespearean ‘prayers, like plays, are performances, enactments that 
expose the prayer-ers to judgment, both human and divine’,188 claiming that 
Shakespeare often deliberately stages prayers that are not heard by God, such as 
Claudius’ failed prayer in Hamlet, in order to draw attention to the fact that they are 
heard by a human audience in the playhouse. As we have seen, though not praying, 
the conspirators explicitly invoke ideas of performance and acting as they kneel then 
kill Caesar, ‘How many ages hence| Shall this our lofty scene be acted over| In states 
unborn and accents yet unknown!’  
Renaissance writers often focus anxiously on the fact that it is difficult to tell 
whether a kneeling gesture effectively shapes the thoughts of the gesturer and makes 
them devout, whether ‘performance’ becomes ‘reality’. In the Elizabethan religious 
context, particularly towards the end of Elizabeth’s reign, these debates were 
                                                
187 Tribble, Cognition in the Globe, 2. 
188 Joseph Sterrett, The Unheard Prayer: Religious Toleration in Shakespeare’s Drama (New York, 
Brill, 2012), ix. 
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dangerous ones to partake in, with potentially painful lethal consequences for those 
who overstepped the mark. By reframing ideas about kneeling, performance, and 
reality within a partly-fictional Roman context, Shakespeare is able to explore, and 
perhaps even intervene in, these debates from a safe distance. Many early modern 
religious writers were obsessed with scrutinising whether or not a person was 
kneeling out of true loyalty to the Church of England and the monarch.189 Because the 
body was the only visible sign of thought and intention available to scrutiny during 
silent moments of prayer, writers on kneeling had to look for bodily clues that a 
person was using a seemingly-devout kneeling gesture to cloak secret seditious or 
impious thoughts. Thus, though early moderns often acknowledged that the body does 
not always shape or represent the mind, they nevertheless believed that the signs of 
this separation between thought and body would be embodied. In A Poore Mans Rest 
(1620), John Norden acknowledges that many people make gestures of devotion 
purely to appear pious, or to flatter rulers. These gestures do not match up to the 
gesturer’s heart, ‘there cannot be a more apparant discouery of a rancke Hypocrite, 
then to make outward shewes of Deuotion, with the gesture and lips, and yet the heart 
to be busied in the cogitation of idle, earthly, and prophane things’. However, Norden 
argues, even the most inveterate hypocrite cannot completely prevent their body from 
representing their impious thoughts. Small bodily details like wandering eyes will 
give them away, ‘nothing more discouereth an idle heart outwardly, then the 
wandering of the eye in the time of diuine prayer: for it is probable, and often found 
                                                
189 There are many instances of early modern writers discussing deceptive Christian-like gestures. A 
translation of the sixteenth-century Lazarillo de Tormes (attributed to Diego Hurtado de Mendoza) 
concentrates on one of Lazarillo’s masters’ ability to control even his eyes when counterfeiting prayer, 
‘he could counterfeit a good deuoute countenance in praying, without any strange gesture, either with 
mouth or eye’, The pleasaunt historie of Lazarillo de Tormes a Spaniarde, trans. David Roulande 
(London: Abel Ieffes, 1586), B1r. Compare Shakespeare’s Richard III, appearing with two churchmen 
reading a bible, purely for effect (Richard III 3.7.47-8). Kneeling was also separated from intention in 
the widespread practice of surrogacy, whereby people would place figurines or paintings of themselves 
kneeling beside the altar at church, so that they could in a sense kneel when their minds were occupied 
elsewhere, or even after they were dead. C.f. Laura Gelfland and Walter Gibson, “Surrogate Selves: 
The ‘Rollin Madonna’ and the Late-Medieval Devotional Portrait,” Simolus: Netherlands Quarterly for 
the History of Art 29(3/4) (2002), 119-38. Mrozowski identifies donor portraits like these as, from the 
9th century onwards, one of the most important iconographical sources for information about kneeling, 
“Genuflection in Medieval Western Culture,” 12. 
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by experience, that the eye withdraweth the heart: and if the eye be inconstant, the 
prayer hath not, nor can haue the due Attention of the heart’.190 Whilst acknowledging 
the ability of the body to deceive about the state of the mind or soul, Norden 
nevertheless attests that no body can completely hide its profound connection to a 
person’s thoughts. It is the body (the wandering eye) that betrays that the outwardly 
devout body is concealing an impious mind. This totalising discourse of embodiment, 
whereby all thought is embodied, even those thoughts that attempt to exploit the 
potential for the soul and body to be separate, is particularly attractive for theories like 
Lakoff and Johnson’s.  
 At the extreme end of the spectrum, many Puritans saw any religious gestures 
at all as potential hypocritical performances. Dissolving the distinction between 
religious and theatrical ideas about the performance-reality boundary, these Puritan 
writers tended to connect religious gestures with theatrical performance, as though 
‘Stage-plays’ were the paradigm of hypocrisy and deceit. The separatist martyr Henry 
Barrow uses the adjective ‘stagelike’ throughout his works to describe the posturing 
of ‘Popish’ ceremony. He laments in A Brief Discouerie of the False Church (1590) 
for example, people ‘making not only an art, but a stage play and an occupation of 
religion’.191 This trend continued into the seventeenth century; William Prynne, one 
of the Puritans who spoke out against kneeling in church, was also a ferocious 
opponent of the ‘immorality’ of theatre, as he describes in Histriomastix (1632). This 
association of stage plays and religious hypocrisy lends strength to the idea that with 
Julius Caesar, Shakespeare was engaging with contemporary discourses about 
                                                
190 John Norden, A Poore Mans Rest (London: T Snodham, 1620), B5v-B6r.  Norden was a 
cartographer-surveyor and also a writer of popular devotional texts.  
191 Henry Barrow, A Brief Discoverie of the False Church (London: 1590), Hiiijv. See Patrick 
Collinson, “Barrow, Henry (c.1550–1593),” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, accessed 28 
August 2012, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/1540. Jody Enders illustrates the thin line 
separating the religious and the theatrical, describing how, during an early modern French theatrical 
representation of Christ feeding the masses, a miracle is said actually to have occurred when thousands 
of loaves appeared, “Performing miracles: mimesis of Valenciennes (1547),” in Tracy Davis and 
Thomas Postlewait, eds. Theatricality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 40-64. 
Elizabeth Williamson’s The Materiality of Religion in Early Modern English Drama (Surrey: Ashgate, 
2009), and Elizabeth Williamson and Jane Hwang Degenhardt’s edited Religion and Drama in Early 
Modern England (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009) demonstrate that drama appropriated, performed, and thus 
changed understandings of religious practices. 
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kneeling, performance, and authenticity. The play might also be said to be staging an 
intervention into these discourses. Though in the short term Brutus’ kneeling gesture 
might seem little more than irony, in the long term it plays out across contemporary 
ideas about the lasting significance of kneeling. Julius Caesar acknowledges the 
crossovers between politico-religious and (anti)theatrical debates about the boundary 
between performance and reality. It then depicts a group of people who try and fail to 
separate performed gestures from the reality of their consequences (Brutus kneels 
ironically, the repercussions are real submission to Caesar). Shakespeare thus 
reaffirms the notion that Targoff states is so central to Elizabethan politics and 
religion: actions performed without conscious understanding and in jest can 
fundamentally shape our ways of understanding, and can become serious parts of our 
nature.  
 Renaissance writers also often linked the idea of vocation and social status, 
another key theme in Julius Caesar, to the theatre, suggesting that having a vocation 
was like having a part to play on the stage of the world. The Renaissance Neo-Stoic 
Guillaume du Vair stated that we must play the part God gave us rather than writing 
our own, and Lemnius Levinas wrote at length of how, ‘the earth is as it were a stage, 
whereon euery man liuing in his state, condition, order and degree, doth play his part’; 
people’s roles are thus not immutable, they ‘are not in deed those persons, which in 
the eie of the world, and light of the common wealth they shew themselues to 
bee...No surely, they are but plaiers vpon the scaffold for a short time’.192 Shakespeare 
alludes to this common trope in his description of the ‘poor player’ on the stage 
(Macbeth 5.5.24-8), and Jacques’ ‘all the world’s a stage’ speech in As You Like it 
(2.7.138ff).193 
                                                
192 Lemnius Levinas, The Sanctuarie of Salvation (London: Hugh Singleton, 1592), B6r. Levinas 
repeats this image of the world as a stage throughout his book. 
193 See also E.L’s description of ‘the vaine worldes stage’, Romes Monarchie (London: the widow 
Orwin, 1596), C1r.  Thomas Heywood’s prefatory “The Author to his Booke” in his Apology for Actors 
explores the trope of the world as a stage and the different parts that can be played there at length (A4r-
v). Several conduct books suggest that people ought to learn to perform the gestures appropriate to their 
vocation, as if they were playing a part. For example, Jacques Guillemeau states, ‘the Chirurgiane must 
endevoure him selfe to have a wise & grave gesture’, befitting his role, The French Chirugereye, trans. 
A.M. (Dort: Isaac Canin, 1598), Aijr.  
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Historically-specific variations in acting techniques will have altered the ways 
in which these habitual actions will have been put into practice. Tribble states, for 
instance, that the main cognitive difference between early modern and present day 
actors was that the former relied more on intense ‘rote repetition’ whereas modern 
actors have a longer rehearsal period in which to explore their characters 
psychologically.194 However, there is a long tradition of interrogating the effect on the 
actor’s personality of the habitual action involved in creating a role on stage. In 
Republic 3.399, Plato argues that people should only imitate good character-models 
because imitation is a form of assimilation to another person whilst acting a wicked 
role causes a person to become imbued with wickedness. Building on this tradition, 
writers such as Thomas Heywood in Apology for Actors argue that actors become 
their characters.195 Richard Flecknoe described Burbage as ‘a delightful Proteus, so 
transforming himself into his part…he never…assum’d himself again until the play 
was done’.196 More recently, Konstantin Stanislavsky, who inspired Method Acting, 
has described acting as an ‘art of experiencing’ where actors attempt to become their 
characters from the inside out.197 Cognitive theory of habitual action suggests that this 
is more than just rhetoric, and is in fact a real and inevitable aspect of the process of 
rehearsed performance. 
 It is perhaps too simple to say that Julius Caesar draws on aspects of kneeling 
in real life and presents them by means of a theatrical performance. Looking at 
kneeling in Julius Caesar illustrates, rather, how performance and reality tend to 
collapse into each other in this play, reflecting the wider way in which performance 
and reality collapse in early modern acts of fealty and devotion. The kneeling gesture, 
in church and in secular contexts, was already imbued with connotations of 
                                                
194 Tribble, Cognition in the Globe, 11. 
195 Heywood, Apology, B4r. 
196 Richard Flecknoe, “A Short Discourse of the English Stage” (1664) appended to Love’s Kingdom 
(London: R. Wood, 1664), G4r. For Proteus imagery and a discussion of the tradition see Joseph 
Roach, The Player’s Passion: Studies in the Science of Acting (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 
1993, first published 1985), 56. Roach writes (49) of the pervasive early modern assumption that ‘the 
actor toys with enormous forces that he can evoke quickly but not easily subdue’. 
197 For Stanislavsky, ‘it is always best when an actor is completely taken over by the play. Then, 
independently of his will, he lives the role, without noticing how he is feeling, not thinking about what 
he is doing, and so everything can happen spontaneously, subconsciously’,  An Actor’s Work: A 
Student’s Diary, trans. and ed. Jean Benedetti (London: Routledge, 2008; first published 1938), 17, 20. 
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theatricality, and contextualised within debates about hypocrisy and about the 
distinction between gesture and thought. At the same time, any kneeling gesture at the 
end of Julius Caesar would surely be parsed as a ‘real’ rather than hypocritical act of 
deference to a monarch or patron. Moreover, no matter how hypocritical we believe 
the conspirators’ kneeling gesture to be, as it was habitually performed in production 
it is likely to have had a real effect on the actors’ plastic bodies and minds, 
strengthening those neural pathways that made them most prone to kneel when they 
spoke the relevant lines, ‘As low as to thy foot doth Cassius fall…pardon, Caesar…’.  
 
Conclusions 
Using cognitive theory to examine these acts of falling, rising, and, in particular, 
kneeling has drawn Renaissance ideas of plasticity, flexibility, fixity, and conformity 
to the fore. These ideas, in both Renaissance thought and cognitive theory, challenge 
the notion that performance and ‘nature’, and gesture and thought, are separable. 
Cognitive theory provides a scientific basis for the common early modern assumption 
that repeatedly performing this subservient gesture would make subservient thought-
patterns increasingly dominant in a person’s mind. Simultaneously, the conspirators’ 
hypocritical and seditious kneeling gesture in Julius Caesar alerts us to the potential 
for subjects to assert control of this gesture and to use it to make their own meanings, 
resisting those meanings that authority-figures have associated with kneeling and 
resisting those authority-figures themselves. Malabou’s theory of plasticity helps to 
explain how this can be so; the plastic mind and body can be shaped either by secular 
and religious authorities or by the gesturer themselves, depending on whether the 
gesturer is conscious of the plasticity of their mind and body and keen to assert 
control over it, or whether they are unconscious of how authorities are using 
prescribed behavioural norms to shape their thoughts. 
 Cognitive studies are often depoliticised, perhaps because of the implicit idea 
that being freed from political ideas makes them more objective. Books like Suparna 
Choudhury and Jan Slaby’s Critical Neuroscience (2012) discussed in the next 
chapter, and Malabou’s What Should We Do With Our Brain? which show how 
neuroscience has been shaped by cultural metaphors, demonstrate that depoliticising 
cognitive science is both an unattainable and an undesirable goal. Reading cognitive 
texts alongside Julius Caesar and early modern discussions of gesture has 
demonstrated that the ability of the kneeling gesture to shape thoughts as well as be 
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shaped by them has historically been inherently politicised; it has been used as both a 
tool to achieve political and religious compliance and as a method of religious non-
conformity, hypocrisy, or political resistance. 
 With its explicit discussions of the use of the vertical axis of the body to create 
and sustain unjust hierarchies, Julius Caesar makes visible the workings of ideology 
as it is generated and maintained through gesture. As such, the play can enable us to 
gain that consciousness of how minds and bodies are plastic that Malabou says is 
crucial if we want to be able to take control of our own plasticity. Julius Caesar also 
makes us aware of our own plasticity because this play encourages us to use our 
thoughts in a flexible, adaptable way. We have seen that the kneeling gesture was a 
source of both power and anxiety in the Renaissance precisely because it could 
embody many ambiguous and contradictory meanings. I have argued that the 
conspirators’ kneeling gesture is part of a wider ambiguity in the ways in which both 
Caesar and the conspirators are presented. Caesar could be a presumptuous tyrant or a 
divinely-ordained ruler, and the conspirators could be wicked traitors or noble 
liberators of Rome. As Lloyd’s 2012 production shows, audiences can be invited to 
sympathise with either one of these perspectives, or both at once. The play can be 
seen as tragic because great Caesar dies, or because noble Brutus does, or because 
they both do. The play encourages us to use our ability to adapt our minds to 
encompass both, or to recognise the potential of either, of these readings. It thus has 
the potential to make us physically aware of our own ambiguous relationship to 
kneeling gestures. 
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Chapter 3 
‘I’ll smell it on the tree’: kissing in Othello 
 
Introduction 
Addressing Desdemona, whom he has just murdered, Othello states, 
 
 I kiss’d thee ere I kill’d thee. No way but this:  
Killing myself, to die upon a kiss.   Dies (5.2.358-9) 
 
Earlier, Othello describes kissing Desdemona as a powerful olfactory experience that 
threatens to change his mind about killing her. He figures kissing her as smelling a 
rose, ‘I’ll smell it on the tree’, and exclaims, ‘Oh, balmy breath, that dost almost 
persuade| Justice to break her sword’ (5.2.15-17). He foreshadows this sensation 
earlier in the play, suggesting that Desdemona’s precious, powerful scent contradicts 
his conscious perception that she is a mere ‘weed’, ‘O thou weed| Who art so lovely 
fair and smell’st so sweet| That the sense aches at thee’ (4.2.67-9). How can 
something as gentle and transient as breath, as scent, threaten to break the heavy, 
immutable sword of Justice?  
Olfaction is an integral element of the gesture of kissing and embracing. The 
way in which kisses will be perceived and thought about by the gesturers will be 
fundamentally shaped by their olfactory experiences, by the chemical sense data that 
they receive during a kiss. But, simultaneously, the gesturers’ prior perceptions of 
kissing, which are shaped both by cultural norms and their individual expectations 
and thoughts regarding the person they are kissing, will influence the way in which 
they interpret the olfactory sense data received during the kiss. When Othello kisses 
Desdemona, the tastes and scents involved in a kiss mingle and compete with, and are 
shaped by, Othello’s belief that Desdemona is having an affair, and his decision to kill 
her. This first chapter showed that the Shakespearean touch is a site where 
performance and reality can both separate and dissolve into each other and where 
established social ideas about gesture can be overturned. Involving both touch and 
scent, kisses add an olfactory dimension to these findings. The kiss also raises new 
questions of audience engagement: if audiences cannot smell Desdemona’s breath (as 
this scent is represented in Othello’s words but not necessarily reproduced with 
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corresponding sweet smells released into the audience), does this have the effect of 
insulating audiences from the fictional world of the play? Othello is stating that he can 
smell something that his audience cannot: Desdemona’s scent. However, at the same 
time, as Tanya Pollard has argued in Drugs and Theater in Early Modern England, 
scents in the theatre are not the same as scents in real life; interwoven with the 
language and action of the play, they are designed to produce emotional effects in the 
audience. Pollard explains that narcotics, perfumes and potions in Shakespeare ‘are 
not just in the theatre but of the theatre’ because (like the magical juice that Puck 
applies to the lovers’ eyes in A Midsummer Night’s Dream) they encourage the 
character to ‘feel new emotions’.198 The theatrical effect of Desdemona’s scent can 
apply both to Othello and to the audience: both can experience altered thoughts and 
emotions as Othello leans in for his final kiss. 
An analysis of gesture in Shakespeare’s plays needs to take into account all of 
the factors that Shakespeare foregrounds with respect to gesture. That means 
analysing not just kinesis but (as we saw with Titus Andronicus), touch as well and 
not just the touch but also (as we see in Othello) the olfactory elements of gesture. 
Kissing is one of the most common and also one of the most emotionally-charged 
gestures in Shakespeare’s plays: Shakespearean characters kiss as they die, greet, or 
betray each other. Othello emphasises the olfactory element of the kiss and this links 
to a thread of olfactory imagery running throughout the play. It would thus be 
impossible fully to understand Othello’s kissing gesture without examining its 
olfactory element. Moreover, this chapter’s discussion of olfactory cognition in 
Shakespeare provides the foundation for chapter 5’s analysis of the emotional 
‘contagion’ associated with violent theatrical gestures in Hamlet. 
Othello’s final couplet seems to have been one of the play’s most troubling 
moments for modern directors. Here, Othello gives voice to the excessive sensual 
power of the kiss, the breath, and olfaction. But, several directors have taken 
advantage of the lack of kissing in Othello’s stage directions to elide such moments or 
rein them in. F1 and Q2 (1630) have no stage directions for Othello’s kisses given to 
Desdemona before he kills her, nor before he kills himself, but at both points 
                                                
198 Tanya Pollard, Drugs and Theater in Early Modern England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 5. Pollard does not focus so much on Othello, or on Othello’s kiss, but she does note, for 
instance, the way in which (p. 134) Iago’s effect on Othello’s mind is like ‘a chemical reaction’. 
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Othello’s lines make clear that he does kiss her. Indeed, before killing her, Othello 
cannot stop kissing Desdemona; his lines show he does so at least three times: ‘one 
more, one more’ (on the third kiss, Q1 (1622) alone has the stage direction ‘Kisses 
her’). At Othello’s death, F1 merely states ‘Dies’ without mentioning a kiss (though 
later editions, Arden for instance, sometimes add a kiss in).199 Q1 and Q2 read ‘He 
dies’, again without mentioning a kiss. In several performances, Othello died before 
he was able to kiss Desdemona. At the RSC in 1954, it seems his wish to die on a kiss 
was never put into practice; Anthony Quayle (both director and actor playing Othello) 
embellished Shakespeare’s text with the prompt ‘Oth fall on end of bed’, suggesting 
that Othello never reached Desdemona’s head.200 In the late nineteenth century, critic 
Edward Mason describes the Italian actor Tommaso Salvini (the first realist actor to 
perform in London) dying ‘before he can reach the bed’ where Desdemona lies; the 
whole scene is then contained by a ‘Quick curtain’.201 In Quayle’s 1955 production, 
the prompts suggest that the three kisses Othello gives Desdemona as she sleeps are 
somewhat too numerous, as they are marked with an emphatic ‘yet again’, ‘OTH 
kisses DES| Kisses again| Yet again’.202 In 1930, W. Bridges-Adams cut at least two 
of the three kisses Othello gives Desdemona before killing her, deleting Othello’s line 
                                                
199 E.J.A. Honigmann edits the SD to, ‘[Kisses Desdemona and] Dies’, Othello by William 
Shakespeare (London: Arden, 1997), 331. 
200 Prompt Book, Othello, by William Shakespeare, directed by Anthony Quayle, Shakespeare 
Memorial Theatre, Stratford on Avon, 1954, Shakespeare Centre Library and Archive. 
201 ‘[H]e gets his sword; as he says “thus” (“Cosi”), he draws it violently across his throat, sawing 
backward and forward. His head falls back, as if more than half-severed from his body; he drops the 
sword and staggers backwards toward the alcove; but, before he can reach the bed, he falls backward, 
and dies, in strong convulsions of the body and the legs. Quick curtain’. Edward Mason, The Othello of 
Tommasso Salvini (London: GP Patromi’s Sons, 1890), 106-7. A play-text interspersed with Mason’s 
descriptions of how certain lines or scenes were performed, and occasional supplementary diagrams 
depicting blocking, this is a detailed description of Salvini’s Othello that usefully notes moments when 
Salvini performed a gesture or passage differently in different performances. Mason watched Salvini’s 
Othello ‘several times’ between 1881 and 1889, allowing Salvini to correct and edit an Italian 
translation of the text in 1882 (some of his remarks are incorporated into the text, others became 
footnotes). Though he describes his text as still ‘slight and inadequate…to describe a consummate 
work of art’, Mason argues that he took scrupulous care to ensure its accuracy because he believes 
Salvini’s performance was ‘the greatest of our time’ (v-vi). 
202 Prompt Book, Othello, by William Shakespeare, directed by Anthony Quayle, Shakespeare 
Memorial Theatre, Stratford on Avon, 1955, Shakespeare Centre Library and Archive. 
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‘one more, one more’.203 In Godfey Tearle’s 1948-9 RSC festival production, ‘one 
more, one more’ is scored it out with a strong pen-line, and at Othello’s death there is 
no mention of a kiss, he merely ‘Falls on the bed and dies’.204 
 In the productions above, the kisses are cut by directors. However, in Terry 
Hands’ 1985 RSC production, restraint was transferred from directors to characters; 
Othello himself was presented as disinclined to kiss Desdemona too much. In this 
production, Othello’s three kisses to Desdemona before killing her were preserved, 
but an earlier kiss was restrained; when Desdemona greeted Othello (Ben Kingsley) 
on arriving in Cyprus, ‘Des opens her arms but Oth stops her by not moving’, and his 
‘and this…and this the greatest discords be’ were kisses on her cheek before finally 
and only at Shakespeare’s stage direction, ‘they kiss’ each other’s lips.205 Later 
productions have used characters to draw attention to the excessive physicality in 
Othello and Desemona’s kisses in other ways; for instance as Othello (Adrian Lester) 
and Desdemona (Olivia Vinall) kissed passionately when greeting in Cyprus in 
Nicholas Hytner’s 2013 Othello at the National Theatre, Othello’s soldiers’ looks of 
discomfort and embarrassment marked these kisses as somewhat inappropriate. Here, 
what in earlier productions had been a discreet directorial embarrassment at the 
number of kisses is staged and made visible. The soldiers in Hytner’s production also 
stage the question of the effect that kisses have on audiences; as they squirmed and 
looked away, they made visible the notion, which this chapter traces from the early 
modern era to present day cognitive theory, that watching onstage kisses can have a 
chemical, cognitive effect on viewers. 
In Benson’s 1904 RSC production, the text was cut so that it ended on the 
couplet, ‘I kiss’d thee ere I kill’d thee: no way but this,| Killing myself, to die upon a 
kiss’. The couplet has been physically cut out from a copy of Othello and pasted in 
Benson’s prompt book alongside the stage direction ‘dies’. ‘Curtain’ is pencilled in 
with a flourish beneath, emphasising the couplet’s momentousness. Overall, there is a 
sense that this final kiss has deliberately been chosen as a climactic, powerful 
                                                
203 Prompt Book, Othello, by William Shakespeare, directed by W. Bridges Adams, Shakespeare 
Memorial Theatre, Stratford on Avon, 1930, Shakespeare Centre Library and Archive. 
204 Prompt Book, Othello, by William Shakespeare, directed by Godfrey Tearle, Shakespeare Memorial 
Theatre, Stratford on Avon, 1948, Shakespeare Centre Library and Archive. 
205 Prompt Book, Othello, by William Shakespeare, directed by Terry Hands, Royal Shakespeare 
Theatre, 1985, Shakespeare Centre Library and Archive. 
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ending.206 This is a suggestive example because it showcases both the marked 
directorial propensity to make cuts in the final scene of Othello and the deep 
significance and dramatic power of Othello’s final kisses. Stanley Cavell argues that 
Othello is re-enacting the moment when he consummated (or failed to consummate) 
his marriage, punning on the alternative Renaissance significance of the word ‘die’ as 
‘to have an orgasm’;207 kissing in Othello often seems to be seen by directors as a 
dangerous, unstable site of inordinate sensuality that needs to be curbed. Using 
cognitive theory, this chapter suggests that it is the olfactory element to kissing that 
gives it this significance; often unacknowledged by critics, but crucially important to 
Othello, Othello’s act of smelling raises modern questions about the chemical 
dimensions of cognition and the metaphoricity of the air. 
Olfaction is central to Othello. As well as Othello’s explicit references to smell 
as he kisses Desdemona, there is an implicit interest in olfaction running throughout 
the entirety of the play. The handkerchief at the play’s heart is steeped in human 
odour; when made it was ‘dyed in mummy, which the skilful| Conserv’d of maiden’s 
hearts’ (3.4.74-5). Othello’s insistence that this ‘mummy’ liquor came from maidens 
suggests that the handkerchief is imbued with a palpable odour of chastity. Designed 
to soak up odour-bearing bodily fluids such as mummy liquor and sweat (whilst the 
strawberries perhaps suggest drops of blood as well), the handkerchief’s 
uncomplicated relationship with chastity is overlaid in Othello’s mind by the idea that 
it has been contaminated with Cassio’s sweat, Iago claims to have seen ‘Cassio wipe 
his beard with’ it (3.3.439). Othello’s earliest critic Thomas Rymer mocked 
Shakespeare in 1693 for giving this insignificant piece of cloth so much prominence, 
contending that it is implausible even for Othello (whom Rymer thinks very stupid) to 
be so swayed by a handkerchief, ‘the Handkerchief is so remote a trifle, no Booby, on 
this side Mauritania, cou’d make any consequence from it’.208 However, recent 
                                                
206 Prompt Book, Othello, by William Shakespeare, directed by F.R. Benson, Shakespeare Memorial 
Theatre, Stratford on Avon, 1904 [according to note in inside cover], Shakespeare Centre Library and 
Archive. Interestingly, the prompt ‘falling upon Desdemona’ is written in pen after ‘no way but this’ 
then crossed out. 
207 Stanley Cavell, Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, first published 1987), 134. 
208  Thomas Rymer, “A Short View of Tragedy” (1693), in The Critical Works of Thomas Rymer, ed. 
Curt Zimansky (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), 159. 
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cognitive studies have focussed on the idea that olfaction is central to romantic 
relationships; ‘love hormones’ like pheromones in sweat have been suggested to 
influence our romantic inclinations. A 2012 study argued that smelling a loved one’s 
clothing brings feelings of comfort and happiness,209 whilst in 1995 Claus Wedekind 
claimed that heterosexual women responded more positively to men’s sweat-soaked T 
shirts the more compatible their genes were.210 Whether or not these studies are 
accurate, they work within a long tradition of associating physical or romantic 
attraction with enticing smells. Othello’s interest in smell is echoed in other 
characters’ use of olfactory and gustatory metaphors for the quality of romantic 
relationships. Emilia describes women discerning between kind and cruel lovers like 
gourmands choosing a dish, ‘they see and smell| And have their palates both for sweet 
and sour’ (4.3.94-5).  
Kissing is figured as a form of olfaction by both early modern and present day 
writers. As it brings two people into close contact, this gesture enables them to 
experience each other’s scents. Involving the mouth, the organ of taste, kissing is 
often described as a form of taste and smell. Indeed, as similar chemoreceptors in both 
the nose and mouth are involved in a kiss, the distinction between kissing as a form of 
tasting and as a form of smelling blurs. In Othello, kisses are linked at once with 
scents and with gustatory or sexual tastes and ‘appetites’. When he kisses Desdemona 
before killing her, Othello seems to be doing an experiment with olfaction, testing 
whether her scent can change his mind (which he egotistically describes as 
‘persuad[ing] Justice to break her sword’). Earlier, Othello describes Desdemona’s 
supposed adultery as a bad smell, ‘Heaven stops the nose at it’, proposing a link 
between kissing, licentiousness, and air, ‘the bawdy wind that kisses all it meets...will 
not hear’t’ (4.2.78-80). Kissing her alive for the last time, there is a dissonance 
between the actual ‘balmy’ scent of Desdemona’s breath and the horrible smell of 
adultery. ‘Balmy’ had a variety of sixteenth-century meanings, encapsulating the wide 
range of meanings attributed to air in the Renaissance: medicinal, soothing, soft, 
                                                
209 Donald McBurney, Sibyl Streeter and Harald Euler’s survey respondents suggested that ‘smelling 
the unwashed clothing of a loved one is…widely practiced’ and reported that ‘it made them feel happy 
and comfortable’, “Olfactory Comfort in Close Relationships,” in Gesualdo Zucco, Rachel Herz, and 
Benoist Schaal, eds., Olfactory Cognition (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2012), 72. 
210 Claus Wedekind, et al., “MHC-dependent preferences in humans,” Proceedings of the Royal Society 
of London 260(1359) (1995), 245–49. 
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deliciously fragrant, and delicate.211 Othello is led to ponder the difference between 
his perception that Desdemona is wicked and the uncorrupted scent of her breath. He 
pauses before acting on his aim to kill her, kissing her repeatedly (‘one more, one 
more’) as if to repeat the experiment, to test his resolve and to render clearer the effect 
that her scent is having on him. He concludes that, like many a poisonous gas, she is 
sweet-smelling but deadly, ‘so sweet was ne’er so fatal’ (5.2.20). Though cognitive 
theorists do not use their experiments to decide whom to murder, what is at stake in 
Othello’s experiment is also at stake in many recent neuroscientific experiments in 
that both aim to discover how far olfaction can produce or destroy romance, sexual 
attraction, and moral or emotional feelings of disgust.  
With experiments into olfaction, cognitive theorists also confront the fact that 
smelling and tasting have long been metaphors for knowledge and experience. 
Investigating olfaction causes cognitive theorists, consciously or unconsciously, to 
interrogate their metaphors for their own praxis. We absorb, digest, chew over ideas, 
hunger for knowledge and taste victory in an argument. The cultural historian of 
sensation David Howes notes that words like ‘sagacious’, ‘sapient’, ‘sage’, and (the 
obsolete) ‘nose-wise’ can mean both ‘clever’ and ‘having a good sense of taste or 
smell’.212 In the prologue to Gargantua (1534), for example, Rabelais compares a 
philosopher seeking knowledge in books to a bloodhound sniffing out the scents of a 
delicious marrowbone, punning on ‘estre saiges’ (‘to be wise’), and the idea of a 
delicious taste or savour.213 The now obsolete seventeenth- century word ‘hogo’ (from 
French ‘haut gout’: strong taste) meant both a strong taste or smell and a brief 
experience of something; the chef William Rabisha describes ‘a rich Broth, with a 
very high hogo’.214 Surly in Mr Crown’s 1685 comedy Sir Courtly Nice makes puns 
that echo Othello’s idea of Desdemona’s adultery stinking to high heaven, ‘Lock up 
the Women till they’r musty, better they shou’d have a Hogo, than their 
                                                
211 O.E.D., ‘balmy’, adj. 
212 David Howse, “Nose-wise: Olfactory Metaphors in Mind,” in Catherine Rouby et al, eds., Olfaction, 
Taste and Cognition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 69. 
213 Francoise Rabelais, Gargantua et Pantagruel, ed. Mireille Huchon (Paris: Folio, 2007), 6-7. This 
example comes from a talk given by Kathryn Banks at the Renaissance Kinesis workshop in honour of 
Guilemette Bolens, Clare College, Cambridge, September 25-7 2014. 
214 O.E.D., ‘hogo’, n; William Rabisha, The Whole Body of Cookery (London: by RW, 1661), D4v.  
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Reputations’.215 Othello’s exclamation when he thinks Cassio is boasting about his 
affair with Desdemona, ‘I see that nose of yours, but not that dog I shall throw it to’ 
(4.1.142-3), is not so outlandish given that the nose is the organ of experience; 
Othello understandably hates the organ that represents Cassio’s supposed knowledge, 
at once literally olfactory and metaphorically sexual, of Desdemona.  
Othello’s attempt to smell Desdemona’s virtue represents both a metaphorical 
evocation of his desire to ‘know’ her character and a more literal, practical attempt to 
know her by physically smelling her body. For cognitive theorists, physical olfactory 
experience is fundamental to many forms of memory, knowledge, emotion, and 
unconscious perceptions of people, places, and things. The historian of perfume 
Annick Le Guérer writes that smell is, 
 
indispensible in grasping some extremely subtle, pre-rational factors, the 
indefinable “something” that emanates from a person, an object, a place, a 
situation. As the sense most closely linked with affect and contact, a sense 
that helps to establish a fusional relationship with the world, revelatory 
not only of substances but also of ambiences, climates, and even 
existential states, the sense of smell is a subtle tool for knowledge that 
allows for intuitive and prelinguistic understanding.216 
 
The cognitive psychologist Rachel Herz finds that smells can have cultural 
associations and emotive affects particular to a certain person or social group. For 
instance, the smell of a lighted match can give cocaine addicts cravings for cocaine; 
US study participants described wintergreen as a pleasant smell (as it is used in US 
candy) but participants in the UK hated the smell (due to wintergreen’s use in UK 
analgesics and its consequent association with pain, trauma, and clinical 
environments).217 The ecstatic, welcoming, entirely ‘sweet’ kisses Othello gives 
Desdemona in 4.2 seem to create habitual memories that colour his perception of 
kissing her in Act 5: though he wants to think of her as a sour betrayer, his intuitive, 
emotive associations and memories suggested to him that she is ‘sweet’. 
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216 Annick Le Guérer, “Olfaction and Cognition: a Philosophical and Psychoanalytic View,” Olfaction, 
Taste and Cognition, 11. 
217 Rachel Herz, “Influences of Odor on Mood and Cognition,” Olfaction, Taste and Cognition, 162-4. 
 
123 
Sergius Kodera has shown that early modern neoplatonic and Aristotelian 
writers like Marsilio Ficino and Gregor Reisch (following earlier neoplatonic authors 
like Calcidius and Plotinus) often described the soul as airy and breath-like. Thus, the 
idea that thoughts are transmitted or perceived by breathing and sniffing was not 
entirely figurative. Kodera explains that air was the site where the material and the 
abstract coalesced in the Renaissance, 
 
in a Neoplatonic conceptual framework that embraces the idea of 
universal animation, it remained difficult to keep the two notions, that is, 
air and soul apart. The ambiguity of the two notions becomes obvious in 
the common functions both entities share in the metaphysical as well as in 
the natural hierarchy of being: air and soul stretch and communicate 
between the realm of mind and that of body.218 
 
In The Matter of Air, Steven Connor argues that ‘air is the privileged matter of 
thought’. He traces how, since the sixteenth century, air has been envisaged as the 
vehicle for smells, gases, magnetic waves, and invisible fluids that transmit, alter, and 
disrupt thought, and as a metaphor for the fluid, intangible nature of thought itself. 
Connor proposes that the ‘bulky, odorous, corporal, kinetic’ nature of physically 
breathing or sniffing ought to be differentiated from the ‘volatile, edgeless, self-
generating act of thought’, mounting ‘a defence of the concrete against the abstract 
air, the air of breath against the air of universal thought’.219 Othello wrestles with this 
distinction, setting Desdemona’s ‘balmy breath’ off against what he sees to be the 
higher more spiritual purpose of ‘just’ murder. Cognitive science sheds light on how, 
in Othello, the physical act of smelling threatens to collapse into the ‘edgeless act of 
thought’, and how it is often uncertain whether words like ‘sweet’ predominantly 
refer to smells or to moral qualities. 
 Several neuroscientific studies suggest that dislike and disgust, and 
attraction and moral approbation, are strongly linked to olfactory stimuli and olfactory 
memories. Mary Phillips and Maike Heining write, ‘the neural response to olfactory 
                                                
218 Sergius Kodera, Disreputable Bodies: Magic, Medicine and Gender in Renaissance Natural 
Philosophy (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2010), 136. 
219 Steven Connor, The Matter of Air: Science and Art of the Ethereal (New York: Reaktion, 2010), 99-
100. 
 
124 
stimulation reflects, at least in part, processing of the emotional component of such a 
stimulus’, and conclude that taste and smell are almost always linked to emotional, 
cognitive valuations, 
 
findings to date indicate that many of the brain regions associated with 
emotion perception are also involved in perception of olfactory stimuli: 
the orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala, and insula. Because odors are rarely 
devoid of emotional salience, it is probable that the involvement of the 
orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala, and insula demonstrated in the neural 
response to olfactory stimulation reflects, at least in part, processing of the 
emotional component of such a stimulus.220  
  
Cognitive theory offers an explanation for moments like the King James Bible’s 
(1611) description of Christians as ‘a sweet savour unto Christ’ (2 Corinthians 2:15) 
which materialised as sweet smelling incense in church, the use of perfume to soothe 
the mind,221 or the links made between bad smells and moral corruption (the phrase 
‘stench of sin’ was common throughout the seventeenth century).222 Phillips and 
Heining’s research suggests that the pervasive early modern tendency to equate 
olfactory stimuli and emotional or moral value-judgements is grounded in the fact that 
emotion perception and olfactory stimuli are processed in the same brain regions.  
 Othello’s idea of taste and smell specifically refers to sexual knowledge, 
reflecting the fact that, since the eleventh century, ‘to know’ has had a specifically 
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sexual meaning.223 He imagines ‘the general camp,| Pioneers and all, had tasted her 
sweet body’ (3.3.345-6). Considered in the context of Merleau-Ponty’s work, 
Othello’s interest in the sexual touch in particular is the next step on from Titus 
Andronicus’ more general interest in skin contact. Chapter 1 established that 
Shakespeare was interested in how a mutual touch can cognitively affect the two 
participants and convey information to each about the other. Merleau-Ponty writes 
that the erotic touch expresses the essence of the touch’s ability to experience the 
world, ‘the body in its sexual being is the primary function whereby we bring into 
existence, for ourselves, or take a hold upon, space, the object, or the instrument’.224 
This chapter’s analysis of kissing builds on chapter 1 by examining an additional, 
olfactory, element to tactile cognition. There are more nerve endings on the lips and 
tongue than on most other areas of the body,225 and though they did not express 
themselves in terms of ‘nerve endings’, several early modern texts see the lips’ super-
sensitivity as significant, foreshadowing Merleau-Ponty’s argument that the kiss is a 
test-case for ideas of touching in general. For instance, the anatomist Gideon Harvey 
(1636/7-1702) believed that touching consisted in ‘the Tact’ or ‘a thick coarse 
spirituous air, the moving of which is the raising of the feeling’. This moving air had 
most effect on the thinner skin of the lips; this is the source of the ‘delightful feeling’ 
in a kiss, and also enables a kiss to be a site where the body is most keenly affected by 
air and attendant olfactory stimuli as ‘air, thin vapours, exhalations...stir & quaver 
these tangent spirits’.226 Harvey imagines the kiss as combining olfaction and kinesis; 
we can add these ‘stir[ring]’ and ‘quaver[ing]’ movements in the skin of the lips to the 
more obvious kinetic features of the kiss discussed earlier in the chapter which in 
various different productions have involved collapsing, kneeling, and leaning in for a 
kiss. 
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 Cognitive studies establish that tasting and smelling are an inextricable mix of 
physiological sensation and linguistic descriptions, memories, and conscious 
expectations. The ‘air, thin vapours, exhalations, or spirits’ Harvey describes are not 
just the physical experience of the kiss but also the more metaphorical vapours of 
‘airy’ thoughts described by Kodera and Connor. Measuring variations in voltage and 
chemicals in the human scalp, Bettina Pause found that our olfactory memories, and 
the way we emotionally and consciously evaluate odour (‘olfactory learning’ and 
‘odor evaluation’), can affect our sensitivity to certain odours and the way that we 
process smell.227 Cognitive psychologist Pamela Dalton finds that our experience of a 
smell depends both on what substance we expect to smell and on how it is described 
to us. She asked subjects to smell the same scent several times, but each time her 
‘confederate (an actor) relayed a series of scripted comments (positive, negative, or 
neutral) intended to bias the true subject’s perception of the quality of the odour and 
any symptoms or sensations the odour produced’. Dalton showed that the way odours 
are described dramatically changes how pleasant and intense they are perceived to be. 
She distinguishes between an odour’s ‘bottom up qualities’ (its actual chemical 
composition) and its ‘top down qualities’ (the biases and conditions surrounding it); 
both top-down and bottom-up qualities influence an odour’s intensity and 
pleasantness.228 The neuroscientist James Goode states that flavour or scent is the 
combination of higher order processing and the signals received in our olfactory 
receptors: it cannot be reduced to the latter.229 Goode explains that the nose’s 2000 
olfactory receptors do not send signals to the brain in a ‘linear’ way that simply 
involves informing us what type of scents are around. Rather, our experience of scent 
is affected by ‘higher-order processing’ in the orbitofrontal cortex whereby the brain 
‘edits’ the most relevant information about a flavour. Goode’s research is based on a 
cognitive priming experiment with wine; wine tasters given the same wine to taste, 
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but with different labels, decided that the wine with a more special, upmarket label 
was more ‘complex’ than that with a simple run-of-the-mill label. He concludes, 
‘What critics are scoring is not some intrinsic property of the liquid in the bottle, but a 
perceptual representation that is to some degree specific to them’. Thus, ‘The 
language we use for describing wine is intrinsic to not only sharing those ideas, but 
also to forming them in the first place’, calibrating and ‘shap[ing]… the 
experience’.230 Othello’s conscious decision that Desdemona is guilty, and Iago’s 
descriptions of her supposed adultery, calibrate his experience of her smell and 
eventually override the power that her ‘sweet’, ‘balmy’ breath has over Othello. 
Prompted by Othello’s demand for ‘ocular proof’ (3.3.360), critics have 
overwhelmingly tended to focus on the visual in Othello; LaRue Love Sloan even 
coins the term ‘eyeconography’ to describe Othello and Iago’s emphasis on sight and 
blindness.231 A decade and a half ago, Michael Neill focussed on the ‘anxious 
fascination’ caused by Othello’s race in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century audiences. 
Neill’s analysis focuses on visuals, on what he calls the ‘stage-picture’; for instance, 
he discusses how ‘the violent chiaroscuro of [the actor William] Macready’s 
blackened face thrust between the virgin-white curtains was experienced as a 
shocking sado-erotic climax’, and he emphasises that what shocked these audiences in 
the final scene were two visuals: the presence of a black character (and in the case of 
Ira Aldridge, a black actor) on stage, and the fact that rather than occurring offstage 
we witness Desdemona’s murder, see ‘the lurid vision of the bed’ with all its visual 
accoutrements from bloody sheets to wild violent movements.232 The words Neill uses 
and quotes, like ‘hideous’, ‘obscene’, and ‘monstrous’, are all related to people or 
objects that are shocking specifically to the eyes. Andrew Sofer argues persuasively 
for the centrality of the handkerchief to Othello, and his discussion focuses on this 
prop’s visual properties, describing it as ‘an incriminating sign’. Sofer enumerates the 
handkerchief’s various movements (falling, being scooped up, and so on) and dwells 
on questions of sight. He asks, for instance, whether the handkerchief’s strawberry 
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pattern would have been visible to audiences and what they might have made of this 
visual clue.233 Sofer uses a telling visual metaphor for his methodology, stating that he 
wants to analyse ‘how the handkerchief appears to consciousness’; the word ‘appears’ 
encapsulates the way that visual metaphors are Sofer’s framework for understanding 
thought.234 Only at the very end of his article does Sofer mention the mummy juice in 
which the handkerchief is steeped. Yet even here, he says nothing of its potential 
odour, and describes this liquid as a ‘felt absence’ rather than a powerful presence, 
contending that, ‘Instead of merely symbolizing its human couriers, the handkerchief 
absorbs and literally inscribes them as felt absences within its ghostly palimpsest’.235 
Persistently stopping short of examining olfaction, Sofer’s article is as haunted by the 
absence of human odour-bearing liquids as he imagines the handkerchief to be. 
Instead of a nebulous absence, or an incidental feature of the play’s climax 
upstaged by ‘the lurid vision of the bed’, olfaction is key to Othello. Othello is a play 
that centrally explores the potential for olfactory stimuli and language to influence the 
‘taste’ of something, how that person or event is experienced. But it is also a play 
about how language and olfactory and gustatory stimuli can conflict with each other. 
Iago aims to change the ‘taste’ of Desdemona in Othello’s mouth using words, ‘the 
food that to him now is as luscious as locusts, shall be to him shortly as bitter as 
coloquintida’ (1.3.347-9). Iago conducts an experiment similar to Goode or Dalton, 
investigating how far his descriptions of Desdemona as unchaste alter Othello’s 
perception of her. And yet, to Othello, despite all this, Desdemona still smells ‘sweet’; 
the intensity of her scent, and the pleasant memories Othello has of her work against 
Iago’s descriptions. Peter Holz argues that our language of olfaction is inherently 
metaphorical; English lacks a lexicon of odour, and so we borrow words relating to 
taste (‘sweet’), touch (‘hot’), and moral evaluation (‘corrupt’) to describe odour. Holz 
concludes that, because of this metaphoricity, ‘research on language about olfactory 
qualities necessarily requires the analysis of poetic features. Without the poetic 
perspective, any semantic analysis of olfactory language turns out to be ungraspable 
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and arbitrary’.236 By using literary theory to analyse the poetics of Othello’s 
descriptions of his olfactory experience, this chapter brings an awareness of language 
to cognitive theories of olfaction, showing that moral appraisals and sense data seep 
into and influence each other, as Iago’s powerful verbal descriptions of Desdemona’s 
supposed infidelity compete in Othello’s mind with his appreciation of her ‘sweet’ 
scent.237 
  
Renaissance and Shakespearean kisses: affecting souls through olfaction 
Knowledge of the wider early modern discourses involving olfaction helps to cast 
light on just why Othello’s final kisses give him such cognitive confusion. Othello’s 
kisses draw on a widespread early modern practice of creating and cementing social 
bonds through touch and olfaction, and this collides in his mind with more sinister 
contemporary associations of the kiss with betrayal and idolatrous lust. Erasmus wrote 
in the late fifteenth century, ‘the world is full of kisses’;238 my database shows that 
kissing and embracing is (after taking hands, refusal to gesture, kneeling, and striking) 
the fifth most common gesture-type in Shakespeare’s plays. The historian J.A. 
Burrow establishes that kisses were prolific in the early modern era and possibly more 
common than handshakes; people kissed each other socially on the mouth, regardless 
of age or gender, far more frequently than they do in the present day (when such a 
kiss tends to be restricted to romantic or erotic contexts).239 Many Shakespearean 
characters kiss in greeting or parting: Benedick tells Beatrice, ‘I will kiss your hand 
and so leave you’ (Much Ado About Nothing 4.1.332), and Titus tells Lucius, ‘Let’s 
kiss and part’ (Titus Andronicus 3.1.287). Burrow and William Frijhoff argue that 
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kisses were so common that early modern writers often did not bother recording 
them.240 This suggests that, even if not explicitly mentioned, kisses often can be 
assumed to occur at moments of greeting or parting in early modern plays.241 It also 
suggests that kisses that are mentioned in early modern documents are especially 
significant in some way.  
 Othello’s kisses are striking because they protract and hinder rather than 
neatly effect a farewell, and they constitute betrayal rather than consolidating love and 
friendship. Othello’s statement ‘I kiss’d thee ere I kill’d thee’ is likely to have 
reminded early modern audiences of Judas, who marked Christ out to die by kissing 
him, ‘Judas, betrayest thou the Son of Man with a kiss?’ (Luke 22:48, K.J.V.). Early 
modern writers often describe Judas’ kiss as the ultimate betrayal because it subverts 
the kiss’s usual role of an innocuous greeting or gesture of love. The Church of 
England clergyman George Lawson writes, ‘he betrays him with a kiss, a sign of love 
in it self; but, in this business, an effect and act of horrid treachery’.242 As Rachel 
Herz’s discussion of the cognitive effects of wintergreen suggests, the early modern 
olfaction-laden gesture of a kiss was suffused with cognitive meanings and 
associations (friendship, betrayal, love, idolatry) that, variously emphasised, will have 
influenced how that kiss was experienced. 
 Amy Cook’s work, cited in the previous chapter, indicated that kneeling is a 
gesture ‘that does not just signify’, but ‘creates’. Early modern kisses could be equally 
performative, able to create as well as represent love, religious devotion, social 
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bonding and reconciliation. 243 Burrow explains that these traditions were established 
in the medieval era and continued into the early modern period; in ceremonies of 
medieval homage, ‘the mutual fidelitas was sealed by a kiss, mouth-to-mouth’ 
between vassal and feudal lord.244 Caliban kissing and licking Trinculo’s shoe 
throughout The Tempest and promising to be his ‘slave’ draws on this common 
connotation of kissing. The ecclesiastical lawyer Henry Swinburne (c.1551-1624) 
writes in A Treatise of Spousalls that kisses can replace words in effecting a marriage 
contract, ‘albeit the one party use no words at all, but signifie his or her consent by 
some Signs...the other party kissing or giving hand accordingly, Spousals are thereby 
Contracted’.245 Thus, in The Two Gentlemen of Verona, Julia asks Proteus, ‘seal the 
bargain with a holy kiss’ (2.2.7). Kissing the ‘X’ on a contract validated it, and 
kissing the Bible was common in court, for example in swearing in foremen;246 at his 
death, Romeo evokes the kiss’s power to seal a bond, ‘lips seal with a righteous kiss| 
A dateless bargain to engrossing death’ (5.3.114-5).  
 This power to seal legal, romantic, and social bonds made kisses deeply 
transgressive if the wrong person or thing was kissed, creating the potential for 
cognitive confusion and dissonances. For Catholics, to kiss a saint’s image was to 
give it value as a vehicle for contact with God; for Protestants, this kissing 
represented an overvaluing of material signs that in fact prevented a close communion 
with God. Early modern anti-Catholic discourses link kissing a saint’s image with 
kissing a corpse, marking both out as sinful. Susan Zimmerman explains that this was 
because post-Reformation writers against idolatry tended to see kissing statues as an 
excessive, irrational act of lust for a non-living human form,  
 
                                                
243 In the early modern era, the same word (‘kiss’, and much less frequently ‘buss’) is used to describe 
all these kinds of kisses. Burrow divides early modern kissing into four categories, each of which is 
determined by a different function: peace-making (the kiss of peace in church), social (e.g. welcoming 
guests), reconciling, and amorous, Gestures and Looks, 50. Frijhoff relates that Roman grammarians 
differentiated ‘oscula (kisses of friendship and affection); basia (kisses of love), and suavia (passionate 
kisses)’, “The Kiss Sacred and Profane,” 211.  
244 , Burrow, Gestures and Looks, 11-12. 
245 Henry Swinburne, A Treatise of Spousalls (London: S. Roycroft, 1686), K3r. 
246 Jonas Adames, The Order of Keeping a Court Leet and Court Baron (London: Thomas Orwin and 
William Kirckham, 1593), A3v. 
 
132 
Homage to idols was thought to have a strongly erotic dimension...the 
desire to substitute a dead, tangible image for the living, invisible 
God...signified man’s overestimation of bodily forms themselves and 
was virtually certain to involve the sin of concupiscence.247 
 
First performed in 1604, Othello is sandwiched between several other Shakespearean 
plays involving characters who kiss dead bodies and die on a kiss. Cleopatra (1606-7) 
tells her servants Iras and Charmian ‘take the last warmth of my lips’ (Antony and 
Cleopatra 5.2.291), and Romeo (1591-5) expresses himself almost identically to 
Othello, ‘with a kiss I die’ (Romeo and Juliet 5.3.120).  Romeo, Juliet, and Othello 
combine their kisses with protestations of overwhelming romantic love and with 
imagery of saints and stone images, evoking the contemporary link between 
subversive idolatrous kissing and lust. Romeo, in the shared sonnet that marks his first 
conversation with Juliet, describes Juliet as a ‘shrine’, and his lips ‘two pilgrims’ 
ready to kiss her (1.5.93ff.); Juliet calls Romeo ‘god of my idolatry’ (2.2.114). Gillian 
Woods explains that Romeo and Juliet here re-thinks the Petrarchan sonnet tradition, 
because instead of being the traditional absent, voiceless addressee of Romeo’s 
sonnets, Juliet takes up and alters his metaphors herself.248 Romeo and Juliet evoke 
ideas of stillness and movement playfully, with Juliet suggesting that she is an 
unmoved (unaffected, chaste) saint, and Romeo altering the metaphor, telling her 
‘move not, whilst my prayer’s effect I take’ (1.5.106): stay still and let me kiss you! 
Othello’s implicit troping of Desdemona as stone image, however, is more 
disempowering; the image of motionless alabaster proleptically figures Desdemona as 
dead whilst she is still alive, denying her agency. Othello follows an implicit anti-
Catholic chain of thought to its logical conclusion; romantic lust is a materialistic lust, 
kissing a saint’s image is an overly materialistic act, saints’ images are dead not alive, 
and so romantic kisses are like kissing a stony corpse. 
 Modern productions of Othello rarely make Christian religious imagery the 
main focus of the play, but this imagery is certainly available to modern audiences. 
Othello, who explicitly states the excessive nature of his love, saying he ‘lov’d not 
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wisely but too well’ (5.2.344), is often depicted kneeling reverently before 
Desdemona’s bed as he kisses her, as if he is adoring a saint’s image.249 Othello 
consolidates these associations with idolatry by imagining Desdemona as a statue 
instead of a person; rather than sensitive and living her skin is ‘smooth as monumental 
alabaster’ (5.2.5). In his anti-Catholic tract The Survey of Popery (1596), written after 
he converted in 1593 from vehement Catholicism to equally vehement Protestantism, 
Thomas Bell ridicules the numerous kisses in ‘the Popish Mass’; his main quibble 
with kissing images is that Catholics treat something that is not alive as if it were a 
living person, ‘they kisse them...as they were yet living’.250 In The Communion of 
Saints (1607), the separatist minister Henry Ainsworth argues, ‘we may not kisse 
them’ for the same reasons.251 Kissing Desdemona’s dead body before his own death, 
Othello enacts the subversive, necrophiliac kiss that Post-Reformation discourse 
associated with Catholicism. By declaring ‘on a kiss I die’, he also literalises the idea 
that kissing a dead image was fatal to the idolater’s soul. His evocative ‘cold, cold my 
girl!| Even like thy chastity’ (5.2.275-6) invites audiences to imagine the physical 
sensations of loving a cold, dead, idol-like being and thus to engage empathetically 
with the bodily act of idolatry.  
 However, Othello also seems confused, throughout the murder scene, about 
whether Desdemona is a real person or an alabaster idol and whether he is righteously 
destroying or reverently worshipping that idol. Explaining that Protestant iconoclasts 
saw humans as ‘lively images of God’, contrasting them to ‘dead’ images of wood or 
stone, Jennifer Waldron argues that Othello tries desperately to envisage Desdemona 
as a false idol, evoking ideas of a Christian or Old Testament rightful sacrifice (or 
Christ, or of an adulterous wife), but ends up acknowledging that he has committed an 
all too human and mundane murder.252 To add to the confusion, whilst reformers 
                                                
249 In Quayle’s 1955 production for instance, he ‘kneels up’; Othello, Quayle. Othello ‘kneels’, too, in 
Michael Attenborough’s later version. Prompt Book, Othello, by William Shakespeare, directed by 
Michael Attenborough, Royal Shakespeare Theatre, Stratford on Avon, 1999, Shakespeare Centre 
Library and Archive. 
250 Thomas Bell, The Survey of Popery (London: Valentine Sims, 1596), R7v. 
251 Henry Ainsworth, The Communion of Saints (London: Giles Thorp, 1607), I3v. 
252 Jennifer Waldron, Reformations of the Body: Idolatry, Sacrifice and Early Modern Theater 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 8, 20-1, 161, 164-5. Waldron adds, ‘Othello’s references to 
law, confession, and sacrifice in the final scene reinforce the play’s earlier allusions to Desdemona as a 
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criticised kissing statues because this was tantamount to pretending that a dead image 
was a living body, Othello inverts this, kissing a living woman as if she was a dead 
stone image. Othello’s knowledge that he is not kissing Desdemona properly perhaps 
gives rise to this implicit description of the kiss as idolatrous. The confusion of 
imagery matches the olfactory confusion in this passage; Othello does not smell what 
he expects to smell, expecting a sinful ‘weed’ he smells a chaste, sweet ‘rose’. 
Expecting a stinking false idol he comes into contact with a pure body sweet as a 
statue perfumed with incense. The spiritually-dead, righteously-murdered adulterous 
Desdemona mingles in his mind with an alluring saint, a pure white image.253 
 Kissing a dead corpse was a common motif in Renaissance romantic ballads, 
and literary writers particularly emphasise the fact that the corpse, like an idol, could 
not feel anything. The popularity of images of kissing corpses in romantic songs and 
poems suggests that these kinds of texts were places were the strong religious taboo 
on lust and idolatry was (implicitly) challenged. The 1625 song The Passionate Lover 
ends, ‘Wa is me, ligs my luife on the cawd ground,| Let me come kisse his frosty 
mouth’.254 Often, such ballads associate romantic love with frustration and with the 
sense that mortal pleasures are limited because they end at death, or even cause death 
due to their reckless excess. In this way, literary texts dissolve the boundary between 
the dual meaning of ‘die’: ‘to lose one’s life’ and ‘to experience orgasm’ – a common 
pun in early modern ballads. Analysing a Scottish ballad depicting two lovers (one 
alive, one now a ghost) Pollard argues that the ‘strong breath’ of the ghost suggests ‘a 
tangible deathliness that will penetrate through the kiss’.255 This association between 
death and romantically or lustfully kissing dead images appears a several times on the 
early modern stage, too. In John Webster’s The White Devil (1612), for instance, the 
                                                                                                                                       
figure of devotion and as a type of Marian intercessor’. 
253 This can be linked to what Farah Karim-Cooper describes as the ‘anxiety about woman’s 
fundamental lack of readbility’ evident in early modern cosmetic culture (which embraced both 
perfumes and make-up), Cosmetics in Shakespearean and Renaissance Drama (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2006), 34. 
254 Anon, The Passionate Lover (London: A. Matthews, 1625). The lover ‘ready was pale Death to 
kisse’ because of his unrequited love; this line echoes the evocation of Death as a love-rival and the 
idea of kissing death as a pleonasm for ‘dying’ seen in Romeo and Juliet.  
255 Pollard, Drugs and Theater, 176-7. 
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devoted wife Isabella dies when she kisses a poisoned picture of her husband,256 and 
Karim-Cooper has linked this to the ‘poisoned minerals’ with which women (in an act 
of theatrical deception which often called their ‘virtue’ into question) painted their 
faces to seem romantically alluring.257 Karim-Cooper traces puns in Webster’s work 
on ‘to dye the complexion’ and to die literally or metaphorically.258 In The Revenger’s 
Tragedy (1606) the Duke dies when he is tricked into kissing the skull of Gloriana, 
believing she is a woman he is going to sleep with.259 This early modern dramatic 
tradition shares themes with ballads but is not above parodying them (as, for instance, 
Autolycus does in The Winter’s Tale with his ballad of a cold maiden who turns into a 
fish), distinguishing itself as a higher form of art than the ballads. Knowledge of this 
tradition of literalising the idea of excessive lust as fatal intensifies the sense of 
danger when Othello kisses his corpse(-like)-wife.  
 Unlike The White Devil and The Revenger’s Tragedy, which depict 
characters literally kissing dead, unfeeling idols (a picture and a skull), Othello kisses 
a living woman and as such has to do careful, intense mental work to bring ideas of 
idolatry into play. Desdemona is not (yet) a corpse and she is made of flesh not stone 
or paint, but Othello warps his image of her to fit this tradition of idolatry; she is a 
monument, alabaster, something dead, cold, remembered. The powerful set of cultural 
associations, persisting for centuries, that link the extravagant olfactory sensuality of 
Othello’s kisses and idolatrous, sinful lust may well have informed more recent 
directorial decisions to cut them. The early-twentieth-century directors cited at the 
start of this chapter may have had an additional imperative to cut these kisses based 
on racist attitudes, shying away from depicting an interracial kiss that may have 
shocked, and Neill shows historically did shock, audiences. Othello’s dying kiss is 
also subversive in the context of the phenomenological theories that have informed 
                                                
256 The RSC’s 2014 production perhaps evoked these associations of idolatry by subverting the image 
of the Virgin Mary pregnant with Christ; Isabella (Faye Castelow) visibly miscarried when poisoned, 
staining the crotch of her white pajamas with blood. The White Devil, by William Shakespeare, 
directed by Maria Aberg, Royal Shakespeare Theatre, August 8 2014. 
257 Karim-Cooper, Cosmetics, 89. ‘Cosmetics were troubling because many of them were poisonous 
even while they made a woman beautiful’ (91). 
258 Karim-Cooper, Cosmetics, 90. 
259 Thomas Middleton, The Revenger’s Tragedy, ed. Brian Gibbons (York: New Mermaids, Methuen, 
2008), 3.5.146. 
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cognitive theory. Evoking an Othello- or Juliet-esque image of a lover caressing a 
dead body, M.C. Dillon explains that for Merleau-Ponty, erotic touches that are not 
experienced as a mutual congress of body and mind constitute a marked failure to 
connect cognitively with the other,  
 
without the intersection of immanence and transcendence, without the 
incarnation of consciousness in the body’s flesh, desire and the caress 
cannot be. You must inhabit your body for it to be the object of my 
desire, and when I caress your body it must be you that I touch—
otherwise erotic love would be but mystified necrophilia.260  
 
Both in the early modern era and the present day, the kisses Othello gives Desdemona 
just before and just after her death represent a shocking contrast to ideals of loving 
behaviour. The way in which Othello transgresses conventions and ideals (i.e. via the 
motif of kissing a corpse) is, however, common in both literary and theological texts. 
 Paradoxically, as well as being associated with death, Othello’s kisses are 
associated with more positive early modern notions about the kiss’s ability to heal or 
to bring life to another person. Othello’s kisses awaken Desdemona from sleep, and 
she also revives a few minutes after she has been killed to speak a few words.261 St. 
Martin is described healing a leper with a kiss, and Romeo imagines a breath-like 
(and thus potentially olfactory) kiss resurrecting his dead body, ‘I dreamt my love 
came and found me dead…and breathed such life with kisses on my lips| That I 
revived and was an emperor’ (5.1.6-9).262 Just as today a ‘French kiss’ is alternatively 
called a ‘soul kiss’,263 many early moderns believed that kissing could cause the souls 
of two people to communicate, and even to inhabit each other’s bodies. Citing Plato 
as a precedent, the scholar Pietro Bembo in Baldassare Castiglione’s The Book of the 
Courtier (1528) says that, ideally, 
                                                
260 M.C. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 146. 
261 In Hands’ Othello, Desdemona spoke ‘falsely, falsely murdered’ in a mechanical way that suggested 
an automaton, something that was almost but not quite human and alive. Archival Recording, Othello, 
by William Shakespeare, directed by Terry Hands, Royal Shakespeare Theatre, 1985, Shakespeare 
Centre Library and Archive. 
262 Frijhoff, “The Kiss Sacred and Profane,” 211. 
263 O.E.D., ‘soul kiss’, n2. 
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a man delights in joining his mouth to that of his beloved in a kiss, not in 
order to bring himself to any unseemly desire, but because he feels that 
that bond is the opening of mutual access to their souls, which, being 
drawn by desire for the other, pour themselves each into the other’s body 
by turn, and mingle so together that each of them has two souls; and a 
single soul, composed thus of these two, rules as it were over two 
bodies. Hence, a kiss may be said to be a joining of souls rather than of 
bodies, because it has such power over the soul that it withdraws it to 
itself and separates it from the body.264 
 
Many early modern writers described kissing as a way of communicating with, 
touching, or even stealing another person’s soul. John Cleveland (1613-58) writes of 
‘two souls pickeering in a kiss’; ‘pickeer’ (now obsolete) meant amorous or sporting 
play, or military skirmish.265 In Abraham Cowley’s (1618-1667) poem “The 
Enjoyment”, the lover promises ‘I’ll kiss thee through, I’ll kiss thy very soul’.266 Early 
modern texts describe kisses as communions of souls to varying degrees of literalness; 
many imagine souls mingling, or being sucked into another person’s mouth, like 
breath. James Shirley (1596-1666) advises “A Lover that durst not speak to his 
Mistress” about how much he loves her, to ‘breathe it in a kisse| And mingle souls’.267 
Kissing Helen of Troy not long before he is due to relinquish his soul to Satan, 
Marlowe’s Dr Faustus references this trope in a way that suggests wish-fulfilment, 
‘her lips suck forth my soul!’ (5.1.90); if only Helen would suck away his soul, he 
would not be burdened with the prospect of it being tormented in hell. In Shackerley 
Marmion’s 1666 Cupid’s Courtship (a translation of Apuleius’ The Golden Ass), 
Psyche kisses Cupid before killing him. Her experience is at once an olfactory, 
physically pneumatic one of tasting and sucking and a cognitively affecting one where 
her thoughts are altered by Cupid’s encroaching soul, ‘She his lips would tast...with 
                                                
264 Baldassare Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier, trans. George Bull (London: Penguin, 1976), 253. 
265 John Cleveland, “The Senses Festival,” in Clieveland’s [sic] Genuine Poems (London: for Robert 
Harford, 1677), B4r. 
266 Abraham Cowley, “The Inioyment,” in Abraham Cowley, The Mistresse (London: for Rowland 
Reynolds, 1667), E5r. 
267 James Shirley, Poems &c (London: Ruth Raworth and Susan Islip, 1646), B8v. 
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her lips she labours all she may| To suck his soul out’. The ‘tast’ of Cupid’s lips 
transfers thoughts of ‘love’ and Cupid’s other ‘vertues’ from his soul to Psyche’s, 
demonstrating the power of early modern kisses to cognitively affect participants, to 
alter and shape their minds.268  
 Othello brings his soul into the equation as soon as he starts building up to 
kissing Desdemona for the last time, ‘it is the cause, my soul’ (5.2.1). Whether 
threatened by idolatrous excess or affected lovingly by another person, souls are 
deeply implicated in early modern conceptions of the kiss. Juliet, speaking within the 
oxymoronic mode of Petrarchan tradition, encapsulates the power of the kiss to feed 
and destroy, to restore and kill, to bring sexual pleasure and (punningly) death, ‘I will 
kiss thy lips| Haply some poison yet doth hang on them| To make me die with a 
restorative’ (5.3.164-6). Over and above the usual chemistry of the kiss, she wants a 
toxic chemistry to come into play and literally kill her. Juliet’s hyperbolic emphasis 
on the chemical aspect of kissing foreshadows Othello’s interest in olfaction. Breath, 
kissing, and death are closely linked in Othello; after savouring Desdemona’s breath, 
Othello cuts it off by strangling her. Salvini made this motif more explicit by playing 
on the idea of being ‘breathless’ after a kiss; Mason reports, having kissed 
Desdemona in welcome, ‘As Othello says, “it stops me here”, he lays his hand upon 
his throat, speaking the words and those which follow as if short of breath. The Italian 
is “Esse il respire mi tronca” – “It cuts off my breath”.’269 As Connor’s analysis 
establishes, the air and the breath are vehicles for smells both literal and metaphorical, 
for poisons, infections, and affect. 
 
Disgust and enjoyment as moral and olfactory qualities 
                                                
268 Shackerley Marmion, Cupid’s Courtship (London: E.O., 1666), C7v-C8r. It was commonly said that 
God killed Moses in a loving way by ‘sucking’ his soul out with a kiss God to save it from Samuel, 
sucked out his [Moses’] soul from the Body by a kisse’, Thomas Manton, A Practical Commentary, or 
an Exposition…On the Epistle of Jude (London: J.M., 1657), Zz3v. Richard Allestree says that God can 
both give and take life with a kiss; if Adam had not sinned, ‘God would have taken up his soul to him 
with a kiss, which they call osculum pacis, he would have receiv’d that spirit which with his mouth he 
did inspire, a kiss of taking leave here to meet in Heaven’, Forty Sermons (Oxford and London: for R. 
Scott et al, 1684), S2r. 
269 Mason, The Othello of Tommasso Salvini, 22.  
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Cognitive studies of olfaction are sites where cognitive theory confronts metaphors 
for cognition.  Historically, thought has been figured through metaphors of smelling 
or tasting the world, metaphors that draw their power from the fact that smelling and 
tasting are indeed forms of experience that affect, and are affected by, our beliefs, 
memories, and knowledge. Cognitive studies into smell and taste are studies of 
metaphors for knowledge, of real embodied ways of knowing, and of cognitive 
theory’s metaphors for itself.  Examining the ways in which humans use smell and 
taste to cognise the world and each other, cognitive theory is also well placed to 
interrogate the way it itself has historically been envisaged as a form of ‘tasting’ or 
‘smelling’ other people and the world. Throughout its history, this olfactory metaphor 
for cognition has been accompanied by anxiety due to olfaction’s associations with 
the sexual, the animal, the ‘base’. Le Guérer traces the history of the idea that smell 
(and, often, taste) is(/are) the ‘lowest’ of the senses from St Augustine, through Freud, 
and onwards, with the result that, ‘The rare attempts by philosophers and 
psychoanalysts to provide a cognitive re-evaluation of the sense of smell have led to 
the idea of a non-rational intelligence, a “flair” that cannot be expressed in words’, 
thus, she argues, smell is, ‘Frequently denigrated as a tool for rational knowledge 
because of its resistance to abstraction, and because of its close links to sexuality’.270 
Accordingly, in their preface to the 2002 work Olfaction, Taste and Cognition, the 
editors note that despite cognitive studies always having taken a great interest in 
gesture, emotion, touch, and sight, their study of olfaction and cognition is one of the 
first of its kind, 
 
Unlike the other senses, olfaction and taste do not have a learned 
discourse dealing with elementary aspects, that is, sensory processing, as 
well as the most abstract aspects, that is, symbolic processing. …We are 
still quite unaware of the nature of gustatory and olfactory 
representations, as compared with what we know about vision and 
audition, for example.271 
 
                                                
270 Le Guérer, “Olfaction and Cognition,” 11. 
271 Catherine Rouby, Benoit Schaal, Danièle Dubois, Rémi Gervais, A. Holley, “Preface,” in Olfaction, 
Taste, and Cognition, xv. 
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Othello insists that sensuality in general (of which kissing and smelling are a part) is 
‘baser’, lower, cruder, more animal than other, ‘rational’, forms of cognition; ‘goats 
and monkeys!’ he exclaims, thinking of Desedemona and Cassio together, whilst 
Mason describes Salvini transforming into an animal, a ‘tiger’, as he is overcome by 
sensual rage.272 This places Othello firmly within this tradition of seeing sensuality, of 
which olfaction is a subcategory, as a lower, less rational form of cognition. Othello 
registers olfactory data, but also attempts to disregard them. He tries to manage and 
diminish the sensual ‘ache’ produced by Desdemona’s scent by concentrating instead 
on his ‘heavenly’ conscious purpose of killing her, which he relates to ideals of 
‘justice’. He repeatedly contrasts these ‘higher’ conscious and divine ideals with what 
he sees as lower, more sensual motivations: romantic love, lust, rage; one of the 
things he most fears is that ‘my blood begins my safer guides to rule’ (2.3.205).  
 Othello experiments with olfaction whilst simultaneously attempting to 
contain and control it, something cognitive theorists are increasingly doing. However, 
Othello as a whole focuses on Othello’s tragic inability to keep sensuality and reason, 
olfaction and his ‘higher purpose’ completely separate. An obsession with sexuality 
mingles very literally with Othello’s high purpose of ‘honour’. For him, Desdemona’s 
honour is as important to him as his own; ‘she is protectress of her honour too’ 
(4.1.14), he tells Iago. After twenty lines, though, Iago has cracked this lofty word 
apart and given it a cruder significance, punning on Desdemona’s ‘honour’ and who 
has been ‘on her’. He states that he knows Cassio, 
 
did...Lie- 
OTHELLO:   With her? 
IAGO:    With her, on her, what you will. 
                                                
272 ‘Othello’s manner, from the moment of Desdemona’s entrance has shown strong self-restraint, a 
settled purpose to make what he intends to do a judicial sacrifice in the interest of justice: he will 
repress passion and act with calm deadly deliberation, as the passive instrument of fate…He holds his 
passion in check, as a giant might hold a raging tiger. Gradually it becomes evident that this restraint 
cannot last, and that the wild beast must break loose’ but, ‘Her repeated denials of her guilt exasperate 
him, until they make his heart too great for what contains it. Finally, her words “Alas! He is betrayed, 
and undone”, and her weeping fairly madden him – the tiger is loose, free, beyond all control – and the 
remaining speeches are uttered in wild and headlong fury and with lightning rapidity’, The Othello of 
Tommaso Salvini, 94-5. 
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OTHELLO:  Lie with her? Lie on her? We say lie on her when they belie her  
(4.1.32-5) 
 
Othello’s noble obsession with ‘honour’ and what he sees as a ‘baser’ obsession with 
who has been ‘on her’ become confused, via homophony: ‘honour’ – ‘on her’. This 
contaminates even his final speech, when Othello states ‘nought I did in hate but all in 
honour’ (5.2.295), we hear Iago’s jingle in the background ‘all in- on- her’. 273 In 1999 
Ray Fearon (the first Black actor to play Othello at the RSC since Paul Robeson in 
1930) particularly brought out this pun, enunciating each syllable of ‘hon-our’.274 The 
silent ‘h’ in ‘honour’ gives way to breathier glottal approximants when ‘honour 
becomes’ ‘on her’ and is paired with ‘hate’. This draws attention to the pneumatics 
involved in pronouncing these lines, and underscores the ways that breath and smell 
infiltrate Othello’s attempts to live purely abstractly and rationally. 
 As well as sharing a certain disgust at olfaction as a baser, cruder form of 
knowing, cognitive theory and Othello both recognise that olfaction is integral to our 
experience of disgust and attraction. In the case of Othello, this interest becomes more 
and more pronounced after Othello falls prey to Iago’s influence. Cognitive studies 
like Herz, Philips, and Heining’s found that the ‘emotional’ content of scents, which 
includes moral judgements like ‘healing’, or ‘wicked’, is inextricable from the 
physical experience of that scent. Many early modern texts also suggest that kissing 
enables people to smell or taste moral or abstract qualities, giving both a literal and a 
figurative meaning to kisses that are sugared, sweet, honeyed, or bitter. When Bottom 
counsels his fellow players, ‘eat no onions nor garlic, for we are to utter sweet breath. 
And I do not doubt but to hear them say, it is a sweet comedy’ (A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream, 4.2.42-4), the literal idea of nice-scented breath blends with a more abstract 
notion of melodious and appealing words. In The Revenger’s Tragedy, the Duchess 
                                                
273 Waldron suggests a further blurring of what Othello sees to be higher and lower thoughts as he 
grapples with the word ‘confess’ yet ‘recoils from the vulgarity of con and fesse’, Reformations of the 
Body, 169. 
274 Archival Recording, Othello, by William Shakespeare, directed by Michael Attenborough, Swan 
Theatre, Stratford upon Avon, April 15 1999. Shakespeare Centre Library and Archive. Several 
reviewers remarked on Fearon’s way of emphasizing words in this manner, Michael Davies called him 
‘too stilted’, Oxford Mail, April 23 1999. Paul Taylor criticized Fearon’s ‘slow and nerveless verse 
delivery’, Independent, April 23 1999. 
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remarks after an incestuous kiss, ‘had not that kiss a taste of sin, ’twere sweet’ 
(3.6.207), allowing the idea of an appealing ‘sweet’ taste to blend and contrast with 
the idea of something that is also morally unappealing. In Geoffrey Thornley’s mid-
seventeenth-century translation of Longus’ Daphnis and Chloe, the physical ‘taste’ 
and feel of Chloe’s kiss, which is first described in a very literal sense of tactile 
softness and gustatory sweetness, ‘softer than roses...sweeter than the honeycombs of 
the lawns and meadows’, has a cognitive effect on Daphnis’ ‘heart’ and ‘soul’, 
enabling him to experience the world in a much wider cognitive sense; he suddenly 
finds himself able to speak and put thoughts into words. Whereas before he had been 
a blunt, plainly-spoken man, he is strikingly described as able to ‘taste’ the world in a 
more abstract sense of experiencing and knowing, ‘now first beginning to taste of the 
world and the language of love’.275 
 Discourses of idolatry are commonly linked with both moral and literally 
olfactory repugnance. The Pope’s shoe (which Catholics could pay to kiss) or the 
antichrist’s foot were described as ‘stinking’ in sharp contrast to the actual sweet 
scents like incense involved in the Mass.276 Othello’s evocation of idolatrously kissing 
an ‘alabaster’ statue, and his concomitant concern with how that statue/corpse/woman 
smells, are intrinsically linked. Early modern writers often claim to be able to ‘sniff 
out’ idolatry thanks to the stench it creates. In Declaration of Egregious Popish 
Impostures (1603), Samuel Harsnett describes the ‘foule stench’ of demons and hell. 
Harsnett’s book is suffused with smells, from the ‘brimstone’ that devils use to 
torment their victims to lay people’s own reports of their ability to smell the delicious 
holiness of priests and the true cross, as well as (as is the case with a woman called 
Sara) to detect the newly-sweet smells of people who had just taken communion.277 
                                                
275 Geoffrey Thornley, trans., Daphnis and Chloe (London: for John Garfield, 1657), E3v-E4r. O.E.D., 
‘taste’, v 3. 
276 E.g. the Church of Ireland Bishop of Armagh Thomas Lancaster writes of the Antichrist, ‘the hiest 
potent vpon earth who god him self comaunded to obey must knele downe & kysse his stynkyng fote’, 
The Right and Trew  Vnderstandynge of the Supper of the Lord (London: E. Whitchurch, 1550), D6r. 
The comfit-maker (and thus dealer in sweetness) John Graunt, who wrote several Church of England 
religious tracts, writes in strikingly similar language of the Pope, ‘Kings and Emperours must kisse his 
stinking feet and toes, in token of their slavish subjection’, Truths Victory Against Heresy (London: 
H.R., 1645), G2r 
277 Samuel Harsnett, Declaration of Egregious Popish Impostures (London: James Roberts, 1603), T3r, 
and see e.g. KK3rff, which describes the blind churchgoer Sara who could tell how many people had 
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Writers often literalise the idea that idolatry was physically disgusting by harnessing a 
common cultural perception that kissing buttocks was repugnant and describing 
idolaters kissing the devil’s anus or buttocks with excessive enjoyment. In the section 
“The Use of Kissing Satan’s Back-parts” in his popular tome Discoverie of Witchcraft 
(1584), Reginald Scot spells out the notion that ‘to kisse the devils back-parts’ is an 
inversion of order, something ‘unseemly’, a morally and physically repugnant 
overturning of the right order of things, 
 
 The baser and vnseemelier the homage is, the more it binds, Reason 
being turned vpside downe cannot iudge otherwise thereof: The 
more vnseemly the more it binds, as agreeable to flesh, that delights 
in filthinesse, it is iust with God to giue vp to such slauish basenesse, 
because his seruice being most pure and holy, is reiected. Looke 
vpon Poperie the nurse of Witch-craft. 
 
Scott’s marginal note links this more explicitly to the excessive, lust-like approach to 
religion that was commonly associated with desires to kiss ‘dead’ statues, ‘The glorie 
of Popish Religion is shame most glorious in her greatest libertie to the flesh, in the 
grossest filthynesse thereof commending horrible vncleannesse not to bee named, as if 
delighted in kissing Satans backe-parts’.278 Fleshly liberty and delight in sensuality 
are precisely what Othello aims to counter; he states that he wants Desdemona with 
him in Cyprus ‘not| To please the palate of my appetite,| Or to comply with heat – the 
young effects| In me defunct’ (1.3.262-4). Shakespeare perhaps mockingly draws on 
the ideas that kissing the anus and kissing a stone idol are ‘vile’ and similar actions in 
A Midsummer Night’s Dream (5.1.200-1) when Pyramus kisses the wall’s ‘stones’ 
(early modern slang for testes, but also perhaps very implicitly evoking the idea of 
idolatrously kissing stone images), and his ‘vile…hole’, ‘O kiss me through the hole 
                                                                                                                                       
taken communion because their scents changed, and how ‘the deuill, who can wel enough endure the 
loathsome odours, and euaporations of hell, is not able to endure the vapour issuing from the mouth of 
a priest, but had rather goe to hell, then abide his smell’. 
278 Reginald Scot, The Discoverie of Witchcraft (London: Henry Denham, 1584), K4r-v. James 
Carmaichel also relates that a devil induced witches to ‘kisse his Buttickes in signe of duetye to him’ as 
he spoke treacherous words about the king of Scotland Newes from Scotland (London: E. Allde[?], 
1592), A4v 
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of this vile wall’. Thisbe’s reply, ‘I kisse the wall’s hole, not your lips’, emphasises 
the way that stones and hole replace lips and living flesh, perhaps parodically 
resonating with more serious contemporary critiques of idolatry. At the RSC in 2004, 
Trevor Nunn made these connotations explicit by having Pyramus and Thisbe talk 
between the wall’s legs, so that Thisbe kissed the actor playing Wall’s buttocks. The 
mechanicals’ jokes enable the reader or audience (including the ‘audience’ on stage, 
consisting of the wedding party) to enjoy the scene, to explore the possibilities for 
‘delight’ in these ideas that were so dangerous in the religious context.   
Idolatrous kisses represented a complete subversion of the normative idea of 
the kiss as social cement. They often did so by simultaneously subverting the kneeling 
gesture in ways that overturned normative ideas of kneeling as social cement 
discussed in chapter 2. Kneeling or bending to kiss the devil’s buttocks in ‘homage’ is 
a hellish alternative to the kiss of feudal homage, also delivered kneeling. In 1593, the 
clergyman George Gifford describes a bewitched man whose key problem was that he 
couldn’t help kissing his cow’s buttocks, evoking the sense of lust as beast-like which 
plagues Othello (in the very first scene, Iago imagines Cassio and Desdemona 
‘making the beast with two backs’ (1.1.116-7)), ‘for his life he could not come in 
where she was, but he must needs take up her tayle and kisse under it’.279 
Shakespeare’s 94th sonnet (first published in 1609, but written and circulated 
much earlier) shows that the link between idealised stone women and the ability to 
smell out that woman’s (predominantly sexual) moral qualities was an abiding feature 
of Shakespeare’s thought. The sonnet begins with a series of homiletic riddles, 
idealising chaste women as stonily still and cold, ‘Who, moving others, are 
themselves as stone,| Unmoved, cold, and to temptation slow’. In Othello (2.1.148-
61), Iago presents Desdemona with similar comparisons in a series of couplets 
beginning, ‘She that was ever fair and never proud,| Had tongue at will and yet was 
never loud’. Iago’s sonnet is structurally very similar to Sonnet 94, except for the 
ending, which tails off, ‘She was a wight, if ever such wight were…To suckle fools 
and chronicle small beer’. Desdemona criticises Iago’s ‘most lame and impotent 
conclusion’; her remark draws attention to the conclusion of Sonnet 94 which Iago 
seems to be deliberately avoiding and which in a more grave fashion specifically links 
                                                
279 George Gifford, A Dialogue Concerning Witches and Witchcraftes (London: Tobie Cook, 1593), 
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the smell of the beloved as a flower or ‘weed’, to the perception of moral corruption, 
‘The sweetest things are soured by their deeds,| Lilies that fester smell far worse than 
weeds’. Sniffing their idols, Othello and the ‘I’ of the Sonnets aim to distinguish 
between the chaste and the unchaste. The distinction in the sonnet is clear cut. A once 
sweet lily smells worse when it rots, compared to a weed that never smelt particularly 
good, just as a once idealised beloved seems worse when (s)he is unfaithful than does 
a lover who was never particularly faithful. But Othello is confused: Desdemona 
smells ‘sweet’ (like a perfect lily) yet he believes she is a weed. His confusion upsets 
the clear equation between moral qualities and smell he expects to find. Desdemona’s 
‘sweet’ smell indicates to the audience, though, that Othello is wrong, and that 
olfaction is an accurate register of morality: to us her, ‘sweet’ smell can be seen as 
confirming her purity. Shakespeare’s interest in the nuanced, profound 
interrelationship of olfaction and cognition prepared ground that cognitive theorists 
are only just beginning to explore. 
 Cognitive theory’s tendency, until quite recently, to regard olfaction as 
something unworthy of study thanks (as Le Guérer and the editors of Olfaction, Taste, 
and Cognition show) to its associations with the irrational, the thoughtless, and in 
particular the sexual has deep roots in early modern thought. Cognitive theorists also 
grapple with another, more modern anxiety about the association of olfaction with the 
‘lower’ aspects of life, due to the prevalence of discussions of olfaction in ‘pop 
science’ and popular culture, and particularly media articles about how ‘love 
hormones’ are supposed subconsciously to influence our satisfaction with our 
romantic partner during kissing. Drawing on this profoundly twentieth century idea of 
hormones, popular science articles often compare kissing to taking drugs, due to its 
powerful and subconscious affect on the mind. One article in the Washington Post 
uses a quotation from Romeo and Juliet, ‘star-crossed lovers’, to place 
neurochemicals in a similar position to the deterministic powers of fate. The author, 
Sheril Kirschenbaum, argues that, by prompting the release of ‘the love hormone 
oxytocin’, ‘kissing influences the uptake of hormones and neurotransmitters beyond 
our conscious control, and these signals play a huge part in how we feel about each 
other’,  
 
The assessment [of the person we are kissing as a potential life-partner] 
occurs at a subconscious level, yet a bad initial kiss may be a result of a 
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genetically star-crossed pair. (Which is something else to worry about 
during a new encounter: “What if the girl of my dreams rejects my 
genes?”) 280 
 
As Giovanni Frazetto and Suzanne Anker noted in 2009, ‘In general we are 
witnessing the rise of a neuroculture (or neurocultures), in which neuroscience 
knowledge partakes in our daily lives, social practices and intellectual discourses’; as 
a result many neuroscientists attempt to separate out and critique inferior, more 
popularist uses of neuroscientific findings.281  
 Slaby and Choudhury, the editors of Critical Neuroscience (2012) explain 
that it is most of all the media that, by sensationalising neuroscientific findings, 
distorts people’s images of their selfhood, leading them to view neuroscience as the 
most objective and infallible way to understand themselves, and to the reductive 
belief that ‘my brain made me do it’. As they point out, ‘Pervasive media messages in 
this manner lead to a climate of opinion that singles out sensationalistic themes, often 
ideologically laden, and pushes towards simplified, and technocratic solutions to 
social problems’.282 Many essays in Critical Neuroscience discuss how fMRI images 
are circulated and tidied up for the popular media in order to create the most 
sensational contrasts (for instance strikingly-dissimilar images of a brain before and 
after drug taking), even if these images have gone through several layers of 
representation and thus are not entirely reliable. Choosing a theme familiar to many 
early modern anti-Catholic writers, Sheril Kirshenbaum’s The Science of Kissing 
deceptively collapses and simplifies evolutionary arguments, stating that darker 
lipsticks make women more attractive (to men) simply because they replicate the dark 
colours of bonobos’ buttocks and of the appetizing berries that our ancestors 
                                                
280 ‘A good kiss can work like a drug, influencing the hormones and neurotransmitters coursing through 
our bodies. It can send two people on a natural high by stimulating pleasure centers in the brain. The 
feeling has much to do with a neurotransmitter called dopamine, which is responsible for craving and 
desire and associated with “falling in love”’, Sheril Kirshenbaum, “Sealed with a kiss-and 
Neuroscience,” in Washington Post, December 26 2014, last accessed July 8 2015, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/23/AR2010122304771.html. 
281 Giovanni Frazetto and Suzanne Anker, “Science and Society: Neuroculture,” Nature Reviews: 
Neuroscience 10 (2009), 815-21. 
282 Slaby and Choudhury, “A Proposal for a Citical Neuroscience,” Critical Neuroscience, 30. 
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supposedly sought in the ancient forests.283 Edmund Rolls presents similarly reductive 
and heteronormative arguments, reducing art to principles of sexual selection, arguing 
that literature is at its root a male display of resources (men are better at art than 
women he claims for this reason), and that the best art uses colours and other stimuli 
that are associated with rewards and sexual attractiveness.284 
 As Suma Jacob et al argue, olfaction generates several prime examples of 
this sort of populist, distorted reasoning. The notion of pheromones, which are said to 
influence our evaluation of sexual and romantic partners via the sense of smell, are a 
case in point. Even if pheromones do exist, they contend, ‘[t]he expectation that 
human pheromones can consistently elicit stereotyped behavior is unrealistic’, as the 
experience of smell is determined by factors like memory and cultural context, ‘The 
inherent multimodal, multidimensional complexities of human behavior render such a 
strict mode inappropriate, and the elaborate neocortical cognitive systems of the 
human nervous system preclude the initiation of complex behaviors by a simple 
signal’.285 Olfaction seems particularly susceptible to this sort of reading because 
olfaction is linked in people’s frames of understanding with sex and the pre-cognitive. 
Theorists and lay people alike have tended until relatively recently to treat olfaction as 
if it was resistant to thorough, logical theorising, and have either ignored it or mixed 
cultural assumptions in with their analyses of it.  
Cognitive theory is deeply affected by its own olfactory metaphors. Its 
methodologies have historically been shaped by dominant cultural attitudes to 
olfaction that saw it as a volatile, base form of experience not worthy of serious 
neuroscientific study. In recent years, cognitive theorists have been seeking to redress 
the balance. Predictably beginning with studies into olfaction and sexuality, cognitive 
theory has since broadened its range to examine how olfaction affects our ‘higher’ 
emotions and value judgements. Othello’s distaste for sexuality and his distrust of 
olfaction even as he experiments with it mean that he has several of the same 
concerns as these cognitive theorists. However, because it is performed on stage, 
Othello’s ‘experiment’ into olfaction’s effect on his conscious decision-making 
                                                
283 Sheril Kirschenbaum, The Science of Kissing (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2011), 9-13. 
284  Edmund Rolls, Neuroculture: On the Implications of Brain Science (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 247-66. 
285 Suma Jacob, Bethanne Zelano, Davinder Hayreh, and Martha McClintock, “Assessing Putative 
Human Pheromones,” Olfaction, Taste, and Cognition, 178. 
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capabilities has different limits, and offers different opportunities, for understanding 
the significance of olfaction, compared to a laboratory study. 
 
Performance 
Ever since St. Augustine’s suggestion that theatrical performances infect theatregoers 
‘with a plague of the soul’, where ‘evil spirits’ inspire the populace with reckless lust 
and love of pleasure, ‘luxuria’, antitheatricalist writers have linked theatregoing with 
moral infection and even demonic possession.286 Stephen Gosson’s Playes Confuted 
(1582) for example describes a play which involved Bacchus and Ariadne gesturing 
lustfully to one another such that, 
 
when they departed to bedde; the company presently was set on fire, they 
that were married posted home to theire wiues; they that were single, 
vowed very solemly, to be wedded. As the stinge of Phalangion spreadeth 
her poyson through euery vaine, when no hurt is seene; so 
amorous gesture, strikes to the heart when no skinne is raced.287  
 
Farah Karim-Cooper traces a chain of imagery linking theatre to the infectious looks 
of the basilisk, reclaiming ‘tactility’ as key to the experience of theatre as a sensory 
medium, which was tasted, ‘consumed’ and chewed over by audiences.288 Pollard 
concludes that ‘a chorus of voices—both from attackers and defenders of the theatre, 
as well as from playwrights themselves—saw theatre not only as a vehicle for 
representing drugs and poisons but also as a kind of drug or poison itself.’289 And 
                                                
286 St. Augustine remarks that this is ironic given that theatres were originally set up to ward off 
physical plagues from cities, ‘Dii propter sedandam corporum pestilentiam ludos sibi scaenicos 
exhiberi iubebant; pontifex autem propter animorum cauendam um cauendam pestilentiam ipsam 
scaenam constitui prohibebat.’; he speaks of the cleverness of the evil spirits (‘astutia spirituum 
nefandorum’) creating this plague, De Civitate Dei, ed. Peter Walsh (Oxford: Aris & Philips, 2005), 
1.32-33. 
287 Gosson, Playes Confuted, G5r.  
288 Farah Karim-Cooper, “Touch and Taste in Shakespeare’s Theatres,” in Farah Karim-Cooper and 
Tiffany Stern, eds., Shakespeare’s Theatres and the Effects of Performance (London: Bloomsbury, 
2013), 215. In this essay, Karim-Cooper explains how (as we have seen) such metaphors for taste and 
infection often conceptually blurred physical and intellectual experiences into one. 
289 Pollard, Drugs and Theater, 9.  
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indeed, Gosson’s description of theatre as a ‘poyson’ that ‘strikes’ the heart without 
inflicting a physical wound resonates strongly with contemporary descriptions of both 
kisses and smells being able to affect the mind and body imperceptibly. We saw that 
Daphnis’ soul ‘sparckles’ when he kisses Chloe, whilst in his translation of Tasso’s 
Aminta, Oldmixon writes ‘something sweet from ev’ry kisse| Mixt with poison, struck 
my heart’.290 Though antitheatricalists tended to focus on infection through visual 
means, the chemical, the olfactory, and the airborne miasma are also important 
elements in their discourse. For instance in Histriomastix (1633) William Prynne 
speaks of ‘Players and Stageplaies’ being ‘diffused like an infectious leprosie, so 
deepely riveted into the seduced prepossessed hearts and judgements of voluptuous 
carnall persons’.291 The word ‘diffuse’ had the sense of spreading a liquid through air; 
Prynne thus creates an image of plays as a disease inhaled by, and affecting the hearts 
and minds of, playgoers.292 
 Many early modern writers evince an additional fear of more literal forms of 
infection, which, like smells or sights, were borne imperceptibly through the air. The 
close-packed bodies of a theatre audience are prone to infection, just as Cleopatra 
imagines herself produced like a theatrical show before crowds with ‘thick breaths| 
Rank of gross diet’ and being ‘forced to drink their vapour’ (Antony and Cleopatra 
5.2.211-4), or Caska, faced with ‘the stinking breaths’ of the crowd feels ‘fear of 
opening my lips and receiving the bad air’ (Julius Caesar 1.2.246-50).This looming 
miasma becomes even worse if, as Gosson suggests, theatregoers are provoked to lust 
and begin kissing. The surgeon Charles Peter remarks in 1686 that venereal disease 
(among other ailments) is ‘gotten by kissing’, so ‘the common Lacivious way of 
Kissing doth much adjuvate [aid] this way of infecting’, via an ‘unwholesome kiss’.293 
The closure of theatres during the plagues added a literal as well as a moral dimension 
to the fears of infection associated with theatre.  
 Kisses in Othello implicate the audience in ideas of being influenced by 
chemicals, smells, feelings, and demonic influences in the air. Audience members do 
not physically go up and smell Desdemona in order to replicate Othello’s experience 
                                                
290 Mr Oldmixon, trans., Aminta by Torquato Tasso (London: for Richard Parker, 1698), C2r. 
291 William Prynne, Histriomastix (London:  E[dward] A[llde, Augustine Mathewes, Thomas Cotes], 
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of olfactory confusion. Doing so would only emphasise the fact that the actor playing 
her may not smell ‘sweet’ at all; rather, Desdemona’s scent is created through 
performance and poetry as Othello responds to and describes it. Nevertheless, 
audiences can be affected by this scene; when Othello says ‘sweet’, audience 
members’ personal olfactory memories and the emotions they associate with sweet 
scents can trigger affective responses in their minds. Holly Duggan shows that smells 
like gunpowder and candle wax would have made theatre a powerfully olfactory 
experience as well as a visual and auditory one;294 but the most important smell in 
Othello, Desdemona’s ‘sweet’ breath is not something the audience experiences 
directly. Audiences are at once aware of their distance from Othello as he is 
profoundly affected by a scent that they do not experience, and empathetically in sync 
with him as his words conjure up that scent for the audiences in their minds. The gap 
between fiction and reality, character and spectator, becomes visible even as it blurs at 
this climactic moment. Olfaction is staged and represented in Othello, but it cannot be 
reproduced as an experience that audiences can completely share with Othello. 
Shakespeare elsewhere uses a kiss to test the olfactory boundary between 
audiences and actors to its limit. In the “Epilogue” to As You Like It, Shakespeare 
cannot resist literalising the common idea that onstage kisses implicate audiences in 
feelings of disgust or lust. The actor playing Rosalind states to the men in the 
audience, ‘If I were a woman, I would kiss as many of you as had...breaths that I 
defied not’, that is, she says, ‘sweet breaths’ (18-22). Though still half in character, 
Rosalind draws attention to the fact that she is a fictional character. ‘If I were a 
woman’ reminds audiences that the speaker is in fact a male actor; however, it is too 
soon for the illusion that the speaker is the fictional Rosalind to have completely 
dissipated. As we saw in the discussion of kneeling at the end of plays in chapter 2, at 
this moment it is ontologically uncertain whether the person addressing the audience 
is the character of Rosalind or the actor: the actor is half in half out of their role. As 
with her/his promise to kneel, Rosalind’s proposal to kiss the audience, and her 
deliberations as to whether she would take pleasure or feel disgust at doing so, 
demonstrate that kissing on stage has the power to cross the boundary between what is 
real and what is performed, most commonly because kisses performed on stage have 
real effects on the material bodies and brains of audience members. By analysing the 
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way that these ideas played out in early modern texts, this chapter has laid the 
historical foundation for chapter 5’s discussion of modern cognitive studies into the 
effect of stage violence on audiences. 
 
Conclusions 
Studies of Othello tend to focus on the eyes, particularly on Othello’s insistence that 
he needs ‘ocular proof’ (3.3.360) of Desdemona’s infidelity. In addition to the essays 
by Sloan, Neill, and Sofer cited above, for example, Angus Fletcher’s chapter, 
“Othello and the Subject of Ocular Proof” in his cognitive study Evolving Hamlet 
traces how the idea of ocular proof in the play will have developed from an unreliable 
source of sense-data to a source of Cartesian certainty. Fletcher argues that it is this 
emphasis on ‘ocular proof’ as a reliable and yet unreliable form of sense data that 
makes Othello ‘an icon of paranoia’. 295 The word ‘icon’ suggests that Fletcher’s 
model of Othello is as something visual, statue-like, much as Othello sees 
Desdemona. However, this chapter has established that as well as vision, Othello 
centres on a strong interest in the link between kissing, olfaction, and moral qualities 
that was replicated in the broader early modern context. Scents, too, are both reliable 
and unreliable indicators of Desdemona’s chastity in the play, and Desdemona’s scent 
causes what might be described as a paranoid fear that the world of senses is 
deceptive (or truthful) in the murder scene. Because it focuses so explicitly on, and 
seeks to expound, the thought processes behind trying to ‘sniff out’ someone’s moral 
character, Othello has proved to be a useful text to read alongside cognitive and 
phenomenological theories of olfaction and erotic gestures. 
In the case of kissing, the physical and metaphorical elements of olfaction are 
not easily separable. By presenting us with a description of how kissing Desdemona 
troubles Othello’s strict ideas about her and the strict hierarchy he envisages between 
the sensual and the rational, Othello has been useful for a cognitive analysis of how 
the thoughts and emotions associated with a kiss can potentially change a person’s 
mind. The close association in early modern thought between demons, transgressive 
kisses, bad smells and chemical poisons on the one hand, and purity, the divine, 
loving kisses, sweet smells,  and restorative chemical affects on the other hand have 
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been given a scientific explanation using cognitive theory. Cognitive studies show 
that there is a symbiotic link between how sweet a smell is and the moral and 
emotional effects we associate it with. There is a ‘bottom up’ process whereby a scent 
or flavour will produce chemical and concomitant emotional effects in the brain and 
mind. But there is also a ‘top down’ process, whereby the cultural associations and 
expectations we have respecting that smell affect how we perceive it. Reading Othello 
alongside other early modern texts has shown how both dominant cultural attitudes 
and personal experiences can shape the way smells are experienced; hatred of idolatry 
or witchcraft caused early modern writers to associate these things with repulsive 
smells, whilst Iago’s descriptions of Desdemona’s infidelity cause Othello to be 
surprised at her ‘sweet’ breath.  
 Desdemona’s stillness and coldness contribute to Othello’s narrative in which 
she is an idol or monument to be worshipped or destroyed. The next chapter returns to 
the idea of theatre as a site of demonic infection to examine more closely the 
implications of characters and actors who, like the dead or sleeping Desdemona are 
gestureless, yet fascinating, presences on stage. 
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Chapter 4 
‘Her Silence Flouts Me’: restraint and the refusal to gesture in The 
Taming of the Shrew. 
 
Introduction 
Encapsulating what she hates most about Bianca, Katherine states in The Taming of 
the Shrew (1593), ‘her silence flouts me’ (2.1.29). Bianca’s ‘silence’ is part of a wider 
repertoire of modest behaviour which involves mild gestures and an obedient 
demeanour.  To ‘flout’ someone was to mock them or to affect an attitude for a 
sarcastic purpose and so Katherine’s statement suggests that, far from being a passive, 
ineffectual phenomenon, restrained behaviour can be a source of powerful 
intentionality.296 This chapter shows that it is not just gesture that is cognitively rich 
in Shakespeare’s plays; refusals to gesture and moments of stillness are just as 
important. Katherine’s suggestion that Bianca’s modest demeanour might be a 
deliberate, parodic performance draws attention to the gap between her outward 
behaviour and her thoughts.  
I argue in this chapter that several significant moments of stillness in The 
Taming of the Shrew draw attention to the gap between performance and reality. In 
doing so, Shakespeare encourages audiences to read Katherine and Bianca’s 
performances of femininity alongside the performances of the actors playing them. As 
well as thereby demonstrating that ‘character’ in Shakespeare’s plays is a category 
that necessarily includes ‘actor’, this chapter examines how actors and characters use 
the same moments of stillness and silence in cognitively very different ways. Whilst 
for actors, a moment of stillness involves careful thought and gestural memory, for 
characters it is often intended to be an indicator that no thought is taking place at all, 
or that that character’s thoughts are being controlled by another. The theory of ‘offline 
cognition’ provides a neurological basis for understanding stillness as a legible sign of 
deep, private, abstract, intense thought which is detached from conscious awareness 
of what the body is doing. However, the theory of ‘cognitive underload’ suggests that 
actors need to work against this type of stillness, because gesture helps to bear some 
of the cognitive ‘load’ involved in memorising and performing lines, restraining 
gesture can impede this process. This suggests a difference between the stillness and 
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silence of an actor and that of their character. Whilst a character’s stillness might 
denote abstract, intense thought during which the character’s mind is decoupled from 
their body, the early modern actor will have produced this effect through an intense 
awareness of their body, using gesture to lighten their cognitive load as they 
memorise and recall their part in the play. However, by suggesting that Bianca’s 
‘silence’ is a deliberate performance rather than an unconscious part of her nature, 
Shakespeare problematises this distinction, and creates a play where the boundaries 
between the actors’ and characters’ cognitive uses of stillness always have the 
potential to blur or overlap. Here, too, actor and character can ask critical questions of 
one another. 
 
Findings from the database: Shakespeare’s wider interest in stillness as ideal 
female behaviour – and performance 
We have seen that a rough distinction can be drawn between characters and actors’ 
stillnesses. Whilst a moment of stillness (like a faint, or falling asleep, or simply being 
ground down into stunned submission to others) can be completely involuntary and 
unconscious on the character’s part, it is deliberately, consciously intended by the 
actor. However, the database shows that Shakespeare frequently worked with this 
issue of intentionality in a less binary way. The Taming of the Shrew is not the only 
Shakespearean play in which characters perform stillness and silence just like actors 
do, appropriating restrained gestures as legible signs of passivity and obedience for 
their own ends. For example, in 1 Henry IV Falstaff ‘falls down as if he were dead’ 
(SD after 5.4.76), lying motionless on stage to avoid being killed by Douglas, only to 
pop back up again, drawing attention to the fact that his stillness was cleverly 
performed. Throughout most of The Winter’s Tale 5.3, Hermione pretends to be a 
statue; as Leontes ponders whether or not she is in fact a real woman he draws 
attention to Hermione’s deliberately performed stillness. Whilst Hermione’s stillness 
is a rather passive test of Leontes’ devotion, Antony and Cleopatra contains a testing 
moment of stillness much closer to Katherine’s idea of using restraint or lack of 
movement and speech to downright ‘flout’ someone. Angry that Iras has died before 
her and thus will be able to greet Antony first in the afterlife, Cleopatra interprets Iras’ 
stillness as a snub, ‘Dost fall?…Dost thou lie still?’ (5.2.293-6).  
The Taming of the Shrew is informed by the early modern notion that physical 
restraint was part of a wider backdrop of ideal female behaviour that included a 
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disinclination to argue or contradict others and a modest temperament. ‘Stillness’ 
could mean the complete absence of movement, absence of mental agitation, absence 
of strife between two people, and ‘Quietness of temper or behaviour; freedom from 
turbulence or self-assertion’.297 In Act 1, Lucentio infers from Bianca’s restrained 
speech and gesture that she embodies the ideal obedient and chaste woman with her 
‘Maid’s mild behaviour and sobriety’ (1.1.71), summing Bianca up as ‘this young 
modest girl’ (1.1.156). Katherine proclaims at the end of the play, 
 
A woman mov’d is like a fountain troubled, 
Muddy, ill-seeming, thick, bereft of beauty, 
And while it is so none so dry or thirsty 
Will deign to sip or touch one drop of it (5.2.142-5).  
 
The slightest movement, it seems, will blur a woman’s beauty. Used in a 
predominantly emotional sense here, the word ‘moved’ is nevertheless rooted in the 
kinetic movements of the body. As an ideal of female behaviour, restraint was 
repeatedly linked to two New Testament passages, and though this chapter’s focus is 
on restrained gestures, these passages show how crucial verbal silence was to ideals of 
femininity as well.298 In the King James Version 1Timothy 2:15-28 reads, ‘Let the 
woman learn in silence with all subjection…I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to 
usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence’. 1 Corinthians 14:34 rearticulates 
this injunction, ‘Let your women keep silence in the churches: for it is not permitted 
unto them to speak; but they are commanded to be under obedience as also saith the 
law’. In 1629, the clergyman Thomas Adams wrote that a wife ought to cultivate a 
‘still and mild’ manner to demonstrate her recognition that her husband was ‘her 
better’, ‘favouring all quietness and lowliness of affection…her reverence doth enjoin 
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tongue from moving. See Meg Brown and Kari McBride, Women’s Roles in the Renaissance 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005), 67.  
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her silence when she stands by’.299 Here, the still and silent woman ‘stands by’ rather 
than acts in her own right, speaking with neither her voice nor her body. In Adams’ 
description, a woman’s restrained gestures are not used to express her own mind, but 
are legible only as signs of ‘reverence’ towards others. How different, then, is Bianca, 
whose ‘silence’ and restraint, while ostensibly signalling her meekness, ‘flouts’ and 
enrages her sister. 
 Shakespeare describes an idealised woman in sonnet 94 as ‘unmoved, cold, 
and to temptation slow’ (line 4). As P.A. Skantze shows in her book Stillness in 
Motion in Seventeenth Century Theatre (2003), many early modern texts described 
stillness as an ideal of female behaviour. For example, Skantze discusses Aphra 
Behn’s Sir Patient Fancy where ‘the confined movement of women of quality is a 
practice lamented by Lucretia and Isabella’.300 Nevertheless, despite this ideal, 
Skantze traces the way that early modern texts frequently depicted ‘men shocked at 
the way that  women really behaved’, citing Samuel Pepys’s diary where he is 
confronted by Nell Gwynn certainly not standing still and docile in her dressing room 
as she flirted with and slept with men between the acts.301 Here, Skantze picks up on 
the same pun that is implicit in sonnet 94: ‘to move’ could also mean ‘to have sex 
with’; she concludes that Restoration drama ‘jostled the static position of looker and 
silently looked upon when bawdy, imaginative women moved about’. 302 
Shakespeare’s interest in stillness was often closely tied with an interest in 
performance, and in particular the actor’s ability consciously to perform 
transformative moments of unconsciousness and lack of control. Sly’s life 
(seemingly) changes completely whilst he falls still on stage and sleeps, but Richard 
III experiences a darker vision when the ghosts of his murder victims visit him in his 
sleep: they deliver the self-fulfilling prophecy ‘despair and die’ to Richard whilst 
blessing his sleeping enemy Richmond. Richard’s sleep is a period of stillness—
sometimes punctuated on stage by his troubled gestures in response to the ghosts’ 
words—with devastating consequences. Waking, Richard affirms ‘I shall despair’ 
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(5.3.127-200); he is then defeated and killed by Richmond in battle. Several similar 
Shakespearean stillnesses embody the confusion between performance and reality that 
a cognitive reading finds to be so central to Shakespearean drama. Death and sleep, 
for instance, are often confused with each other in Shakespeare’s plays: Juliet and 
Innogen both fall into charmed sleeps that make the other characters believe they have 
died. Though they are moments of complete passivity on the character’s part, these 
stillnesses tend to be crucial to Shakespearean plotlines. Characters rarely fall asleep 
in Shakespeare’s plays without experiencing a life-changing vision or other visitation; 
they rarely faint without revealing something crucial about themselves or changing 
the course of the plot.303  
As the discussion of failed handshakes in chapter 1 showed, Shakespeare is 
often particularly interested in gestures that do not do what they are supposed to. In 
The Taming of the Shrew, the same is true of restrained gestures; mild, modest 
behaviour does not always indicate a restrained and obedient mind and in fact can be 
a sign of the opposite: defiance, manipulation, ‘flouting’. This issue is particularly 
obvious at the end of The Taming of the Shrew; here, the text falls significantly silent 
at the climactic moment, when we potentially see whether Katherine has indeed 
turned into an ideal docile wife. In the final scene, as Baptista states, Katherine 
appears ‘changed, as she had never been’ (5.2.115). At the start of the play, she is a 
‘shrew’: a violent, voluble, disobedient, malignant person.304 Many actresses have 
emphasised this behaviour by moving their bodies wildly and energetically, from Ada 
Rehan who really did punch John Drew (Petruchio) in Daly’s New York production 
in 1887, through Mrs Benson in 1921 who ‘bites’ F.R. Benson’s Petruchio during the 
                                                
303 As we saw, Brutus in Julius Caesar has a similar experience to Richard III with the Ghost of 
Caesar. The divorced Katherine in Henry VIII (SD after 4.2.82) experiences a wish-fulfilling vision of 
six dancers curtseying to her and placing a crown on her head; she wakes ‘assured’ of ‘eternal 
happiness’ (4.2.90-2). Old Hamlet is murdered in his sleep setting of the chain of events that cause 
Hamlet, as are the two young princes in Richard III. The tortured misunderstandings in Cymbeline 
begin when Iachimo creeps into Imogen’s bedroom as she sleeps (2.2), ending only when the sleeping 
Posthumus is given a message by the ghosts of his family (5.4.ff.). Dead bodies in Shakespeare’s plays, 
too, continue to signify in important ways, despite being mute and motionless. In 2 Henry VI 3.2.147ff, 
the King and courtiers gather round Duke’s Humphrey’s body, interpreting its appearance to gauge 
whether he has been murdered, for example, whilst in Measure for Measure, the dead Ragozine’s head 
is disguised as Claudio’s so the Duke can pretend that Claudio has been executed (4.3.69-102). 
304 O.E.D., ‘shrew’, n.  
 
158 
wooing scene, to Elizabeth Taylor’s screeching Katherina hitting Richard Burton with 
a plank of wood she has torn up from the floor.305 By the end of the play, Katherine’s 
behaviour is modest and obedient.  In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the 
word ‘shrew’ was particularly applied to wives; the contrast between Katherine’s 
behaviour at the beginning and end of the play is a contrast between undesirable and 
desirable wifely behaviour as described by Corinthians and writers like Adams.  
However, when Katherine proposes, and Petruchio commands, an ultimate test of 
docility and obedience, placing her hand beneath Petruchio’s foot (5.2.177ff.), 
nothing in the stage directions or in any of the characters’ lines indicates whether or 
not Katherine obeys him. This moment of textual silence enables an ambiguity about 
how far Katherine actually is tamed. This moment also foregrounds the agency of the 
actor playing Katherine, who has to decide how to respond to Petruchio’s command 
when the text gives so little guidance.  
Directors often seem compelled to ‘solve’ the problem of textual 
indeterminacy by emphasising one of two options: either Katherine is ‘really’ tamed, 
or she is just pretending. In 2003 at the Globe, Katherine (Kathryn Hunter) left no 
doubt that her mindset was not that of an awe-struck, obedient wife or that her new 
‘tamed’ identity was purely an external show. She parodied tropes of idealised 
femininity by overplaying them, bowing and scraping to Petruchio in exaggerated, 
ironic obedience, emphasising the disparity between her scrupulously ‘wifely’ 
behaviour and her derogatory opinion of Petruchio.306  By contrast, Michelle Gomez’s 
Katherine (Royal Shakespeare Company, 2009) had her autonomy completely 
                                                
305 Tori Haring-Smith, From Farce to Metadrama: A Stage History of The Taming of the Shrew 1594-
1983 (London: Greenwood Press, 1985), 63. ‘bites him’, Prompt Book, The Taming of the Shrew, by 
William Shakespeare, directed by F.R. Benson, Shakespeare Memorial Theatre, Stratford on Avon, 
1921, Shakespeare Centre Library and Archive. The Taming of the Shrew, by William Shakespeare, 
directed by Franco Zeffirelli, 1967, London, Twentieth Century Fox, DVD. 
306 Production Photographs, The Taming of the Shrew, by William Shakespeare, directed by Phyllida 
Lloyd, Globe Theatre, 2003, Globe Theatre Archive.  Descriptions of the final scene also derived from 
Gerry Halliday, review of The Taming of the Shrew, Rogues Review, August 24 2003; Elizabeth 
Schafer, “The Taming of the Shrew,”  Around the Globe 25 (2003), 14-15. Haring-Smith explains that 
this interpretation became particularly fashionable in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when 
portrayals of Katherine as terrorized by a violent Petruchio generally fell from favour and directors 
instead attempted to inject some light domestic comedy into the play, From Farce to Metadrama, 60-
70. 
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destroyed by Petruchio and ended the play sitting motionless and vacant eyed on the 
stage as Petruchio kicked her. Reviewers described her Katherine in the final scenes 
as a ‘zombie’, ‘doll’, or ‘automaton’, all entities whose gestures are characterised by 
restraint, slowness, and, in the case of a doll, complete stillness.307 These revealing 
metaphors suggest that Katherine’s loss of her willpower and Petruchio’s control over 
her thoughts were central to her new ‘tamed’ identity in this production; there was no 
disparity between Katherine’s external behaviour and her thoughts, because Petruchio 
had destroyed her capacity for independent thought.  
At every turn, Katherine and Bianca’s behaviour is associated with the actor’s 
art. Not only is their docile feminine behaviour overshadowed by the suspicion that it 
is a mere performance, their shrewishness is likewise a very theatrical performance, 
exploiting the generic conventions of a string of early modern plays about shrews and 
pointing towards discourses about the shrewishness of theatre itself. Sly moves in just 
15 lines from being a loud drunken lout and unruly kinetic presence (he has ‘burst’ 
(Induction 1.68) several glasses, for instance) to a contained presence on stage when 
he falls fast asleep (SD at Induction 1.15), showcasing the actor’s ability to move 
quickly from wild movements to stillness. But, Bryan Reynolds shows that in The 
Taming of the Shrew Shakespeare is doing much more than providing a few moments 
where actors can show off their comic skill at performing stillness. Rather, Reynolds 
suggests, Shakespeare embeds Katherine and Bianca’s performances of docile 
                                                
307 Sarah Hemming found her ‘utterly subservient, so stripped of spirit that she looks as though she 
were on tranquilisers’, Financial Times, February 19 2009. Michael Coveney described her as ‘zombie-
like’, Independent, February 19 2009. An inflatable female sex doll was thrown around the stage 
throughout the stag-party-themed production. Several critics (for instance Claire Allfree and Lyn 
Gardner) compared Katherine to the doll, unable to think or feel for herself, an instrument of other 
characters’ misogynistic aims. Allfree argues, ‘Katherina’s limp body at the end echoes the blowup 
doll tossed around by the stags’, Metro, February 19 2009. Gardner notes, ‘The blowup doll of the stag 
night becomes flesh and blood in the final moments, as Michelle Gomez’s broken Katherina lies limply 
on the floor’, Guardian, February 23 2009. Charles Spencer stated that Petruchio’s goal was ‘to break 
her spirit’, Telegraph, February 18 2009. Quentin Letts says he ‘generally behaves like a CIA man with 
a suspected terrorist’, whilst she is ‘humiliated and forlorn and pitiable’, Daily Mail, February 18, 
2009. Fiona Mountford described her as ‘utterly subjugated and humiliated, walking and talking like an 
automaton’, Evening Standard, February 18, 2009. In one particularly shocking early modern shrew-
taming story, Johannes Bramis’ A Merry Jest of a Shrewde and Curste Wife (c.1530), the husband uses 
pure violence to tame his wife, beating her and then wrapping her in a salted horse’s skin.  
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femininity explicitly within early modern antitheatrical discourses that saw the theatre 
as a site of demonic power. Reynolds argues that Petruchio’s exercise of diabolical 
influence over Katherine, commanding her to perform a role that erases her original 
personality, reflects early modern descriptions of the theatre as a ‘devil’s house’ 
where actors are possessed by their characters as if by demons.308  
In the early modern era, both supporters (for instance Thomas Heywood) and 
opponents of the theatre described acting as a kind of demonic possession by a role. 
This idea derives ultimately from St. Augustine’s description in City of God of an 
actor becoming their character in the same way that the thoughts of a possessed 
person are deeply altered by the demon possessing them.309 Robert Schuler argues 
that Katherine and Petruchio are both ‘inscribed within the discourses of demonology’ 
because they invert and transgress patriarchal norms. Referring to this transgression, 
Grumio calls Katherine a ‘fiend of hell’ (1.1.88) and repeats that the only husband she 
can have is ‘a devil’ (1.1.121, 123). The word ‘shrew’ itself could mean any evil thing 
or person, and until around 1500 it was a synonym for the devil.310 Reynolds’ work 
shows that Katherine’s transgression of expected feminine behaviour is rooted in the 
idea that performance is itself a transgression of the norm. When Petruchio 
deliberately disrupts his own wedding in 2.1 by punching the priest and flinging the 
communion wine in the air, he makes visible contemporary notions of the theatre as 
the site of blasphemy. 
                                                
308 Bryan Reynolds, “The Devil's House, ‘or worse’: Transversal Power and Antitheatrical Discourse in 
Early Modern England,” Theatre Journal 49(2) (1997), 149. As Reynolds explains, the early modern 
antitheatricalist John Rainolds (1549-1607) called theatre ‘the devil’s house’. 
309 Augustine also uses the metaphor of infection and plague to describe the ways in which an actor’s 
personality is infiltrated and altered by their character’s, De Civitate Dei, 8. Thomas Heywood, An 
Apology for Actors (London: Nicholas Oakes, 1612), B4r.  Stephen Greenblatt argues in his essay 
“Shakespeare and the Exorcists” that discourses of possession and exorcism pervasively underlie early 
modern ideas of performance, Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in 
Renaissance England (Berkeley: California University Press, 1988), 94-128. C.f. Hillaire Kallendorf’s 
book-length study of this trope, Exorcism and its Texts: Subjectivity in Early Modern Literature of 
England and Spain (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2003). The notion of the actor becoming their 
character is discussed in Roach, The Player’s Passion, 49ff. Henk Gras argues that audiences perceived 
actors on the stage as if they truly were their characters, Studies in Elizabethan Audience Response to 
the Theatre, 2 vols (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1993), vol 1, passim, c.f. 124 for discussion of the 
exorcism-trope. 
310 O.E.D., ‘shrew’, n2. 
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 The motifs of the devilish shrew, a marriage between a shrewish woman and 
the devil, and the demonically possessed woman were theatrical spectacles to which 
early modern audiences were well accustomed. For instance, Grim the Collier of 
Croydon (c.1600) depicts the demon Belfagour’s attempts to marry the shrew Honoria 
and his discovery that she is more diabolical than he is. A Yorkshire Tragedy (1608), 
originally thought to be by Shakespeare but probably by Thomas Middleton, portrays 
a husband possessed by a violent devil.311 Schuler contends that Petruchio is modelled 
on the medieval vice or stage-devil and he identifies several witch-like traits in 
Katherine’s character, placing them firmly within the literary tradition of shrews or 
witches wedded to devils.312 However, in an earlier play, 1 Henry VI (composed 
c.1591, first published in the First Folio), Shakespeare does not just use this generic 
framework to structure his plots, he also questions it and tests its limits. This 
precedent suggests that antitheatricalist discourse, and ideas of (gendered) 
performance and stage craft are crucial to The Taming of the Shrew. 
 In 1 Henry VI, testing the limits of the trope of the violent woman married to, 
or possessed by, the devil involves staging verbal silence and restrained gesture as a 
form of protest, of ‘flouting’, as well as of powerlessness. When Joan la Pucelle calls 
on her devils for military aid in 5.3, a stage direction states of the devils, ‘They walk, 
and speak not’ (SD after 5.3.12). Because the devils have no lines in this scene, their 
                                                
311 There are parallels between Petruchio’s insistence that all he wants from marriage is a rich wife, no 
matter what her personality is like (‘wealth is burden of my wooing dance…I come to wive it wealthily 
in Padua’, 1.2.68, 75), and the Husband in A Yorkshire Tragedy who is greedy for his wife’s dowry and 
willing to sell his soul to the devil to get rich. The Husband tells his wife that ‘hell will stand more 
pleasant than her house at home’ when she refuses to feed his profligacy with her money. He explains 
that he was prompted to kill his children (to rid himself of the expense they caused) because ‘the 
enemy my eyes so bleard’; ‘the enemy’ is a very common Elizabethan euphemism for Satan. The 
murderous husband displays a supernatural strength when servants try to restrain him, again suggesting 
that he is possessed by the devil; ‘a fowler strength than his| Ore threw me’, one of the servants attests 
after fighting the husband. [‘William Shakespeare’], A Yorkshire Tragedy (London: Richard Braddock, 
1608), B1v, D3v, C4v.  
312 Robert Schuler, “Bewitching the Shrew,” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 46(4) (2004), 
392, 395. Schuler compares Petruchio depriving Katherine of food and sleep and then asking her to 
perform ridiculous tasks like calling the sun the moon to the techniques used by inquisitors to force 
witches to confess the most outlandish crimes (409). He interprets Katherine’s final emphasis on her 
soft body as a kind of transformation from witch to good woman, as ‘a key reputed feature of the witch 
was her unnaturally “hard body”’ (413). 
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only noted appearance in the play, their lack of speech is a given fact. Thus, this in 
some ways otiose stage direction emphasising the silence is especially significant. The 
devils’ silence is doubly emphasised by Joan’s response to it, ‘O, hold me not with 
silence over-long’ (5.3.13). As Joan continues to plead with them, ‘They hang their 
heads’, and ‘They shake their heads’ (SDs after 5.3.18, 20). In early modern England, 
as now, these were gestures of bashfulness or shame, and dissent or refusal, 
respectively.313 Finally, ‘They depart’ (SD after 5.3.24), completely denying Joan 
their help. Contextualised among these other gestures of refusal and inability to help, 
the stage direction ‘They walk and speak not’ acquires a similar significance to these 
other stage directions. Far from a mere neutral absence of speech, the devils’ silence 
is a powerful, meaningful form of resistance to Joan’s demands. Indeed, Joan 
interprets the devils’ gestures as signs of their relative power: ‘My ancient 
incantations are too weak| And hell too strong for me to buckle with’ (5.3.27-8).  
When Joan offers the devils her ‘body’ in return for their help (1 Henry VI 
5.3.20), she evokes the common early modern literary theme of the marriage of a 
witch or shrew to the devil, and this shared theme is not the only suggestive 
comparison that can be drawn between 1 Henry VI and The Taming of the Shrew. 
Whilst the devils flout Joan with their refusal to speak, Bianca and Katherine flout 
with both restrained gestures and words.  Both plays disrupt generic conventions, not 
by using violent spectacles but by staging restraint. Constrained and powerless devils 
crop up in several other early modern plays: Marlowe’s Mephistopheles’ power is 
limitless save for the fact that he cannot speak the truth about holy things, for 
instance, ‘Faustus: Sweet Mephistopheles, tell me who made the world| 
Mephistopheles: I will not’. 314 However, early modern audiences would have reason 
to expect their stage-devils to be unruly in speech and gesture; since the Mystery 
Cycles, devils had been a thrillingly kinetic presence on the stage, providing a 
highlight of early modern drama as they leapt around surrounded with loud noises and 
striking stage effects. The devils in Christopher Marlowe’s Dr Faustus (1604, 1616) 
                                                
313 O.E.D., ‘hang’, v, 4b and ‘shake’, v, 6b. 
314 Dr Faustus (1604 text), in Frank Romany and Robert Lindsey, eds., Christopher Marlowe: The 
Complete Plays (London: Penguin, 2003), 2.3.70. Grim the Collier of Croydon turns the idea of devils’ 
limited power into a comedy; the demon Belfagour is so thoroughly brow-beaten and taken advantage 
of by a shrew and her friends that he is positively delighted to escape back to Hell. I.T., Grim the 
Collier of Croydon (London: R.D., 1662). 
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appear throwing fireworks at several points, for example. The mute, constrained 
devils in 1 Henry VI, then, also signify Shakespeare’s refusal to conform to generic 
conventions and present his audiences with wildly gesturing demons.  The devils are 
not only characters refusing to perform for Joan, they are also actors refusing to 
perform according to the established generic conventions of stage-devils. In one way, 
The Taming of the Shrew completes this trajectory as we trace Katherine’s 
transformation from a devilish ‘shrew’ to a woman who refuses to engage in devilish 
behaviour (though in so doing she remains firmly embedded within what Schuler 
identifies as the diabolical practice of theatrical representation).  
Compare 1 Henry 3, too, with a work like Barnabe Barnes’ The Diuels 
Charter (1607), the final scene of which is entirely dedicated to depicting devils 
‘triumphing’ over Pope Alexander, who sold his soul in exchange for worldly power. 
At this climactic moment, ‘Alexander is in extreame torment and groneth whilst the 
diuill laugheth at him’; the devils plan lavish torments for Alexander and taunt him 
for his ‘hipocrisie’ as he attempts a last-minute prayer.315 In 1 Henry VI, the 
appearance of the stage-devils is contrastingly anticlimactic and is usurped by the 
English soldiers and nobles; it is they, rather than the devils, who taunt Joan for her 
hypocrisy as they prepare to torment and execute her (the fact that she claims – albeit 
not entirely convincingly – to be pregnant makes their decision to kill her especially 
shocking). The next chapter will trace another way in which 1 Henry VI set the tone 
for Shakespeare’s later career as a pioneer of stage violence. By refusing to let the 
devils steal the show, Shakespeare foregrounds the play’s battle scenes instead. As 
Charles Edelman argues, 1 Henry VI stands out for being the first English play to 
represent sustained periods of hand-to-hand combat.316 Muted and restrained, the 
devils are prevented from upstaging the play’s fight-scenes, which would have been 
skilled and realistic.317  In the next chapter, we will see how Shakespeare innovated 
stage violence further in Hamlet to exploit and close the gap between performance 
and reality. In terms of The Taming of the Shrew, though, drawing on gendered 
                                                
315 Barnabe Barnes, The Diuil’s Charter (London: G.E., 1607), Scaena Ultima, SD after 183. 
316 ‘Shakespeare was an innovator…of stage-violence’ from Henry VI onwards, Charles Edelman, 
Brawl Ridiculous: Swordfighting in Shakespeare’s Plays (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1992), 23. 
317 Early modern fight scenes would have deployed state of the art fencing techniques, Edelman, Brawl 
Ridiculous, 51. 
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notions of the theatricality of the diabolical enables Shakespeare to tie feminine 
performance even more closely to theatrical representation. 
I suggest that when it comes to gesture, what Shakespeare is drawing our 
attention to in this play is not this question of whether or not Katherine’s restrained 
behaviour indicates that she is really tamed. As we saw in chapter 2, this distinction 
between essential nature and ‘mere’ performance has the tendency to dissolve on the 
Shakespearean stage. Rather, it seems that Shakespeare is most keen to draw attention 
to the gap between character and actor, fascinating audiences by the way that this gap 
widens but also seamlessly disappears. Cognitive theory helps us to tease out this 
relationship by explaining how restraint and stillness are cognitively different for 
characters and for actors. Performances of modest femininity are the key focus of 
interrogating the relationship between actors and their characters in The Taming of the 
Shrew.318 The play’s main action is carefully framed by the Induction, where the 
players who perform The Taming of the Shrew are coached on how to perform a good 
play. Several of the players (and Bartholomew the page) then go on to pretend to be 
women: Bianca, Katherine, and Sly’s ‘wife’. But, the lord warns them, it is important 
to keep the gap between performance and reality closed, to stay in character no matter 
what, 
 
I am doubtful of your modesties. 
Lest, over-eyeing of his odd behaviour 
(For yet his honour never heard a play), 
You break into some merry passion (Induction 1.94-7). 
 
By couching his warning in the gendered language of ‘modesty’, the lord implies that 
a good performance of femininity and a convincing theatrical performance share the 
qualities of physical restraint, controlling gesture from the unruliness of ‘passion’. By 
                                                
318 Laurie Maguire argues that the performed femininities in the play are linked through a chain of 
imagery relating to another type of playing: playing musical instruments. She explains that ‘the 
figurative association between bad behaviour and bad music was a Renaissance commonplace’, and 
links this to ideas of taming and misogyny as ‘the lute remains an object that the male subject uses for 
pleasure’, “Cultural Control in The Taming of the Shrew,” Renaissance Drama (56) (1995), 87, 97. 
This gives new connotations of subversiveness to Bianca’s ‘silence’, as an instrument which refuses to 
make a sound is one that refuses its male ‘player’ the ‘pleasure’ Maguire describes. 
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using the word ‘modesty’, the same word used by Lucentio of Bianca, the lord’s 
speech signposts the way that the players’ performance and Katherine and Bianca’s 
performances of femininity are one and the same; the play that the players perform is 
The Taming of the Shrew and two players will take the roles of Katherine and Bianca. 
When they perform femininity, Katherine and Bianca are actors, both within the 
fictional world of the play (where the players put on The Taming of the Shrew to 
entertain Sly) and in reality, where they are created by actors in the Globe. 
The tension between the theories of cognitive underload and offline cognition 
helps to tease out the relationship between actor and character. Goldin-Meadow 
explains how, according to the principle of ‘cognitive underload’, not gesturing 
impedes thought. She contends that gesture is used to aid, organise, and generate 
thought by lightening a person’s ‘cognitive load’ and allowing them to think more 
efficiently. According to this theory, without the aid of gesture, understanding 
becomes more difficult. Goldin-Meadow explains, ‘speakers gesture in order to 
lighten their cognitive load. They produce more gestures on difficult tasks in order to 
make the task easier… gesturing can free up cognitive resources that can then be used 
elsewhere’.319  Goldin-Meadow tested this by giving participants two tasks to do 
(remembering items on a list and solving a maths problem). When allowed to gesture, 
the participants performed better on the tasks than when not allowed to gesture. In 
another test, she asked people to depress two buttons with their hands whilst speaking 
(so they could not use their hands to gesture); they performed less well on memorising 
and computational tasks than they did when they could gesture freely.320 Impeded, 
restricted gestures, she concludes, are correlated with impeded, restricted thoughts. 
Evelyn Tribble applies the theory of cognitive underload to early modern 
performance, arguing that actors relied heavily on gesture to enable them to learn 
lines. She reasons that, with the big demands made on them to memorise their parts 
(often within just two weeks), these actors ‘offloaded’ knowledge onto their 
environment (and particularly onto part-books, play-summaries, prompters and the 
bodies and minds of other actors) and anchored memories within their gestures in 
order to reduce their cognitive burden. By limiting the amount of knowledge that they 
contained in their own heads, and distributing memories and cues for memories in 
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their bodies and their environment, they freed up cognitive resources for memorising 
their lines. Tribble explains that because it does not just involve the brain and body 
but is extended into the environment, this is ‘a genuinely extended (rather than a 
merely embodied) practice’,321 but like Goldin-Meadow she affirms that gesture is 
crucial to enabling the free flow of thought, suggesting that the actors performing The 
Taming of the Shrew will have needed movement to ensure a convincing 
performance.  
Rhonda Blair (both an actor and a cognitive theorist) provides a first-hand 
account of using Tribble’s theories to rehearse. She states that ‘rote repetition’ 
accompanied by gesture ensured that her lines were ‘securely embodied’ such that, 
when she deployed the gestures she had rehearsed in performance, the relevant lines 
emerged from her memory. Blair describes concentrating on the shape of her mouth 
as she spoke and using gestures that, for her, evoked the tenor of particular words. For 
example, she would ‘clench’ her body at what, due to her personal memories and 
associations, felt to her like cold or ‘wintery’ words (‘partridge’ was one such 
word).322 By focusing on the way her lines were thus embodied, Blair successfully 
‘offloaded’ and anchored information in her body, aiding her cognitive processes. 
Nevertheless, actors can appropriate stillness as a sign of abstract thought. The 
idea of ‘offline cognition’, which views stillness as a legible sign of deep thought 
rather than impeded thought, derives from Robert Gordon and Alvin Goldman’s 
research in the 1980s into ‘simulation theory’ (which the next chapter looks at in more 
detail). According to this theory, thought is at its most powerful not when attached to 
gesture but when it is decoupled from the body. Gordon and Goldman argued that in 
order to understand other people’s minds, or to make decisions about future events, 
people create hypothetical ‘simulations’ of these occurrences; they imagine them 
happening. Because these are hypothetical situations, they do not rely on perception 
of what is actually happening in the body of, or world around, the person creating the 
simulation. Simulation thus involves a subject disengaging from the sensory inputs 
provided by their environment (and, potentially, even their own bodies) in order to 
reason abstractly. This disengagement came to be known as ‘offline cognition’. Its 
                                                
321 Tribble, Cognition in the Globe, 2, 101, 20.  
322 Rhonda Blair, “Text to Embodiment: Situated Cognition and Some Implications for the Actor,” 
paper presented at Cognitive Futures in the Humanities conference, Bangor University, Wales, April 4-
6 2013. 
 
167 
opposite is ‘online’ cognition, where a person’s thoughts engage directly with their 
environment. Offline cognition is generally described by cognitive theorists as 
reflective, deliberate, conscious, and self-aware (whereas online cognition is often 
seen to be habitual, conducted without much reflection). Marisa Przyrembel et al 
explain,  
 
states of offline, or decoupled cognition, tend to emerge in situations in 
which the mind generates streams of thoughts that have minimal direct 
correlation to ongoing perceptual events and are often defined as stimulus 
independent thoughts (SIT). These SIT can also subserve inferences about 
other people’s minds, or, alternatively, reasoning about the self and the 
world.323  
 
The theory of offline cognition provides a scientific basis for the long-held idea that 
moments where a Shakespearean character’s exterior bodily signs become difficult to 
read indicate that thought (in some cases, Shakespeare’s, in others, his characters’) is 
at its most intense and interesting. This is often the case in performance at the end of 
The Taming of the Shrew, when Katherine’s seemingly-docile restraint has the 
potential to conceal subversive, manipulative intentions.  
There exists a sizeable tradition of identifying periods of stillness and/or 
silence on stage with particularly profound inner thought.324 Previously to the 
definitive emergence of cognitive theory into Shakespeare studies (with works by 
authors like Lyne, Cook, and Tribble) in 2010-12, twenty-first-century examinations 
of interiority in Shakespeare’s plays, like David Hillman’s Shakespeare’s Entrails 
                                                
323 Marisa Przyrembel et al, “Illuminating the Dark Matter of Neuroscience,” Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 6(190) (2012), 112. See P.J. Corr, “Individual Differences in Cognition: In Search of a 
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(2007), have tended to be psychoanalytic. Critics used psychoanalytic theory to find 
evidence of repressed thoughts and other aspects of a character’s inner life in 
moments where meaning is hidden, withheld, or left ambiguous or unsaid.325 Hillman 
argues that the pervasive early modern idea that the body’s external appearance 
obscured the workings of a person’s inner life resulted in inevitably frustrated 
‘fantasies of access’ to the interior of other people’s bodies and minds.326 Cognitive 
studies of Shakespeare’s plays have tended to affirm this idea that stillness and silence 
draw attention to the presence of an ‘inner’ world of profound thought. But cognitive 
theory highlights the difficulty of teasing out the specifics of this inner world 
according to its own frameworks. Lyne writes that all these, ‘Places where meaning is 
difficult, occluded and resistant to resolution’ indicate the presence of abstract thought 
so complex and powerful that it surpasses the power of language.327  
Cognitive studies take this tradition into new territory by examining stillness 
as the location where the relationship between character and actor becomes most 
visible. There is a potential tension here. On the one hand, we have this suggestion 
that thought is given most free rein when it is liberated from gesture (and its 
accompanying reminders of corporeality and the specifics of time and space). But, on 
the other, we have the idea that restraining gesture results in cognitive overload and 
thus impedes and disrupts thought precisely because thoughts are ‘decoupled’ from 
gesture and an awareness of the environment. This highlights the distinction noted 
above between actors and the characters that they are playing. Whilst a moment of 
                                                
325 Joseph Schwartz writes in his history of psychoanalysis, ‘psychoanalysis is a systematic attempt by 
many workers over the last 100 years to understand the structure and dynamics of the inner world of 
the experiencing human being’; Schwartz argues that, in pursuing this endeavour, psychoanalysis 
‘shares a boundary with literature’, Cassandra’s Daughter: A History of Psychoanalysis in Europe and 
America (London: Penguin, 1999), 1. 
326 ‘[T]he problem turns out to lie in, precisely, the fantasy of access; the search fails in so far as the 
ruling notion remains that of an inner realm that is incommensurate with the outer. In the end, it is a 
notion that is in the service of an attempt to stave off knowledge, a refusal to recognise something 
about the necessary sufficiency, in human matters, of the external’, David Hillman, Shakespeare’s 
Entrails: Belief, Scepticism, and the Interior of the Body (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007),172. 
327 Lyne, Shakespeare, Rhetoric, and Cognition, 12. Sophie Read, “Shakespeare and the Arts of 
Cognition,” in The Oxford Handbook of Shakespeare’s Poetry, ed. Jonathan Post (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013) and Philip Davies, Shakespeare Thinking (London: Continuum, 2011) 
rearticulate this argument. All of these studies focus on language rather than gesture. 
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stillness and/or silence for a character can indicate ‘offline cognition’ or deep and 
abstract thought, this does not apply to the actor, who at this very moment may be 
very much ‘online’ and (as Tribble suggests) highly (though unconsciously) aware of 
their body and their environment as they draw on all of their bodily resources in order 
to remember and (re)create a plausible performance of introspection.  
The chapter ends by arguing that The Taming of the Shrew is permeated by 
what Sibylle Baumbach describes as literary fascination. For Baumbach, this is ‘both 
attraction and repulsion’ resulting in ‘a moment of stillness, of petrification or 
fascination’.328 If characterisation is what Aoife Monks refers to as ‘an exchange of 
looks’,329 where actors and characters exchange looks with each other and the 
audience, The Taming of the Shrew invites us to look closer, to look at the relationship 
between character and actor itself. As Katherine pauses before putting her hand 
beneath Petruchio’s foot (or not), her suspended gesture makes us aware of two 
simultaneous and not completely separable performances in play, that of the actor 
performing Katherine, and that of Katherine performing a tamed woman. As Bianca 
throws a tantrum at her sister before quickly restraining her gestures when she sees 
Lucentio, and as Bartholomew the page hastily adopts a woman’s garb and restrained 
behaviour, this gap between the performer and the character they assume is made part 
of the play itself. This invites us to pause and to stare, fascinated, at the complex play 
of actors’ and characters’ thoughts. I argue that in these moments of stillness and 
restraint, Katherine and Bianca are fascinating both because they open up the gap in 
the fiction to reveal the actor and because they show how transgressively-appropriated 
(rather than essentially natural) gender norms are. Fascinated by Katherine’s (at the 
time) deviations from the feminine norm and (in the present day) deviations from our 
feminist expectations,  other characters on stage and audience members offstage are 
invited to become still themselves, as they gaze at this spectacle. What fascinates us 
cognitively about the play is precisely the moment where performances threaten to 
fail to signify anything definite, and, in so doing, highlight the fact that they are 
performances. 
 
                                                
328 Sibylle Baumbach, “Medusa’s Gaze and the Aesthetics of Fascination,” Anglia 128(2) (2010), 225, 
229. 
329 Aoife Monks, The Actor in Costume (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 143. 
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Performing stillness: what does this mean cognitively? 
We have seen that there is a disparity between what stillness signifies for an actor and 
what it signifies for the character they play. According to theories of cognitive 
underload, insofar as gesture is essential to learning lines, moments of stillness 
impede the actor’s art. However, the actor’s performance on stage will often involve 
falling still when their character sleeps, or dies, or simply pauses to ponder; in the 
early modern era (and, most likely, in other moments throughout Shakespearean stage 
history) these onstage stillnesses are likely to have been rehearsed and memorised by 
the embodied processes Tribble describes. Thus, though they may be intended to 
signify that a character is failing or struggling to think or remember or is making no 
cognitive effort at all, deliberate stillness on stage is the product of careful cognitive 
effort and memorisation. Signs of impeded or inefficient cognition for a character, 
they are the products of fluent and efficient cognition on the part of the actor.  
This highlights a key complexity that an exploration of Shakespeare’s plays 
introduces into cognitive theory. Cognitive theory often tends to examine how people 
behave when they are not attempting to deliberately perform their gestures. Indeed, 
Goldin-Meadow defines gesture as a spontaneous and involuntary movement that 
‘slips out’ as a person speaks rather than something consciously performed.330 It was 
crucial to Goldin-Meadow’s study of restrained gestures that the people she observed 
were not trying to deliberately perform their gestures, so she aimed as far as possible 
to study gesture and cognition in everyday situations; for instance she sat in on a 
maths lesson in a real classroom. This is very different to theatrical performances, 
where pauses in actors’ speech and gesture tend to be scripted and consciously 
controlled.331 Because it explicitly makes visible, and examines, the theatricality of 
restrained gesture, The Taming of the Shrew can provide pointers for the cognitive 
theorist on how to adapt theories about restrained gesture as an involuntary symptom 
                                                
330 Goldin-Meadow, Hearing Gesture, 12. 
331 Amy Cook notes the discrepancy between the findings from cognitive linguists’ laboratory 
experiments about language-use and actors’ use of language on stage. She argues that it is difficult to  
neatly apply these laboratory findings to scripted discourse on stage, ‘There are important differences 
between actors speaking someone else’s words within a discourse structure they may not understand 
and asking people to speak about their past and future in front of camera’, Shakespearean Neuroplay, 
119. 
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of deep thought or as an obstacle to thought, in order to include a nuanced sense of the 
actor’s intentionality. 
 Actors have historically intentionally appropriated stillness in order to play a 
fictional role, destabilising the assumption that these outward signs are always a 
reliable indicator of a person’s thoughts. Looking at the stage history of stillness 
shows that actors have done this from the early modern era to the present day, though 
stillness was expressed in different ways in different periods. Cognitive theory 
encourages us to seek both shared traits and culturally-specific differences between 
performances in different eras. On the one hand, cognitive theory seeks to uncover 
facts about the brain that might resist historical difference. For instance, Rhonda 
Blair’s effective use of the early modern cognitive rehearsal techniques described by 
Tribble demonstrates that techniques of cognitive underload are as useful for modern 
performers as they were for early modern actors. On the other hand, cognitive theories 
also emphasise plasticity; the brain’s ability to adapt to new experiences creates 
patterns of thought that are often highly individualised. The neurobiologist Stephen 
Rose explains that the brain ‘is inseparably a product of both evolution and 
development and the culture and history within which we are embedded’, so ‘The 
brains and minds of twenty-first-century people differ not just from those of our 
Pleistocene ancestors, but even from those of our great-grandparents’ and those of our 
contemporaries due to the difference in individuals’ experiences and memories.332 
Historically-nuanced, stillness and restraint have nevertheless been key parts of acting 
on the Shakespearean stage since the early modern era, and remain so today. This is 
especially the case with The Taming of the Shrew, where an interrogation of feminine 
stillness is built into the text. 
Paul Menzer argues that early modern actors often deployed a deliberately 
postured ‘articulate stillness’ which audiences understood to convey aspects of their 
character’s ‘necessarily unseen passionate inner life’, a ‘legible passionate 
experience’.333 This was certainly the case in later centuries as well; many eighteenth- 
                                                
332 Stephen Rose, “The Need for a Critical Neuroscience,” in Critical Neuroscience, 60-3; Slaby and 
Choudhury write that this is because the self is ‘constitutively situated’, constituted by as well as 
constituting its environment, “Introduction,” in Critical Neuroscience, 12.  
333 Paul Menzer, “The Actor’s Inhibition: Early Modern Acting and the Rhetoric of Restraint,” in Mary 
Floyd-Wilson and Garrett Sullivan, eds., Embodiment and Environment in Early Modern England 
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and nineteenth-century actors tried to cultivate what art historian Robin Simon calls 
an ‘immobile style’.334 Advising actors how to portray different emotions in his 
influential Guide to the Stage (1864), Francis Wemyss writes of a number of 
introspective, withdrawn emotions which are portrayed by a deliberate stillness. For 
instance, ‘Tranquillity or apathy, appears by the composure of the body and limbs, 
without the exercise of any one muscle…’, and ‘Melancholy, or fixed grief, is gloomy, 
sedentary, motionless’.335 David Garrick (1717-79) was particularly famous for 
pausing in the midst of his lines to create a tableau vivant, signifying deep thought or 
‘inner turmoil’ by a stillness and silence that deliberately drew the audience’s 
attention.336 In his diary, the early twentieth-century actor and director Herbert 
Beerbohm Tree described Twelfth Night’s still and measured Viola as, ‘Deep water 
with a ripple on it’, her lack of energetic action signifying all the more clearly that she 
was a deep thinker.337  
The example of Garrick, contrasted with some of his contemporaries, 
illustrates how actors made stillness legible to a theatre audience. Each of Garrick’s 
tableaux vivants involved bodily postures and facial expressions associated with a 
specific emotion. The emotion in question was legible to his audiences because it was 
uniformly represented by that particular static posture and expression not only on 
stage, but in paintings, painting and acting manuals, and theatrical prints. Garrick 
imitated the static poses found in paintings (particularly those of his friend 
Hogarth).338 He also knew that painters (notably Hogarth) often observed him acting 
                                                
334 Robin Simon, “Shared Conceptions of Gesture and Action,” part of the Mellon Lecture series, 
National Portrait Gallery, London, January 28 2013. 
335 Francis Wemyss, The Guide to the Stage (New York: Samuel French, 1864), 32 
336 Todd Borlick, “‘Painting of A Sorrow’: Visual Culture and the Performance of Stasis in David 
Garrick’s Hamlet,” Shakespeare Bulletin 5(1) (2007), 3-31. ‘Garrick astonished audiences by both 
suspending his voice and sustaining postures in the midst of the most frenzied activity, creating both an 
auditory silence and a physical stillness’ (5). 
337 Diary, Herbert Beerbohm Tree, 1903, entry for May 11, Bristol Theatre Archive. The word ‘Viola’ 
is added later in pencil to this phrase (which is written in ink) as though having jotted down the phrase, 
Tree returned to it later when it gained meaning for him as a description of Viola. Tree rarely used his 
diaries (which are almost all held in this archive) to actually write his appointments in; rather, he used 
them as notebooks, writing choice quotations or ideas for plays all over them. 
338 The connection between Garrick’s Shakespearean roles and Hogarth’s paintings was often so deep 
as to be unconscious – several audience remembers remarked the similarity between Garrick’s 
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to gain inspiration for future paintings. This was a prominent example of widespread 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century practices of cross-fertilisation between actors’ 
poses held as they paused on stage and paintings. Robin Simon explains that actors 
would study painting manuals, especially Charles LeBrun’s treatise on representing 
emotion in painting, Méthode pour Apprendre à Dessiner les Passions (1698), and 
aim to replicate the static poses and gestures they found there on the stage. Painters, in 
their turn, studied acting guides (particularly Aaron Hill’s The Prompter (1734-6)) 
and were required by the rules laid down by the French Academy for the popular 
genre of history painting (which comprised paintings depicting dramatic literary or 
historical events) to base their paintings on ‘minute attention to the text’ of a 
particular literary work. From 1800, Simon argues, paintings began to determine 
acting styles more than acting styles affected paintings; owning a collection of 
theatrical prints symbolised an actor’s success: these prints came to influence actors 
more than performances they had actually seen. Simon states that, as a result, 
paintings of Shakespearean actors, acting manuals, painting manuals, and actors on 
stage shared ‘a language of recognisable gesture’; using this language was one of the 
‘plain practicalities’ of painting and acting.339 Shakespearean characters on stage thus 
bore traces of the static paintings by which they were so often inspired. 
Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century actors who failed to achieve an articulate 
stillness were ridiculed for their stock poses and gormless expressions; their acting 
tended to be seen as wooden and shallow rather than indicative of profound thought. 
For instance, in his Shakespearean roles John Philip Kemble (1757-1823) attempted 
the immobile style perfected by Garrick, however his dramatic pauses often rendered 
him more like a statue or an immobile object than a human being in the throes of 
passion. William Hazlitt described Kemble as, ‘the very still life and statuary of the 
stage; a perfect figure of a man; a petrifaction of sentiment, that heaves no sigh, and 
                                                                                                                                       
portrayal of Othello and a servant in one of Hogarth’s Harlots Progress prints. Though Garrick was not 
deliberately copying the print, ‘many years later, when Garrick was one day looking through his “own 
choice folio of Hogarth’s prints”, he came to the one in question and was bound to remark: “Faith! It is 
devilish like”’, Alan Kendall, David Garrick: A Biography (London: Harrap, 1985), 40-1. 
339 Robin Simon, “Shared Conceptions of Gesture and Action,” and “Making History: History Painting 
and the Theatre,” January 21 2013, Mellon Lectures. Further context from Marcus Risdell, curator, 
Garrick Club Archive, conversation with the author, September 24 2012. 
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sheds no tear; an icicle upon the bust of Tragedy’.340 Hazlitt’s description emphasises 
the unchanging, stone-like effect of Kemble’s pauses, the expression of this ‘petrified’ 
sentiment is halted and obscured. Hazlitt’s image of Kemble as a comparatively tiny, 
frozen, non-human object, ‘an icicle’ clinging to ‘the bust of Tragedy’ comically 
evokes a dehumanising, featureless, unemotional (thanks to the figurative idea of 
emotional ‘coldness’), diminished acting style. As we saw in the first chapter, Henry 
Siddons condemned actors who simply tried to follow stock advice to the letter as 
creating ‘a set of puppets’ rather than believable characters. Hazlitt’s remarks suggest 
that during moments of articulate stillness, sentiment was expected to be energetically 
visible in the actor’s face and posture, indicating that the character’s thoughts are 
working profoundly and intensely, changing and progressing. Patrick O’Brian’s 
etching The Theatrical Steel-Yards of 1750 (April 1751) illustrates the contrast 
between Garrick’s legible, passionate, articulate acting style and the mannequin-like 
stillness of inferior actors.341 O’Brian depicts a steelyard with a giant balance, with 
Garrick alone on the right hand side outweighing the Covent Garden actors on the 
left, just as his prowess metaphorically ‘outweighs’ other actors’. The stock poses on 
the left-hand side of O’Brian’s etching perhaps evoke the (often comically) rigid 
gestures of the ceramic Staffordshire figurines of Shakespearean characters, popular 
at the time.342 As the above-cited accounts of Garrick and other actors suggest, when a 
character falls still because they are thinking deeply, abstracted from their 
environment and even their own body, this cognitive disengagement is achieved 
because the actor is, by contrast, highly cognitively engaged with their body and their 
environment to ensure that their facial expressions and gestures are legible to the 
audience and to stay aware of their cues, scripted lines, and other actors. 
In chapter 2, we saw that Shakespeare was interested in how habitual action 
can shape the mind. This chapter began to explore how cognitive studies is part of a 
continuous tradition, dating back to at least Aristotle, which argues that habitual 
action can change a person’s patterns of thought and behaviour until those habitually-
performed actions become entrenched habits, and ‘second nature’. This tradition 
suggests that, performed habitually, a particular gesture or type of behaviour changes 
                                                
340 William Hazlitt, A View of the English Stage (London: Robert Stodart, 1818), 100. 
341 Patrick O’Brian, The Theatrical Steel-Yards of 1750: Publish’d 27th April 1751, Elephant Folio, 95r, 
Garrick Club Archive, London. 
342  A large collection of these can be seen in the Garrick Club, London. 
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from being a deliberately-chosen act to something a person cannot help but repeat, 
signalling an often fundamental change in their nature. Often explicitly engaging with 
Aristotle and with subsequent philosophical works, neuroscientific studies add to this 
tradition evidence that habitual action also changes patterns of brain function.  
Aristotle argued in Nichomachean Ethics that a person’s nature can be altered by 
habitual actions; telling a single lie, for instance, does not make a person a liar, but 
lying again and again will habituate that person to lying until they are by temperament 
a liar. He argued that virtue and vice were by definition character traits produced by 
habitual action.343 A staple classroom text in the Renaissance,344 the Nicomachean 
Ethics’ arguments about habit were prominent in early modern writings about virtue 
and custom. For instance Francis Bacon’s popular essay ‘On Custom’ (1612, enlarged 
1625) is grounded in this view that habit is ‘the chief magistrate of men’s lives’ so 
that ‘men’s… deeds, are after as they have been accustomed’.345 Michel Montaigne’s 
1595 essay ‘On Habit and On the Difficulty of Changing a Traditional Law’ describes 
habit as ‘the Queen and Empress of the World… the principal activity of custom is so 
to seize us and to grip us in her claws that it is hardly in our power to struggle free and 
to come back into ourselves, where we can reason and argue about her ordinances’. 346 
Both essayists conclude that the best way to reform people’s manners and increase 
their virtue is by ensuring that they develop good habits from a young age, and that, 
conversely, bad habits can quickly become so entrenched that there is no hope for 
adults who formed bad patterns of thought and behaviour as children.  
Neurological studies of habit give a scientific basis to these ideas. Steven 
Hyman presents drug addiction as a test-case for the implications of habitual action 
for volition in general, because, ‘Addicted people habitually engage in apparently 
voluntary behaviours, such as drug seeking and drug use, that are by standard 
definitions of addiction compulsive or beyond the person’s control’. Hyman argues 
that habitual, repeated action, rather than the ‘biochemical toxicity’ of drugs, is the 
most important cause of any addiction-related change to a person’s nature. All 
habitual actions, he found, can ‘affect normal brain mechanisms, such as experience-
                                                
343 Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics,” in Complete Works, Book 3. 
344 William Baldwin, William Shakspere’s Small Latine & Lesse Greeke (Illinois: University of Illinois 
Press, 1944), 106, 237. 
345 Bacon, Essays, 109.  
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dependent neural plasticity taken to an extreme’.347 The neuroscientists Martina Reska 
and Martin Paulus also found that both addiction to drugs and the compulsive 
performance of seemingly neutral actions (such as hand washing) change brain 
activation patterns, making it increasingly difficult for a person to change their 
behaviour.348 Reska and Paulus’ work suggests, again, that it is repeated action, rather 
than biochemical toxicity, that can change a person’s character.  
As we have seen, Catharine Malabou restates this neurological problem 
philosophically. She argues that habit is essential to creating a person’s character or 
personality as a stable and continuous entity by creating a consistent pattern of 
behaviour. But, paradoxically, she states that habit also reduces the possibility for a 
subject to choose freely how they act. Thus, ‘habit murders man. And it does so just 
as surely as it makes man live’ because, ‘The exemplary individuality’ which 
constitutes a person is ‘sculpted by habit’, ‘the gradual formation of the “I” is 
paradoxically accompanied by a loss of fluidity’. Through habit, she argues, the self 
reflects on its own actions, interpreting itself, and thereby constituting itself ‘in and as 
a second nature’. She relates her analysis of neurological plasticity back to Aristotle’s 
original argument in Nicomachean Ethics, illustrating how strongly modern cognitive 
and neurological studies reinforce the Aristotelian viewpoint, ‘For Aristotle, habit 
implies the aptitude for change, along with the possibility of preserving the 
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348 Martina Reske and Martin Paulus, “A Neuroscientific Approach to Addiction: Ethical Concerns’, 
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modifications inherent in such a change’.349  The Taming of the Shrew troubles this 
rather neat idea, by suggesting that in a theatrical performance (whether that means 
femininity performed by Katherine and Bianca, Bartholomew and the players in the 
Induction, or by Shakespeare’s actors), repeated action does not always have such a 
straightforward effect on the brain. There remains the uncertainty throughout the play, 
that what seems to be a restrained and involuntary (second) nature is in fact a 
deliberate appropriation of restrained gesture for a person’s own ends. 
In the opening lines of Act 1, Lucentio alludes to Nicomachean Ethics and 
Aristotle’s doctrine of gaining happiness (‘eudaimonia’) through virtue built by habit, 
‘that part of philosophy| Will I apply that treats of happiness by virtue specially to be 
achieved’ (1.1.19-20). Tranio cautions Lucentio not to become a dry ‘stock’ of a 
philosopher, suggesting that he mix Aristotle’s philosophy with the advice on 
romance in the poet Ovid’s Amores. Do not, he advises ‘so devote to Aristotle’s 
checks| As Ovid be an outcast quite abjured’ (1.1.32-3). In Act 5, Petruchio shows off 
Katherine’s ‘new-built virtue and obedience’ (5.2.118). This idea of ‘building’ 
Katherine’s character, constructing it anew, suggests that Petruchio has applied 
Aristotelian principles to his romantic life by intervening to alter Katherine’s habits 
until she becomes the obedient, modest, and quiet wife he wants. Shakespeare depicts 
Petruchio restraining Katherine’s wild gestures until she appears to internalise these 
principles of docile femininity and restraint and performs them automatically of her 
own accord. But Shakespeare also emphasises the gaps in this performance, providing 
many moments in the text where performances of femininity are punctured or 
questioned. Julius Caesar engaged in a more implicit examination of the power of 
habitual performance to alter the mind, but this becomes an explicit focus of 
productions of The Taming of the Shrew. With Julius Caesar, there are implicit links 
between the habitual performances of characters and those of actors, which become 
particularly suggestive when the monarch was knelt to at the end of the play. Imbued 
with an interest in the creation of a performance of femininity The Taming of the 
Shrew takes this a step further and visibly teases out the relationship between 
performed femininity and theatrical performance. 
Many productions depict Petruchio violently overriding Katherine’s ability 
autonomously to choose her own way of life, until this new, ‘tamed’ way of life 
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becomes a second nature to her and she can choose no other. In the first 
Shakespearean ‘talkie’ (1929) Petruchio (Douglas Fairbanks) forces Katherine (Mary 
Pickford) to gesture as if she loves him until, worn down, she performs these gestures 
of her own accord. When they first meet, Fairbanks plants his hand forcibly over 
Pickford’s mouth so that she cannot speak, holding her still in such a way that, to her 
father and the other characters behind them, it appears Katherine and Petruchio are 
embracing lovingly, with Katherine obediently and happily still and silent. Later, 
Fairbanks kisses Pickford, his mouth preventing her from continuing her angry tirade 
about how little she likes him; Pickford initially struggles, but eventually falls limp 
and still.350 In cognitive terms, Petruchio compels Katherine to gesture restrainedly 
and obediently until her thought patterns alter to make these new modes of behaviour 
part of her nature. Cognitive theories of habitual action suggest that here the 
traditional distinction between Katherine’s modest behaviour as either ‘mere’ 
performance or ‘inherent’ nature dissolves: the very act of performing the role of a 
tamed wife will shape and mould Katherine’s nature.  
Some productions can be interpreted along the lines that both Katherine and 
the actor playing her are using habitual gestures to produce a performance, the same 
performance. The actor learns their role by rote, embedding their lines and gestures 
(including any moments of stillness that they need to perform) in their muscle 
memory. Katherine is forced to gesture by Petruchio in an obedient, wifely way until, 
it is implied, she begins to act like this of her own volition; it is she who first suggests 
that each wife should be ready ‘to place your hands below your husband’s foot’ 
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(5.2.177). Reviewing a 1981 production, Ralph Berry describes Katherine as a willing 
colluder in Petruchio’s financial gamble,  
 
The key is that Petruchio has won a bet, and Katherina knows it. The 
glance that Sharry Flett shot at her groom registered the point fully (‘Did 
you? Good for you! And now you can buy me another gown!’). I see no 
reason why Katherina, alone in Padua, should be untouched by the 
economic drives sustaining the community. So Kate sings for her 
supper, and very prettily too. 351 
 
Katherine’s performance for money and approval at the end of the play coincides with 
the actor’s.  
 However, The Taming of the Shrew also ruptures the fabric of this 
performance. As with Katherine’s sly, silent glance aside in the performance Berry 
describes, this play persistently explores the possibility that obedient wifely behaviour 
could be a deliberate performance rather than (as in the case of the zombie-like 
Gomez described at the start of the chapter) second nature. This is the case not least in 
the Induction when Bartholomew the page, using an onion to help himself cry 
devotedly, tricks Christopher Sly into believing he is his ‘wife in all obedience’ 
(Induction 1.2.07).  As well as being a prop to aid a theatrical performance, the onion 
is used to suggest that women are by nature performers, able to ‘command’ tears at 
will, ‘And if the boy have not a woman’s gift| To rain a shower of commanded tears,| 
An onion will do well for such a shift’ (Induction 1.124-6), Bartholomew’s onion is a 
stage property designed to enable him to create a femininity that is inherently 
performance.  
 The chain of ‘command’ does not stop with Bartholomew, or Katherine. Both 
performances of femininity are ultimately commanded not by the performer 
themselves but by others: Petruchio, the lord in the Induction, and the theatre 
audience. Just as Berry describes Katherine ‘sing[ing]’ for her supper like a theatrical 
performer, Bartholomew is told to perform femininity to gain the ‘love’ of the lord, 
who is paying his wages, 
                                                
351 Cited in H.R. Coursen, Shakespearean Performance as Interpretation (Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 1992), 62. 
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Tell him from me, as he will win my love, 
He bear himself with honourable action 
Such as he hath observ’d in noble ladies 
Unto their lords, by them accomplish’d (Induction 1.109-12) 
 
To ‘accomplish’ here means ‘to perform’, and the links between Bartholomew’s 
hammed-up ideal wifely performance and Katherine’s performance are even stronger 
when Sly and his ‘wife’ double as Petruchio and Katherine, as often occurs in 
productions; notably Michael Bogdanov’s (1978), and Gale Edwards’ (1995). 
Analogies beg to be drawn between Petruchio’s coaching of Kate to perform and the 
more overtly theatrical coaching of the page in the Induction, and also of the very 
actors who perform The Taming of the Shrew. Catherine Bates writes,  
 
When Petruchio invites Kate to imagine that the sun is the moon and so 
forth he is doing neither more nor less than the tricksy Lord who lays on 
‘The Taming of the Shrew’ in order to beguile the drunken Christopher 
Sly, and no more nor less, of course, than Shakespeare himself, who is 
all the while busy urging us to suspend our disbelief and enter into the 
theatrical illusion of his Padua …with the moral laws governing human 
sexuality temporarily suspended during courtship, the aesthetic laws 
governing art and illusion neatly step in to take their place.  
 
For Bates, The Taming of the Shrew stands out amongst all of his works for 
making visible the theatrical mechanisms behind Petruchio’s ‘building’ up of 
Katherine’s new character, 
 
In The Taming of the Shrew, Shakespeare makes the comparison 
between the two more pointedly than ever. A man orders his woman 
exactly as the artist orders his material. Here love’s labours are won in 
the same way that an audience is won, the implication being that the 
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success or failure of the one necessarily dictates the success or failure of 
the other.352 
 
Petruchio’s shaping of Katherine like the sculpture Malabou describes as inherently 
plastic is, Bates suggests, deeply bound up with the question of whether what is 
simultaneously a theatrical performance and a performance of docile femininity is 
‘successful’. Is Katherine’s final stillness legible and convincing to the audience on 
stage (the guests at the wedding feast) and off, both as a performance of docile 
femininity and as a theatrical performance? 
 Part of the way in which Shakespeare exposes this congruence between the 
theatrical and the feminine performance is by pointing to moments in which either 
performance fails. For instance, when Bartholomew appears in the character of Sly’s 
wife, one of Sly’s ‘servants’ tells Sly, ‘the tears that she hath shed for thee| Like 
envious flood o’errun her lovely face’ (Induction 1.2.64-5). Perhaps this line signals 
that Bartholomew has used too much onion and is weeping uncontrollably; if so, the 
servant’s remark both smoothes over the gap between fiction and reality and makes it 
visible by potentially creating a moment where we see the actors joking among 
themselves, as actors. More obviously, Sly threatens to puncture the fiction that 
Bartholomew is a woman by removing Bartholomew’s costume, ‘Madam undress 
you, and come now to bed’ (Induction 2.115). When the Induction is included in 
performance (it is not always; Doran cut it in 2003, for example), audiences are 
primed to see femininity as a precarious performance that can fail. Katherine and 
Bianca are first seen as players, chatting with the lord before getting into character.  
When, as in the original productions, the female characters are played by male actors, 
the ‘actorly’ quality of femininity is further underscored. The fact that the female 
characters’ restraint, which seemingly stems from innate characteristics, has been 
deliberately performed is hard to forget. 
With or without the priming effect of the Induction, Bianca’s conversion from 
the ‘maid’s mild behaviour and sobriety’ with which she wins Lucentio over to be her 
husband to her ‘headstrong’ (5.2.148) behaviour when she has achieved this aim 
                                                
352Catherine Bates, “Love and Courtship,” in Alexander Leggat, ed, The Cambridge Companion to 
Shakespearean Comedy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 118. S. Jayne focuses on the 
congruence between Sly and Petruchio, “The Dreaming of the Shrew,” Shakespeare Quarterly 17(1) 
(1966), 41-56. 
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suggests that her earlier restrained behaviour is a deliberate performance used only to 
get herself a husband. Hortensio emphasises that mild behaviour is a necessary 
bargaining chip for those in search of a husband when he tells Katherine, ‘No mates 
for you| Unless you were of gentler, milder mould’ (1.1.59-60). At the end of the play, 
Bianca refuses to come when Lucentio calls her, mocks wifely obedience as ‘foolish 
duty’, and calls him a ‘fool’ (5.2. 134, 138). George Gascoigne’s play Supposes 
(1566), a significant source for Shakespeare’s Bianca-Lucentio subplot (Lucentio 
nods to this when he refers to his use of ‘counterfeit supposes’ (5.1.117)), focuses on 
the protagonist Polynesta arranging to see her lover as much as possible whilst 
ensuring that other people ‘thoght hir a holy yong woman’, a virgin dedicated to 
chastity and obedience,  
 
Oh God, how men may be deceived in a woman? who wold have 
beleeved the contrary but that she had bin a virgin? aske the neighbours 
and you shall heare very good report of hir: marke hir behaviors & you 
would have judged hir very maidenly…353  
 
Katherine, Bianca, Petruchio, Lucentio, and Tranio all take on a disguise or affect 
behaviour to achieve a specific goal. The tension between outward behaviour and 
‘essential’ nature applies not just to Katherine, but to the whole society in which she 
lives.  
Supposes and The Taming of the Shrew are part of a genre of early modern 
plays which ask audiences to question apparent feminine virtue as not a 
straightforward contrast to shrewishness but a shrewd performance. For example, in 
Ben Jonson’s Epicene or The Silent Woman (1609), Epicene is praised for her silent, 
modest behaviour. Her seemingly-perfect performance of femininity is found to be 
pure deception when she is revealed to be a boy playing a trick. Offhand remarks in 
this play, such as ‘silence in woman is like speech in man’ (2.3.111) and Truewit’s 
incredulous ‘Can he endure no noise, and will venture on a wife?’ (1.2.19-20) suggest 
                                                
353 George Gascoigne, “Supposes” (first performed 1566), in The Whole Workes, 2nd edn (London: 
Abell Ieffes, 1587), 3. 4.40-9. Schuler supports the notion of Bianca as a shrew, quoting the proverb 
‘the white devil is worse than the black’, “Bewitching the Shrew,” 420.  
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both that minimal speech and gesture are ideals for women, and that women tend not 
to meet these ideals.354  
In performance, the gap between Bianca’s seemingly ‘silent’ and ‘modest’ 
nature and her real ‘headstrong’ self can be made explicit for an audience from the 
outset, by means of asides, and sharp contrasts in her behaviour when she thinks 
Lucentio is watching and her behaviour when she believes herself to be alone. Eve 
Myles’ Bianca at the Royal Shakespeare Theatre in 2003 presented an earnestly 
modest and obedient demeanour to the other characters, but revealed her more cynical 
thoughts in gestural asides to the audience. At one point, for instance, she seemed to 
swoon delightedly when kissing Lucentio then turned and grimaced to the audience, 
shoving her fingers into her mouth to indicate ‘he makes me sick’.355 In Franco 
Zeffirelli’s 1967 film version, when Natasha Pyne’s Bianca believes no-one can see 
her she screams wildly, threatening Kate with a balled-up fist so frantically that she 
has to be restrained. However, when Bianca realises that Lucentio is watching, she 
stops abruptly, places a hand on her breast, stands still and says softly to her father, 
‘sir, to your pleasure humbly I subscribe’. Gasping slightly as she sees Lucentio, Pyne 
leaves no doubt that her restrained gestures and protestations of obedience are merely 
an act to serve her plan to seduce him. Caught momentarily unawares, Pyne’s Bianca 
registers the gap between performance and reality; catching Pyne’s Bianca at the 
moment her performance of restrained femininity falters, audiences are alerted to the 
gaps in this performance, the intentionality behind a seemingly innate restraint.356 
 Bianca’s ability to affect quiet, restrained behaviour, and to put this behaviour 
aside when she wishes, suggests that Katherine’s own modest, restrained movements 
and words when she presents herself as ‘tamed’ in the final scenes of the play may 
likewise be a deliberate performance. Katherine’s silence at the end of the play draws 
on a rich seam of early modern debate about whether obedient wifely behaviour was a 
deliberate performance rather than a manifestation of a woman’s essential nature (or 
her ‘second nature’ laid down by habit). Being a ‘second nature’ did not necessarily 
mean that restraint was undesirable. The model wife Eulalia in a popular translation of 
                                                
354  Ben Jonson, “Epicene,” in The Alchemist and Other Plays, ed. Gordon Campbell (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995). 
355 The Taming of the Shrew, by William Shakespeare, directed by Gregory Doran, Royal Shakespeare 
Theatre, Stratford Upon Avon, August 21 2003. 
356 Zeffirelli, The Taming of the Shrew. 
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Erasmus’ A mery dialogue, declaringe the propertyes of shrowde shrewes, and honest 
wyues (1557), for instance, uses deliberate ‘craftes’ to please her husband.357  
Eulalia’s obedient words and gestures are consciously performed to further her ends 
of having a quiet life and a happy, strife-free marriage.  
Pyne can draw, and Myles drew, laughter from audiences as Bianca exposes 
the deliberate thought behind her seemingly-thoughtless docility. In extreme cases, 
failure to maintain appropriate types of stillness can draw attention to the actor’s body 
in ways that puncture the fictional world of the play itself. The awkward silences 
when an actor forgets their lines, or the involuntary movements and noises when 
actors laugh or slip over inappropriately are known as ‘corpsing’ because they ‘kill’ 
that actor’s character.358 One example of such an incident involves John Philip 
Kemble; famously afflicted with a cough throughout much of his career, a 
contemporary account notes that, ‘Mr Kemble once playing Macbeth, whilst he 
suffered from a violent cold, actually coughed after his decease’, ruining the play.359 
The uncertainty of whether ‘his’ refers to Kemble or Macbeth highlights the absurdity 
of this event. If the cough belongs to Macbeth, Macbeth has wondrously managed to 
cough after dying. When it is recognised as Kemble’s cough, however, the actor’s 
                                                
357 Desiderius Erasmus, A Mery Dialogue, Declaryinge the Properties of Shrowde Shrewes and Honest 
Wyves, trans. John Rastell (London: J. Cawood, 1557), A6v. Eulalia lists these ‘craftes’, for instance 
(A7r) ‘yf my husband wer very sad at anye tyme, no time to speake to him. I laughed not nor tryfled 
him as many a woman doth but I looked rufully and heauyly’. 
358 Nicholas Ridout argues, ‘The moment of laughter annihilates the represented being, leaving the 
performer alone on stage, helpless, with nothing to fall back on, nothing to do, no one to be’, Stage 
Fright: Animals and Other Theatrical Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 134. 
359 James Saunders, “Macbeth’s Cold,” in Collections on Macbeth and Other Plays, Saunders 
Collection ER1/88-89, Shakespeare Centre Library and Archive, 88r. A local antiquary, Saunders filled 
51 volumes with transcriptions of historical documents and anecdotes from popular newspapers, and 
his own paintings of historical monuments and people; his son Henry Caulfield Saunders presented 
them to the Royal Shakespearean Club in 1849 and the Club placed them in the Shakespeare’s 
Birthplace Archive after its restoration in 1862. Robert Bearman, “Captain James Saunders of 
Stratford-upon-Avon: a local antiquary,” Dugdale Society Occasional Papers 33 (Hertford: Stephen 
Austin and Sons, 1990), 10, 29-35; Robert Bearman, emails to the author September 8-14, 2012. Amy 
Hurst, Collections Archivist at the Shakespeare Birthplace Trust helped with me further context on 
various occasions in July-September 2012. Kemble’s ‘habitual cough’ is mentioned several times in 
James Boaden’s Memoirs of the Life of John Philip Kemble (Philadelphia: Robert Small, 1825), 140, 
346. 
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body obtrudes into the play, destroying the illusion that Macbeth is lying there dead. 
Ironically, this example of ‘corpsing’ revives a corpse: Kemble’s cough ‘kills’ the 
illusion that there is such a character as Macbeth by making Macbeth seem to live 
when he ought to be dead. An involuntary, explosive body movement exposes, even 
as it troubles, the deliberate restraint involved in performing stillness on the stage. 
The fissures between performance and reality, the innate and the deliberately-
assumed, in The Taming of the Shrew are built into the play-text, though surely it is 
not unknown for actors to corpse during productions of this play. I suggest that 
Shakespeare deliberately makes the performer’s intentionality visible at various 
moments in The Taming of the Shrew (whether the performer is a character playing a 
part, or the actor themself) in order to create moments that are, as Baumbach puts it, 
cognitively ‘fascinating’. 
 
Staging audience attention: cognitive theories of fascination 
We are drawn to the gaps that show the performer behind the performance in The 
Taming of the Shrew. Bianca’s shrewd asides belie Lucentio’s naive appraisal of her 
character, but give audiences a glimpse of her ‘true’ nature. Bartholomew’s actorly 
and ‘wifely’ fear at Sly’s insistence that he undress is more straightforwardly 
metatheatrical: the actor is here worried that his performance might be (literally) 
exposed as something unreal. These moments where restrained behaviour is seen to 
be a deliberate act expose the differences between characters’ and actors’ cognition. 
The difference between the performer’s deep cognitive engagement with staying still 
and their almost involuntary habituation to performing stillness on stage, and the 
characters’ appropriation of restrained gesture to deliberately construct a seemingly 
innate docility, have the power to fascinate us. Cognitive studies of fascination link 
fascination intrinsically with both the stillness of the image that fascinates, and the 
stillness of the spectator who is fascinated by that image. Just as audiences were 
invited to pause and take in Garrick’s tableaux vivants, Baumbach describes the 
petrified Medusa as a ‘fascinating image, as well as...an image of fascination’; 
fascinated by stillness, we become still when we are fascinated. Baubach adds that 
‘the intensity of the relation between...spectator and spectacle’ ‘becomes blurred’ 
during this moment of mutual stillness. 360 She writes, 
                                                
360 Baumbach, “Medusa’s Gaze,” 229-30. 
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The Medusa image can be applied to capture the moment of fascination, which 
freezes the senses in an encounter the unfamiliar or beautiful, holding the 
viewer in a state of uncertainty, rapt in the desire to know “more”. It is this 
tension, this in-between-ness at the instant of fascination, between self and 
other, which constitutes the “Medusa effect”, a temporary paralysis of the 
reader or spectator as an aesthetic event that is petrifying, yet not lethal, 
preserving without effacing its object.361 
 
Baumbach suggests that fascination is a measure of how successful a work of art is; 
whilst for Bates the blurred boundary between actor, author, and character is at the 
heart of The Taming of the Shrew, Baumbach’s work suggests that we ought to 
interrogate the relationship between audience, actor, and character as well.362 This is 
something that Laurie Maguire has already done with Othello. Maguire describes 
Othello as, essentially, an actor as he tells Desdemona his life story and how, listening 
with rapt attention, ‘Desdemona blurs the storyteller and the story told; she confuses 
the character and the actor.’ This reading of Desdemona’s fascinated attention as she 
clings to Othello enables Maguire to reconfigure the way that the play is inderstood; 
though ‘It is customary to view Othello as a play about Self and Other’, she writes, ‘I 
am suggesting that it understands these categories as theatrical rather than racial: that 
the plot originates not in a white woman marrying a black man, but in an audience 
member falling in love with an actor-character’.363 
 A group of cognitive scholars at Mainz University lead by Richard Hill are 
currently studying literary fascination, loosely defining ‘literary fascination’ as an 
especially focused engagement with a particular object on stage or in a literary 
narrative. Hill’s laboratory studies indicate that humans use their ‘current best 
prediction’ to create a rough scheme for understanding the causal structure of the 
world and hone, refine, and adapt this scheme in response to new perceptual data. 
Occurrences or objects that are out of the ordinary, beyond human comprehension, or 
particularly threatening excite fascinated attention. This kind of attention attempts to 
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reduce surprises in the future; fixating on unusual objects enables people to 
understand them and incorporate them into their future predictions about how the 
world works.364 As Baumbach puts it, we are fascinated by objects that ‘defy 
description or classification’, and it is only once this unusual object has been 
processed and understood that its ‘spell’ can be broken.365 The stunned silence of 
audience members shocked by, and attempting to comprehend, the appearance of 
Lavinia in Titus Andronicus ‘her hands cut off, and her tongue cut out, and ravished’ 
(SD before 4.1.1) is one example of fascination. In explicitly exceeding the tortures 
suffered by her Ovidian precedent Philomel (who only had her tongue cut out by her 
attacker Tereus, whereas Chiron and Demetreius are ‘a craftier Tereus’ 2.3.41), 
Lavinia’s appearance causes audiences to re-evaluate their previous models of literary 
horror. Lavinia appears as a grotesque literalisation of contemporary ideals of still and 
silent femininity, her cut off tongue and hands are marks of violent control and male 
denial of her autonomy. 
 Characters frequently pause to watch each other’s behaviour in The Taming of 
the Shrew, and they are most fascinated when a gap between performance and reality 
becomes visible. Katherine and Petruchio stand still to watch this gap when the 
Pedant (who has been pretending to be Tranio’s father as Tranio pretends to be 
Lucentio) confronts the real Lucentio’s real father, ‘Kate, let’s stand aside and see the 
end of this controversy’ (5.1.61-2).  The characters’ fascination at events like these 
will also tend to be shared by audiences; actors’ conscious, careful cognitive 
engagement in the act of staying still and silent invites a similar engagement from the 
audience. The ways in which audiences engaged with plays will have changed over 
time, in response to changes in acting styles, from Garrick’s tableaux vivants to the 
implicit equation of Katherine with a gestureless inflated sex doll in the RSC’s 2009 
production with Gomez. Audiences might share the characters’ shock at a shrewish 
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woman, or a woman who has lost her autonomy, at a disrupted wedding ceremony, or 
at a beautiful Bianca.  
Intriguingly, in her article on Medusa’s gaze, Baumbach associates fascination 
with the demonic and with deception, two features commonly associated with 
Katherine and/or Bianca. Several moments in the play where Bianca is at her most 
deceptive, and Katherine or Petruchio at their most subversively demonic are 
accompanied by descriptions of the fascination their actions provoke. The Taming of 
the Shrew stages moments of fascination at several points in the play when characters 
pause, struck by unexpected or socially-inappropriate sights. Bent on a life of lonely 
study, for instance, Lucentio is astounded to behold beautiful Bianca. He stops and 
stares at her as his future plans are rapidly updated to incorporate this new encounter; 
‘mum [i.e. silence], and gaze your fill’ (1.1.73), Tranio advises him. Lucentio falls in 
love with Bianca whist he stands still and stares at her, ‘while idly I stood looking on,| 
I found the effect of love in idleness’ (1.1.149-51). Bianca does not drown out 
Katherine by talking but rather by her fascinating ‘silence’, 
 
TRANIO:  Mark’d you not how her sister 
  Began to scold, and raise up such a storm 
  That mortal ears might hardly ensure the din? 
LUCENTIO:  Tranio, I saw her coral lips to move, 
  And with her breath she did perfume the air. 
  Sacred and sweet was all I saw in her. 
TRANIO:  Nay, then ‘tis time to stir him from his trance, 
  I pray, awake sir (1.1.171-7) 
 
In a ‘trance’ and not ‘stir[ring]’, Lucentio is clearly fascinated. He sees Bianca’s lips 
moving and smells her sweet breath (employing, like Othello, images of figuratively 
sweet breath to suggest idealised femininity) but he does not hear anything she says. 
In his mind, she is thus the perfect woman: beautiful, holy, and docile. Tranio’s 
suggestion that Lucentio is asleep fits the fact that what Lucentio sees in Bianca is 
more a wishful dream than a reality. 
When Petruchio arrives at his own wedding transgressively attired in an 
extravagantly shabby manner, Baptista and the other characters are shocked to behold 
this ‘eye-sore’ (3.2.101); Petruchio’s lines make it clear that they have paused to view 
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him in amazement, ‘wherefore gaze this goodly company,| As if they saw some 
wondrous monument’ (3.2.94-5). The early modern word ‘monument’ has 
connotations of intense, absorbed thought: to ‘monument’ something was to 
remember or record it, and a ‘monument’ was any document or object devoted to 
commemorating something.366 The word thus in general related intense thought, and 
significant cognitive acts of memory, to a motionless object. However, in 
Shakespeare’s works, the word ‘monument’ is almost always contrasted with a living 
body, and has connotations of stillness where thought and feeling are absent. In All’s 
Well That Ends Well, for instance, Bertram tells Diana that she is nothing but a 
monument if she is not inspired to lust and affection  
 
If quick fire of youth light not your mind 
You are no maiden but a monument 
When you are dead, you should be such a one 
As you are not, for you are cold and stern (4.2.5-8). 
 
Quick and lively thought and emotion are contrasted with the unfeeling, unmoving 
body.367 A Shakespearean ‘monument’, then, could be a site where cognition is 
particularly absent, or where it is particularly and intensely present, much as in 
cognitive theory stillness can signify both profound and detailed thought and 
restricted, even absent thought. 
Katherine’s transgression of social expectations with her shrewish behaviour makes 
her an object of fascination both for other characters and for audience members; both 
her absence of restraint and her new restrained nature or clever performance at the end 
of the play can cause us to pause in fascination. Mary Pickford’s first appearance as 
Katherine establishes her as an object of fascinated attention. Initially, only the effects 
of Katherine’s presence are seen; the camera cuts chaotically between shots of people 
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fleeing her desperately and hiding wherever they can, a cat leaping onto a cornice to 
escape her, mirrors smashing as she throws projectiles, chairs whizzing through the 
air, and terrified people toppling down the stairs that lead to her room. This episode 
invites the audience to anticipate eagerly the extraordinarily terrifying and physically 
powerful source of the chaos. Then, the camera moves up the stairs, sweeping slowly 
over the wreckage, increasing the suspense, and finally rests on Pickford, eyes wide 
with fury, glamorous with her deep red lips and elaborate outfit, breathing heavily 
with exertion but not otherwise still. The camera lingers on Pickford as if it is itself 
fascinated by her, inviting to pause and take stock of this revelation.368 Jennifer 
Waldron has shown that Renaissance antitheatricalists such as Gosson were 
particularly suspicious of the lustful fascination prompted by performed femininity, 
which left audiences ‘gaping on plays’. She explains that for antitheatricalists, 
fascination was ‘a sensory mode that arrests the viewer’s judgement as it ravishes the 
body with carnal pleasures’.369 
In The Taming of the Shrew, fascination works in several ways. Firstly, 
characters’ fascination on stage reproduces the fascination of audiences. Both 
characters on stage and the theatre audience gape in amazement at Petruchio’s 
outlandish wedding gear, for instance. However, audiences are invited not just to look 
at Petruchio, but to look and listen at the characters commenting on him, to observe 
them gaping, standing stock still. Thus, an audience member also sees a reflection of 
themselves, the fascinated subject, on stage. This awareness enables a critique of the 
performances: how well is the actor performing? Are they betraying themselves by 
coughing, blinking, or visibly breathing? 370 Finally, when their attention is drawn to 
Christopher Sly – as he comments on the play, then very visibly fails to be fascinated 
by it as he falls asleep and expresses his wish, ‘Would it were done!’ (1.1.349-54) – 
the audience remembers that the events they see on stage are fictional. The Induction 
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establishes that The Taming of the Shrew is in fact a play staged by itinerant players 
for Christopher Sly and his attendants, who sit on stage (originally, they were 
probably on the onstage balcony, ‘above’ the stage (SD after 1.1.348)) and 
occasionally comment on the play. On the one hand, by placing this fictional audience 
on stage, the play draws attention to the ways in which the roles of audience and 
characters overlap as fascinated characters replicate and reflect the audience’s 
fascinated attention. On the other hand, Sly’s interjections disrupt the attention the 
audience pays to the events on stage, causing audience members to replicate his own 
inability to focus on the play. 
Several modern performances have underscored Sly’s role as both a fictional 
character and an audience member by attempting to create uncertainty as to whether 
Sly is a genuine audience member or an actor engaging in a scripted performance. In 
Bogdanov’s landmark 1978 RSC production, for instance, the play began with Sly 
emerging rowdily from a seat in the stalls. Front of House staff members threatened to 
throw him out or to call the police. There was a scuffle over whether Sly had a ticket 
or not (‘It’s alright, my mate’s got my ticket’), until he finally moved onto the stage to 
perform the Induction.371 This modern performance enabled a deeper understanding 
of Sly’s role by drawing out his relationship to the audience. The issue over whether 
Sly in fact has a ticket to the play highlighted his ambiguous role: was he like a 
member of the audience (who should have got a ticket) or was he an actor? 
Bogdanov’s production also highlighted a significant aspect of the text: the way that, 
with Sly, Shakespeare stages the idea of (in)appropriate audience behaviour. 
Sly’s inappropriate behaviour during the play (as he falls asleep and proclaims 
that he wishes the play was already over) draws attention by contrast to the 
playwright’s and actors’ desire for an audience to be still and silent in a way that 
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begins by misunderstanding the other characters’ archaic vocabulary (‘GRIFFIN: What raiment will 
your honour wear today?| SLY: Not Raymond, Christopher’ (9r)) until phrases like ‘hither’ and 
‘goodly’ (12r) begin to slip from his mouth. 
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signals not disinterest but fascinated attention. The audience’s stilless and silence is a 
kind of performance dictated by social constraints particular to their historical context. 
P.A. Skantze provides interesting material on women in early modern audiences 
having to force themselves not to laugh at ribald jokes on stage in order to give the 
(often completely false) impression that they did not understand a word of what was 
being said, for example.372 As we have seen, when audience members do move, those 
movements are often significant with respect to the performance on stage. Audiences 
craning to see Caesar fall engage the vertical axes of their bodies in the high-low 
metaphoric structure of Julius Caesar. Audiences fainting at performances of Titus 
Andronicus, on the other hand, threaten to upstage the action on the stage. But, the 
most mild and modest audiences, as well as actors and many characters, must be 
cognitively engaged in the act of staying still. 
 
Conclusions 
The link that is so often assumed between external bodily signs and states of mind is 
what enables stillness to be legible in performances of The Taming of the Shrew. 
However, it is not entirely legible, and remains partly ambiguous and mystifying, 
precisely because this link is also questioned and destabilised by performance. 
Stillness is not always an expression of essential(ised) nature as both actors and 
characters in this play appropriate stillness for the purposes of playing fictional, 
feigned roles. Stillness is part of a repertoire of behaviour central both to Katherine’s 
role as a tamed early modern wife and to the actor’s art in creating her character. The 
moment of textual silence in Act 5, where the text leaves it uncertain whether 
Katherine behaves with wifely ‘silence’ and ‘stillness’ and obeys Petruchio’s 
command to put her hand under his foot emphasises the ability of both the character 
of Katherine and the actor playing her to create a variety of meanings and hints of 
intention through still, restrained gestures and behaviour. Thereby, it draws the actor’s 
body to the audience’s attention, enabling the distinction between character and actor 
both to become visible and visibly to dissolve. The question of whether Katherine is 
‘truly’ tamed or ‘just’ performing becomes moot: as Erasmus’ Eulalia shows, 
tamedness necessarily includes elements of performance whilst performance can 
eventually become a person’s real second nature.  
                                                
372 Skantze, Stillness in Motion, 142.  
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Paying attention to moments of stillness illustrates Shakespeare’s interest not 
only in gesture but in the limits of gesture. The other chapters in this thesis, exploring 
how gestures can embody meaning, suggest that Shakespeare is most interested in 
moments when gestures conceal meaning, or fail to embody the meanings for which 
they are normally used. For example, the first chapter showed that Shakespeare pays 
closest attention to the gesture of taking hands in Titus Andronicus, but in this play 
handclasps are subverted so that they are no longer a gesture of amity and frank 
exchange of minds but a manipulative, deceptive exchange of objects. The fact that 
marked pauses or hesitations in gesture are so important to Shakespeare throughout 
his career bears witness to his wider interest in the limitations of gesture as a bearer of 
stable meanings and his attention to the significant ways that gesture can fail to 
signify. Shakespeare also favours gestures that point to their own artifice: severed 
hands that can only be false, kneeling gestures that are performed with potentially 
insidious intent, kisses involving heavenly scents that audience members cannot smell 
and which exist only in Othello’s lines.  In The Taming of the Shrew, restrained 
gestures point more profoundly to the specifically theatrical mechanisms behind the 
appropriation of stillness in order to create a character, prompting us to take 
Bartholomew’s, Bianca’s, and (potentially) Katherine’s performances of restrained 
femininity with a pinch of salt. 
This chapter’s discussion of the importance of restraint to Shakespearean 
acting, and in particular of moments of restrained or refused gesture as moments 
where the relationship between actor and character is most fruitfully scrutinised, lays 
the foundation for the examination of held-back gestures in the final thesis chapter. 
The problem of stillness in stage deaths, illustrated by the above anecdote of 
‘Macbeth’s Cold’ shows how difficult maintaining the illusion of realistic violence 
and death can be on stage. The final chapter examines how Shakespeare 
simultaneously dissolves and makes visible the gaps between the world of the play 
and the ‘real’ world of actors, scripts, and deliberate gestures when it comes to stage 
violence in Hamlet. 
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Chapter 5 
‘Actions that a man might play’: Hamlet and simulated stage violence 
 
Introduction 
When Laertes poisons his sharpened fencing foil to kill Hamlet, he emphasises the 
fact that Hamlet’s death will involve lightness of touch and minimal contact. Laertes 
will give only the very tip of his sword the merest touch of poison, ‘I’ll touch my 
point| With this contagion, that if I gall him slightly,| It may be death’ (4.7.146-8). 
Laertes imagines simply chafing or breaking the surface of Hamlet’s skin (two 
contemporary meanings of ‘to gall’).373 He further stresses the lack of energetic 
violence needed in this final duel, stating that Hamlet may ‘be but scratch’d withal’ 
and he will die (4.7.146). This careful framing has a significant effect on the way that 
stage violence in Hamlet is imagined by audiences, readers, and actors. It also has an 
effect on the way that Hamlet and Laertes’ final duel can be acted, because it relieves 
the actors from the need to simulate violent, bloody mortal combat. This chapter will 
examine how in this way the final duel between Hamlet and Laertes closes the gap 
between character and actor.  
Critics are well attuned to the collapsible boundary between performance and 
reality in Hamlet. This is examined, for instance, by Peter Platt in Shakespeare and 
the Culture of Paradox, which is discussed later in the chapter. This chapter reviews 
the relationship between performance and reality in order to think through its 
implications for cognitive studies. My aim here is to use a cognitive approach to this 
performance-reality boundary to show how theatrical cognitive studies of violence 
can be. As we shall see, cognitive theorists often talk, like early modern texts on 
theatre do, of ‘scripts’, acting and (dis)simulation. The chapter will examine and 
explain the close links between the theatre and the cognitive theorist’s laboratory as 
experimental spaces. This thesis asks not only what cognitive theory can tell us about 
Shakespeare, but also what Shakespeare can tell us about cognitive theory. The 
suggestive similarity between the theatre and the cognitive laboratory suggests that 
theatrical methods of pretence, dissimulation, affect and acting can help cognitive 
theorists to understand how humans behave, and particularly how and why they 
behave aggressively.   
                                                
373 O.E.D., ‘gall, v1, 1, 3. 
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At the end of Hamlet the characters’ and actors’ intentions—fighting with 
light touches—become almost the same. By implication, the character’s and actor’s 
cognitive processes are much more similar here than in bloodier types of stage 
violence filled with thumping blows and huge slashing, stabbing movements. In these 
bloodier types of stage violence, characters are trying their hardest fatally to wound 
each other and actors (generally) are trying their hardest to do the opposite and not 
harm each other too much at all. As this chapter shows, Hamlet (1599-1602) is a 
particularly pointed example of a general Shakespearean interest in around 1599-1602 
in staging violence that is restrained and limited. The motif of light touches in 
Shakespeare’s plays which this chapter goes on to discuss are, as Marjorie O’Rourke 
Boyle has shown in her book Senses of Touch, part of a wider Renaissance interest in 
‘delicate’ touches between humans, and between the human and the divine. O’Rourke 
Boyle’s work relates back to chapter 1’s discussion of the handclasp in Titus 
Andronicus as (reflecting the Aristotelian description of the hand as ‘the instrument of 
instruments’ that was so popular in the Renaissance), she shows that the hand related 
uniquely to human ‘dignity’, creativity and piety.374 The present chapter reflects on, 
and brings to a conclusion, the ideas about touching, restraint, representation, and 
olfaction in the previous chapters. Discourses of part-olfactory part-mental 
‘contagion’ stand in place of actual physical contact, and a restrained gesture becomes 
the point where the boundary between representation and reality once more dissolves. 
 Unlike kisses and handshakes, which can be performed on stage with as much 
skin contact as we expect from ‘real’ kisses and handshakes offstage, stage punches 
and sword thrusts often involve encouraging the viewer to imagine bodily contact that 
in fact is not enacted. Staged fights-to-the-death are usually moments when actors’ 
and characters’ intentions diverge. As we have seen, whilst one or both characters are 
trying their hardest to harm the other, the actors are trying hard not to really hurt each 
other at all. The gap between actors’ bodies as characters supposedly make violent 
contact with each other becomes a widening gap between fiction and reality. When 
audiences can see actors slapping their own wrists instead of each other’s faces, or 
                                                
374 For a discussion of the ‘delicate’ touch of God, for instance, see Marjorie O’Rourke Boyle, Senses 
of Touch: Human Dignity and Deformity from Michaelangelo to Calvin (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 202. In 
terms of literary (including Shakespearean) texts, O’Rourke Boyle links lightness of touch in particular 
to discourses about female simplicity and fragility thanks to the sensuality and dexterity of the female 
hand (see for instance 165).  
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smacking swords onto the stage-floor as their opponent pretends that the sword has 
wounded them, the fiction that the action on stage involves two people wounding and 
killing each other is punctured. The device of the poisoned foil in Hamlet both 
acknowledges and masks the difference between actors and characters because a 
slight graze can be simulated realistically without endangering the actors. Thus, 
during this stage fight there is little divergence between what the actors are doing and 
what they appear to be doing; both actors and characters are fencing and only 
touching each other lightly.  
Early modern audiences expected a realistic fight, and early modern actors 
needed fencing to be included among their skills. The clown Richard Tarlton, member 
of Shakespeare’s company, was awarded the title Master of Fence in 1587, for 
example.375 This made the stakes particularly high when it came to ensuring no harm 
was done to the actors whilst characters truly appeared to be fighting to the death. 
Edelman’s research into Shakespearean stage fighting reveals a strong ‘association of 
Shakespearean theatre with skilful fencing’. Elizabethan playhouses were used for 
fencing competitions, thus as the Globe ‘was not only a theatre but a prizefighting 
arena...anything less than a totally verisimilar fight would have been laughed off the 
stage’.376 ‘Fictional’ fights between Shakespearean characters could cause real 
damage to the actor’s bodies, ‘Even though stage weaponry would have been bated, 
strong blows to the body had (and have) to be given, causing serious injury to the 
actor unless he is well-protected’.377 Terry King, fight director for Gregory Doran’s 
2008 RSC Hamlet, argues that, compared to the mass brawls of Shakespeare’s 
histories, the duel in Hamlet is set up so that it has to be particularly realistic and 
convincing as it involves just two opponents, 
                                                
375 Peter Thomson, “Tarlton, Richard (d. 1588),” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, accessed 
January 3 2015, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/26971. 
376 Edelman, Brawl Ridiculous, 6-7. The detailed descriptions in many fencing manuals could easily be 
read as a set of moves to be mimicked on stage, such as this passage in George Silver’s popular treatise 
(which draws in another form of entertainment with close links to theatre: ‘dauncing’), ‘if a blow be 
made at the left side of the head, a verie small turning of the wrist with the knuckles downward, 
defendeth that side of the head and bodie, and the point of the Rapier much indangereth the hand, arme, 
face or bodie of the striker: and if anie thrust be made, the wards, by reason of the indirections in 
mouing the feet in maner of dauncing, as aforesaid, maketh a perfect ward, and still withall the point 
greatly endangereth the other’, Paradoxes of Defence (London: Richard Field, 1599), C3v. 
377 Edelman, Brawl Ridiculous, 30. 
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The biggest challenge in Hamlet is that there is nothing to distract 
attention from the fights. Arranging big fight scenes with lots of people 
on stage does present its own problems, but it also means that the 
swordplay doesn’t have to be very clever, because your eyes are 
constantly being pulled all around the stage. In Hamlet there is a lot of 
focus on just two people fighting, they are the centre of attention.378  
 
The device of the poisoned foil means that Laertes and Hamlet’s final duel can bear 
this scrutiny, as it is not difficult to make a slight graze look realistic. Moreover, 
Shakespeare dramatises the act of watching on stage as Claudius and Osric observe 
the duel closely and describe what is happening aloud. Claudius commands, ‘you the 
judges bear a wary eye’ (5.2.279). Osric, whose job it is to record the ‘hits’ is usually 
depicted as the main judge in performance, but Claudius’ later comments, and his 
personal interest in seeing if Laertes manages to wound and thus poison Hamlet, 
means that he too is almost always depicted as watching the fight very closely. This 
relieves the audience from the need to scrutinise the fight-scene visually, as Claudius 
and Osric are scrutinising it for them; the audience are encouraged to follow the 
action of the fight through characters’ verbal descriptions as Osric notes when each 
‘hit[s]’ the other. Claudius distracts the audience further from scrutinising the fight by 
performing several attention-grabbing actions during the duel: poisoning the cup, 
enticing Hamlet to take a sip, and reacting with horror when Gertrude prepares to 
drink from it. In Roger Mitchell’s 1987 RSC production Osric circled downstage and 
Claudius upstage,379 occluding the fight from the audience’s gaze even as they gave 
the impression that it was being carefully scrutinised. In Michael Boyd’s 2004 RSC 
production, Claudius (Clive Wood) circled Hamlet and Laertes watching them all the 
time.380 Wood drew attention to the wine cup at a crucial moment; he only poisoned it 
                                                
378 Terry King, in Programme, Hamlet, by William Shakespeare, directed by Gregory Doran (Royal 
Shakespeare Company, 2008), 4r. 
379 ‘Osric circles DS as they play; C circles US as they play’, Prompt Book, Hamlet, by William 
Shakespeare, directed by Roger Mitchell, Royal Shakespeare Theatre, 1987, Shakespeare Centre 
Library and Archive. 
380 ‘Ham + Laertes fight as Claudius circles’, “Supplementary Prompt Book (moves only),” Hamlet, by 
William Shakespeare, directed by Michael Boyd, Royal Shakespeare Theatre, 2004, Shakespeare 
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when Hamlet seemed to be about to win, and thus distracted the audience’s attention 
from the stage fight just as it got most intense.381 Careful staging and plotting make 
the duel ‘a verisimilar fight’. 
The chapter on taking hands established that touches in Shakespeare’s plays 
are often imagined and figurative; described rather than, or as well as, physically felt 
with the skin. Much of the touching in Hamlet’s final fight sequence also happens 
through language. When Osric notes ‘a very palpable hit’ (5.2.281), he redoubles the 
idea of touching inherent in ‘hit’ as ‘palpable’ derives from Latin ‘palpabilis’, ‘that 
which may be touched’. Osric’s word ‘palpable’ also extends the idea of touching 
from a literal ‘hit’ to a touch that is imagined, as ‘palpable’ also had the wider 
figurative sense of something that is ‘sensed’ or ‘felt’ with the mind.382 As the chapter 
on kissing showed, the vocabulary of touching and smelling was often used to 
indicate mental influence in the early modern era and in particular was a common way 
of envisaging the ways that people could be influenced by each other at the theatre. 
Laertes links the touch of his sword to olfaction and airborne contamination by 
describing the poison as a ‘contagion’, which derives from the Latin con-tangere, ‘to 
touch together’. Hamlet is the first recorded usage for both the literal and figurative 
meanings of ‘contagion’: a disease passed on by touching, or a pernicious mental 
influence. The Oxford English Dictionary lists Laertes’ use of ‘contagion’ to mean 
‘poison’ as the first usage of this concrete meaning of contagion, and Hamlet’s image 
of hell ‘breath[ing] forth…contagion’ from graves (3.2.389-90) as the first figurative 
usage. ‘Contagion’ could also simply mean ‘influence’.383 When Laertes states that he 
will merely ‘touch’ the ‘point’ of his sword with ‘contagion’, the word ‘contagion’ 
completely overturns the minimal, highly localised physical contact implied by 
‘touch’ and ‘point’ (which conjure up an image of Laertes just dabbing the sharp point 
of a sword with some poison). The word ‘contagion’ turns this dabbing gesture into 
an action that suggests a spreading infection that has a broad effect that is both 
physical and psychological. As well as spreading to infect Hamlet, this contagion 
spreads to infect Claudius and Laertes himself when Hamlet turns the sword against 
                                                                                                                                       
Centre Library and Archive. An accompanying sketch shows Claudius’ trajectory. 
381 Archival Recording, Hamlet, by William Shakespeare, directed by Michael Boyd, Royal 
Shakespeare Theatre, September 23 2004, Shakespeare Centre Library and Archive. 
382 O.E.D., ‘palpable’, adj, 1, 3-4. 
383 O.E.D., ‘contagion’, n, 3 b, c, 4.  
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them. Moreover, the sight of this stage violence has the power potentially to ‘infect’ 
audience’s minds with violent, fearful, or aggressive thoughts. Poised at a crucial 
moment in a play where language becomes violent and tangible in unprecedented 
ways, Laertes’ sword is tipped with a particularly theatrical poison, which 
persuasively influences audiences to imagine that they are seeing a fight to the death. 
From 1662 onwards, ‘contagion’ developed a specifically olfactory meaning, 
‘stench’.384 Jan Klata’s rendering of the duel in 2013-14 brought together these ideas 
of olfaction and touches, as Hamlet (Dimitrij Schaad) and Laertes (Ronny Miersch) 
did not aim blows or draw blood at all. Instead, the duel focused on them invading 
each other’s personal space; one fight-move involved Schaad pushing his head under 
Miersch’s T-shirt which was transparent with sweat and gurning through the fabric at 
the audience.385 Schaad’s gesture here, by transforming a scene of stage violence into 
one which focuses on touch and olfaction, drew (probably implicitly, or unwittingly) 
on the link between touching and olfaction which, chapters 1 and 3 showed, are 
central to early modern conceptions of how theatre affected the audience. By drawing 
attention to the fact that Miersch had sweated so much that his top was transparent, 
and by performing a comic, almost gentle, gesture instead of a stabbing one that drew 
blood, Schaad’s gesture also drew explicitly on the conditions of performance, where 
actors sweated with the exertion of performing their roles and where real violence was 
not permitted, only touches that did not wound. The previous chapter discussed early 
modern discourses of the theatre as a site of olfactory contagion, where audiences 
could be influenced by plays as if by airborne diseases or drugs. That chapter 
reframed Renaissance ideas of the subconscious influence of olfaction in a cognitive 
light. The current chapter examines this idea of influence from a different angle, by 
looking specifically at cognitive theories of violence and empathy, and in particular at 
what it means for audiences and actors to be ‘touched’ by a fictional story to such an 
extent that they experience real aggressive or fearful thoughts and feelings.  
Cognitive material dealing with audiences’ reactions to theatrical stage 
violence is scarce. However, there exists a wealth of studies into the effects of film 
and videogame violence on cognition, with many studies finding that, despite the fact 
that videogames are more interactive than films (encouraging gamers to shoot ‘first 
                                                
384 O.E.D., ‘contagion’, n, 6. 
385 Hamlet, Klata. 
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person’ style for example), they both have several similarities when it comes to 
producing violent thoughts. Films and games tend to be specifically designed to 
produce a cognitive, chemical response in viewers and players, increasing the 
production of hormones associated with excitement, fear, and anger like adrenaline. 
As Hollywood stuntman Hal Needham writes, ‘When people see my movies, I want 
to get their adrenaline flowing; if I don’t, I haven’t done my job’.386 In a 1998 
cognitive study of violent films and games, the psychologist Brad Bushman makes the 
connection between media violence and chemical affect particularly immediate by 
describing films as a ‘drug’, a ‘hallucinogen’, that has ‘imitative and disinhibitative 
effects’ on viewers, causing them to become less restrained about recreating in real 
life what they have seen on screen.387 This idea of the chemical effect of films is not 
just metaphorical; in 2001, Bushman and fellow psychologist Craig Anderson found 
that ‘long-term exposure to violent media’ has a ‘positive and significant’ effect on 
violent thoughts, and results in increased ‘aggressive cognition’ (i.e. gamers 
experience a higher number of violent thoughts) and ‘aggressive affect’ (‘feelings of 
anger or hostility’), as well as generating symptoms of ‘physiological arousal’ 
associated with being in a fight, including increased adrenaline and stress 
hormones.388  
What is interesting, too, is the way that, though these studies tend to focus on 
films and video games to the exclusion of theatre, they are often pervaded by 
theatrical metaphors. Theatre often seems to be a guiding principle, or underlying 
idea, behind studies into film and videogame violence. Strikingly, Anderson and 
Bushman use the theatrical or cinematic metaphor of ‘scripts’ to describe the effect of 
violent media on cognition; they argue that such media alter a viewer or gamer’s 
cognitive ‘scripts’. They state that violent media expose people to violent behavioural 
responses to hostile or challenging scenarios, which they then store in their 
kinaesthetic memories as ‘behavioural scripts’. Implicitly, engagement with violent 
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387 Brad Bushman, “Priming Effects of Media Violence on Accessibility of Aggressive Constructs in 
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388 Craig Anderson and Brad Bushman, “Effects of Violent Video Games on Aggressive Behavior, 
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media is like rehearsing or memorising a script which is then likely to be acted out in 
a person’s real life.389 Bushman writes, ‘once a script has been stored in memory, it 
may be retrieved at some later time as a guide for behaviour’.390 The script metaphor 
is used several times in cognitive studies of violence; for instance Nancy Guerra, L. 
Huesmann and Anja Spindler found that children raised in violent communities 
develop ‘social scripts emphasising aggressive responses’.391 This metaphor of a 
‘script’ is used in such a way that it blurs the boundary between fiction and reality; 
fictional representations of violence provide the basis for real life aggressive 
cognition and action. Learning a script and ‘rehearsing’ it in our mind both involve a 
chemical change in our bodies and brains associated with violence experience and 
thus pave the way for ‘real’ violent action later on. 
 In Hamlet, Shakespeare depicts characters who are interested, like Anderson 
and Bushman, in how a carefully-constructed scenario can affect the mind of someone 
watching, or asked to participate interactively in, that scenario. Hamlet is full of 
experiments which aim to produce an effect, or measure a reaction, in another 
person’s mind. Characters construct scenarios, coach each other how to behave, and 
observe the consequences. This chapter discusses in particular how the final duel 
between Hamlet and Laertes is a kind of experiment, with its two carefully-concocted 
poisons, and Claudius carefully watching both participants’ reactions, and laying a bet 
on the result. Earlier in the play, Polonius and Claudius ‘loose’ Ophelia to Hamlet and 
watch to see how he reacts, to test if he is indeed mad. If this encounter with Ophelia 
makes Hamlet analogous to a modern gamer negotiating his way through the fictional 
scenario of an interactive video game, The Mousetrap positions Claudius as someone 
akin to the more passive audience of a film. Hamlet writes and stages The Mousetrap 
under painstakingly-controlled conditions to see how it affects Claudius: what is 
perhaps the first experiment into the effect of stage violence on audience’s minds is, 
excitingly, itself part of a play.   
 Hamlet carefully hones the situation, writing the script himself and giving 
the players lengthy advice about how to act it out, so that it will produce the effect he 
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desires. Then, he scrutinises Claudius closely, hoping that the play will have a visible 
affect on Claudius and reveal his mind, 
 
I’ll have these players 
Play something like the murther of my father 
Before mine uncle. I'll observe his looks.  
I’ll tent him to the quick. If ‘a do blench, 
I know my course (2.2.594-598). 
 
 Hamlet’s ‘experiment’ is similar to a cognitive one (and particularly that of 
Berkowitz, which is discussed below) in that Hamlet is creating a situation that is 
honed to have a particular cognitive effect on Claudius; by observing the play’s effect 
on Claudius, Hamlet hopes to know his mind. Hamlet canot be as direct as a modern 
experimentor: he cannot ask Claudius how he feels, or get him to fill in a 
questionnaire rating how The Mousetrap has affected him. If Hamlet felt able to 
simply ask Claudius if he killed his father, and was sure of getting the truth, there 
would be no need to stage The Mousetrap at all. Hamlet needs to be indirect enough 
to catch Claudius off his guard, whilst being as direct as he can be so as to ensure that 
the content of the play is applicable specifically to Claudius. After a particularly 
pointed reference to what he believes Claudius to have done (killing his brother, 
marrying his sister in law), Hamlet uses imagery of poison to describe the effect the 
play has had on Claudius. The Player Queen declares (and what could be more 
provocative), ‘In second husband let me be accursed.| None wed the second but who 
killed the first’ (3.2.179-80). Hamlet, in the audience, interjects ‘That’s wormwood!’ 
(3.2.181), referring to the bitter plant wormwood which also had a contemporary 
figurative sense of something that was bitter to experience.392 Caught out, Claudius’ 
response to the play is olfactory, ‘my offense is rank, it smells to heaven’ (3.3.36). 
Here, Hamlet and Claudius draw on the early modern discourses that linked being 
affected by a play to figurative and literal infection. They also prefigure modern 
descriptions of violent (and, as we saw in chapter 3, romantic and erotic) media as 
drugs or hallucinogens.393  
                                                
392 O.E.D., ‘wormwood’, n, 1a, 2a. 
393 In the chapter 3 I suggested that Iago was experimenting on Othello by creating fictional accounts of 
 
203 
 Hamlet’s ‘experiment’ with The Mousetrap is different from the idea of 
cognitive scripts in two significant ways. Firstly, unlike the cognitive theorists cited 
above, Hamlet is not experimenting to see how the play will create a ‘script’ that his 
audience member, Claudius, might then follow in ‘real life’ (i.e. when he has finished 
watching The Mousetrap). Rather, the order is reversed. Claudius has already 
committed a ‘real life’ violent act, and the script Hamlet creates, the script of The 
Mousetrap, aims to recreate that act. The Mousetrap aims, in fact, to draw violent acts 
from Claudius’ memory, to make his thoughts publicly visible to those who, like 
Hamlet, are concentrating on reading Claudius’ bodily signs, and to confirm what 
Hamlet suspects Claudius has already done. So, The Mousetrap uses a fictional 
scenario to test what was real in the past rather than, as cognitive studies of violence 
tend to do, examining if a fictional scenario materialises as a ‘real’ act in the future. 
Secondly, the future violent acts intended to be prompted by The Mousetrap are not 
perpetrated by Claudius, the audience member. They are perpetrated by Hamlet, the 
experimentor. Hamlet does not conduct his experiment to stir his audience to 
violence, rather he uses The Mousetrap as a justification for his own revengeful 
violent acts. If Claudius ‘blenches’, Hamlet will kill him. Hamlet is a much more 
active force than the experimenters in the cognitive studies above, who elide 
themselves, slip from view, aim merely to observe and not act and perhaps assume 
themselves to be immune from the violent affects that they detect in their subjects. 
But when Hamlet remarks to Claudius, ‘Your Majesty and we that have free souls it 
touches us not’ (3.2.241-2), the sense is ironic; the affective infection of The 
Mousetrap ‘touches’ both experimentor and subject. 
Leonard Berkowitz’ “Film Violence and the Cue Properties of Available 
Targets” (1966), a seminal study of violence and cognition cited at length by 
Anderson and Bushman, is a prime example of how Shakespeare’s concern with the 
effect of fictional scenarios on people’s minds is shared by modern cognitive 
theorists. There is an intrinsic theatricality to Berkowitz’s experiment. Berkowitz 
wished to measure how people’s violent cognition and violent affect differed 
depending on whether they had watched a film of a violent prize fight or a film of a 
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trackrace which was just as exciting but involved zero violence. As we will see, 
Berkowitz took on a role akin to theatrical director, training and deploying actors, 
creating a series of carefully-scripted scenarios and monitoring their effect on his 
subjects. In this sense, he bears an intriguing similarity to Hamlet coaching the 
players to perform The Mousetrap and monitoring its effect on Claudius, or Polonius 
coaching Ophelia on how to behave and then monitoring her effect on Hamlet. I 
suggest that this similarity is not a coincidence. Because they aim to produce and test 
particular effects on their audience members or participants, studies like Berkowitz’s 
tend almost of a necessity to use ‘theatrical’ elements. This is because theatre is a core 
case of an activity designed to produce specific affects in the minds of audiences. 
Dramatists have for centuries been carefully honing the instruments for doing so—
creating characters, devising scenarios, deceiving audiences by masking the gaps 
between fiction and reality— and these tools have proved very useful for 
experimenters like Berkowitz. As Susan Feagin argues, literary narratives are much 
more powerful than real life situations when it comes to producing empathetic or 
affective feelings like hostility or sadness. This is because, like an experiment, literary 
texts do not involve the distractions of real life situations, and are focused instead on 
producing emotions and affective responses in readers, which makes them more 
efficient at doing so,  
 
Simulating mental activity is likely to be easier with respect to 
characters in narrative literature than with actual people since literature 
is written for those who would appreciate it—something not to be 
assumed of the ‘narratives’ that people create as we live our lives. Good 
literature will often provide, through style and substance, opportunities 
for empathizing with characters, activities that, in turn, may enhance 
appreciation.394 
 
The charge is often levelled against neuroscientific and cognitive experiments 
that they are too unlike real life for their findings to be applicable outside of the 
lab, that the closed, artificial environment of the laboratory where a single 
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Perspectives, ed. Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 161. 
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emotion is produced and studied, does not reflect the complexity of real life. 
However, this is potentially a strength when it comes to reading cognitive 
theory alongside literary texts because, as Feagin argues, this is one of the ways 
that cognitive experiments can be most like literature. Berkowitz’s scenarios, 
for example, were carefully designed to produce a particular cognitive effect in 
participants: hostility to varying extents. Berkowitz took pains to exclude all 
other variables from his scenarios so that he could focus solely on aggression.  
Berkowitz’s experiment demonstrates the propensity for theatrical frameworks 
and fictional scenarios to be permeated with real cognitive effects. The actor being 
beaten in the prizefight film was Kirk Douglas (though unnamed by Berkowitz, this 
film is perhaps Champion, 1949). Berkowitz instructed a confederate to pretend to be 
a subject volunteering for the experiment; the confederate engaged with the genuine 
experimental subjects and introduced himself at times as ‘Kirk’, a college boxer. At 
other times, the confederate introduced himself as the unsporty ‘Bob’. Berkowitz 
hypothesised that the subjects of his experiment would associate this confederate 
called ‘Kirk’ with Kirk Douglas in the film, and that seeing Kirk Douglas being 
beaten up would provide them with a kind of mental script or behavioural pattern that 
would encourage them to want to attack the confederate ‘Kirk’ in some way. To 
amplify the effect, in some instances, Berkowitz secretly instructed ‘Kirk’/‘Bob’ to 
play the role of an irritating, aggressive, even malicious person and at other times 
Berkowitz secretly asked the confederate to behave ‘neutrally’ around the 
experimental subjects. He wanted to see if, when the confederate ‘Kirk’ was 
aggressive, it further encouraged the subjects to want to re-enact the prize-fighting 
scenario they had seen on screen, where Kirk Douglas acted aggressively towards his 
opponent, after which the opponent took violent revenge. Berkowitz measured the 
effect that the two characters of ‘Kirk’/‘Bob’ and their different behaviours had on his 
subjects’ thoughts and actions by asking the subjects to complete a questionnaire 
about how they felt about ‘Kirk’ or ‘Bob’ and giving them the opportunity to give 
‘Kirk’/‘Bob’ electric shocks depending on how well he answered a test question (he 
gave exactly the same answer with each subject).   
Berkowitz found that playing the part of Kirk the boxer, and behaving in a 
hostile fashion towards the subjects meant that the confederate increased the subjects’ 
aggressive affect and aggressive cognition, and their aggressive actions. In their 
questionnaire, subjects reported disliking Kirk more than Bob, especially when he 
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acted aggressively towards them; they gave Kirk (especially aggressive Kirk) more 
electric shocks. Berkowitz manipulates several staged, fictional scenarios and 
characters, and finds that they had a real cognitive effect on those exposed to them. 
He is well aware of the fictive aspect of the experiment, often using the words 
‘supposedly’ and ostensibly’ (the experimenter leaves the room ‘ostensibly to bring 
the subject’s work to the other person for judging’; ‘Kirk’/‘Bob’ only ‘supposedly’ 
receives electric shocks), and indeed even revels in it with a grand unveiling at the 
end, when ‘the experimenter explained the deceptions that had been practiced upon 
the subject’.395  
 Reading the last act of Hamlet with studies like Berkowitz’s in mind 
emphasises that theatricality and ‘real’ violent cognition are not polar opposites. 
Indeed, recent productions of Hamlet have drawn careful attention to the theatricality 
of this fight; Adrian Noble’s Barbican version in 1992 added cannon and applause 
into the text, evoking both a theatrical performance and prizefights throughout the 
ages.396  Both Berkowitz’s fictional filmic prize fight and Hamlet’s original 
performances in a playing space that was once a theatre and a prize fighting arena, 
have been created with the relationship between theatricality and reality in mind. The 
final duel in Hamlet involves a tangle of staged and real aggression. Real fencing 
skills are used in fight-sequences that are staged to a fictional script; imagined 
poisonous chemicals are balanced against the potential for real olfactory responses as 
actors sweat and their adrenaline levels rise along with the audience’s; and, in general, 
a fictional storyline can produce real cognitive responses of fear and aggression in the 
actors’ and audience’s minds. Drawing on the ‘simulation theory’ of cognition (the 
idea of ‘simulation’ is also crucial to Feagin’s argument above), which suggests that 
the only difference between imagined and truly enacted violence is the intensity of 
affect it provokes, I will explore how the boundary between real and fictional 
violence, an actor’s words and a character’s touch, is dissolved in Hamlet. 
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Striking in Shakespeare’s plays 
Hamlet (first published in Q1 1603, probably performed 1600-1), was part of an 
ongoing Shakespearean ‘experiment’ into stage-violence. In particular, around the 
time of writing Hamlet, Shakespeare had developed an interest in staging how 
violence can be pretended, controlled, and theatrically performed. As we saw in 
chapter 4, in Edelman’s words, ‘Shakespeare was...an innovator of stage violence’. 
Edelman explains that, even in plays like Tamburlaine whose plots feature several 
battles, there was little actual swordfighting on the stage before Shakespeare began 
his history cycle with the Henry VI tetralogy in 1590-1.397 In their Dictionary of Stage 
Directions, Dessen and Thomson provide further evidence for Edelman’s claim that it 
was only after the 1590s that, thanks to Shakespeare, stage violence became popular 
in England. Dessen and Thomson show that striking, fighting and wounding are all 
‘widely used’ terms in stage directions in English plays in the period 1580-1642, but 
it was Shakespeare who used them most and earlier. The examples that they cite show 
that, apart from in Shakespeare’s plays, instructions to fight or strike or wound do not 
really start to become common in stage directions until after the turn of the 
seventeenth century, with plays like A Chaste Maid in Cheapside (1613), whilst non-
Shakespearean examples from the 1590s or first decade of the seventeenth century 
tend not to involve not actual stage-fights, but characters walking onto the stage 
already wounded or having their wounds examined. Dessen and Thomson’s earliest 
non-Shakespearean examples of people fighting or being wounded on stage tend to 
come later than Shakespeare’s histories; one example is Drayton’s Sir John Oldcastle 
(1599).398 It was only when Shakespeare’s playwriting career was drawing to a close 
that other playwrights began to make onstage violence the focal point of key scenes, 
in The Duchess of Malfi (1614), The Revenger’s Tragedy (1606), and other revenge-
plays. Following the precedent Shakespeare had set in England with plays like Titus 
Andronicus, these plays attempt to outdo each other with the ingenuity of their 
violence. Cyril Tourneur’s The Atheist’s Tragedy (1611), for example, contains 
perhaps the most violent use of ‘ax’ listed by Dessen and Thomson, ‘he raises the ax, 
strikes out his own brains’.399  
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Edelman argues that Shakespeare’s key innovation was not just in portraying 
thrilling, realistic violence on stage (this was something that Robert Greene may also 
have attempted to do, as he includes combat in stage directions), but in exploring its 
potential to affect characters and plot, ‘Shakespeare’s use of these swordfights, often 
combining them with dialogue, turned more than a few “feats of activity” into feats of 
high drama’.400 The way that Shakespeare presented violent ‘feats of high drama’ 
changed considerably over time. In his early works, Shakespeare displayed an 
enthusiasm for simply staging violence in various forms, focusing on bloody and 
energetic depictions of violence, from the histories’ mass brawls and hand to hand 
combat to the farcical beatings of servants in the early comedies, especially The 
Comedy of Errors (1594) where the Dromios expend many lines discussing, and 
bitterly joking about, their beatings. By the late 1590s, though, Shakespeare began to 
explore the opportunities offered by the theatre for examining ideas of representation 
and playacting by depicting arrested, frustrated violent acts. Comparing Shakespeare 
to Webster, R.A. Foakes also notes that whilst Shakespeare shared a fascination with 
violence with other early modern playwrights, what marked him out as different from 
them was the fact that ‘during a long career he dramatized changing perspectives on 
representations of human violence that show a maturing of his thinking about the 
matter’.401 
As we have seen, Laertes emphasises a fight involving light, controlled 
touches, which are so light on both sides that there is debate over whether Hamlet in 
fact managed to touch Laertes at all (‘Judgement’, he asks, 5.2.280). This reflects the 
actors’ need to control their movements in stage violence, stopping a stage-punch 
before it makes contact with the other’s skin, reining in a sword-thrust so that it does 
not harm the other actor. The previous chapter showed that arrested and restrained 
gestures are places where the link between actor and character becomes particularly 
fraught with meaning; they are thus sites where this link can be scrutinised most 
fruitfully by the cognitive theorist. Hamlet is part of a group of plays, spanning a 
decade and a half in Shakespeare’s career, that dramatise violence that is stopped in 
mid-motion, usually when it is thwarted by others. In these plays, Shakespeare 
explores the theatrical potential for violent gestures and situations that are halted and 
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frustrated to generate affective responses (fear, anger, sadness) in the audience’s 
minds. 
In King John (c.1587) 4.1, Arthur uses the power of youth, innocence, and 
persuasion to stop Hubert from blinding him with the burning poker he wields; 
Hubert’s ensuing tears may well be mirrored by the audience’s. In The Tempest 
(1610-11), as their rivals sleep, Antonio urges Sebastian, ‘Draw together:| And when I 
rear my hand, do you the like| To fall it on Gonzalo’ (2.1.294-6). Swords drawn, 
Sebastian interrupts Antonio before they strike with, ‘O but one word’ (2.1.296), and 
Ariel wakes the sleepers up, thwarting the imminent murder. Ariel’s stage-
management of Sebastian and Antonio’s intended violence recalls The Merchant of 
Venice (1596-8), when Portia prevents Shylock from wounding or killing Antonio. 
Shakespeare emphasises the suspense of this moment; Shylock whets his knife, Portia 
claims Antonio is beyond help and tells him to prepare for death before interrupting 
the looming Shylock by noting that, ‘this bond doth give thee here no jot of blood’ 
(4.1.306). In Henry Baynton’s 1922 touring production in the West of England, Portia 
emphasised the potentially unexpected, dramatic nature of this moment; rather than 
making it clear that she planned all along to save Antonio with the blood-clause, she 
‘looked up suddenly from the bond in the trial scene [an] indication that she herself, 
and just at that moment, had realised the flaw’.402 Shakespeare increases the tension 
and uncertainty by giving Portia new reasons not to save Antonio during this scene, 
even if she had originally planned to do so; her husband Bassanio interjects and states 
that he would gladly ‘sacrifice’ his wife (4.1.282-7) to save Antonio. Giving Portia 
the perfect opportunity to kill her key rival, this scene is also a suspenseful test of her 
character. Productions often emphasise this dramatic tension, giving the final 
frustration of Shylock’s violent desires extra import. In 1947 at the RSC, Frank 
Benson included a crowd on stage, who weep and turn away in horror as Shylock 
approaches Antonio with his knife.403 At the Barbican in 1988, Antonio’s (John 
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Carlisle’s) arms were bound to a horizontal piece of wood, evoking the crucifixion. 404 
When Portia stepped in to stop Shylock’s striking gesture, these overtones of the 
sacrifice of Christ being stopped lent a sense of added momentousness to this arrested 
violent gesture. In this production in particular, which used a variety of biblical 
symbolism, in the anti-semitic world of Antonio and Bassanio Shylock represented 
‘the Jews’ who killed Christ, and this ending gave a sense of biblical history being re-
written.  
Though the final duel in Hamlet itself does not depict a violent act that is 
dramatically stopped in its tracks, the fact that Hamlet is sandwiched between several 
plays that raise the stakes of threatened, then abrogated, violence emphasises the 
importance of the idea of controlled and resisted violence to Shakespeare’s thought. 
Many early modern plays include intimidating threats to kill. However, making a 
point of dramatising characters offering, and then restraining themselves from 
committing, violent acts, is a particular preoccupation of Shakespeare’s. In the case of 
Hamlet, it is the actors rather than the characters who must control their violent 
gestures; the device of the poisoned foil and Laertes’ emphasis on the fact that 
energetic violent gestures are not needed, give them a fictional reason for doing so. 
Before the duel, Hamlet asserts that he has no desire to harm Laertes, 
‘disclaiming’ any hatred of him and stating that any harm he has done him previously 
is an accident, ‘I have shot mine arrow o’er the house| And hurt my brother’ (5.2.243-
4). Hamlet’s claims that he is reluctant to harm Laertes place Hamlet within a set of 
Shakespearean plays portraying characters who, though set up to fight, are unwilling 
to actually do each other any harm. In these plays, Shakespeare makes visible the 
conditions of performance, whereby actors are compelled by the script to fight but 
need to stop short of actually wounding each other. In Twelfth Night (first performed 
1602), Sir Toby stages a duel between Andrew and Viola, both of whom are terrified 
of fighting. As Toby stage-manages the fight it seems almost as if he is conducting an 
experiment, seeing what will happen when he incites a chemical response of fear and 
aggression in two vulnerable people. Rather like Berkowitz, he runs between the two 
terrified combatants, checking on their responses to each other and creating a fictional 
atmosphere of aggression. Toby describes Andrew to Viola twice as ‘incensed’ 
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(3.4.238, 260), the same word Claudius uses of Hamlet and Laertes (5.2.302). Toby 
pretends to Viola that Andrew is the best fighter around, ‘souls and bodies hath he 
divorced three’ (3.4.237); meanwhile, he presents Viola to Andrew as ‘a very devil’ 
(3.4.273). As they fight, Viola notes aside ‘how much I lack of a man’ (3.4.302), 
reminding the audience at this crucial juncture that she is in male disguise, playing a 
part, underscoring the fact that this is a moment where Shakespeare is thinking 
specifically about the potential for theatre to enable various permutations of violence.  
In The Merry Wives of Windsor (first published 1602, but probably performed 
several years earlier), Shakespeare again deploys the theatrical technique of the aside 
during a reluctant fight. The Host, acting again as a director, incites Sir Hugh Evans 
and Doctor Caius to duel; Sir Hugh is clearly putting on a show. He addresses Doctor 
Caius, ‘Pray you let us not be laughing-stocks to other men’s humours; I desire you in 
friendship, and I will one way or other make you amends. I will knog your urinal 
about your knave’s cockscomb’ (3.1.85-9). The first sentence is clearly spoken aside 
to Dr Caius as Sir Hugh is imploring him not to fight; modern editions sometimes 
mark this as ‘aside’. The second sentence, beginning ‘I will knog your urinal...’ is 
spoken aloud, as Sir Hugh puts on a show of pugnacity; in modern editions, these 
lines are sometimes marked ‘aloud’ or similar. The First Folio and quartos do not 
distinguish between the ‘aside’ and ‘aloud’ parts, however, simply separating them 
with a colon (F1), full stop (Q1, 1602; Q2, 1619), or semicolon (Q3, 1630) after 
‘amends’. Q1 and Q2 have the additional stage direction ‘they offer to fight’, where 
‘offer’ refers to a stage-fight that is set up and then dismantled through language and 
through Sir Hugh’s fearful aspect and gestures. 
Sir Hugh’s aside reminds us that his and Caius’ fight is both a staged 
experiment and an experimental staging of controlled violence. Andrew, Viola, and 
Sir Hugh’s fear of real violence coincides with, and reflects, the actor’s avoidance of 
real violence which would puncture the fictional world of the play. These characters’ 
search for ingenious solutions to the need not to get killed reflects the playwright’s 
need to seek ingenious solutions to the problem of depicting a death or wounding on 
stage without actually harming anyone. Again, dramatising a need for restraint is a 
key aspect of Shakespeare’s stagecraft; here he is interested in creating a fictional 
world that responds to the material conditions of performance. Characters’ 
motivations provide a reason for stage violence to be restrained, and as such the more 
pragmatic reason for restraint (actors must not actually harm or kill other actors) is 
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simultaneously masked and dramatised.  Perhaps the most famous example of an 
opposite tendency is Act 5 of Thomas Kyd’s The Spanish Tragedy (probably first 
performed 1587). Here, Hieronymo stages a play in which the stabbings are 
performed with real knives so that Bel-Imperia and her cast-mates truly die when the 
plot of Hieronymo’s play calls for stage-deaths. Kyd’s play is in many ways the 
inverse of Shakespeare’s technique. Staging a play that is fictional, but which turns 
out to be real, Kyd’s characters dramatise the anxiety that many early modern actors 
might have felt about the potential for being really wounded by stage fights. At the 
same time, the violence here is clearly fictional, the ‘real’ stabbings involve not the 
actors’ deaths, but the death of the characters within the play. Shakespeare, however, 
as Hamlet and the examples discussed above show, almost constantly keeps the 
distinction between actors and characters blurred. The actors’ motivations and 
concerns are justified and dramatised by the characters’ actions. It becomes hard to 
tell whether it is the actors or the characters who are restraining violence, because in 
many ways it is both. 
 
Violence in Hamlet as an experiment 
Cognitive theories of ‘simulation’ can provide a new reading of how violence on the 
stage relates to reality. Overturning previous assumptions, cognitive theory suggests 
that stage violence is in indistinguishable from real violence in several significant 
ways. This is because cognitively humans experience imagined or otherwise fictional 
violent scenarios as qualitatively similar to, though less intensely than, they 
experience ‘real’ ones. The cognitive studies by Anderson, Bushman, and Berkowitz 
cited above indicate that when it comes to witnessing violence, audiences have the 
same types of cognitive responses—increased fearful and/or aggressive thoughts and 
feelings—to staged violence as they do to real violence. Cognitive theory suggests 
that performing stage violence can induce the same feelings and thoughts of fear and 
aggression that real violence might in the actors’ minds, too. There is currently no 
body of cognitive research into the differences between how actors experience real 
violence compared to how they experience staged violence. However, cognitive 
theorists suggest that, though the types of affect (increased aggressive thoughts, 
increased aggressive cognition) are the same, there is a difference in intensity in the 
affects caused in audience’s minds by real and by fictional violence.  
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In a 2005 study into how monkeys’ understandings of a person’s intentions 
can change the way that they respond affectively to their gestures, Kiyoshi Nakahara 
and Yasushi Miyashita suggest that the human brain generally takes the context of 
violence into account.405 These authors, and Jean Decety and Claus Lamm, find that 
violence that is known to be fictional, or which (as in the case of a surgeon inflicting 
pain in order to cure someone) is done for what the perceiver believes is a ‘good’ 
reason, generates much less intense thoughts and feelings of fear and aggression than 
does violence that is random, unwarranted, or malicious.406 In Shakespeare’s works, 
there is also a generic difference in violence; audiences can perceive differences, for 
instance, between comic violence (such as the beatings in The Comedy of Errors) 
which is generally designed to raise laughs, and tragic violence, such as when Romeo 
and Juliet kill themselves or Mercutio dies, his life lost unnecessarily. Though both 
real and simulated violence generate aggressive and/or fearful thoughts and feelings 
in the minds of people watching it, and may (as Nakahara and Miyashita’s work 
suggests) cause them to feel that they are themselves experiencing the pain that they 
are observing, real violence does so with greater intensity.  
Audiences know that the violence in the final duel in Hamlet is fictional and 
does not present any immediate physical danger either to the actors or to themselves, 
so it is reasonable to assume that audiences’ cognitive responses to this duel are less 
intense that their responses would be to a real fight on the street. Nakahara and 
Miyashita link this to the appraisal of gesturers’ intentions; if violent gestures are 
perceived to be done in service of a good intention, for a good reason (for instance, 
some audiences might think punishing a wrongdoer with violence constituted a good 
reason), or in a fictional context, they will generate less intense feelings of fear or 
aggression. However, Shakespeare takes especial care to elide the differences between 
actors’ and characters’ intentions in Hamlet’s final duel. We know this violence to be 
fictional, in part because we know that the actors do not have violent intentions 
towards each other. But, by blurring the boundary between actors’ and characters’ 
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intentions, Shakespeare helps to make this question disappear. When we see 
obtrusively ‘stagy’ stage violence, where it is clear that the action is being theatrically 
performed, the gap between character and actor is at the forefront of our minds. 
However, in Hamlet’s final duel, Shakespeare hides this gap, and it is up to the 
cognitive theorist to make it visible again. As Mark Turner has suggested, theatre and 
literature are filled with ‘compressed’ or hidden meanings, which humans are ‘not 
built to see’ immediately. Turner urged cognitive theorists to focus on unpacking and 
explaining the meanings that authors or performances elide, enabling us to see them at 
last.407   
 This cognitive reading provides a new way of understanding audience’s 
appraisal of the link between the real and the fictional in drama. Previous literary 
theories of simulation on stage have been dominated by the Aristotelian notion that 
though they do not necessarily represent things that actually occurred, plays reflect 
reality because they represent the sort of things that could or should happen. In 
Poetics, Aristotle gives the example of the story of Mitys, who was murdered. Mitys’ 
statue later fell on his murderer, killing him. Aristotle notes that this probably did not 
happen in real life, but it is a good story to include in a drama because it is the sort of 
thing that should happen; Mitys seems thereby to be getting his just revenge.408  
Aristotle argues that the terrible events of tragedies help viewers to manage their 
emotions, enabling them to experience the purging or purifying (‘catharsis’) of fearful 
or violent feelings. Tragedies call up ‘pity and fear’ in audiences’ minds so as to 
purge them in the final act.409 On this Aristotelian model, audiences then step out of 
the theatre freed from the troublesome emotions of pity and fear.  Perhaps this was 
true for the time in which Aristotle wrote, when violence was only reported rather 
than enacted on stage, and audiences only had to deal with descriptions of violence 
rather than (as is much more affecting, and as was increasingly the case on the early 
modern stage) scenes of violence enacted before their eyes. Descriptions of violence 
are, cognitive theory suggests, easier for audiences to mentally let go of than 
embodied enactments of violence. As we have seen, Renaissance antitheatricalists 
worried later that drama had the opposite effect of causing uncontrolled emotions that 
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persist after the play has finished, as in Gosson’s suggestion, discussed in chapter 3, 
that a play might cause audiences to experience unbridled lust.  
Writing towards the end of the twentieth century, A. D. Nuttall follows 
Aristotle’s argument, contending that Shakespeare’s mimesis occurs in the 
‘hypothetical mode’. By this, Nuttall means that, precisely as Aristotle said, a poet 
does not imitate the ‘actual’ but the ‘probable’.410 Adding to this Aristotelian 
foundation, Nuttall argues that the difference between the fictional world of the play 
and reality is crucial, as it enables audiences to learn from the consequences of the 
(often terrible) decisions made by fictional characters without anyone having been 
harmed in the real world.411 Kendall Walton’s comprehensive and influential Mimesis 
as Make-Believe argues of literary representations or ‘imaginings’, ‘most imaginings 
are in one way or another dependent on or aimed at or anchored in the real world’, 
even when they are a move to escape reality, because ‘real things…prompt 
imaginings; they are objects of imaginings; they generate fictional truths’.412 All of 
these theories share the assumption that everything that happens on stage is pure 
representation rather than reality. Cognitive theory suggests that this is distinction has 
been overdrawn. 
Cognitive theories of simulation help to explain how stage violence 
materialises as real cognitive and chemical experiences of aggression and fear in the 
minds and bodies of both the actors performing it and the audience members watching 
it.  While the actor might not receive a physical wound, the violent gestures involved 
in stage violence produce similar (though perhaps less intense) affective and 
physiological responses. In “The Brain’s Concepts” (2005), Vittorio Gallese and 
George Lakoff advance the ‘simulation hypothesis’. Providing neural evidence, they 
argue that when we imagine or plan to do something, our sensorimotor systems 
‘simulate’ the actions we are thinking about in such a way that the boundary between 
imagining and doing blurs. Imagining punching someone triggers almost exactly the 
same sensorimotor neuron activity as actually punching them. As Gary Hesslow 
explains, ‘When one imagines seeing something, some of the same part of the brain is 
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used as when one actually sees. When we imagine moving, some of the same part of 
the brain is used as when we actually move’.413 Gallese and Lakoff argue, ‘The 
understanding of concrete concepts—physical actions, physical objects, and so on—
requires sensorimotor simulation’, such that ‘[i]magining and doing use a shared 
neural substrate’: ‘imagination, like perceiving and doing, is embodied, that is, 
structured by our constant encounter and interaction with the world via our bodies and 
brains.’414 In Hamlet, audiences and actors are encouraged to simulate violent touches 
through language: imagining a poisoned foil, ‘a palpable hit’, a ‘gall[ing]’ ‘scratch’. 
However, simulation theory suggests that there is little difference – in terms of how 
they are qualitatively experienced by actors and audiences – in pretending to fight and 
truly fighting, or in watching a pretend fight and watching a real fight. Audience 
members’ knowledge that the actors are not truly harmed restricts the more active 
types of responses that they would likely have to real violence witnessed on the street; 
for instance, audiences do not call an ambulance for Hamlet and Laertes, and they do 
not worry that these seemingly-violent men pose a danger to them as they sit in their 
seats. However, the research of theorists like Lakoff, Gallese, and Hesslow suggests 
that watching a violent gesture prompts an embodied response in the spectator and 
that this embodied response is similar (though differing in intensity) for both ‘real’ 
and ‘fictional’ violence. Stage combat is not a representation of reality that remains 
distinct from reality, rather in significant ways it is experienced as reality.  
As we saw in chapter 2, prior to cognitive theory, the most famous and 
significant theoretical articulation of the idea that reality and fiction can become 
ontologically inseparable in acting was Stanislavsky’s description of acting as an ‘art 
of experiencing’. Stanislavsky argued that actors involved in fictional scenarios 
should draw on real experiences in creating their characters, and should also 
experience those scenarios as affectively real. John Astington argues that because 
Stanislavsky’s description of acting is so broad and open, it is applicable to acting 
throughout the ages. Astington writes, ‘Stanislavski’s writings about acting…do not 
say anything particularly new about the art’, but rather describe a broad relation 
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between players’ learned techniques and their personal emotions.415 Because acting 
methods change over time, the particular ways in which the relation between 
technique and emotion manifests itself will be different for different time periods and 
material contexts. As we have seen, Tribble shows that modern rehearsal and 
performance techniques differ from those of the early modern era when rehearsal 
times were much shorter and different materials were used. In the present day, as 
Astington argues, whilst an actor might match their performance to video clips of a 
character they are performing, or deliberately employ Method Acting to get into their 
role, an early modern actor relied on other techniques and technologies: rhetorical 
training in the grammar school, plots, prompters, rehearsal spaces in a fellow actor’s 
home, relying on other actors’ memories in ensemble scenes, or (as Tribble explains) 
looking out for clues and hints from the older actors to whom they were apprenticed. 
Astington uses as an example the idea of ‘study’ which Hamlet references in his 
advice to the players, arguing that early modern ideas of studying for a part will have 
been determined by the types of spaces that were available to actors, cultural practices 
of rehearsal, and the technologies that existed at the time.416  
 Literary critics should always be alert to the nuanced differences between 
acting in different time periods. However, as Astington suggests, early modern and 
modern discourses of performance share an emphasis on the relationship between 
deliberate, controlled, theatrical techniques and the real chemical effects and affects 
that help to make up a performance.  Robert Gordon applies simulation theory to 
modern Shakespearean actors, contending that representing violent or aggressive 
characters involves ‘hypothetico-practical reasoning’ whereby the actor must shift 
their current ‘norms and values’ so that they can enter an aggressive mindset.417 
Gordon uses as an example the characters of Leander and Demetrius in A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream, who are angry with each other, perhaps to the point of wishing to kill 
each other. On Gordon’s reading, though the framework is a deliberate, conscious, 
rational one (the actor decides to cultivate aggression), the aggression generated for 
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these ‘fictional’ motivations is the same (though, again, potentially less intense) as the 
aggression the actor would feel if they had really been confronted with a murderous 
love-rival. Though early modern writers on theatre debate about the moral 
consequences of plays, they tend (with a few exceptions) to share an assumption that 
real affects are involved in acting and watching plays.418 For Sidney in The Defense of 
Poesy the power of poetry lies in its ability to generate noble thoughts and emotions, 
‘as the image of each action stirreth and instructeth the mind, so the lofty image of 
such worthies most inflameth the mind with desire to be worthy, and informs with 
counsel how to be worthy’.419 Whilst for Gosson (as we saw in the previous chapter), 
plays set audience ‘on fire’ with lust, for Sidney, the best plays leave audiences 
‘inflamed’ with a desire to do good deeds. Burning is a very common image in 
antitheatricalist discourse; theatre is imagined as an emotional conflagration that 
spreads from the actors to the audience. Prynne notes again and again in Histriomastix 
that people who are made to ‘burn’ with lust at plays will ultimately burn in hell.420 It 
is striking, then, that in Hamlet’s final duel, and in Twelfth Night, Shakespeare uses 
the word ‘incensed’, which could mean both literally ‘aflame’ and ‘burning with 
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their audiences with evil thoughts and emotions like the poison of ‘Phalangion’, he also argues that 
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anger’ or ‘excited’, to describe the duellers.421 ‘Part them, they are incensed’, 
Claudius exclaims of Hamlet and Laertes (5.2.298), evoking contemporary discourses 
of the power of theatre to inflame actors and audiences with empathy, excitement, 
rage, or lust. As this moment in Hamlet is also a moment where actors’ and 
characters’ affects, thoughts, and intentions are blurred, it can also be argued that the 
word ‘incensed’ signals a moment where actors inflame their characters with violent 
thoughts and affects, and vice versa. 
 Early modern antitheatricalists and modern cognitive theorists share an 
interest in the ability of fictional scenarios to affect audiences; they also share 
metaphors of drugs and poisons to express the ways that plays work on audiences. 
However, unlike modern cognitive theorists, antitheatricalists do not focus on stage 
violence. Renaissance antitheatricalist texts tend to focus on plays prompting lustful 
thoughts and feelings; violence is a more specifically modern cognitive concern. 
When Renaissance antitheatricalists and defenders of plays mention the effect of stage 
violence on audiences, it is in passing, and usually with regard to the ability of plays 
to teach audiences to be obedient or disobedient to monarchs. Heywood, for instance, 
rebuffs the charge that theatrical representations of violent rebellions might inspire 
audiences to act in the same way (as in the famous example of Essex’s followers 
watching Richard II with its deposition scene before the Essex rebellion). On the 
contrary, Heywood argues, plays help audiences to resist re-enacting scenes of 
insurrection, because they demonstrate the negative consequences of such violent 
acts,  
 
Playes are writ with this ayme, and carried with this method, to teach the 
subjects obedience to their King, to shew the people the untimely ends 
of such as have moved tumults, commotions, and insurrections, to 
present them with the flourishing estate of such as live in obedience.422  
 
Rather than being (as Bushman and Anderson argue) cognitive ‘scripts’ that are 
designed to be re-enacted in real life, Heywood describes plays as a kind of counter-
script, one that should be ignored or mentally torn up. By showing audiences the 
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calamities that result from rebellious violence, Heywood suggests that plays present 
audiences with scripts that they ought not to follow. By drawing attention to the wider 
context of acts of stage violence (violent rebellions end up badly for those involved in 
them), Heywood shows how a cognitive appraisal of the context of stage-violence (its 
consequences and the intentions behind it) influences how far the cognitive scripts it 
presents audiences with are embodied and re-enacted in ‘real’ life. Or so Heywood 
hopes. Theories that contextualising stage violence can lessen its effect on audiences 
serve to qualify, and frame, the idea that watching violent acts on stage creates an 
embodied response in audiences. If onstage violence is depicted as having an 
undesirable consequence, this theory suggests, this will ultimately propel audiences 
more towards non-violence than towards violence in their real lives. 
 If early modern texts like Heywood’s can suggest modifications to cognitive 
theories of stage violence, cognitive theory in its turn brings a new slant to early 
modern notions of simulation, acting, and representation. Cognitive theory marks a 
significant shift in the idea of ‘simulation’ from meaning an unnatural deception to 
meaning a real, natural, and useful part of all action. Thus, cognitive readings of 
Hamlet provide a new way of interpreting the play that was not readily available in 
the Renaissance. In the early modern era, ‘simulation’ and the verb and adjective 
‘simulate’ referred pejoratively to a sinful deception. Thomas Blount’s 1661 
dictionary defines, ‘Simulation (simulatio) a feigning, a counterfeiting, a making of 
resemblance, a disembling, a colour or pretence.’423 Examining all entries for 
‘simulate’ and ‘simulation’ on Early English Books Online shows that the majority of 
uses of this word were in a religious context, and described a pernicious resemblance 
to reality, ‘put from you all simulacion or faining’ warns Catholic theologian Roger 
Edgeworth in 1557.424 In 1551, the reformed Protestant John Bale (previously a 
Catholic monk) described the antichrist’s ‘symulate holynesse’.425 However, in 
cognitive theory, simulation is intrinsic to thought and constitutes a cognitive process 
that is shared between imagined and real scenarios. Simulated violence specifically 
has been used to train people to deal with real violent scenarios, illustrating how in the 
present day ‘simulation’ can be desirable rather than sinful. From 1947, ‘to simulate’ 
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specifically meant to create a realistic situation that was designed to train people for a 
particular real life event.426 Military flight simulators, for instance, aim to recreate as 
far as possible the chemical, visual, cognitive effects of real life combat, thus 
providing a ‘safe environment’ where trainees can learn to respond to violent 
situations, creating cognitive scripts for use in real combat. 427 The modern notion of 
simulation as something usefully linking fiction and reality helps to bring a fresh 
perspective on early modern texts, which were created at a time when simulation 
tended to be presented as something to avoid as it distanced a person from reality. 
Cognitive theory also provides a new way of approaching theatrical 
simulation. Several early modern antitheatricalists make the common connection 
between playacting and religious hypocrisy, drawing on the fact that ‘hypocrite’ 
comes from the Greek ὑποκριτή, ‘actor on stage’. Though ‘hypocrite’ could be a 
neutral term for an actor, it is clear that these opponents of the theatre were using the 
word in a pejorative sense. In The Hypocrite Discovered and Cured (1644), Samuel 
Torshell explains, ‘the name of Hypocrite is drawne from them that come disguised 
upon the Stage, their faces and habits so coloured and altered, that they sometimes 
appeare to be men, sometimes women, sometimes old, sometimes young, &c’.428 The 
puritan Richard Baxter denounces pretended piety as ‘simulate, histrionick, scenical, 
and hypocritical’.429 Here, the word ‘simulate’ (‘deceptive’) slips quickly towards the 
word ‘hypocritical’. There is a kind of domino-effect of words relating simulation to 
acting and deception; ‘histrionic’ comes from Latin histrionicus, ‘theatrical’; 
‘scenical’ means like a theatre scene. By the time we get to ‘hypocritical’, the link has 
been made, via ‘theatrical’ and scenical’, between deception and the theatre. Stage-
plays became a specific example of a more general quality of (usually pernicious) 
pretence, as Claudio explains in The Dumb Divine Speaker, ‘an hypocrite...is euery 
dissembler, that representeth any other condition then he is indeede. Heereupon, stage 
players, and all kind of Comedians were tearmed hypocrites, and the action of 
Comedians called hypocrisie and dissimulation’.430 
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The word ‘simulation’ is used only once in Shakespeare’s works, as Malvolio 
ponders the riddle or ‘simulation’ in a love letter, not realising that the letter is a 
forgery and thus a ‘simulation’ in more senses than one: ‘M, O, A, I. This simulation 
is not as the former’ (Twelfth Night 2.5.120).  
However, throughout his works, and not least in Hamlet, Shakespeare is 
interested in how reality and pretence can collide. Hamlet notes that his melancholic 
symptoms (wearing black, looking downcast) could just as easily be pretended as a 
true representation of his state of mind. Tellingly, he uses the theatrical word ‘play’ to 
express this, ‘they are actions that a man might play’ (1.2.84). Critics have tended to 
read Hamlet’s lines as emphasising the hollowness and vanity of acting, for instance 
in Shakespeare and the Culture of Paradox Peter Platt glosses, ‘All representation – 
even in the theatre of the world – is a lie…Hamlet begins the play with an 
antitheatricalist perspective and thus links the “actions that a man might play” to show 
and seeming’. Platt argues that Hamlet progresses from this distaste with falsehood to 
an acknowledgement of the ‘power and pathos in the gap between self and role’.431 
However, cognitive theory suggests a reading of Hamlet that emphasises the lack of a 
gap between character and actor. Cognitive theory has prompted an awareness of the 
fact that in the duel scene, Shakespeare is minimising the gap between what 
characters and actors have to do. Rhonda Blair, influenced by Joseph LeDoux’s 
argument in  Synaptic Self that what a person ‘is’ is constituted by what their synapses 
are doing and have done in the past, uses cognitive theory to articulate this argument. 
Applying LeDoux’s ideas to actors on the stage, Blair argues,  
 
Questions of what belongs to the “character” and what to the “actor”, 
what is “real” and what is not, become moot. There is no character in 
any objective sense; there is only the process and behaviour of particular 
individual in a particular context. What the actor is doing becomes 
simply—and complexly—that: what the actor is doing[.]432   
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As we have seen, in the duel scene in Hamlet, tricks like the poisoned foils and the 
emphasis on light touches enable the actors and the characters to sidestep the usual 
problem in stage violence whereby there is a gap between the bloody, energetic 
violence their characters are engaged in and the actors’ need not to actually harm each 
other. Moreover, cognitive studies have shown that even simulated violence results in 
real violent cognition and violent affect. In Hamlet, ‘Questions of what belongs to the 
“character” and what to the “actor”, what is “real” and what is not, become moot.’  
 Hamlet centres very much on the blurring of the real and the pretended. The 
travelling player cries real tears and puts on an entirely realistic performance, even 
though his speech is ‘a fiction...a dream of passion’ (2.2.552), for example, whilst 
there is constant debate (both among characters in the play and literary critics) about 
whether Hamlet is really mad or just pretending. The stage violence in Hamlet is, as 
we have seen, a nuanced and sometimes indistinguishable blend of the real and the 
fictional. As Heywood and Nakahara and Miyashita suggest, the context of the 
violence in Hamlet is crucial to understanding how it affects audiences. As Edelman 
showed, Shakespeare was notable not just for presenting spectacular violent acts on 
stage, but for infusing them with ‘high drama’, weaving them in to a fictional plot, 
framing them with speeches and dialogue.  Dessen argues that verisimilitude is not 
‘the only yardstick’ for understanding early modern stage fighting. Whilst Elizabethan 
audiences did indeed expect to see stage fighting that was life-like, Dessen stresses 
the need to relate stage violence not only to real life practices but to the plot and 
world of the play.433 Hamlet’s plot provides a context for understanding the violence 
of the final duel, and thus for understanding how it might act on audiences: does it 
present them with a script for them to follow, with a scene that invites embodied re-
enactments? 
Foakes argues that a mark of Shakespeare’s mature style was that he became 
interested, particularly in Hamlet, in ‘violence that has no motive, or is inadequately 
motivated, violence that may appear to arise spontaneously, and to be essentially 
meaningless, until meaning is attributed to it after the event’.434 This is potentially 
true of other violent acts in Hamlet, many of which do seem to be spontaneous, 
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random, ‘inadequately motivated’ acts. When he kills Polonius, Hamlet simply stabs 
at an arras, unsure of who is behind it; his intention is focused on Gertrude rather than 
on a conscious attempt to kill Polonius. Foakes describes Hamlet’s murder of 
Polonius as, ‘a lashing out, a spontaneous act that may in some way release pent-up 
feelings and frustrations associated with his uncle, his mother, Ophelia, and the 
general state of Denmark, but it remains in the end inexplicable’. 435 Gertrude seems 
to add weight to Foakes’ reading, as she describes Hamlet killing Polonius as ‘a rash 
and bloody deed’ (3.4.27), suggesting a ‘lashing out’ rather than a calculating murder. 
Later, Horatio sums up the whole play as a set of ‘accidental judgements, casual 
slaughters’ (5.2.382), and Foakes describes a pre-rational, motiveless, inexplicable 
human urge to violence in similar terms, as a kind of ‘lashing out’, arguing, 
‘Hamlet…is, in the end, not about revenge so much as about the human impulse to 
violence’.436  
Foakes’ arguments can be challenged by the fact that, Polonius’ death aside, 
most violent acts in Hamlet do have a clear motivation. Claudius kills Old Hamlet 
because he wants his crown (and, perhaps from the very start he wants to marry 
Gertrude too); Hamlet kills Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to stop them killing him 
first; Laertes kills Hamlet to avenge Polonius, and Hamlet kills Claudius to avenge his 
father. However, this chapter has suggested another way to argue against Foakes’ 
statement that violence in Hamlet is an expression of a motiveless, primal, 
unstoppable, inexplicable urge. Foakes’ argument rests on the assumption that the 
motive for onstage violence in Hamlet is located in characters’ intentions. Because 
characters’ intentions are not always clear, he argues, there is no recognisable 
motivation for their violent acts. However, this chapter has suggested that the 
motivation for the final duel in Hamlet, and specifically for the way that this duel is 
manifested through light touches, rests not in the characters’ intentions but in a 
complex mix of characters’ and actor’s needs and motivations. Looking at both the 
characters’ and the actors’ motivations suggests that the specifics of Hamlet’s final 
duel are shaped and driven by the actors’ need not to physically wound each other 
whilst simultaneously providing a powerful, realistic, affecting spectacle for the 
audience. This need is fictionalised using the device of the poisoned foils and the 
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distractions provided by Claudius, Osric, and Gertrude, giving the characters a lack of 
motivation to inflict substantial wounds on each other. 
 Hamlet acknowledges that this violence has had a physiological effect on the 
other characters watching on stage and, implicitly on the theatre audience; both 
‘audiences’ ‘tremble and look pale’, 
 
You that look pale and tremble at this chance, 
That are but mutes or audience to this act, 
Had I but time (as this fell sergeant, Death, 
Is strict in his arrest), O, I could tell you— 
But let it be. (5.2.394-8) 
 
Hamlet offers to speak to the audience, perhaps to give some insight into what these 
violent ‘act[s]’ have taught him, but he stops himself. Unlike in King Lear, where a 
rhyming couplet sums up the lessons learned from the play’s violence (‘The weight of 
this sad time we must obey,| Speak what we feel, not what we ought to say’ (5.3.324-
5)) no explicit lessons are laid out for the audience in Hamlet. Horatio promises to 
‘truly deliver’ the facts of what has happened, but there is no talk of a lesson learned 
(other than Horatio’s suggestion that the violence was ‘unnatural’ and largely 
accidental or mistaken) (5.2.381, 384). This is very noteworthy given that Hamlet is, 
this chapter suggests, deeply concerned with the effects that violence can have on an 
audience, and especially in this final scene. Hamlet (and Hamlet) conducts an 
experiment into stage violence, but Shakespeare markedly fails to write up any 
conclusions.  By promising to ‘tell’ and ‘truly deliver’ and then pointedly failing to 
keep these promises, Hamlet and Horatio draw attention to the lack of lessons learned 
from the violence. The previous chapter showed that meaning pours in to those 
moments where Shakespearean characters refuse to speak when speech is expected of 
them, whether by audiences or by other characters. This final chapter has suggested 
that the meaning of violent acts in Hamlet is created by audiences, characters, and 
actors; actors’ and characters’ intentions dissolve into each other at the moment of 
climactic violence, producing chemical, physiological, cognitive effects in their 
audiences. Hamlet and Horatio’s arrested speeches and broken promises emphasise 
the gap between characters’ and audiences’ knowledge, suggesting that it is up to 
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audiences and literary critics to interpret this moment and fill it with meaning. This is 
precisely what this chapter has attempted to do. 
 
Conclusions  
Cognitive theories suggest that far from being pure representation, violence on stage 
can, ontologically, be cognitively almost indistinguishable from reality (though there 
is likely to be a difference in intensity between actors’ and audience’s experiences of 
real and fictional violence). The fictional scenarios deployed in cognitive studies of 
violence often share with theatre in general, and Hamlet in particular, the aim of 
producing particular thoughts and affects in people’s minds. In Hamlet, Shakespeare 
works particularly hard to dissolve the boundary between the real and the fictional, 
using the opportunities and mechanisms of theatrical performance to create a final                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
scene of violence that is perceived as realistic.  
Cognitive theorists’ use of scripted scenarios and acting-out to produce and 
analyse aggression in humans suggests that the boundary between reality and fiction 
in ‘real life’ is often just as collapsible as it is in the theatre. As Berkowitz’s study 
showed, people can become aggressive and annoyed even when the person who is 
annoying them is just pretending to be an irritating character called Kirk. Acting’s 
ability to produce real emotions in both audiences and actors is, as we have seen, a 
concern that early modern writers on the theatre share with cognitive theorists. In this 
chapter, examining violence in Hamlet and the effect it has on the minds of the people 
in the theatre has been one way of exploring this shared concern.  Our understanding 
of how violence works on stage can be transferred over into the cognitive context: in 
both cases, performed violence (even when it is not particularly gory, but especially 
when it looks realistic) can be a contagious force that shapes the thoughts and 
emotions of both actors and onlookers.   
The dissolved boundary between the real and the fictional has been one of the 
wider concerns of the thesis. Those moments when performances of Shakespeare’s 
plays draw to a close are also moments when this boundary most often becomes tested 
and dissolved. This is the case not just in Hamlet but in plays like Julius Caesar and 
As You Like It. From actors kneeling ambiguously half in and half out of their role to 
fictional provisions being made for actors’ need to restrain violent actions on stage, 
this thesis has shown that there is often something crucial about the moment when, 
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just before the curtain falls, the world of the play begins to seep decisively back into 
the ‘real’ world. 
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Conclusion 
 
Hamlet’s description of his behaviour, ‘these are actions that a man might play’, 
expresses an essential early modern interest in the frequently wavering and dissolving 
boundaries between playacting and reality, and between gesture and thought. This 
thesis’s examination of five key Shakespearean (non-)gestures has provided a rich 
resource for both cognitive theory and Shakespeare studies in three main ways. 
Firstly, an emphasis on embodiment on stage has uncovered readings of plays by 
Shakespeare that were readily accessible to early modern audiences and readers, but 
have been somewhat lost to us in the intervening years. For example, early modern 
audiences could hardly have failed to experience Brutus’ kneeling gesture as a 
momentous act, thanks to the strong associations kneeling had in the early modern era 
with performative ceremonies of feudal obedience, religious humility, and 
expressions of deference to a monarch or noble. Cognitive theories of kinaesthetics 
have recaptured crucial gestures and moments like these for modern readers, critics, 
and audiences.  
Secondly, this thesis has suggested new ways of doing cognitive theory. 
Allowing Shakespeare to speak back to cognitive theory has enabled us to understand 
gesture in a way that is definitively Shakespearean, rather than simply attempting to 
fit Shakespeare’s plays into the Procrustean bed of existing definitions of gesture, 
cognitive or otherwise. The thesis shows that, modifying the influential definitions of 
gesture formulated by Goldin-Meadow and McNeill (which have helped shape the 
work of scholars such as Cook), significant gestures in Shakespeare’s plays very often 
involve skin-contact and have practical purposes as well as symbolic meanings. For 
example, the gesture of taking hands was a tactile, pragmatic social action in the 
Renaissance, but it also embedded the gesturers in an abundant network of symbolic 
meanings involving truth, the heart, deference, love, and unity of mind. Moreover, 
this thesis has shown that though they involve the body in movement, Shakespearean 
gestures are often fundamentally comprised by restraint and cutting short. This 
thesis’s cognitive analysis of Shakespeare has also shown how theatrical, how 
Shakespearean, cognitive theory already was. By dramatising the act of 
experimentation, Shakespeare exposes its theatrical metaphors and methods: acting, 
testing, performing, smelling, scripts. Though cognitive theory needed to be modified 
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at points to become a better tool for studying the Shakespearean text, it is in many 
ways an ideal theoretical tool for studying Shakespeare’s plays because cognitive 
theorists tend to share Shakespeare’s concern with the limits of gesture, its effect on 
viewers, its ability to shape the mind, and its relationship with language. 
Thirdly, by paying attention to the conditions of performance in Shakespeare’s 
plays, this thesis has teased out the nuanced ways in which cognitive studies of 
gesture in a theatrical performance differ from cognitive studies done in the 
laboratory. Above all, the thesis has shown that it is certainly not as simple as saying 
that laboratory studies examine ‘real life cognition’ and cognitive studies examine 
‘pretended representations of fictional characters cognising things’. On the one hand, 
the thesis has brought to cognitive theory an awareness of irony that is often lacking 
in scientific articles. Shakespeare’s plays are constantly alert to the fact that gestures 
can be performed with a conscious, often Machiavellian, control over their meaning, 
that they can be performed to deceive both other people and the gesturer themselves.  
However, this thesis has also shown that laboratory studies of cognition and 
Shakespeare’s plays share traits with each other that they do not share with real life. 
In particular, the creation of a closed, controlled environment and a concentration on 
exploring specific isolated gestures, performed in such a way as to produce specific 
affects in both gesturers and those observing them is fundamental to both cognitive 
‘laboratory’ studies and Shakespeare’s plays. These elements that make laboratory 
studies and Shakespeare’s plays similar to each other are also precisely those elements 
that make them differ from the messier, less controlled, less focused cognitive 
atmosphere of ‘real life’ outside of the lab, away from the theatre. In many ways, 
then, cognitive theory is more naturally applied to Shakespearean drama than to real 
life. This is evidenced, as chapters 3 and 5 showed, by the way that cognitive theory 
uses theatrical metaphors of ‘scripts’ and drugs or poisons and theatrical techniques of 
performance and observation. Ideas of cognition as a script, or of knowledge as 
something olfactory show how cognitive theorists use the same metaphors that have 
(as writers like Tanya Pollard show) historically been applied to the theatre: theatre as 
script, theatre as poison, bad habit, or hallucinogen. And in general cognitive theory’s 
concern with gesture, language, and emotion means that it is examining the very tools 
of theatre. 
The key finding that was common to all of the chapters in this thesis is that in 
Shakespeare’s plays the boundaries between ‘theatre’ and ‘reality’ are highly blurred. 
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Shakespeare is a playwright who takes care to make visible the concerns and 
conditions of performance. For example, as we saw in chapter 5, Hamlet includes plot 
devices that cater for, and make obvious, at the same time that they smoothly mask, 
the actors’ need not to really harm each other during stage fights. Shakespeare also 
plays with the parallels between performance and ‘real life’. He draws suggestive 
comparisons between actors kneeling deferentially to a monarch at the end of a play 
and the characters kneeling murderously and ironically to a monarch within the play, 
he translates a staged kiss into an offer of a real kiss between character and audience 
members, and he shows a handshake dramatically and bloodily abrogated in Titus 
Andronicus only to have Puck offer audiences his hand across the play/real world 
divide in A Midsummer Night’s Dream. Shakespeare seemed to have been very much 
aware of the fact that characters and actors, performance and reality, are not 
ontologically separable in his plays. He tests the limits of this distinction, he makes 
the boundary between representation and reality visible only to cross it with a pointed 
theatricality. 
 This thesis’ use of cognitive theory has generated a new way of thinking 
about the fiction-reality boundary in Shakespeare’s plays. By drawing on new 
research into olfaction, cognitive underload, and phenomenological ideas of skin 
contact it has shown that the ‘fictional’ scenarios of Shakespeare’s plays are 
completely permeated with real cognitive effects. The actors’ cognitive and 
physiological processes as they gesture, smell, sweat, and make skin contact with 
each other coalesce or contrast, to varying extents, with the performed cognitive and 
physiological processes of the characters they are playing. The thesis has shown that 
cognitive theory provides a new vocabulary for addressing the long-standing critical 
idea of a play as a fiction grounded in reality. It also provides a scientific evidential 
basis for discussing the collapsing boundary between fiction and reality 
We have seen that Shakespeare was very aware of this collapsing boundary, 
and exploited, tested, and thematised it wherever he could, creating some of the most 
powerful moments in his plays in the process. Cognitive theory shows us new areas 
for research into these moments that draw out themes that are already present in 
Shakespeare’s plays but which have sometimes been sidelined in favour of critical 
discussions of language and rhetoric rather than gesture. Chapter 2 demonstrated that 
concentrating on the act of kneeling in Julius Caesar provides a new reading of the 
play, bringing to the fore a network of up-down vocabulary that was always there in 
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the play-text. The chapter on kissing showed that moving away from the usual critical 
tendency to emphasise ideas of looking, blindness, and ‘ocular proof’ in Othello 
revealed a train of imagery relating to olfaction as a barometer of morality and a key 
site for interrogating the relationship between the mental and the physical.  
This thesis has shown that there is potential for further study into 
Shakespearean gestures.The thesis has provided a picture of Shakespearean gesture 
which can now potentially be extended to include more gestures, and more early 
modern play-texts both by Shakespeare and other authors. Though the thesis only 
examined five plays in detail, the database suggests that there is room for a more 
comprehensive study of Shakespearean gesture. Sitting down, eating, and dropping 
objects are all types of gestures that, though less common, appear at significant 
moments in Shakespeare’s plays. When Lucetta drops Proteus’ love letter to Julia in 
Two Gentlemen of Verona 1.2, for instance, it initiates a tense, comedic dialogue in 
which Julia attempts to both suppress and express her urge to pick it up and read it.  
Branching out into a detailed examination of other playwrights was beyond 
the scope of a thesis that focuses on Shakespeare’s plays. However, comparing the 
findings in this thesis to works by other playwrights will help to see how different 
writers dealt with the relationship between gesture, language, and thought that this 
thesis has spelled out. 
Finally, the thesis suggests that the decisions made by directors are very 
important to any cognitive study of Shakespeare’s plays. Looking at actors’ and 
directors’ decisions has been particularly useful for the discussions of performance in 
this thesis, as these types of decision making and interpretation are legible, important 
cognitive process at the heart of a play in production. John Lutterbie, Rhonda Blair, 
and similar scholars are already showing how fruitful it is when cognitive theorists are 
embedded in theatre companies, whether as actors, directors, or advisors.437 Blair 
occupies all three roles, and as her discussion of cognitive underload, invoked in 
chapter 4, shows, her cognitive-theoretical work usefully both informs and is 
informed by her practice on stage. This thesis suggests, then, that there are 
                                                
437 See for instance Lutterbie, Toward a General Theory of Acting, Blair, “Image and Action,” and 
Rhonda Blair, The Actor, Image and Action: Acting and Cognitive Neuroscience (London: Routledge, 
2008). 
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increasingly important relationships to be had between theatre practitioners and 
cognitive theorists. 
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